Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 111 › Conversation 111-002

Nixon, Dent & Weinberger on Vietnam War and Cease-fire agreement

Tuesday, January 23, 1973 · 8:38 PM–9:05 PM ET · Cabinet Room · 22 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Agnew, Spiro T. (Vice President); Cabinet officers; Rogers, William P.; Laird, Melvin R.; Richardson, Elliot L.; Kleindienst, Richard G.; Morton, Rogers C. B.; Butz, Earl L.; Dent, Frederick B.; Brennan, Peter J.; Weinberger, Caspar W. ("Cap"); Lynn, James T.; Brinegar, Claude S.; Ash, Roy L.; Scali, John A.; Armstrong, Anne L.; Shultz, George P.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Flanigan, Peter M.; Timmons, William E.; Ziegler, Ronald L.; Price, Raymond K., Jr.; Stein, Herbert; Safire, William L.; Garment, Leonard; Bush, George H. W.; White House photographerConversation111-002 on Tape 111StartTuesday, January 23, 1973 at 8:38 PMEndTuesday, January 23, 1973 at 9:05 PMRecording deviceCabinet RoomSourceNixon Library record for 111-002 ↗

AI Summary

In this meeting, President Nixon met with his Vice President, Cabinet, and senior staff to provide a briefing on the impending Vietnam cease-fire agreement, scheduled for signing on January 27, 1973. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger detailed the arduous negotiation process, emphasizing that the agreement achieved key U.S. objectives including the return of POWs, the withdrawal of American forces, and the right of South Vietnamese self-determination. Following the Vietnam discussion, the President transitioned to a briefing on the fiscal year 1974 budget, where Director Caspar Weinberger presented plans for spending cuts and program terminations designed to maintain a full-employment balance and avoid tax increases.

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NARA Description

On January 23, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, and Cabinet officers and staffers, including William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Elliot L. Richardson, Richard G. Kleindienst, Rogers C. B. Morton, Earl L. Butz, Frederick B. Dent, Peter J. Brennan, Caspar W. ("Cap") Weinberger, James T. Lynn, Claude S. Brinegar, Roy L. Ash, John A. Scali, Anne L. Armstrong, George P. Shultz, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Peter M. Flanigan, William E. Timmons, Ronald L. Ziegler, Raymond K. Price, Jr., Herbert Stein, William L. Safire, Leonard Garment, George H. W. Bush, the White House photographer, and members of the press, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 8:38 pm to 9:05 pm. The Cabinet Room taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 111-002 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 111-2

Date: January 23, 1973
Time: 8:38 pm - 9:05 pm
Location: Cabinet Room

The President met with Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird,
Elliot L. Richardson, Richard G. Kleindienst, Rogers C. B. Morton, Earl L. Butz, Frederick B.
Dent, Peter J. Brennan, Caspar W. (“Cap”) Weinberger, James T. Lynn, Claude S. Brinegar, Roy
L. Ash, John A. Scali, Anne L. Armstrong, George P. Shultz, H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman, Henry A.
Kissinger, Peter M. Flanigan, William E. Timmons, Ronald L. Ziegler, Raymond K. Price, Jr.,
Herbert Stein, William L. Safire, Leonard Garment, and George H. W. Bush; the White House
photographer and members of the press were present at the beginning of the meeting

******************************************************************************

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and
released 09/04/2019.]
[Unintelligible]
[111-002-w002]
[Duration: 1m 53s]

     Greetings

     General conversation

     The President’s schedule
          -Meeting on January 24, 1973 at 4:00 pm

******************************************************************************

     [Photograph session]

     Vietnam cease-fire agreement
          -Television appearances
          -”Peace with honor”
          -Chronology
               -Congressional briefing
          -Text of forthcoming announcement
               -Timing
               -Provisions
               -Protocols
          -US objectives
               -Return of prisoners of war [POWs]
               -International supervision
Show the rest of the log (53 more lines)
               -Withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam
               -Self-determination
          -POWs
          -Timing

******************************************************************************

[This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.]
[National Security]
[111-002-w001]
[Duration: 11m 44s]

