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Conversation 033-089

TapeTape 33StartSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:02 PMEndSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:08 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations, specifically addressing concerns that the South Vietnamese government was attempting to delay or obstruct the process. Kissinger reported that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was encountering resistance from South Vietnamese officials, but the pair agreed that the U.S. could not delay the Paris negotiations or risk an open break with Saigon at this stage. Nixon instructed Kissinger to maintain a firm stance and finalize the best possible agreement, opting to manage the South Vietnamese response after the terms in Paris were settled.

Vietnam WarParis Peace AccordsHenry KissingerEllsworth BunkerNguyen Van ThieuSouth VietnamForeign policy
AudioNARA Description

On November 18, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 12:02 pm to 12:08 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 033-089 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 33-89

Date: November 18, 1972
Time: 12:02 pm - 12:08 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.

       Kissinger's location
             -Washington, DC

       President's schedule
             -Dictation

       David Ben-Gurion
            -Letter to the President
                  -Sense of history
                  -Vietnam
                  -The President's People’s Republic of China [PRC] trip
            -Acquaintance with Kissinger

       John J. McCloy
             -Letter to the President
                   -Comparison with Abraham Lincoln
                          -Civil War
                          -Doves

       Vietnam negotiations
            -South Vietnamese response
                 -Telephone call from Ellsworth F. Bunker
                        -Message
                 -US response
                                            - 92 -

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. June-07)

                                                                 Conversation No. 33-89 (cont’d)

                 -Memorandum to Bunker
                        -Objection to settlement agreement
                               -William H. Sullivan
                 -Presidential response
                        -Possible letter
                 -Paris
                        -Settlement agreement text
                 -Bunker
                 -Negotiations
                        -Delay
                 -Hanoi
                 -Nguyen Van Thieu's Options
          -Settlement agreement
                 -US options
                        -Bilateral action
                 -Cease-fire
                        -Laos, Cambodia
                 -South Vietnam’s bargaining position
                        -Kissinger’s forthcoming trip to Paris
                               -Announcement
                        -Bunker's response
          -Cambodia


*****************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration: 3s ]
[Subject: Cambodia]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
*****************************************************************

                 -Norodom Sihanouk
                      -Relations with North Vietnamese
                      -Comment to Algerian ambassador
                            -Soviet Union
          -Settlement agreement
          -Alexander M. Haig, Jr's position on South Vietnam
                                             - 93 -

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. June-07)

                                                            Conversation No. 33-89 (cont’d)

             -South Vietnamese position
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Mr. President, I have Dr. Kissinger calling you now.
Fine.
Thank you.
President on the line, sir.
Hi, Henry.
Mr. President, you in New York or Washington?
No, I'm here.
Oh, fine, fine.
I'm just back dictating about scores of letters to my friends.
Boy, I've told you, nobody knows after an election how much you've got to do on that.
I've got to work that in in my spare time.
But I had to come down here to finish off a lot of them.
I had a very nice letter from Ben Gurion, you know.
Oh, isn't that nice?
I wrote him a note, and he, with his great sense of history, hell, he didn't talk about Vietnam or the other thing.
He said the greatest moment was China.
And he said, because by that you may help to bring about the day when the peoples of the world can—well, he didn't put it this way.
I did.
People of the world can be friends and so forth, you know.
But I mean, with that
But the old man's like an Old Testament prophet.
Do you know him?
Yes, yes.
He's a remarkable man.
Yeah.
Yes, I've met him.
Go ahead.
What do you have?
We've also had a really very warm letter, which I'm sending to you from McCloy.
Oh, yeah.
Which compares what you went through with what Lincoln went through during the Civil War.
And they are a version of the Dove.
So I've sent it over to you.
Uh-huh.
And you might want to take a look on it.
What I wanted to mention and check with you is, we had a phone call from Bunker, we haven't had the actual message yet, saying that now apparently the South Vietnamese are beginning to kick over the traces again.
Oh, Christ.
And I believe that we just have to continue now and get the best agreement we can, and then face them with it afterwards.
How are they kicking it over?
Well, they've apparently submitted a memorandum to him, which he just said the news is not good, and their ambassador here has also raised some questions with Sullivan.
It's their old pattern.
What they always do is they first read what you give them, then they raise a few technical objections, and then they just keep escalating it.
Well, shall I send him another letter?
No, I think we now have to wait, Mr. President, until we see at least what's going to happen in Paris.
And once we have the text of an agreement in Paris, we'll have a new situation.
So Bunker says that they're kicking over the traces and just being unreasonable as hell.
Is that it, Curt?
That seems to be the case.
But we can't delay the negotiation, and we can't tell Hanoi that we're having trouble.
No, sir.
We're going to play it like an accordion.
All right.
When you really come down to it, though, I just can't see how Chew's got any other choice.
God damn it.
We've told him we're doing everything we can, and that's going to be it.
But on the other hand, the idea of just making a bilateral thing, Henry, is...
It's repugnant.
It's repugnant because we lose everything we've done.
You know what I mean?
People said we could have done that years ago.
Well, if we can get a ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia, and we can, of course, say we've put them in a position where they can defend themselves.
But it's going to be a miserable exercise.
Well, it may not be.
You just can't tell.
We do it bilaterally.
This may be bargaining on their part, knowing that you're going to Paris.
Basically, I really don't know where the hell they're going to go.
And they're still making all the preparations as if there will be a ceasefire.
Right.
I know, sir.
But I just wanted to check with you whether it is in accord with your...
your views that we proceed negotiating.
We can't wait any longer for coordinating.
Well, what would be the choice otherwise?
I mean, you wouldn't go?
That's right, and ask for another delay, but I think that's almost impossible.
Well, you couldn't do that.
I mean, not after all, but I would simply go—you mean they—don't you really think they're trying to strengthen the bargaining position before you go to Paris, isn't it?
Or— I think that's one possibility, that they're just trying to prove that if they're going to cave, they're going to do it afterwards, not before.
And probably that they figure since they'll get less than what they agreed to, they better ask for more.
Well, I think you tell Bunker to play it damn tough.
He is, isn't he?
Oh, yeah.
In which Shianook says that, uh,
his interests were completely sold out by the North Vietnamese.
He said this to the Algerian ambassador.
It was one of the most shocking examples.
And it's an example of U.S.-Soviet pressure, and that it's the Soviets who pressed the North Vietnamese into yielding.
Well, go right ahead on the same track.
Do the very best that you can.
Haig has no doubts about going ahead now, does he?
Oh, no.
No, no.
He's completely with it.
And feels that we have to do it.
Haig is against an open break with them before the negotiation, as I am.
Oh, absolutely.
Yeah, no.
Go negotiate now.
When they kick over the treasurer, they're making public statements.
No.
No, no.
This is a private communication.
Yeah, yeah.
All right.
Just go ahead.
Do the very best you can.
Get the very best agreement you can.
That's all right.
Okay.
Okay.
Fine, Henry.
Fine.
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