Nixon, National Security Council & Laird on Vietnam War and Military Strategy

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They've got one movie theater at tax rate.

They've got a tax rate of $1,500 on a $20,000 house.

And the whole city is crying right now because they've tied up a bunch of other laws.

They've tied up all their people for it, apparently.

Unbelievable what people do, the services people do when they move in into these streets.

The elected officials are going right up the wall.

Can you do anything?

I've been the one head of New Jersey, New Jersey City, and I've been a waste of money.

But there are good parts of Jersey on the right, John.

Yes, sir.

That's right.

Yes, sir.

very well received by the people of the United States.

But I think it's on the environment they had their first in the country.

I mean, they can't be a damn idiot because they've been on the ground.

Beyond the law enforcement area, they can really hit you around.

We have this meeting for purposes of one subject, which is this question.

I thought it would be well to pull it all together at this time to see where we stand.

But, uh, in terms of responding to the actions over the next, uh, month, uh, three months before that he threw the drive, uh, the, uh, the, the intelligence authority has a,

Well, I was trying to say not a divergence, but there's a queen of views on this, as there always is, as to what to expect.

But they all agree that the enemy at once ends in a pretty good spot.

So I think we would start with the intelligence analysis of health and the health and the health and the health and the health and the health and the health

Thank you.

I think they're going to do their best for this community, although this is where Vietnamization is probably going to have some of its best impact, and that is that the Viet Cong apparatus inside South Vietnam has never been before, so their capacity to mount these Sapper tanks is thereby weak.

I think that's important to point out, because they've had about three of those attacks in the last 22-day period.

If you take the similar 22-day period before 10-68, you'll find that the number of attacks during that period was 33.

So it's a ratio of 3 to 33 if you compare the same 22-day period.

And I think it ends because of the security that has been associated in itself.

It's made these accurate tags less prevalent during this 22-day period.

And if you compare that same period to 68...

Is there artillery five yards, five miles of range greater than the Soviet means?

Does that mean the Russian artillery is five miles?

We have bigger guns now than we've had before.

We have them there with all the money we've been putting in.

Why would we do that?

Is there some reason?

No, we have our, excuse me, we have our artillery that size.

Yes, we have the South Vietnamese and military.

Military region one.

Military region one, the South Vietnamese have the hundred and seventy-five millimeter.

Is that as much as you've got to move around?

It's very difficult to move around.

It's just maneuverability.

There's any possibility of a South Vietnamese

initiative on the North Vietnamese troops while they're maneuvering around preparing for this assault.

In other words, I would assume there are not any fixed positions of defense and they may be vulnerable.

Well, they could hit it before they're ready to jump off.

South Vietnamese have been very active until a whole month ago.

put out orders to all his friends to get on the offensive, clean up, fight again.

They've been very, very happy.

And they've been successful as well, I think, recently.

So, yeah, it's happened.

Had an awful lot of contact with them.

A lot of small actions going on all the time.

Edwin Moore's going to cover that in his briefing, but the point that I think that we should bear in mind is that, it's true, we had the 175s on the military, 3-1.

But if I was on the ground, the A1 coming in with a full load or the B52 coming in with a full load makes a 130 look like peanuts.

And you want to put yourself in the position of what we've done with those A1s, too, and the kind of weapons that the South Vietnamese were flying just this last week with their A1s and the missions that they flew right in that trail area.

Now, I don't want to discount how effective they were because we're using all sorts of intelligence.

And the South Vietnamese were flying those flights.

And I'm sure we're hitting things there.

I'm not sure up in North Laos.

But I'm sure with this new all-source intelligence we're getting that we are doing some business.

But I think Michael Morris is going to cover that in his book.

And we might as well just open it up and get a plan in place.

And we'll see.

Mr. President, I'm going to speak to Laos first.

As I said, the military situation in Laos, as you know, most of the detentions during the recent weeks have been directed to Long Cane, which is a bank house in the headquarters.

And it was kicked off when the North Vietnamese moved across the Plain Yards and then proceeded with their attack on Long Cane.

It was here that they used a 130-millimeter gun.

They had 16.

We find out that 8 of them have been destroyed and 4 are in reserve.

And we've also had reports that the Romanian guns have been damaged.

As a fact of the matter, they haven't been built.

One thing, there will be a lifelong change, except three rounds were made about a week ago.

So they have not been in fire recently.

down in front of the main yards, closer to Lockheed Adams.

And that's possibly for the purpose of trying to move these guns.

But I said at one time that these guns aren't very mobile even.

And so they have a difficulty moving them around.

And once they're in place, they are pretty well fixed.

The 155-millimeter gun that we have, the Howison,

is much more ore can be moved by helos, and actually they can be used more effectively in that kind of terrain.

As the same question stands now, the Highway 7, which goes across while and intersects with Highway 33, which runs north and south, has been occupied by the North Vietnamese, and they are moving forces toward Blanc-Provence, the north, and some down to the south.

The problem now will be that they were able to move all the way west of Blanc-Gueing.

provide a case before they have to move in that direction.

So far they haven't done that.

We're expecting them to make a heavy attack on the long game any minute because we get indications that they are assembling the supplies and

because that operation is being handled by .

We are primarily involved with respect to the .

We haven't been giving them adequate amount of support, and we haven't been communicating any of this, indicating that the troops are having some of the challenges, that they are tired, that in some cases they're complaining about lack of supplies, and they don't want to fight.

That's from an isolated unit, of course, that's surrounding Longtang.

The bank file has captured the Skyline bridge and the demolished depot in that area.

Now further south, along the DMC, the road extended from the DMC Highway 9 goes all the way across and here comes the

and North Beach means it moves to the westward for the purpose of protecting AOC.

And the same thing with Keynes and involving Fat Coat.

So I would say that what they're trying to do at the outset is, one, destroy bank houses, and secondly, control all the levels used to highway 15, which runs generally in this direction, for the express purpose of putting themselves in a strong position politically and at the same time

as you recall last fall the campbell is uh attended what they call a 10-lock two-off

a large number of forces, and the purpose was to open Highway 6 all the way from Phnom Penh up to Thailand.

Here they were in kind of the night vision, which had been for some time over on the eastern side of the river, Mekong River, moved over, and there was quite a bit of fighting

The result was that about the 20 of the 63 battalions that the capability had fought and operated were temporarily infested.

They're now rebuilding them.

They have deployed that forces along Highway 6 and are currently in a strong position there.

In addition to that, the North Vietnamese have always had one

and they use that pavement to enter the Highway 4, which comes up from Cinnamonville, the C4, up to North Kent.

At the moment, Highway 4 is open.

Convoys are running regularly.

In addition to that, the convoys are running up to North Kent from along Highway 2, and the mainline road convoy, the first one that the Campbellians have deployed themselves, just arrived in North Kent this week.

It's planned that in the future that the Campbell Air Force will escort all of the convoys from the south-eastern border to North Canada.

Recently, in connection with the overall movement of forces, which I'm going to talk about in more detail in a second, the north-eastern east had moved the 273rd Regiment, the independent regiment, down to Stong Creek.

And last year, they moved the 52nd Regiment to the same place,

and has often participated down here in the innovation of these roads that lead up from the sea to North Kent.

Just what they're going to do this year, we have this year, we are watching it very carefully.

Now, east of the river, north of here, we still have the same three divisions.

That's the Wimbledon and the Fontaine operation of the South Beach Bay.

The name of the fifth, the seventh, and the ninth.

Hold it down.

uh the reserve those are particularly reserved for the of the southeast beach area and uh in addition to making them to hold these reserves here and at the same time support the uh uh local forces in their uh their own bank actions and arrests and so forth however these three

and so far we do not feel that they have been totally refurbished and re-equipped and re-manned.

In other words, they're not up in any sense to full strength.

That's right.

They are arrested in the sense that the south-eastern military with their forces are about three weeks ago in anticipation of these activities that are about to take place.

And the south-eastern military forces that were deployed against these three divisions are now in full back-end detainment process, right in anticipation of this activity that we think was the dark of our air strikes in this period.

Yes, sir, the number of kills in this particular area primarily by anti-frags during the night was about 910.

We think that's from our area.

Yes, sir, and the southeast.

The southeast was quite heavy.

As a matter of fact, we've been trying to get them to do all this action

as well as acting inside South Vietnam, so our forces would be free to go up into the country.

I was really caught about three months ago.

I didn't get it.

This thing was coming along, and we should be sure to step up airstrikes in that area.

Now, that's been done.

That is correct, and that was done in Indonesia.

And they have no requirements for airstrikes in Cambodia that have been fired either by the South Vietnamese or the U.S. forces.

If you'd like a listing of the increases, I can give them to you, Mr. President.

The other reason I raised this question is that, as you know, it has been raised quite often in the press and other places as to whether or not we were providing adequate air support during our courses.

Do you believe we have?

Well, I believe we've answered every request, and we haven't been able to do it in the last three years.

