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Conversation 032-011

TapeTape 32StartTuesday, October 24, 1972 at 12:10 AMEndTuesday, October 24, 1972 at 12:17 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Rogers, William P.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon briefed Secretary of State William P. Rogers on recent negotiations with North Vietnam following his return from New York and a meeting with Henry Kissinger. The discussion focused on the extreme paranoia and recalcitrance of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, who had accused the U.S. of conspiring against his administration. Nixon emphasized that securing a viable peace settlement was a long-term strategic necessity for U.S. foreign policy—not a campaign-driven deadline—and urged Rogers to remain calm in upcoming meetings to prevent the collapse of the negotiations.

Vietnam WarNguyen Van ThieuHenry KissingerPeace negotiationsForeign policyWilliam P. Rogers
AudioNARA Description

On October 24, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers talked on the telephone from 12:10 am to 12:17 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 032-011 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 032-011

Date: October 24, 1972
Time: 12:10 am and 12:17 am
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with William P. Rogers.

        The President's return from New York
            -Previous meeting with Henry A. Kissinger

        Vietnam
            -Forthcoming meeting with Kissinger and Rogers
                 -Time
            -Settlement
                 -Information from Kissinger and Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                 -Nguyen Van Thieu
                      -Paranoia
                 -1972 election
                      -Importance compared with US efforts in Vietnam
                          -Kissinger, Haig

                  -US conditions
                      -The President’s view
                           -1972 election
                  -Kissinger
                      -Attitude
                  -Thieu’s response
                      -Accusations
                           -US conspiracy with the People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                           -The President’s manipulation of the US press
                           -William H. Sullivan’s activities in Saigon
                           -The President’s view
                      -US response
                      -Meeting with Kissinger
                      -Changes in terms
                           -Submission to North Vietnam
                  -Negotiations
                      -Meeting in Paris
                  -North Vietnamese message
                  -North Vietnamese position
                      -Need for a settlement
                      -North Vietnamese concessions
                           -North Vietnamese prisoners of war [POWs]
                           -Cambodia
                           -Laos
                  -Sullivan
                      -Knowledge
                  -US position
                      -The President’s view
                           -Thieu
                  -Thieu’s confidence in Ellsworth F. Bunker
                  -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.’s efforts with Thieu
                  -Bunker’s and Wendall Wyatt’s view
                      -North Vietnamese concession
                           -May 8, 1972
                      -US position

******************************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 12/19/2017.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[032-011-w001]
[Duration: 1m 1s]

       1972 Campaign
             -New York trip
                   -Motorcade
                           -Size of crowd
                   -Itinerary
                           -Eastchester, White Plans
                   -Rallies
                           -Nassau, Suffolk
             -New York Daily News poll
                   -Release
                           -Nelson A. Rockefeller
                   -New York state figures
                           -Point spread

******************************************************************************

        Vietnam
            -Settlement
                 -Thieu’s position
                     -Kissinger’s response
                 -US position
                     -Stakes
                          -Viability of Thieu and South Vietnam
                              -US sacrifice in Vietnam War
                              -Possibility of communist takeover
                          -US foreign policy
                              -South Korea
                              -Thailand
                              -Japan
                              -Europe
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Secretary Rogers.
Hope I didn't get you out of bed.
No, not a bit.
I just got in from New York a few minutes ago, and I saw Henry for about 15, 20 minutes is all.
He's pretty tired, but I told him to sleep in.
I told him we'd put the meeting till 11, but he said he'd be ready at 10, so he'll come in.
In essence, there's nothing that he hasn't
that you don't have through Hague and that we've talked about.
The real problem is that, of course, is that Q is really paranoid at the present time and we've got to keep our heads and Henry realizes this and not flush him because it isn't the election, it's the question of losing everything we fought for.
But the main point when we're talking tomorrow and on
Henry is, I think, on salvo on this, and that Hague feels strongly about.
I emphasize, I said, Henry, I told him before he went, I said, the election is not a consideration.
We're not going to have an election deadline.
If we can get a better agreement afterwards, if we can have a chance to get Chu to go afterwards, let's do it.
So if you would sort of lean on that point, I think it would be helpful.
And also, on the point that just do the right thing, that's all we're trying to do.
But he's in good...
he's in he's much calmer than he was but you know he it must be pretty rugged because god i'm going to let him tell you he tried to give me a little what to christ he said we plot it with the chinese and even inferred that i'd build up the american press against him and that
Sullivan and others were around trying to stir up his enemies in Saigon.
Bullshit.
Pure bullshit.
You've got to be careful not to get too mad at them, though.
We know that.
On the other hand, Henry had a second meeting with him and said, would you sue them?
He says, look, we'll take all your changes back.
There are 21 changes and we'll submit them to them.
I told Henry that I didn't, he ought to try to, we haven't heard from the North Vietnamese.
It was a pretty
sort of a nasty message today and so forth.
But I said, now look, that the main thing is to have his next meeting in Paris about Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.
That buys us the time.
You said we got a nasty message from him?
Well, I think it's the one that you know about.
When I say nasty, they just...
indicated their disturbance that we were unable to work it out, you know, what we would expect.
But we've got them in a little spot, too.
They want to blow it with us, we'll blow it with them.
And I think they need the peace as much as, frankly,
As we want it.
Let's put it that way.
We won't need it.
I think they do.
Otherwise, they wouldn't have gone this far.
They wouldn't have gone.
And they've made this concession.
They've allowed the prisoners now, their prisoners, to stay in the jails.
The Cambodia concession allows concession.
Jesus, it's just something.
Well, anyway, I think Sullivan is...
aware of everything and i uh i mean he was there for most for most of this i guess in any event just uh but my line is play it cool don't get mad at you don't get mad anybody else keep everybody cool and then and then maybe time will heal a little bit right i hope one of the problems bill is that uh
But Bunker's lost his confidence.
It isn't Bunker's fault.
Bunker, you know what I mean?
The fellow's getting suspicious of everybody.
Abrams made a hell of a good pitch and made no dent.
So we'll see what you're dealing with.
That's tough.
Incidentally, Henry said he showed the agreement to Wyatt and to Bunker.
They both say it's a
It's really, it's a cave-in.
It's everything we asked for made.
Right.
Which is the point you made, you know.
Well, no doubt about it.
But that's why it puts us on the spot, really.
Yeah, if they blow.
If they blow, because really it's our proposal.
Well, I think we can hold it.
Let's hope for the best.
Okay.
And Henry isn't pissed off at two in the sense of being irrational about it.
He was from the first mission.
But now he realizes that, as I said to him, I said, look, what's going to happen if he goes?
I said the whole thing would come to pieces and 55,000 would have died for nothing.
I said, we have got to do the best we can to save this damn place.
And I really feel that.
I just feel it.
We're being watched now by, I mean, it has nothing to do with election, it has nothing to do with American opinion and the rest who would like to get out and be done with it.
God damn it, if we lose 55,000 and the whole place goes communism, we'll never forgive ourselves.
Exactly.
And, of course, foreign policy shot to hell.
Well, yeah, because it would hurt the Koreans, it would hurt the, I mean, Koreans would worry about us, the Thais, the Japanese, let alone even the Europeans, despite all their whining.
Exactly.
Okay.
Fine, thank you, Mr. President.
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