Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 189 › Conversation 189-025
Nixon phone call with Mitchell on Vietnam War and 1972 Election
Wednesday, May 17, 1972 · 3:02 PM–3:16 PM ET · Camp David Hard Wire · 8 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and John Mitchell discuss current political developments, including Democratic primary trends and the potential impact of busing as a campaign issue. The conversation shifts to the administration's military strategy in Vietnam, with Nixon justifying the blockade and bombing campaigns as necessary measures despite the risk of canceling the Moscow summit. Nixon expresses confidence that these actions have improved domestic and South Vietnamese morale, maintaining that securing a favorable outcome in Vietnam is his overriding priority.
- Vietnam War
- 1972 Election
- Democratic Party
- Mining and Blockade of North Vietnam
- Busing
- Foreign Policy
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
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So, how would you like to be the Democratic National Chairman these days?
That vote in Michigan, John, is almost unbelievable.
And it certainly knocks down the idea that some of our people, I mean, not any of our top, but some of the little boys down in Woodwork,
The domestic counsel arrested.
They have that, well, busing really cuts both ways and all that, and we shouldn't really make a donation.
Good God, I mean, he gets 51%, and busing was the issue, wasn't it?
It certainly presents a different ballgame for us.
Well, frankly, it's not a damn thing we can do about it, so that's that.
So McGuire wins that.
He gets California that he just, his own people, not just he, but his people would not want to go and leave him, you know.
And he's picking up the delegates like we did in 68, isn't he?
I thought this thing, Wallace's, would really nominate Gilbert.
That was my feeling yesterday, and I guess I just did wrong.
Speaking of one thing, it's Tobon Bliss.
Is that all set now?
Yeah.
Incidentally, on that committee, you know, we have to sort of give them lip service there, but the best thing to do with the committee is to apologize.
God, it's... Ray, that's got to be...
I know.
That's right.
Promise me anything.
Okay.
Yeah, yeah.
How old?
Typically, you get those young guys working.
Sure, sure.
Now, one thing, just putting your ear against you, you're talking to me.
But this malarkey, to the extent, to the effect that we live in an age of violence and so forth, which they first blamed on the Lord, it had, I suppose, your memories long enough.
Just, we have to go back to T.R.
Kinlan.
But you remember when they shot Roosevelt, and shot at him, and killed him, and killed, yeah, Cermak, remember that one?
Harry Truman, and shot up the House of Representatives.
And so that's just malarkey.
There are none, period, and that's the cause for a free country.
While Wallace brought some of this on himself, by God, these irrational attacks on him by the likes of Humphrey and Muskie and McGovern didn't help a bit, did they?
He was a Wallace man.
That's suspicious.
It just doesn't sound like it.
He was just wearing those buttons and those little tics.
Assuming that we still get off Saturday and the eventual crew ride on us.
Remember, in Minnesota, Connie, you know, when just eight, nine days ago when we made this decision, you said that you didn't think they would cancel the summit.
Well, I'll tell you, I was very relaxed about it in the sense that I knew there was nothing else to do.
And I said, well, it's, I said, it's very interesting to talk about this.
But I said, we've got, the way I got to it was that I said, I am making a decision on the assumption that they will.
So don't tell me whether they will, they may or they may not.
I don't give a damn.
Because I've got to make it, because I said, assuming that they will, above everything else, we cannot lose in Vietnam.
I said, Vietnam is more important than going to Moscow.
So let's just understand that once and for all.
So that was, you see, the thing that was the overriding issue with me.
It was a, I knew, I knew the heat we'd take, but I knew it had to be done.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely.
But it was, we could have done that long ago.
As a matter of fact, John, the most important things that have happened is, in my view, is that it's had a, well, first, it's had a damn good effect on the morale of this country.
You know, we really, our people, I don't know what your people tell you, but the speakers and other things say that they're getting a very, very good reception.
Yeah.
The other thing is that it's had, and this has been critical,
It's turned around the morale of the South Vietnamese forces and their people.
They were really on the skids at the time we moved.
The North Vietnamese were given a shock.
They didn't expect even the bombing.
We burst in around Hanoi.
And this just has unbelievably struck terror into their hearts.
They know that this means we've crossed the line and that they've got no choice.
They've got to deal with this venture.
Yeah, they're just petrified that we might, that the United States might come out of riot, aren't they?
Yeah.
Some of the bitches are just that bad.
Also, they know they got us into the trouble, too.
They're concerned.
They're just petrified that we bring it on.
The battlefield situation out there has been
pretty good in the next three or four days.
We expect they'll take another crack at Khantung.
But as I told Henry, I thought I'd take Khantung.
I'm not concerned.
I think the American people are going to worry about whether they take some.
Because particularly in light of the fact that the South Vietnamese have been making smoothies themselves, don't you think that balances out a bit?
It also held an amok, which is really the place that matters.
Of course, the real thing, John, is that the whole blockade thing is working.
By reason of the fact that China's built and Cambodia's cut off, which was not the case in 1968, by reason of the fact that we're
We've totally cut off the stuff from sea and finally got some airplanes and bombs that can knock out bridges.
By golly, they're in trouble.
Now it'll pay off.
It'll take two or three months, but in two or three months, they are going to have to be looking places for oil.
They don't want it because they recommend it against it and
CIA is a saint, those bastards, you know, said, oh, it wouldn't work.
Well, the point is, it might not have worked before.
It was a different kind of a war.
This is a mechanized war, not a guerrilla war now.
And let's face it, if we hadn't done it in Cambodia, this wouldn't work either.
Saints.
I'm not concerned so much that the military squeal around, let the columns be written.
They're going to be red-faced as hell.
That's the main thing.
If it comes out, which it will.
It will in the end.
I mean, it's just a question of time.
That's all.
It's a question of time.
We have to level the place.
We're going to see that this one comes out all right.
Well, okay, John.
We'll watch the... Well, we keep up the good work.
We appreciate it.
Give my best to all the people on staff over there.
Bye-bye.
NARA Description
On May 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and John N. Mitchell met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 3:02 pm to 3:16 pm. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 189-025 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 189-25 Date: May 17, 1972 Time: 3:02 pm - 3:16 pm Location: Camp David Hard Wire The President talked with John N. Mitchell. ***************************************************************** [Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 09/11/2019. Segment cleared for release.] [Personal Returnable] [189-025-w001] [Duration: 2m 10s] [See Conversation No. 131-013] [End of telephone conversation] *****************************************************************
Also recorded on May 17, 1972
- 131-010 2:42 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at Camp David from 2:42 pm to 2:44 pm.
- 131-011 2:44 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 2:44 pm and 2:46 pm.
- 189-022 2:44 PM · 4 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 2:44 pm and 2:46 pm.
- 131-012 2:46 PM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone at Camp David from 2:46 pm to 3:01 pm.
- 189-023 2:46 PM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 2:46 pm to 3:01 pm.
- 131-041 3:01 PM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:01 pm and 3:02 pm.
- 189-024 3:01 PM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:01 pm and 3:02 pm.
- 131-013 3:02 PM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John N. Mitchell talked on the telephone at Camp David from 3:02 pm to 3:16 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 189-025, May 17, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/189-025 (accessed September 23, 2026).