And we try to, I mean, they're experienced.

We try to anticipate what things we would ask and we would request.

You're satisfied with what we've done here?

I'm satisfied with what we've done in the area, not only here, but also in North Laos.

You're satisfied with what we're doing in North Laos?

Yes, as a matter of fact, the long hang didn't fall, it was there.

As clear as that.

They're not good for that.

It was the Viscons, B-52s.

In B-52s, Mr. President, in the last 15 days, we've put 3,500 tons of stuff in B-52s just in that one area.

And the total amount of all ammunition

From North Vietnam into North Laos, it's estimated 710 tons, all in.

Well, the P-52 is the last P-52 with 3,500 tons in it.

I'm not sure about the targeting.

I'm not sure because we don't have... You don't have on the ground.

Right.

In North, no, we have better targeting in Cambodia, and we have better targeting on the Ho Chi Minh trip.

What about the targeting data?

You can't talk to that?

No, sir, but I must say it's been helpful after all that, after the exercise, and with the target boxes and all that, good at least accomplishin' the job.

The man that's on lately had some comments from the... No, can I ask one other question?

No, we didn't get to do it yet, to be honest.

Well, the first week of the outbreak is a long time ago.

It was not by enemy.

I know the Philippines.

You're correct.

What about the...

Yes.

is the attack land map, that is, the F-4s that have destroyed the 130-mil-meter weapon.

I'll give you a 10-point target with a long bomb.

The F-4s have been long game because of the range of the attack.

They've been used by the Air Force.

But you're flying from carriers as well as from the ground in here.

Yes, sir.

I'm going to tell that to the Secretary of the President.

While I'm still on the subject of Cambodia, I should point out that today the South East and East are conducting cross-border operations in these three places with about 2,000 men.

And just stopping infiltration and stopping to reinforce a unit down in a looming forest area.

I ask one question and perhaps the best of my comment upon it.

I indicated a couple of months ago that you might consider the possibility rather than just, you know, this kind of operation, some major action.

When you see the fact that the South Vietnamese ground forces are, in terms of numbers, three times stronger than the North Vietnamese, you see the fact that the South Vietnamese have air support and a navy in the North Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese have neither.

that they might consider the possibility of blundering the enemy's message by some action on their own.

Is that, as I understand it, the South Vietnamese have rejected that idea due to the fact that they want to be in place for the expected enemy attacks?

Yes, I think that's the case.

Yes, that's true.

Say what?

You're now in Cambodia.

Yes.

Here we sit and we see three divisions there.

We see this and the other thing.

Everybody's wearing one of the North Indian pieces.

Here the North Indian piece is one-third of the forces with a long supply trail with no Air Force.

I'm just trying to put it in terms of .

I follow on that, but that's the same thing that was going through my mind, except that modification is feasible or possible to consider an initiative on the part of the South Vietnamese, possibly on a reserve,

of the North Vietnamese in North Vietnam instead of in Cambodia, mainly looking at the propaganda effect of the South Indonesian nation in response to all this, where they actually go into North Vietnam where there's a large concentration reserve of troops or materiel and maybe a parachute operation is not going to happen.

Give the paper something to write about.

They considered it a kind of action plan.

I think that's one thing they might be able to do in small rates, but not anything on a large scale like Lansdowne, for example, last year.

They have views, I think, and I think we agree with them.

The defense against this sort of thing is better on that territory than just trying to move into Laos, which is a very difficult territory to fight in.

Well, they're military people, though, isn't it?

are more apt to be willing to do some of these things than the President.

So the President, when I discussed this matter with him, just to the very first, and as frankly as I could, you remember, on the operation and also on ratings to the North, went into these things in some detail with him.

He is a little reluctant.

He was reluctant at Lansdowne.

He was the person that put the hold on Lansdowne when really Obama up there would have gone a little further.

And John might do well to comment on that because he really feels that his primary responsibility is not to Cambodia.

He'll help Cambodia if it thinks it helps him.

Well, I think that's true.

I think he's not willing to risk the destruction of his armed forces.

That's the thing.

And this is why he didn't go further in life.

Given Napoleon's early years, the way in which he was

to avoid the destruction of your own forces is not to sit in place and get your ass beat off.

The way to avoid it is to go in with inferior forces and not count on the opposition.

I'm not getting into the strategy, but it seems to me that law and communication

no Air Force, no Navy, and here they all sit there and say, gee whiz, they're going to have an offensive.

Well, I wonder, I understand that you can't do anything that he will not approve, and he's been fine, and he's manned up brilliantly in this political thing and the rest, and I'm not suggesting that our people are going to throw, we aren't engaged in sex abuse in the ground, but...

I know the hell they're racist, but we discussed it.

The thing that I'm concerned about is that it's probably too late.

They're just not going to do it.

Isn't that right?

They're going to wait and take a blow.

Is that correct?

They're just going to take a blow.

The NFL's going to take the play.

They're just going to play the defense.

They are currently moving out through the whole area and trying to get them under fire before they get in position and so on.

702 is going to the ring.

I think I'll get to that in just a minute.

a month has just gone by, where they have moved into Base Area 701 and 702 following the B-52 attacks.

And this effort, though, has been primarily one of seeding some supplies.

They have made contact on occasion and have counted very large numbers of small B-52s killed by the air attacks.

I would like now to go into the movements that the, uh, Northeastern Union has made of that main force of groups, uh, during, uh, the last, uh, months, and the, the movements we think they're going with.

Uh, this is the DMC right here.

Actually, they had brought the 308th Division down from Hanoi to this end area.

And they did the same thing last year during Lampson 719.

And as a matter of fact, some of the offices of the 380th Division were, in fact, in Lounge.

So they have reinforced this area by making that movement.

Secondly, they have moved the 320th Division downhill

of the Highlands.

And it is a division that we think will be primarily involved in the strike on the Pleiku Frontier area up here in the B3 Front.

As of today, all elements of the 320th Division are either right on the southeast beach border, or at least they are east of Attacook, which is the publishing town right here.

That is the unit that we think will be used primarily in this anticipated operation here in the Highlands area.

Next, the 304th Division is being moved into

the uh western end of military region one uh in the east side area that's the division that's uh eventually during the dry season that moves into that area they're repeating the same pattern and i indicated the 324th division is moving down to base area 611 and the antelope out here this also is the pattern of their previous performance during the dry season

But in any event, they are all paying that which is a military reason one, and taking that position as military reason two, which will permit them or give them the capability of making this strike cost him.

Now, I'm going to talk just a minute about the strategic reserves that General Mann proposes to send out to these two regions.

But I can tell you that the situation, first the current situation, the combat strength in military region one shows that currently the North Vietnamese have 15,900 combat troops.

and the combat strength of the Saudi army is 22,775.

And if they move all these units that we anticipated against the military region one by mid-February, the North Asian army has a capability of 29,100, whereas if General Pence ends up just

which consists of a marine navigation that means South East Indies would have 30,371 in position in this particular area.

And the BC3 front today, inside South East Indies, 8,300 North East Indies and about 13,000 South East Indies.

The proposal here is to bring up the Airborne Division and this was in the B3 branch.

The North Beach means 16,000 and the South Beach means 23,000.

Laura Superior argued about 7,000 troops in that area and they have additional reserves that could be brought in if necessary.

As Jim pointed out, this division, the 12th regiment of the 3rd division, has moved down on Highway 19, which runs from the post over to the islands area, undoubtedly with the intention of interdicting any transportation that moves back and forth on that particular line.

This regiment stays here all the time.

It has not been moving back and forth to North Beach now.

So generally speaking, that is the situation we have.

We have these four artillery regiments just north of the DMC.

They have the 130mm gun.

During that time, 719, they did fire from Laos into the northern part of the military region.

One, they have not yet fired across the DMC with these 130mm guns, but they have them now, and there's no way they could do that if they chose to do so.

So that is the one we are faced with.

This will, of course, result in a significant drawdown in North Vietnam.

Currently they have 37,000.

These movements that seem to be underway with the intelligence community, things underway, will draw them down to 18,000 in the Pan Am and North Vietnam, from 37,000 down to 18,000 as they move down into this area.

Now we'll talk next about the infiltration arrivals, and these do not include, Mr. President, the regular units, the organized units like the 325 units of Phillips.

And again, I've simply shown a projection during the January-April, because that's primarily the time of the incident.

You'll see that the projection is about the same.

So far as the doors and the support portions are concerned, the interesting thing is the difference in the allocation of the distribution.

In other words, you see this tank, they've allocated 8,000 plus more to the B-3 front than they did previously.

Whereas before, there was 1,000 more that went into the solitary reason one.

and a few thousand more going into Cozum, which is the area down further south.

But this is another indicator that we just believe that the main development is going to take place in the B3 Front.

Because this is a .

You say that looking at the various balance of forces at the present time, that, I mean, the balance in terms of the battles and the report coming, a very major element that can change this from that is the fact that there will not be significant surprises.