       Vietnam cease-fire agreement
            -Cambodia and Laos
                  -Prospects for ceasefires
                         -Formality
            -Nguyen Van Thieu
            -Potential violations
                  -International supervisory force
                         -Composition
            -William H. Sullivan
            -History of recent negotiations
                  -North Vietnamese attitude
                  -Lyndon B. Johnson's death
            -Vietnamization

******************************************************************************

     Vietnam cease-fire agreement
          -Congressional opposition to the President’s policy
                -Mansfield amendment
                -POWs
                     -Wives
          -Importance
          -President’s policy
                -Peace with honor
                     -Importance
          -Congressional supporters and opponents
                -Democrats, Republicans

******************************************************************************

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and
released 09/04/2019.]
[Unintelligible]
[111-002-w003]
[Duration: 1m 43s]

     General conversation

******************************************************************************

The President, et al. left at 9:05 pm

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Why don't we look here for a formal picture.
John, turn that way and you might go get a formal picture.
I know.
I'll put another one tomorrow.
I'll put another one tomorrow, too.
This will be a very...
for a very brief meeting and purpose.
I'm sure, again, it's a vision of the new eyes of the world, the eyes of the nation.
Let me tell you why I didn't announce it.
It must have been very brief in my earlier discussion.
It must be very brief.
and by the, for example, the reading of the legislature, which is right afterwards, by, will only be pro forma like this, and then we're going to have a legislative reading against it.
Tomorrow, it looks like this is anxious.
I was starting to say that I will announce at 10 o'clock during the reading of the talk on television, including today.
I will read to you here now.
This agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris conference.
on Vietnam on January 27, 1973.
And second, at the International Congress Center in Paris, the ceasefire would take effect 2400 grand each meeting time on January 27, 1973.
And the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam expressed the hope of this agreement to ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in the China and Southeast Asia.
That is the announcement.
We made it head on.
Washington.
Now, what?
This agreement does, and what the protocols, which are virtuous and fairly important, is to accomplish all the goals that I have announced in January.
You remember the report.
At first, that there had to be a return of all of our prisoners to war.
I said that there had to be an international supervised ceasefire.
I said there should be a withdrawal of all American forces and there should be a right on the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future without outside interference.
All of those things have to be met.
As far as the
Implementation is concerned.
The flight is in effect in terms of prisoners who distance 60 days from statics.
All prisoners who have been interned in almost the United States Council.
If it is 60 days from statics, all American forces will be in conflict and enthroned.
And in terms of the international supervising fire, we will cease fire at 7 o'clock Washington time.
In terms of what it means for Cambodia and Laos and so forth,
I think it's a, let me, let me say this, at this point, since this is a subject that will come up within a leaders' meeting, that we're going to probably have to answer it.
I think it would be well for any to take just a moment on Cambodia and Laos, because the Vietnam thing is all I'm really going to talk about tonight.
There's, there's very scintillating discurs.
that Vietnam has some understanding regarding Cambodia.
Now, you've got to understand that Cambodia allows for a lot of interest, and they're quite important.
Go ahead if you're taking that on.
The major thing is that it's essential not to talk about that trip.
not so that it has to get us to always when the market agreement comes out.
But that won't be the agreement either.
But we have strong reason to believe that there will be a ceasefire in Laos within 15 days of the agreement in Vietnam.
So by around February 10th,
The two parties there are already negotiating, and we have, as I said, a strong reason to believe which can be jeopardized only by an excess of talk here.
Secondly, with respect to Cambodia, the situation is more complex because there are factions there that are not always in control of the parties involved.
But we believe that if de facto ceasefire will occur in Spain, which will be a little bit messier than the one in Laos, over an incomparable period of time after the agreement is signed by the Secretary of State on Saturday,
but the degree of formality of respect that allows ceasefire is greater than the degree of formality that the Cambodians ceasefire, but we have
on the status of their state of the vote.
These are un-Chinese.
I use the term China.
That's what we're fixing.
