Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 21 › Conversation 021-007

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on US-China Relations and Taiwan

Monday, March 6, 1972 · 8:23 PM–8:28 PM ET · White House Telephone · 6 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation021-007 on Tape 21 (tape position 00:28:47–00:34:39)StartMonday, March 6, 1972 at 8:23 PMEndMonday, March 6, 1972 at 8:28 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 021-007 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 646310014 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed a report from New York regarding the People’s Republic of China's (PRC) reaction to recent U.S. public statements on Taiwan and Vietnam. While the PRC expressed concern, they maintained a diplomatic tone and approved the visit of a U.S. House delegation via a new, formal public channel. The two leaders decided to brief Secretary of State William P. Rogers on these developments while cautioning him to exercise greater discretion in his rhetoric to avoid jeopardizing future diplomatic progress.

Audio

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NARA Description

On March 6, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 8:23 pm to 8:28 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 021-007 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 21-7

Date: March 6, 1972
Time: 8:23 pm - 8:28 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.

     US-People’s Republic of China [PRC] relations

          -Report from New York
               -PRC reaction to US statements
                     -Taiwan, Republic of China
                     -Vietnam
                     -Possible forwarding of reaction to William P. Rogers
                     -Proposed message to PRC officials
                           -State Department
               -PRC approval of visit by delegation from the House of Representatives
                     -Use of public channel
               -PRC reaction to US statements
                     -Kissinger’s view
               -Proposed US response to PRC
                     -Statement on Vietnam
               -Edward R.G. Heath
                     -Taiwan
                           -Vietnam
               -Message from North Vietnam
                     -Le Duc Tho
                           -PRC
                                 -Soviets
               -Announcement of public channel
               -Kissinger’s previous conversation with Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
               -PRC reaction to US statements
                     -Previous statement by Hugh Scott
                           -State Department
                     -Possible forwarding of reaction to Rogers
          -Vietnam
               -Troop withdrawal announcement
                     -The President’s view
                     -Timing
          -Possible forwarding of PRC reaction to Rogers
               -State Department

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 1 minute of this recording (about 16% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Mr. President, I just got the report from New York.
It wasn't quite as bad as I feared it was on the same line.
They protested vigorously at some of the public statements.
They said if they continued, they'd have to do something.
Which ones did they not?
Primarily the Taiwan-Vietnam list.
They did not attack the Taiwan, what we said about Taiwan, the Dutch.
They just said that we knew they'd stayed in their position.
And they had told us that we could keep...
They said they were giving it as an oral note because they didn't want to create difficulties.
Why don't you... You know, remember I told you on Thursday that
reported this to me that I'd like to send a message to them, but not the same attention that the State Department said.
Yeah, well, their problem is the public position they've made.
Yeah, I understand.
But they did it in a most gentlemanly way, and they wrapped it up in some good news.
They said they approved the House people, but they wanted to make very sure we wouldn't announce it, and that we should submit the thing in the formal public channel.
In the formal channel that we were going to set up,
And then the answer would come back officially from them.
But they could tell you personally, since you were personally interested.
Then they'd handle it very discreetly.
That they would approve it.
No, actually, it was the most gentlemanly, and it shows their interest in it.
They said they didn't want to make a record of their protest, and therefore they asked their ambassador to do it already.
But they wanted to point out to you.
Why don't you, do you think we owe them a message, though, to say the statement on Vietnam?
should be ignored, et cetera.
But you remember, he said to you when he left that rather keep your troops on Taiwan than think it would be a time to remember.
He said you're not in a hurry.
And he reminded you of that.
But on the other hand, he's not making a public record of it.
He's in a little dark.
And we're not going public.
There may not be a relationship between you and the other side.
I think, Mr. President, what happened was that there is a relationship, I think, for this reason.
It may not be what we said publicly last week so much, but they must have asked for clearance for Li Daxiu to come through China.
And the Chinese may have said, good God, you can't do that now.
That's soon, that's soon.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
You see?
and make us vulnerable to the rush.
And I think the public statement last week may have added 10% or 20% to that.
But generally, they approved also that we announce this Friday what the public channel is.
They're playing the game.
No, what's striking is
Well, the point is, though, that we owe them one.
They didn't, as I expected, they didn't mention Scott.
Well, can we pass this to Roger?
Yeah, I think we should.
Or do you think you should?
Yeah, I think so.
Ron would say that we got this message, expressed concern about tying it that way.
That's the way to get that across without giving it a memorandum.
Right.
How would that be?
Right.
I can put it by telling him also that they agreed to the challenge.
Yeah.
Good.
That's good.
Yeah.
So they did it in the most contributory form.
Well, from now on, he's going to read, but you tell Rogers how important it is not to watch the film.
But he's really got to watch it.
I think it contributed to the other delay.
Right.
But I think they had an additional reason just not to have it that low.
Right, right.
But that other thing will come in handy, and I think it matters.
Well, as a matter of fact, we may need something in April.
Well, we must, however, make another troop withdrawal announcement before then, no matter what is wrong.
I have no intention to.
Well, it happens before it's time.
Well, we'll just make it a little late this time.
I think we should.
Maybe just do it one time, another time.
We'd make it about one.
When do we, when do we, when are we going to make it, April 15th?
Yeah.
why don't we just say that on the 15th or just don't say anything yeah we have another announcement because we are not tied to the 15th we've we've said before the first of may as always
That's going to be all right.
But I think we get into trouble if we do another factor.
Good.
Good.
Well, that's fine.
Good.
So it's a disappointment on the other side.
Yeah.
I think we got away better than I thought we would.
Right.
All right.

Also recorded on March 6, 1972

  • 021-003 4:13 PM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:13 pm and 7:14 pm.
  • 678-005 5:05 PM · 8 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:05 pm to 5:10 pm.
  • 678-006 5:10 PM · 52 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 5:10 pm and 5:15 pm.
  • 678-007 5:15 PM · 1 hr 39 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:15 pm to 6:59 pm.
  • 678-008 6:59 PM · 26 sec — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House on an unknown date, sometime between 6:59 pm on March 6, 1972 and 7:54 am on March 7, 1972.
  • 021-004 7:14 PM · 45 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 7:14 pm to 7:15 pm.
  • 021-005 7:15 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:15 pm and 7:36 pm.
  • 021-006 7:36 PM · 26 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone from 7:36 pm to 8:02 pm.

All 36 conversations from March 6, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 021-007, March 6, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 646310014). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/021-007 (accessed November 4, 2026).