It's pretty hard, but it's pretty well taken.

Yes, sir, I have a fascinating question.

It was surprising, when you went back to looking at the 60s, I do sometimes say that intelligence was very bad, but it wasn't quite as bad as some people now make up.

Well, I don't, I'm trying to say that, but I read all the newspapers.

It was a tiny question.

It was a lot of surprises.

It was a little bit of technology.

That's right.

I think that tiny thing was more of a surprise than the numbers did.

I think the numbers were fairly within the ballpark.

I have the numbers here that you estimated.

They're not too far off, the numbers, but the tiny thing was a surprise.

I'm not referring to the adults.

I'm referring to the fact that we haven't developed those drugs, but that they have more so long, which is pretty well known.

I don't quite know what's happening.

And we're getting more information from the South Vietnamese people.

And we're getting a few more defectors and capturing a few more people.

So we're having to make more progress in intelligence today than we had before.

If I may, with respect to the air activity, I'd show you two things, or three things, actually.

First, I wanted to show the difference in the deployment of the surface air missiles this year compared to last year.

four battalions in Gloucester.

We have struck these battalions and elements out of them, such as radars and fans and so on.

And I think that they are trying to move again to find another position.

They haven't been too active recently.

We're going ahead and right on in there with the B-52s, despite the fact that they are there.

The red shows the current deployments.

You can see that there's been not only an increase in total numbers south of 20 degrees, but there's also been an increase in the movement downtown.

In other words, there's one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight down in this area, whereas last year there were only two.

In other words, today we have the 30th attack overall south of 20, which does constitute an increase as well as a change in deployment.

Uh, in addition, there's been a significant increase in air activity in terms of major incursions from ball feed now into plants.

Uh, for instance, uh, we had, uh, here, uh, some, uh, uh, 53 and 9, making a total of, uh, 62.

Uh, these, uh,

since I told them.

And note that the majority of these incursions take place up to and off of the Settlement Pass 97, which leads into the Laos, which then is used for supporting the Long Cane area.

So,

This has meant that, generally, you had to supply a certain amount of escort and find a command air patrol in that area, which could be otherwise used for additional missions, strike patients and so on.

And when the makes come into the area,

It's necessary to move out, what we call a slow move, just as a matter of precaution so they don't get intercepted.

So this considerably stepped up activity here since October has affected the overall air effort to a certain degree in the sense that it has caused more defense, required more defenses, and secondly has generated some restraints on activity.

I'm showing you the location of the GCI sites in these triangles.

These are the sites that actually control these fighters when they are in a plow.

And I'm going to speak to that again in just a minute.

Out of interest is the effort we've put forward in what we call the command operations against the truck movements down through the OQM Trail.

You know, the North Phoenix has a total of about 22,000 to 24,000 trucks.

They have just, we understand, requested the Russians to give them another 5,000 trucks.

They keep about 4,000 at least of these trucks in the OQM Trail area.

We, on the other hand, have augmented our C-130 induction capability and have been going after these trucks.

Now, when you try to compare this deal with last year, there are several factors that should be taken into consideration.

One is the weather has been different across where they have been.

The operation got started somewhat later.

And two, we have had this case problem that I mentioned to you, which requires certain precautions with respect to protection of the aircraft that was involved in this truck shot.

But note that the overall

destroyed damage.

It is higher this year by about 300.

And the thing is that it went up rather sharply during the recent week, from the 22nd to the 28th of January.

we had 843 reported.

Another factor here is that we have video recordings of about 35% of these activities, so it's possible to analyze them much more accurately than we have been able to do in the past.

This is a feature in the C-130 gunship.

But you can see what's happening.

I would expect that the 7172's destruction rate would be

to increase the data we get in the February.

They've done a tremendous job, Mr. President, on this prediction, I think.

And the comparison of the throughput in 71 compared to 70 is extraordinary.

I think the throughput in 70 was about somewhere around 40%, 37, 38% was about 15% in 71.

How many wins have we lost in the mix?

We've lost one aircraft.

We're really, really, really a little goosey, aren't we, about having lost one?

No, sir.

That country's time for us is 21.

It's the same period of time.

So, I mean, we have not lost a lot of aircraft.

We're not concerned about the fighter aircraft, Mr. President.

We're concerned about the B-52s and the C-130s and its slow-moving aircraft.

The C-130s should be the main schedule of the B-52s.

Yes, we've had two vessels fired at the deep institutes and missed one tank.

Now, sometimes when they need to get in the area around the DMZ, of course, we will not help.

It's a great reply.

But we've taken extra precautions to make certain that none of the deep institutes were hit.

But I think that itself would be a kind of a psychological boost to the... What is the situation?

Oh, of course.

What is the situation with regard to the Pacific Basin?

Are many of these mix bases in the bin area?

Yes, let me show you the bin, sir.

There are today eight, sir, south of 20 degrees, seven in the Vicon Air Force, and one in Marmite.

They actually have three airfields that they can operate from, four airfields.

It's Don Boyd, Bennett, Vaughn Lang, and Bythoff.

This is a 20-degree, we just use that as a yardstick.

As I say, they have seven there and one there today.

And this is why most of the activity is up here east of Monk and Monk Highway 7.

What one of these airfields did we hit?

Did we get during the period just after Christmas to get the bid?

Yeah, so we have had in the last month or so, and I'm going to talk about that in just a minute, so these three, we have not yet had this one.

Those craters, so they can put them back.

Well, we don't want to hit the craters.

We don't want to hit the craters of every one of them.

We consider every make-up there a hostile make-up.

Okay.

Now, having observed all these moves and these activities, I'm going to have to repeat some of the things Mr. Howell said, but what are the enemy forces of action available to them, and what are the most likely actions that they will take in light of the deployments that they have now set up?

Well, what I have here is a consensus, I think, on the part of General Mapp, General Abrams, Admiral McKean, and those of us here in the Pentagon.

So there's no real disagreement on what they have the capability of doing and what they indicate that they intend to do.

The first is to conduct...

I should have already put this first.

We think this will be first.

A major offensive in Northwestern Military Region 2.

And it will be attacks from the Cambodian base areas or from the Laos area against isolated water camps and fossil fuel bases.

They have attacks against Kwaiku City and other objectives in the southern and central Kwaiku Province.

And even a division size sweep through the central and southern Khantung Province with objectives of capturing the city.

Now, we wouldn't think that they would intend to hold the city, but the psychological purposes, they would intend to occupy the city temporarily like they did Wade in 1968.

And this is being guarded against.

And then finally, we would expect them to have diversions in the

to Coastal Orleans, where they do have some forces, although minor.

So as far as military region one is concerned, we would think that that would be actually divided into two phases.

First, one which would start in February, which would be an attachment to Pond Cree and Tlalocan provinces.

That's in the northern part.

Here's where the LOC rejoins.

And then when the weather gets dry in March, the second phase was not clear constitute.

The tanks across the DMV was ready to mount a force into the low end.

That's in the eastern part of the northern military region 1.

If you recall, Mr. President, they have built this road across the DMZ and they do have a case on it.

They want to commit all their forces to move across the DMZ.

So far as military reasons three and four are concerned, we don't expect too much in those reasons other than we have a tax that adds to our common reserves.

Your authorities have been adequate.

All the airstrikes in the DMC area.

Yes, sir.

In the DMC area itself, the south of the median line.

We haven't been conducting aft tracks except to protect the reaction capacity.

What about the roads for being constructed?

In other words, as far as the roads for being constructed are for that line, you don't hit that?

We haven't hit the roads north of the median line.

We have hit the roads heavily south of the line.

I'm going to talk about these authorities, I believe, on the next chart, Mr. President.

I have a question.

Yes, sir.

Tom, on your previous chart, did you indicate that the pillars of Region 3 were far greater than they had been last year?

Oh, sorry.

I mean, just...

We isolated attacks against the outposts and district towns.

will try to maintain control of St. Lyle to ensure the LLC system, and they will maintain pressure on the nations in Cambodia.

As I mentioned once before, the activity of the 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions in Cambodia will be aimed at tying down the reserves in Military Region 3, thereby preventing them from being moved north.

And with that, it is now a very broad outline of what they intend to do.

I'd like to talk now about what we have done about this.

has put out a directive which incorporates these actions.

First, this was taking place, actually, it was the issue before Christmas.

He ordered intensified operations to disrupt and foil enemy plans.

This is primarily for the forces up in the military, even the 1 and 2.

He has made a huge plan for his chief

reserve and exportation of mobility capability.

And the plan is, in broad terms, is this, that the Marine Division will be sent to Military Region 1.

He's already sent two brigades, leaving one more brigade in reserve.

The Airborne Division will be sent to Military Region 2.

It is standing by now with the 1st Brigade

In addition to that, he has earmarked a brigade and an armed cavalry squadron in military Region 4, which can, within 20 miles, be moved up to the Saigon area in the event that there's a request for this force after the reserves are moved out.