And, of course, there are other forces.
It's been very, very important.
Oh, a couple of other points should be made.
After a great deal of political argument, the government of South Vietnam, the general and the president of the U.S. in particular, are totally for it.
And we'll read those statements.
I'm sure you'll make a recommendation already.
The U.S. is going on television to have another interview with the president.
I have made a statement here that he goes, of course, and that is what has been told us that he does.
That is what I can do to express that .
Now as far as the problems are concerned, we have to be aware of it.
between now and the ceasefire, there will be an environment that both sides will be trying to grab as much as they can.
When I say there will be, I assume that because that happens in all ceasefires, after the ceasefire, that there will be inevitably, in this kind of guerrilla warfare, where you don't have a line, there will be violations.
And that's why the supervisory body is so important, which was, how many, 11?
760, Mr. President.
I would want to be one of them.
Well, actually, it's 1160 in the international valley, and in addition to that, there is a sort of island commission from which we serve, which has 3,300 members, of which we supply a board.
And after we drop out of it, there'll be...
The supervisory force composed of the two being the lead parties, which has about 1,600.
So the total supervisory mechanism will range from 3,300 to 4,600.
And it's really distributed over the country in a very effective way.
Now, whatever limitations the supervisory bodies have had in the past, the international force is four times larger than any that has operated there before.
The two-party commission never existed at all.
And the machinery by which they operate, including provisions for minority reform, gives us a better chance to get something done that the treaties extend.
One little note of interest is that...
I'm sure you can share it with the other side.
Probably get out.
The question is always, when do you believe that it was going to break?
And, well, it's just fantastic that as I formed the leaders in January and January of the first meeting,
After, of course, 10 days of negotiations in December, the negotiations agreed to code that money, not simply on details, but code.
In our case, the meetings were in Stonewall.
It was obvious that they were going to do that.
It was then that we resolved the main policy, and then on the 30th of December, they had our conditions to return to Congress.
The technical talks began on the 2nd.
Henry arrived on the 8th of January and began his thoughts.
He was there for more than he said.
He was there for four or five days.
The, uh, my talks, the, uh, talks that he'd given itself resumed at the 8th.
Let's see, on Monday.
That was Monday.
His birthday was brutal.
As Bill knows, Henry's message on the first day made us all think, here we go again.
First day ain't no good.
It was a total absolute deadlock.
So, at the President's instructions I told them, I sent them a message that night that I would have to leave on Wednesday night.
So then, on the next day, which happened to be the President's birthday, he made a very major advance on the two outstanding issues in his agreement, and they began to
to work with great energy on the technical agreement.
And up to then, they had had an unbeceivable head in charge of the technical agreement, and they put their vice minister in charge, and I asked Bill Sullivan to discuss the technical thing.
So that started moving on the line.
And then it happened to be the president's birthday, and I sent him a cable saying,
It's broken her heart before, but it's maintained another day or two.
She's going to have a break, so he said, well, let's not get too optimistic.
But if it is, I just will take it with another hand.
Thank you.
And by the end of that we had settled almost the entire agreement.
And all the principles with respect to the protocol.
But then having a set of principles and details and then we worked out the location of the heat, logistics and directions for the heat and most of that was done last week.
So when I arrived last night, there were, with respect to the agreement itself, only three things to be done, which we settled very quickly this morning.
I mean, with respect to the protocol, there were three things to be done.
And then a great deal of the surroundings, Frankfurt, the international conference, and so forth, was one of the most favorably determined and settled things.
Well, for example, they had another big issue in St. Louis is that today, I thought, because of President Johnson's death, at that point, it would be a modest opportunity to take a little more time.
And so I sent a message over to Henry, and I just pointed out that the Muppets were there.
And also, I thought it might help a little with the therapy with the South.
He said that they're so determined to settle, he better go.
And they didn't shake him a bit.
When they were ready, they were ready.
They just wanted to leave.
They couldn't have kept him from settling today, right?
Yeah.
I must say their confidence that we had with that, they said the buoy is a negotiation show, but in fact, last night,
that we finished the English and Vietnamese texts.
They took the English texts home with them and locked them in the safe, lest we take out a page and slip in another one.