Now, we have also taken action to ensure that as the air lift is available to quickly move these South Beach Reserves any place they are required in South Beach County.

He has taken another look at the defensive plans of all military regions.

He has made the technical effort to get the RF and the TEO in a state of increased vigilance.

And he has increased his air reconnaissance and his intelligence intercept capability.

And they have canceled all these forces between 4 and 21 February.

That's during his technical period.

At the same time, we have moved out on several portionary actions.

The first three I'm going to talk to you separately.

Additional airfarms have been granted.

We have developed plans for service out of air capabilities.

We have captured and viewed out of helicopter incidents.

Uh, we've planned to increase CVA-enabled gunpowder support.

We have allocated all of the CBU munitions that we have.

These are the small, uh, uh, anti-personnel-attacked weapons, Mr. President, that have been very effective recently.

We've said, we've made certain that all that we have in inventory is available for this operation.

We have developed a plan for strikes against the LOCs in Oimee, Manhattan.

I mentioned they had a lift augmentation.

And General Nablus talked about the security of our forces.

He has formed 28 teams.

He sent them to examine the defense plans and the alertness of every U.S. unit in Southeast Manhattan.

The overall reporting we've received so far is good.

All of our people are aware of the threat and they're not going to be surprised.

And in addition to that, we've developed plans to increase P-3 offshore patrols in the event that the seed infill question gets kept up during this crisis.

Now I'd like to talk about these first three, the air charges, the plans to develop the surge of air elements, and the availability of fuel pumps.

first aid and authorities.

I've left it here with the red dots.

This is what the O.A.

requested.

Next, the black square shows the authority he's been granted so far.

First, he asked for answer points for the Vietnam forces that might be in pursuit or conduct cross-border operations.

This has been given to him.

across the Laos and Cambodian borders.

He can use U.S. and S.S. to support the South Beach Beach if they conduct operations across the border.

Secondly, he asked for a bargain to release the census north of the PMDL.

Here's the floor.

We've only been supplying operating census south of the PMDL.

This will give us a readout on

the activity along the northern part of the DMZ, both lateral and vertical activity, and will, I think, provide more warning and prevent a better counteraction to be taken.

Next, we ask for authority to strike the TCI radars in North Beach Ham, directing the main fighters.

He was given authority to fire the anti-radar missiles, mainly the strike and the standing arm against these GCI sites when they walked on or when there was many activity and the GCI site was operated.

In addition to that, so far, he was not given authority to attack these radars whenever one was located, but rather we have

for this purpose, so that if it's directed from him, he can, in fact, do that.

How many, what are we talking about there, in terms of numbers and strikes?

No, that's what we said there.

That's a little different, Mr. President.

He knows that whenever they're using a directing mix-up in that particular area, he wouldn't hit it.

But I understand.

But the third he wants is to run to... Once he locates one, he wants to go get it when the weather permits regardless of main activity.

In other words, he does not want to wait for a protected reenactment situation.

How many would it require?

How many strikes?

Where?

Oh, well, he asked for authority for those south of Pointe, those fine, the fine sites, I believe.

Okay, I got it.

Well, we asked him to develop a plan, Mr. President, how many strikes it would take to do it, and we haven't gotten that plan back yet.

I guess we're not ready to do technical.

Well, look, there are three different takes that I'm going to talk about, and one is that...

If the radar lands on the air, then they can fire a strike against that radar.

The second is that while the radar is locked, they can also use other explosives that are not focused on the radar.

They do not depend on homing in on the radar.

The third is what he tasked with, namely to attack it.

outside the engagement, but even while the engagement's going on, he does not now have authority to use anything other than only... That's right.

Isn't that correct?

So, so that he would think that he was a liar, or he, he is asked for authority to strike regardless, regardless of his... What he finds is... That's what he finds.

Now, you've got to understand, Mr. President, one strike might not necessarily...

Although he may have been demoted to the White House, they would put him back in action.

So what do you look for then?

Any time you find one, you go... Now the second thing he was requested with respect to the same sentence.

As you know, he already had...

authority to fire the anti-regal missiles against the SAM sites.

And we've been doing this with increasing regularity as the SAM has increased.

He was advised that once the ground offensive starts, that this authority would be considered on a case-by-case basis, and we would go ahead and take the station plan for the one-time strike against Sam Sikes.

I should point out that we have authority today to strike those four sites in Laos, and we have struck the four sites, parts of them.

What they do is they dig a hole, and they move them around all the time.

And in fact, you may know where one is today, and it may not be that far.

Do I understand that, uh, what really affects that group of people?

Half of the enemy launches its massive attack.

that he then on a case-by-case basis has got to get an authority to obtain the signature?

Yes, that's what we know.

Well, what we've asked here is that we've asked Mr. President to come in with a plan and do it now, and that plan is to be submitted.

Well, I guess that's right.

I know that there's been some disagreement as to what you do down the road.

I don't think there's any disagreement.

Well, what I meant is that I just want to be sure that there's a clear understanding here as to the two different phases.

What do we do now?

What do we do when it starts now?

Without, of course, giving the measures and the people the...

and the right to start a nuclear war.

He wants to make sure offensive has begun.

The situation totally changes, in my opinion.

We're not gonna go through this crap of saying, well, we can't do two of these goddamn things.

It's not gonna be done that good.

I don't think there's any question.

I don't know.

There is.

That's exactly what we've been talking about both places.

If they start an offensive, we're not gonna go through this nonsense of saying, well, wait until that sandwich is and then we can knock it out.

That's what the argument's about.

We will have plans to strike these sites and these radars subject to this order.

Also, he requested permission to strike those land vehicles that I showed you.

Now here the argument is also...

So the question, what has been granted here already is to be done in case the case stages, right?

We have told him to increase his airfield requirements and to make sure that these requirements

supported with, uh, uh, he was attacked the enemy, and so we have been doing a series of, uh, operations in this area.

You've got all these .

Yes, sir.

Now, we have not attacked the, uh, ISAR, which is the one right up on the edge of the, uh, uh, 20-degree peril.

So we've attacked John Boyer, Ben, and 29.

And it's been very effective.

Usually what happens is they have one reconnaissance plane, two fighters protected against me, and eight attack planes.

And when the responsive plane goes over the airfield and it's shooting the late night fires, they're dumping their weapons on the, hopefully on base or on the support facilities of the airfield.

But here you have to better emphasize that this has to be done contagiously in order to make sure that the airfield is not restored to operation.

Go ahead.

Well, he's also been told that, again, that once the battle is joined, so to speak, that any advance south of 18, as the secretary-led just said, is hostile, and they can be attacked at any time, any at any point.

I should add to this that we have stationed two Taylor's cruisers.

Yes, we had one firing squad.

They're standing off, they're ready to fire.

Now, Mr. President, may I ask if the later discussion will bring out the objections to granting these authorities to be asked to?

That's right.

Let's take a look at that and see if it happens.

The last one is against, go ahead, logistics.

Yes, sir.

He asked for authority to strike stockpiles and transshipment points and conduct all-encompasses against trucks moving down the LOCs leading into Laos, mainly through the, primarily through the Vanguari and the Bajia Passes.

Is that it, sir?

Yes, sir.

It's top of 18 degrees.

Again, given the first chart.

Yeah, that's all right.

Well, again, it's 20 degrees.

Sure, it's right here.

And it's... That's...

But 60 miles, one more degree.

No, no, no, 75 miles, I was saying.

What's that?

20, 20.

Now let's look at the experience.

Yes, sir.

Here we hydro the concept of the plan and send it out to the field to get them to flesh it out in terms of the exact number of sorties, the exact number of deltation marks and so on.

And we have the plan available which would authorize the general agent to win these attacks on these logistics activities that have taken place feeding into plants.

Of course, the weather situation at this point will be... Well, there isn't one in February, so of course, it's about January or February that we found out that the worst part of the plan was taxes six days out of February that have 10,000 feet of our altitude for a period of...

three hours, and they have three days that have a period of six hours, whereas if you have 10,000 feet.

So, uh,

This is one of the reasons that General Abrams is asked to go when he has the opportunity, so that...

Whenever is the window?

Whenever is the window is what we're talking about, yes.

Now, I think General Mason would generally request... Other things that we should be doing now that is not included, because it seems to me that

Because of the importance of this new offensive, we ought to take every possible action.

I don't think we have anything to lose if American people don't understand all of this stuff.

It only seems to be the only question we have is what can we do to be effective?

And that brings up the point that the one airfield with the seven paces above the 18th parallel and the other airfields with the one pick and the one deck below which you have the authority.

I'd just like to make a comment about what we can do.

Because I think that's the important question, what we can do as far as the defense is concerned.

The offensive, I think, if it takes place, will be in the B-3 front.

I think that that's indicated by all of the activities, and that's where the attack will be made.

Now, we've got to concentrate on whether that attack, it seems to me, and do everything we possibly can with all of the air power we have, because this is much, it gives me, to me, it's a much greater advantage than any kind of artillery or anything else the other side can handle.

The activities in the Norris will not have anything to do with the B-3 activities.

because every bit of logistics support if the activities are going to take place in the next three weeks have already gone through these passes and it's already in place.

Anything that needs to come down to support that operation will be available until March or April.

So everything that for this attack that we're concerned about is in place and in need, including the people that are involved as far as the B3 front is concerned.

Now, as far as an attack may be in March or April, I think these logistics strikes should be authorized, and I hope that the contingency finance group gives the latitude to General Abrams to go three or four times for letting him pick the particular day that he goes based upon the weather conditions that exist.

I think it's better to give him either 24 or 48 hours, two or three times, that he can make the choice.

Because that's the most effective way to limit a possible offensive in the March and April period.

Because those would be the supplies to use in March and April, not the February offensive.

In that way, he can live with it as far as the country is concerned.

I think it's understandable in a short period, if you go for five, six, seven, or eight days in a row, there is a certain amount of political pressure that people get given a long period of time.

And I am sure that General Agents could be more effective with the use of his assets if he has the authority himself to go 24 or 48 hours in an arm.

in these areas to hit logistics.

Now, I don't want to mislead anybody at this table that it's not going to have an effect upon the A3 front offensive if it comes.

It will have an effect upon a possible future offensive that might come in April, May period.

But it takes at least that long.

Now, that's not true about Territory 1, but it is true about Territory 2 and then the Highlands area.

That stuff is already in place.

But you have a built-in restraint in terms of the weather.

Well, the weather is going to be lousy all month.

So this idea that we're going to have great weather up there is going to be the lousy weather.

The weather in December, January, and February is lousy, and it probably will be lousy into March.

The point I'm making is you're not going to have a seven-day good weather period at all.

We don't have to worry about weather events in the seven days.

What is the situation?

Let me come back to that DMZ.

The possibility of there moving in mass across the sanctuary they have with the lines drawn.

The authority, has he asked for authority to get above that locked down, the concrete roads up, for him to be?

That would be part of this position's plan.

That would be part of it?

Yes, sir.

He's not asked for that authority yet?

Yes, sir.

He said it's a hard thing to look at.

One pass area there goes through the upper part of the DMC and that is it.

And the road goes right parallel to the DMC.

That's one road.

How many roads have been built?

You said several roads have been built across the DMC.

And they'll come, they thought potentially might come down this road.

There are two roads, two roads being built, one major road and the start of another.

We want part of it, not the other part, Councilor.

Well, the road has not been used now, but we are, it goes into South Vietnam.

We are, presently, our bodies.

We want all of it south of the DMV office.

But it has not been used, and there hasn't been much to get there.

They just reconstructed it.

He wants authority to use that target area if there's a logistic buildup there.

He won't go up and just hit it if there is a logistic buildup.

But if there is a logistic buildup there, and he has a good weather window, and there are supplies there, he'd like to hit it.

Mr. President, it seems to me that you and the faculty, we got two weeks before the presentation began.

Uh, and I don't, I think the American people feel a threat that's gone so far down trying to work out a peaceful settlement.

They don't support it.

They really don't want anything for us to do.

It seems to me that if this offensive takes place, well, the president is going to be king.

And even if it's reasonably successful from this standpoint, there's going to be all kinds of second-guessings on it that we should, the president should seriously consider giving the military any authority that it wants.

In Greece, of course, not nuclear, but in anything else.

Because short of that, it seems to me this is the key fight.

It could well be.

It has to be the turning point in the whole battle.

So I would, what I was wondering about, in addition to what Ben O'Hare was asking for, are there other things that the military can do?

the president should consider and the authority that they should have to prevent this offensive order to deal with this.

In other words, is everything being done that can be done?

Or are there other things that we should be thinking about?

I'd like to expand on that.

I'd like to listen to what you said, really, and just said what I was going to say to some extent.

And that is this.

It seems that all the military preparations and the carefully defined limits of what can be done prior to any strike have pretty well been anticipated and explored.

The point I worry about is what happens to us after the strike, and I'm not talking about necessarily actions that are of grave military importance.

I'm talking about the psychology of the war and the fact that the North Vietnamese have now responded to not only the President's peace initiatives, but to his

three times or four times repeated warning that any escalation of war on their part that jeopardizes the success of our troops there will be responded to immediately in a very affirmative way.

So now it seems to me that

Military considerations aside, we have to look into psychology of what's going to take place in the United States the minute that they launch these attacks.

There's going to be a decry of the failure of Vietnamization, and we should have been out by now, and it's all lost.

And it only didn't overcome that as I see it.

It's something that should be very carefully planned now.

It represents a punch action by

the United States, with the South Vietnamese, in an area we've never gone.

And let them call it a widening of the war, but someplace where we can go in there and hit them in the gut real hard.

Maybe, I don't know what you think about doing something to High Palm Harbor or anything else.

I mean, maybe that's an unmentionable subject, but the point is that they've been warned three or four times not to do this.

They're gonna do it anyhow.

They're going to do it for political reasons more than military reasons, because they think they can drive us out through the pressure of public opinion.

And it seems to me that it's time, when they do it, the President having issued these warnings on four occasions, not to make them idle, but to move in there and hit them a good one in the gut somewhere they've never been touched before.

Mr. President, may I?

I think both from the standpoint of public utterances and actions over there, that a good part of it ought to precede your departure to the United States.

We ought to be preparing our own propaganda offensive now.

That you're going to China didn't precipitate all this, because this is the posture in which our enemies here are going to put it.

If you hadn't gone to China, they wouldn't have launched this offensive.

The propaganda offensive that ought to be launched here at home now is that this is another Tet.

Wes Moreland is the only man that I know of that really made a point of it.

But we ought to be saying it tomorrow, the next day, and the next day, long before people are conscious that you're leading on whatever day it is in February.

And so that when you do react, you're reacting to an offense.

And an offense is on their part that parallels what they did in the Tet Offensive in 1968.

There ought to be ties out against it.

They're prepared, they're going to do it, and so forth.

Otherwise, I think the American president, or any of the presidents, are going to frankly lay it to your door and say, well, you had a very despicable trip that wasn't happening.

Mr. President, I want to make a point here.

I think it's overlooked, and that is that I am confident that this will be a success as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned.

And I am confident that our program will hold.

Now, they're going to lose a battle or two.

But they're doing nothing differently than they did last year or the year before.

The numbers aren't about the same.

Now they're going into a different area.

They're going into the B Street front.

And they will conduct a battle there.

But let's not forget that we have done certain things in the last three years to build up these South Vietnamese.

to build up their capabilities.

And I don't believe that we're going to be in a position where the South Vietnamese are going to get such a bad bloody nose.

that it's going to be any kind of a defeat interpreted in that way here in the United States.

But now, if it looks like it then, doesn't that make a difference how successful it is?

It's very important, but as far as the B-3 front battle is concerned, we've got all the authorities we need for the B-3 front battle.

I'm concerned about the next battle, maybe on down the road in two or three months after we get back.

We've got everything in place to handle the B-3.

When I got back in November, I made the report to the President, and in that report I anticipated the B-3 front as the battle site.

And at that time I went to the Joint Chiefs and asked them to prepare the plans to defend on the B-3 front.

And we've been planning for this since November.

Now, everything that we have on the V-3 front is in place right now.

You can't do a hell of a lot more on the V-3 front.

We've got a surge capability on our 52s.

We have a surge capability on our tactical air.

We have a surge capability as far as our naval air is concerned.

And its presence, well, its presence is in China.

That could be the major area of concern.

uh now as far as the next offensive is concerned that's a different problem and that's why i believe that some standby authorities given as general abrams in the area of logistics support knocking out these particular areas i would limit those authorities to him to vote for a 24 48 hour grade but three or four times and he can do it

because then you can start the attack and you can announce when it is over.

He should choose the times when there are logistic builds up there so we can actually hit something, and you do have to have a good weather.

I think that that is needed and necessary.

That isn't going to help the problem while you're in China, necessarily, Mr. President.

I think that should be understood around the table.

because that battle is pretty well drawn, and if it comes...

But you have a week then, and that's only a week that we're there, so why is it...

But I just don't want people to get too panicky about the period of time that you're gone in China, because those particular

supplies and the combat personnel.

I think Dick would have to agree with that, that they're in place on that.

No, I can't understand.

All the supplies are in place, all the personnel are in place.

We obviously know that.

We have to know where they are.

And we're in.

Are we in the north?

What we're doing there with the B-52s and with the attack air right now, we've got the best all-source intelligence.

operation going on in the country.

We've never had in the whole history of this war.

And I think it would be well to explain to them exactly what we're doing as far as hitting in there right now.

You've got some good papers there.

Your comment doesn't, it's not inconsistent with us.

If we do what John suggested, I think we should.

Then if it doesn't come off or it's not successful, we can say, well, no, we anticipated it and we started against it, and that's why it was unsuccessful.