Let me just summarize and sign off.
It's quite interesting to note that without the success of the Vietnamization program, there would have been no settlement.
Because the South Vietnamese would not have settled unless they were confident they could defend themselves, and the North Vietnamese wouldn't have had the incentive to settle if they thought they could.
We're all at easy to knock over.
Our own military actions, of course, played a very decisive part, because without our doing something that they didn't want us to do, we would have very little incentive.
I would say also that I would have to say that the settlement was not made easier by the totally irresponsible actions of the Congress.
I do not refer to the whole country over and over again.
Over the past four years, the Congress, particularly the Senate, and even in this session, I think that we were going back to the Congress table to pass resolutions.
which called basically for a settlement, which was far less than they were willing to settle for, and far less than he got.
And just to sum it up in a word, I say it in one sentence when I speak sometimes, is perhaps both reasons.
You see, to many people, the so-called Grimesfield Resolution prisoners are withdrawn.
Is that right?
Isn't that a great deal?
We get our POWs and we withdraw.
Isn't that a good deal?
Well, I'll tell you the people that understand that probably better than anybody else, and a lot better people than senators and congressmen.
are the wives of the prisoners of war who said, our people, our men, did not become prisoners.
They did not suffer.
They really did not wait.
And we did not fight this war just to get them back.
And their colleagues did not die just for the purpose of getting our prisoners of war back.
The difficulty with the POW withdrawal proposal, which is the proposal, the most responsible proposal of all the irresponsible ones, this is the police irresponsible, I would say, the difficulty is that it would have ended the war for us.
but the war for 50 million people in the end of Chinese Revolution.
The agreement we have is a ceasefire for Vietnam and with the possibility of a ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia.
And so what we have done, by insisting on peace without it, we not only have our prisoners back, or our withdrawal, but in turn we're supposed to provide a ceasefire stopping the war for the end of Chinese.
And also, we have the right to sell the enemies to determine their own future under a proper, supervised budget.
Something which was awesome, but not as good as it should have been thrown.
What I'm really trying to say is that it's been rather long, it's been rather painful, it's been very difficult, as many of you might know.
I wonder why don't we get out of Johnson's War anyway?
Why don't we blame on the Democrats and get out and so forth and so on?
The reason is, this is not Johnson's War.
or Kennedy's war.
I mean, I have never engaged with that kind of, what I think, irresponsible rhetoric.
It's happened that it started in Kennedy's administration and continued in Johnson's administration, and in my opinion, it was very badly handled.
Maybe, perhaps, he made a mistake.
But the point is, whatever happened, the United States was involved.
We have now withdrawn our forces down to the minimal route to there.
We have now achieved freedom, which achieves our goals of peace for Vietnam that has had war for the past 25 years, and the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their future without having communists running a compulsion bomb against their will.
And my view is the fact that we as a country, it will mean a lot, certainly, to the 75th South Vietnam.
But the fact that the United States was responsible to do it,
will have, in my opinion, a decisive event on what is going to be in the world.
We here at SET and the United States, by its engagement with Vietnam, are in the world.
I can assure you that if the United States did not prove to be responsible in Vietnam, if we had ended this war, could it be with surrender, prisoner to withdrawal?
The Chinese wouldn't consider us worth talking to.
The Russians wouldn't consider us worth talking to.
The Europeans, with all of their bitching, would not consider us to be reliable allies.
And so what's involved here, which most of the members of the Senate in the House eventually will understand, and which all of us around this table must understand, is that the United States can play a role
to keep the peace.
And as the only one who can stay free from the world, we have to be responsible.
That's what this piece is all about.
Let me say this.
I have as much contempt for the Republicans who would come and run as I do for the Democrats who would come and run.
We couldn't have done it without Democrats in the House and Senate who stood with us when some of our Republicans were deserted.
And we couldn't have done it with a lot of Democrats without a lot of Democrats in this country, including a lot of me friends running around who stood with us.
when a lot of the sort of elitists were running away from us thank god for this good

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Cite this conversation

Conversation 111-002, January 23, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/111-002 (accessed November 13, 2026).