But I don't want to go in and around this table to think about any of those questions.

It has something to do with that fact that it will not.

And the problem that you have here

You know, there are a lot of people that get panicky around here each time that you go for four or five days.

I have to know.

I go down and I love to take the heat for this stuff.

I've always said, Mr. President, publicly and all, that I would recommend, I've never committed you, but I would recommend that we blast hell out of them, take them across the DMZ.

That's what we've said, that's true.

The point that I make is that you have been a period for back in China, the 20th of March.

The 20th of March.

There are always targets there.

The problem of hitting these targets is nothing will end well.

And so it won't be a matter of General Abrams discovering a supply buildup or something of this kind any time in the next three months.

There will be targets, and if we had the visibility, the fact that we had the visibility so they can strike these trucks, these moving trucks, these temporary stockpiles and so on, they would find productive targets any time that the weather was suitable.

And they have authority to strike.

And they have authority to do that.

If they have authority to do that, they have outside of North Vietnam.

Our group, we're discussing outside of North Vietnam.

That's right.

The authority we're discussing is an authority which would be strapped in below the 18th or maybe up to the 20th in those past areas to go after any logistic buildings.

We've gone after them before.

In the period, for example, in the five-day period?

No.

after Christmas, between Christmas and New Year's.

That was originally authorized as basically a two-day operation.

Weather was lousy, so they took it for two days and they extended it by, well actually it was four days in total, but we extended it for two more days.

But what we're talking about here is rather than having

rather than having these authorities that you get four days at a time, which each day escalates to a new story, is to have the authority, and the authority might be extended over a second, but as I understand it is, they want authorities over a 30-day period to get for 24 hours, whenever the weather is good.

In other words, crack.

That's what I like.

Rather than attempting on an ad hoc basis to say, well, now you can go for five days.

Well, that five days may be the lousiest sand weather there is, so you wouldn't want to go.

And also, the difficulty is that, again,

but it's continued over a period of time, unless there was a enormous propagation, you'd ask more of the problem.

On the other hand, if you follow through your intelligence reports, we're having correct protective reactions strikes every damn day right now.

You're getting things.

I understand, and I just want to be sure that that's being interpreted very, very broadly.

Well, I don't know if they can.

They can't interpret any.

I've gone out and talked to Tom and haven't been given them the same kind of broadest interpretation.

The thing is that there was a story appearing in the New York Times to the effect person.

that we ordered these strikes for no military reason, which was not true, because as you remember now, the U.S. came over and said, geez, look, we've got a hit now.

Right.

And because you were anticipating that they should be three bills under.

Right.

And that's what we were trying to get.

And the second point was that it was intended beyond the time it was useful for films of other reasons.

One of the reasons that you said it is because you said the weather was bad, right?

Yes, the weather was bad.

Tell us about the fact that you got it.

Very worthwhile.

Some people ask what could we do to bear out the indication that they've tried to go to the police.

A five-day strike got through to a pretty tough, and all of our interceptions have been done.

They were raised to do it.

But also against the infiltration by foot and bicycle, et cetera, that has been taking place that you settled out that I indicated at the beginning.

They are clear that in the base areas that they are going to use the wood fuels against the highlands have been laid on quite heavily due to these CPUs, which I mentioned to you as well as I think one of the PCP Institute's track would be about 130,000 cubic meters all at one time.

And we still have indications that the forces are moving into the B3 front.

So we've been working on those all right.

I think in answer to the Vice President's question, the authorities that General Abrams had requested would give him latitude to do something

that we haven't done before, of course, they think would require some action in all of the 20.

How many B-52s do we have for some time operating in this area?

47, sir.

How many do we have in the world?

450.

How far are we?

They only hold, some of them only do science.

How many?

Science.

How many?

Science.

What is the situation with regard to where the rest of those are?

How far away are some of them?

I mean, in Europe and other places.

One of the things is the company that currently operates Blue House in Thailand.

What I mean is if we wanted to supplement the four years.

Right now we're not finding as many B-50s.

as we could.

Now, General Abrams has the authority to search now.

He has chosen not to search at this particular time, but he can search now, and he could search for 30 days.

To a certain extent, yeah.

To a certain extent, though, I just want to be sure I understand where the real danger is.

It's the psyop.

I'm out.

Because you talk about saturation, you have to get everything that moves.

on there, you might get another four or five hundred.

And when we really come down to it, I think we have to face it, sure, that the South Vietnamese have taken some casualties, but their casualties are down this year compared to the last also.

You look at the North Vietnamese, it's not a lot of casualties.

But they're at least, when you look at the North Vietnamese casualties,

I think their numbers are probably exaggerated, but a great, great number of those will do our air operations great.

I don't want to be automated.

I'd be used to, say, Thailand.

Would that be helpful in detaining this?

Well, that would certainly broaden the field of development, particularly if we had a problem up in Los Angeles.

The problem is they push the number of people to put in Thailand for one thing, but we have to increase the number of people when they move out.

And in addition, we put in temporary duties.

We can move, Bill.

When I look at this, we can move 50 tons off the farm into Thailand.

to carry on the search now.

And he can't search now, but we're not at that point yet.

But we have the capabilities to take some of those aircraft and retrofit it in Guam.

You see, you have to retrofit your aircraft and take some military weapons into this type of body, which can be done.

But we have aircraft in Guam now that could be used in this particular case.

What about your carrier aircraft?

Could you bring some down from the Sea of Japan to supplement?

How many carriers do you have now operating on the pack air?

Currently, as this is a chart indication, we have available four operations.

5,000 of the South-East sorties a month.

The UNF was programmed for 6,700 and the Navy for 3,300.

That gives us a total of 15,000 tank escortees and 1,000 beach institutes, 33 a day.

Now,

In-country, we have a capability to assume we take certain actions.

For 60 to 90 days, it's 30, by increasing the number of zoos by a share up to 17,540, and searching the zoos to 12,000.

Now this 540 is a result of a plan I made which would move the aircraft from Clark Air Force Base in Philippines down to Thailand and give us a 18-minute over the A-1s, A-1s over the Air Force.

Now for 30 days where you would make an all-out effort, but of course subsequent to the 30 days you'd have to drop down considerably.

So we have a gate building of about this many.

with the three carriers there.

I don't have any instructions, but none of those carriers are going off to Hong Kong.

Where are those?

You've got three carriers there in the area now.

How many other carriers?

How many are over in Hawaii and others?

Could you get three more carriers out there, for example, this thing?

The next one that we've got on standby is the Kitty Hawk.

And she could, I want to give her 10 days to get out.

She could move out and be out there in the end of the month.

Or the end of this month.

The end of this month.

Yes.

The Kitty Hawk.

Where's the Kitty Hawk now?

The Kitty Hawk is on the west coast.

That was before.

No.

What about the one that's up there around Korea?

No, so we have all three of them.

So if you have, you could, I guess kind of... Yeah, so we could send one more.

We could send one more carrier and...

I'd like to see you on that.

Yes, sir.

And then, of course, the next step would be, and we need it for a tactical air, would be to take the F-4s from either Okinawa or South Korea and move them down.

And so those are the alternatives we have.

But we have right now, subject to making this small deployment from the Philippines, a series capability of 21,530 days.

At that point, we would put all three carriers in a toss-up and run them up to 1,300.

The King Hawk will add another 1,600 sorties to this number.

He probably wouldn't ever use that many sorties, Mr. President, but we do have the capability.

I think it's interesting to get a real break on the weather.

We can double for a... Let me put it this way.

When we think in terms of 24-hour strikes...

you get just as much heat for 50 if you do it for 5,000, if it's for 24 hours.

If you expand it to five days, then the heat is enormous.

In other words, the part that I would like, what I think the contingency plan has problems, because I remember we once talked about the contingency plan, and I remember Henry and we talked about it earlier,

Be ready that when there's a window, you can tell them to stop, then get in, get out, and then say it's over.

Now, you've got to have it there ready to get them to help us out, rather than them dribbling it out, you know, not over it, dropping it on the counter, because the weather's bad.

That happens to me.

We can do that.

I don't think we'll ever go as many sorties, even in the good days.

We can fly on a search basis, but we can do it.

The B-52s are the ones that are limited as far as their search to 30 days.

Others can search up to 60 to 90 days.

This is how I have to do it.

I move from 42.

Well, we could go up to about 40 sorties a day.

Right now, number 52.

Unless you increase the total number of planks, you cannot meet the order the president is making for 24, 48 hours.

Then what do we get?

search capability is to increase the daily average, and then that gives you higher total at the end of the month, but if you want to put everything into one day or two days, you need no airplanes there because there's no way you can have the functionality of a one day, you know.

The book about the real problems of this war, multi-relations-wise, addressed, I suppose, many books to be written about in the future.

It showed that, perhaps, they might not be fun enough to deal with the problems.

It must have been pretty good.

And I don't think it's greatest of all decisions.

But it was the gradual escalation of the day after maximum force at the maximum point in time.

That gradual escalation gives away all of the strength of the water dropping in Iraq.

It destroyed the American support of the damn war.

Now, if you were concerned that you can't do it, not gradually, the then theory of gradualism in war has always been wrong.

Totally wrong.

It's tit for tat crap.

The only thing to do if the other guy gives you a clap on the wrist is to kick him in the groin.

That's one of the theories.

And that's what we've got to do here.

You're talking now, you were talking about flexibility.

If you're limiting your flexibility as a magnet before, is the flexibility going to be valuable?

Is the flexibility something new that's going to get a few places and it's probably going to get prescribed?

But I know exactly what you mean, Mayor.

That was the first time we've been up to 20 degrees since the November 68th stand-up.

What happened to the truck parking?

I think you've got a very big truck parking.

You know, 4,200 trucks.

Some officers, I think the last pictures show that they have... Take another look at that, will you?

The truck parking.

There's a truck park right up there where they can walk the Chinese railroad to the truck.

That's way up there.

That would be a nice target.

It's a spectacular target.

But the trucks will be right down there from Russia.

The Russians have never refused the request of the North Vietnamese for trucks.

As soon as a truck is destroyed, another one is on the way.

Also, we have had the capability of both shelling targets ashore or blocking and so on.

Now, this has been, of course, rejected for 80 years now.

I was lucky to have the first thing to have done.

There's only one thing that I think some people fail to realize that General Abrams

Joy Chase Westmoreland, who just was there, has just recently sent in a report.

And he is confident.

He is confident.

Westmoreland News.

Westmoreland is coming.

What for?

That the South View and the Mesa can handle the B3.

No, I'm just giving you the report, sir.

Westmoreland was extremely fun.

Right, so after what happened in 1978.

And they handle the propaganda.

Well, the propaganda, I think we've got to be in a position where we help.

I think it's a very good one.

Let me say, before we, while you're, let's have an elsewhere bunker.

Tell us the word, if you will, about, uh, uh, we read, uh, I noticed, uh, it's a long, uh, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a,

I think he's very well received.

I think one of the encouraging things is the fact that the police force is a continent.

Yes.

I go up in November and talk to General Lamb about his problems.

And his very last is no problem.

Tell me, this is what I said.

Are you, do you feel, well, I should ask this today, I don't know.

General West, have they ever, I know they've changed three generals.

Yes, sir.

Is it an improvement or just more of the same thing?

I don't know if it's true.

You did so?

Yes, sir.

Well, it's the...

I have the same experience.

...the general, the new commander of the 25th and 23rd.

One of the best-understanding jobs.

You agree?

There's another good man in the 23rd, and he's somebody in the 22nd that's doing it.

He wanted to be part of this three years ago.

He put a pawn out who was very good because he's so corrupt.

I think Zill was very confident about the B3 front.

General Minton and MR3.

I think that's one of the strong things.

And the situation in the countryside today is the control that the government has.

And another development which has been the

It's the improvement of the territorial forces, the regional forces.

They're doing, in fact, they're doing, they're doing very well.

They're doing, yeah.

So that all in all, I'd say, and Jill's relaxed about it, I think that this is a very healthy development.

What was the purpose?

He did not have the effect that he did before, obviously.

Most people give credit and courage to take this vote.

And I'm hoping that something will come of it.

The part that you should make, of course, and that everybody should make out there is that, according to its coldest terms,

South Vietnam should get demoralized if they concluded that the peacenik forces in this country led to not just an American withdrawal, but led to withdrawal of our aid program as military and economic in the future, which is their real objective.

Now,

The revelation of our peace initiative has bought a little time in that respect.

The conquerors, I mean, the jackasses were ready to go off with another one of their kicks, not just a withdrawal date, but the clay, the cut sorges, the cut everything else.

I think if the point could be strongly made,

public support at the moment, which is reflected in congressional support, which is in turn reflected in appropriated

is more solid than it has been for a long time, that therefore they can have confidence that they're going to continue to have economic and military aid so that they will be able to fight the enemy.

That is the key point.

If they take the long view, then at first you have the short view problem.

That's what we were addressing in 2002.

And there you say they think they're ready for it.

They're not right for that at the moment.

I don't think they would be already, as I say, if I had an Air Force and a Navy and short communications lines up against an enemy with a long communications line, no Air Forces, no Navy, good God if they aren't, no that morale now, they can't make it at all, can they?

If they cannot at this time, do you agree on that?

Yes, I think this is a critical test that we need to go through.

Pretty good odds on their sign.

They've gone from two, a little out of about 200 intact aircraft to over a thousand that they're operating in a period of 24 months.

Could just help you.

They're all distracted.

I just feel that, Mr. President, that we have accomplished something here, and that we have people with capability.

And I don't want to get into a panic situation.

I want to do everything we can to protect it, but I don't want to give the impression, as far as this country is concerned, particularly a few of them.

I've been out and testified before the Congress.

Maybe everything is all right.

But I'll tell you, it's not going to be easy to get that economic entry for Vietnam.

It's a tough damn problem right now, worth $300 million, like right at this pressing time.

Others think that the atmosphere has changed and we get this money through it easily, but it hasn't changed.

As far as, if you've got questions in those committees, look at this last action of the Senate just this last week.

Most people are in there, and sometimes I think our people aren't being tough enough on this thing, but by God, they've done it.

They really gave us a good job this week on economic aid on the immunization.

You've got to get that money back somehow.

And it's not easy.

It's going to be a tough, hard, rough fight.

And they're trying to take everything out of my budget and put it over in the aid administration.

Now, up there in the hill.

the Fulbright, the Mansfields, and the rest of them.

I tell you, if it gets out of this defense budget, the vehicleization program is down the drain in 73 and 74, because the only thing that keeps it going is that it's in the defense budget, not over there in the aid budget.

That's the only thing that keeps it going.

You know that, don't you?

We all agree with that.

I'll just quickly wind up for a second.

In our evaluation of the QLO assets, showing the U.S. QLO assets and the South African Asian assets, note that as to the $70,000 drawdown down, I'll be standing as the one made, we would move from $38,000 to $670,000, and they would increase the South African Asian $560,000

primarily in this category, the big helos.

So that leads us in with a lift gate building.

That is lifting South Beach Beach troops at 10,000, U.S. troops at 8,000, South Beach Beach at 6,800, and U.S. at 5,100.

That's because the South Beach Beach is smaller, and you can put more in there.

And for more, the lift gate building, they all put their own helos.

They have, as of May, 6,450, and by one May, they have 7,360.

I think I want to make sure we understand that I was concerned about the 60 days film on reports of the effect, as we were withdrawing, and our dealers were coming down there, and we had to talk about it, talk to you about it, and keep them in.

I don't care what the hell we're withdrawing in terms of men, but they've got to have enough at this point, you know.

You're doing that, right?

We've done well on that, Mr. President.

This is a greater capability than I think they'll actually use, but I think they should have this March.

Well, they had a program originally, I think, about 400.

We went back again, and Joe Aitken raised it to 6.1.

I went back again, and he raised it to 6.7.

Yeah, right.

That's what I'm saying.

I'm not going to .

All right, quickly.

Obviously, as someone said before, the purpose here is primarily political.

As to we in the United States have been in negotiations, certainly to arouse more of the Air Force elements in the U.S.

I think they can arm its capability to conduct far-flutter operations.

Certainly, as far as the election, it's a very favorable classification to meet the rules of the trade.

And above all, to degrade the urban self-confidence of the general Abrams has emphasized in the past.

The developments I've already mentioned, taxing the military in one and two phases.

First, regimental size, and secondly, and perhaps even across the DMZ.

Military Region 1 primarily, then the western highlands and 3 and 4 will just be sample attacks and attacks against pacification targets.

The South Asian is alerted, they have plans developed, and we've taken preparatory actions and we'll look at additional actions.

They do have large numbers, certainly far greater mobility, these are things you just mentioned, Mr. President, superior fly power to take them in the air, and constantly, it's really up to them on what's on the basis of will, as I said.

If they want to do it, they can do it.

We've given them every capability.

After the money action, just what some action you want to take, we will work on the extension plan for the additional B-52s.

We do have a plan for how many additional B-52s you could get there.

So we have referred to that economy for this.

one may pop that we may get, but also from the fact that it will be known that they're there, it's going to have an enormous psychological effect.

And I think it's worth playing.

I also wanted to see the story of getting off the speed.

We'll get to that.

And also, in regard to any other, also the contingency line, but also some symbolic moves can be made, too.

I mean, they all tied to military.

It won't mean anything unless they have military .

But also, with regard to what other, like the M4s, NAWAs, et cetera, et cetera, where you can draw them down from the side off because it's for the action .

earlier that this offensive equipment is, as far as the North Vietnamese is concerned, it isn't about China, and it isn't about Russia, it's about South Vietnam after it was going to come, and it was inevitable, and they're going to try to get on top.

From the standpoint of the offensive that we'll have, it's a failure.

will have a massive effect on them.

It's going to have a massive effect on them because they will fail, not against the United States, although we will, of course, help a great deal in the air, but they will fail against the Army when they fight to have great content.

Under these circumstances, then, they then have to look at their whole card.

And so, as we see, this event is the one that will come in February, or at least it's anticipated.

Then the one that will come later in March and April.

We must realize that this must help the North Vietnamese.

We'll cover for the late deal.

After we're out, they can make it.

And if they fail, they're going to have to look very, very closely to what their options are.

If they succeed, the other point that should be made is this.

We don't want to do anything that is stupid.

We don't want to do anything that unnecessarily exacerbates our public in this country.

Because we must realize that as important for what we're doing, or as the level of criticism of what we do escalates, it encourages the enemy.

And therefore we don't want that to happen to the extent that we can mitigate.

On the other hand, we must also realize that in terms of getting ourselves into a position where we can react very strongly to enemy offensive action, we have not been in a better position to do so for a long time.

The American people will understand it for two reasons.

One, because American ground forces are not involved.

And that forces will have all that on television.

Because

but the peace proposal having been made and having been rather generally supported and having been reacted to by a step up in the military.

So under these circumstances, we're now in a position for a period of time which could pass.

It might pass in 60 days.

It'll last me for a period of time where the action we take in...

We don't want to do anything that unnecessarily exacerbates our public in this country.

Because we must realize that as important for what we're doing, or as the level of criticism of what we do escalates, it encourages the enemy.

And therefore, we don't want that to happen to the extent that we can mitigate.

On the other hand, we must also realize that

in terms of getting ourselves into a position where we can react very strongly to enemy offensive action.

We have not been in a better position to do so for a long time.

The American people will understand it for two reasons.

One, because American ground forces are not involved.

In fact, we're going to have all that on television.

because of the peace proposal having been made and having been rather generally supported and having been reacted to by a step up in the military.

So under these circumstances, we're now in a position for a period of time which could pass.

It'll last for a period of time where the action we can take

where the level of activity is in the air.

That's what we're talking about.

It's going to be much greater than it otherwise would be.

I will look at the U.S. plan because it is well-given.

an enormous distraction because there may be a day or a time when something very sensitive may be discussed in the diplomatic army.

It might be, for example, one of the reasons you don't give them just a blank.

And this thing is that

who knows, maybe not too good a chance, but could be who knows right now.

Perhaps there could be some level in the negotiating.

If there is, I'm just using that as an example, you have to be in a position to know whether you want to do it that time or at another time.

That's what we have to do.

We can't go fast through it.

On the other hand, what we see out here in the 2C plans, let's see not only what the South Vietnamese

who have been trained but are still somewhat ignorant in terms of modern warfare is concerned.

What they have asked for, what General Abe has asked for, but also what the impact the Chinese and the rest have come up with as to what we can do that we are not doing.

That's why I want to see them getting off.

We want to see more B-52s.

We want to see A-1s.

Anything that you think?

Maybe the Millennium, but maybe the Royal.

And also in terms of the targeting thing, we've gone over this before.

We've got two or three plans on that.

I think we've got a pretty good range of targets, including the ones you mentioned.

But we'll take another look at the targets, too.

The timing is right and the weather is right.

We can do quite a bit.

The main thing we all have to understand here is

The greatest miscalculation is that we will pay, on our part, an exorbitant price because of the political situation in the United States.

That's not true.

Because there's one determination I think we're going to lose.

Not there.

I determined that long ago.

We wouldn't have gone into Cambodia, we wouldn't have gone into Laos if we had not made that determination.

The politics was what was motivating what we were doing.

I would declare immediately after I took office in January of 1969 that the whole damn thing was the moment Johnson and Kennedy, it was the Democrats' war, and we're ending it like Eisenhower ended Korea, and we're getting the hell out, and let it go down to two.

We didn't do that.

We didn't do it politically, whatever.

It would be wrong for the country, wrong for the world, so forth and so on.

and come to this point, the United States is not going to lose.

And that means we will do what is necessary.

But we can't do it in terms of pusillanimous planning and options that we're going to have.

So we want to see what you have.

Don't get dragged into the record.

You know, I know everybody's got all this stuff out.

We'll ask for all this.

You know, I'm sure you've found this in a story in the New York Times.

I'm only the devil to know that you don't.

I don't think anybody else sitting in this chair would have ordered Cambodia or Laos.

If we had that Cambodia or Laos, our catch would be 100 feet today, brother.

And they survived.

So my point is, even with the election facing us, even with the diplomatic initiatives we have, we have to win it.

We have to be sure we don't lose here for reasons that affect China.

They affect Russia.

They affect the Mideast.

They offend Europe.

That's what this is all about.

Now, having said all that, we don't want to be dumb about it.

That's real, I think it's not, because we have a very doubtful public opinion situation in this country.

And at the moment, it's a little quiet, but they'll stir up again.

Mr. President, on that score, I think if you could impress on President Chu, he probably knows it, but

Tom says this is a critical test.

And even if it looks that this is over with, that we had to come to his rescue, it's gonna cause us trouble getting an additional economic military aid for him.

If he comes out of this looking as if the organization is working and he is successful, that's gonna help us in our next future.

It's gonna help us a lot.

It's damn important for him to fully understand that I understand.

He's got the witness on his own.

That's right.

And as far as our own activities are concerned, do everything, but fire every goddamn P.R.O.

officer in the Defense Department.

Don't talk about it.

Just do it.

You know.

Let it in there, but don't say, we had so many sorties and all this stuff.

Let the Arvin, if the Arvin pulls this off, let them have the credit.

Very important.

They get the credit.

Not our B-52s, not our A-1s, not Drake.

Let's do it.

But let's be sure that the Arvin, in this instance, gets the credit.

We'll get the blame if they don't.

We want them to get the crank tight.

Also, it's very important in terms of your getting the dough for what we need.

Yes.

I think you've got to be prepared for Ron Singleton and the others that got you straight on the rack.

Obviously, the press is going to try to keep you good.

You know, all those cultures, all these, maybe no matter how it comes up.

I don't know.

Yes, every yard of ground that is lost, every heaven that is captured, every provincial town that we've followed will be the best part of the best group.

And I think you'd have the situation, the rather ironic situation, you think of World War I and World War II, and even Korea, I remember the St. John landings,

Whenever our side won, it got in this front page and everybody was cheering.

It was great.

Well, whenever our side wins, it's in the course of ads.

And whenever any side of the enemy does anything good, big, that's great.

And that's true.

We have that situation.

We all know.

You're absolutely right about that.

But that's right.

I mean, the important thing in the long run, though, is to win.

The important thing, the propaganda will hurt for a while, but sure, they'll be, what Meadows described as spectacular is the rest.

And we don't want to be Pollyannic about it, saying, yeah, this is a hell of a battle.

Many battles have been lost.

And just to leave it in the proper context, all of you students of military history, I've mentioned it before here, March 21st,

the period of World War I, the Great Summer War, which was supposed to be an enormous defeat, and a general dog was disgraced as a result of it, and retired.

And yet, historically, if you look at the fact that in the week, in two weeks of that battle, they lost 400,000, the Germans lost 400,000, the first time that they lost, the Germans lost the war.

because of that battle.

Because he put everything he had in there and didn't break.

So the most important thing here is to remember the headlines may be bad, people have lost the help.

How many times have we lost the Amphibians?

We've got, I mean, if you look at CBS over the past year, I was looking at it, there have been at least 30 broadcasters since Mount Henson fall.

Maybe it will.

The point is, we've got to fix the propaganda, but we're talking about just being sure that doing everything we can to see that the argument comes through.

And it's tough.

Do you have any other questions?

Mr. President, I have a question on that.

Because these North Carolina days wasn't really that packed with this time.

This is going to be costly in lives.

Now, they already got the replacements.

Yes, I think so.

Of course, they had a situation last year where they lost $3,000 in the Amazon 7-1-9, whereas North Beach Beach was losing about $16,000.

Yeah.

The whole side is going to have to pay for what we're going to try to do here.

After the maximum cash is on the North Beach Beach, they're going to have to commit themselves.

They're going to see the play-through or the content or the fire support, but they're going to have to match.

And that's really going to work.

Mr. President, I'd like to ask the Secretary of State, because most of these active cases will require an increase of, for example, time.

Over the 32,000 that are seated down now, if you see any political problems, there's a temporary increase in time.

I don't think we should let anything like that stand in our way.

It's a short period of time we're talking about.

to the moment.

I think that the American public thinks of the President and everything that he can to bring about a peaceful settlement by negotiations, and they're prepared for us to take whatever action he thinks is necessary.

We're only talking about the 200 to 800 people in each of them.

That's right.

Go ahead, I have a story for you.

Right away.

Nixon, National Security Council & Laird on Vietnam War and Military Strategy

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