Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 338 › Conversation 338-042

Nixon, Kissinger & Haldeman on Vietnam War and Soviet Union

Thursday, May 11, 1972 · 12:04 PM–12:51 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 30 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); [Unknown person(s)]Conversation338-042 on Tape 338 (tape position 03:11:47–03:41:18)StartThursday, May 11, 1972 at 12:04 PMEndThursday, May 11, 1972 at 12:51 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 338-042 ↗

President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and H.R. Haldeman met to coordinate strategy regarding the escalation of the Vietnam War and the upcoming Soviet Summit. The discussion focused on the effectiveness of recent U.S. air strikes against North Vietnamese infrastructure, the ongoing blockade of Haiphong Harbor, and the potential impact of these actions on relations with the Soviet Union. The participants decided to restrict public statements from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to avoid undermining the President's peace offer or creating diplomatic confusion as the administration prepared for the Moscow summit.

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Position in tape: 03:11:47 – 03:41:18

part B, 1:09:31

338a.mp3
338b.mp3

On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 12:04 pm and 12:51 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 338-042 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 338-42

Date: May 11, 1972
Time: Unknown between 12:04 and 12:51 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President dictated a memorandum for the files.

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 32s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

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Henry A. Kissinger entered at 12:51 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Report
                -Bridges
                      -Damage
                -Soviet Summit
                -Haiphong Harbor
                      -Instructions
                            -Soviet ships

H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman entered at 12:53 pm.

                -Damage
                      -Bridges
                      -Petroleum, oils, and lubricants [POL]
                      -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. cable
          -USS Newport News
                -Shelling
          -Air strikes
                -POL
                -Power plants
                      -Destruction
                -Impact
                      -Le Duc Tho (?)
          -Blockade
Show the rest of the log (152 more lines)
                -Soviet protests
                -Mines
                      -Soviet shipping
                -People's Republic of China [PRC]
          -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
                -Propaganda efforts
                      -Leaflets
          -North Vietnam offensive
                -An Loc
                      -Casualties

                -Kontum
                -An Loc
                -Tanks
                     -Destruction
                     -Number

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 12:53 pm.

     Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 1:12 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Intensity

     Soviet Union
          -German treaties
          -Relations with Hanoi
               -North Vietnam public statements
                     -Tone

     Vietnam
          -William P. Rogers
                -Public statements
                      -Contents
                      -Kissinger’s view
                -Press conference
                      -Meeting with the President
                            -Purpose
                      -Advisability
                      -Purpose
                            -Legality of blockade
                                 -Soviet reply
                            -Legislation on Vietnam
                                 -President's peace offer
          -Soviet statements
          -Melvin R. Laird
          -Rogers
                -Public statements
                      -Legality
                      -Criticism of Soviets

            -Peace offer
                  -Interpretation
                        -Kissinger’s view
      -Forthcoming testimony on Capitol Hill
      -Business Council
      -Press conference
-Blockade
      -Soviet ships
            -Kissinger’s previous conversation with Jerzy Michalowski
      -Soviet public statements
            -Tone
-President's Soviet trip [Soviet Summit]
      -Warsaw stopover
            -Approval
                  -Significance
      -Announcement
      -Kissinger meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
            -Summit
                  -Camp David
                  -Possible incident concerning Soviet ships
      -President's meeting with Nikolai S. Patolichev
      -Soviet response to President's previous speech
      -US air strikes
            -Limitations
-Air strikes
      -Damage
-Soviet Summit
      -Cancellation
            -Likelihood
      -German treaties
            -Ratification
                  -Willy Brandt’s role
      -Plenary sessions
      -US position
      -President's meeting with Foreign Trade Minister [Patolichev]
      -Cancellation
            -Likelihood
      -President's meeting with Patolichev
            -Leonid I. Brezhnev
            -Significance
            -Soviet Union, Iran comparison
                  -Mohammed Reza Tahlavi [Shah of Iran]

                -Kissinger meeting with Dobrynin
                     -Purpose
           -Rogers
                -Public statements
                     -Administration line
                     -Soviet response
                     -Advisability
                            -Kissinger’s view
                     -Effect

Kissinger left at 1:12 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Soviet Summit
                -Cancellation
                      -Timing
                -Soviet intentions
                -President's position
                -Cancellation
                      -US reactions
                            -Public opinion
                            -President's critics
                                  -Haldeman’s view
          -President's press conference
                -Scheduling
                -Timing
          -Soviet summit
                -News reports
                      -Robert B. Semple, Jr.
                      -John B. Connally
                      -New York Times
                      -John F. Osborne
                      -Wall Street Journal
                      -Effect

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 1m 44s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5

**********************************************************************

     President's schedule
          -Camp David
          -Meeting with Rogers
          -Meeting with Wilbur D. Mills
          -Camp David

     Vietnam
          -Support for the President

Haldeman left at 1:29 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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They're really good.
You know, they're really good.
It's out of here.
Get it out of here.
Keep up the good work.

— 1 min 34 s with no transcribed speech —

I'm a profile.
Not that you can't describe.
The two spats are completely down.

— 1 min 10 s with no transcribed speech —

.
.
.
They've shown the pictures, so this is the matter.
Abrams had the cable in, and General Vogt was the best thing that's happened to us.
He's put three squadrons of us back in.
And I think that's just Vogt.
Oh, no, Vogt knows what we want, Mr. President.
We don't let the drug last for that.
I think we're going to send them this time, Mr. President.
I think we've got these numbers.
V-Doc code stayed behind us.
I accepted it yesterday.
The next chapter.
They are absolutely rejecting it.
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.
One of the things that happened was a massive attack on that block that started 10 hours before our because we took it.
Which means, in other words, that our because we just tried to punt the hitting something that was running to them.
They stick up because we do hitting.
And the North Vietnamese were so panicked that they ran towards
If they don't get it on this attack, they're not going to get it.
Our guys planned it, knocked out 25 tanks behind the clock.

— 1 min 9 s with no transcribed speech —

Now, if they're preparing a massive blow, the reception is so great that it must be overcome.
And I can't quite seem to do this, but how will they do it?
We've got the Germans in this coming up next week.
Have they got the resources?
And nor have they got the examples.
What are they going to get?
Unless they have made a secret deal with Hanoi,
The departing statements on behalf of Hanoi, I believe, Hanoi, we cannot make any comment.
We have to get, I'm sorry, I'm wondering if we have to get a sure lock.
Well, it can't be.
He's told specifically what he's supposed to say and what he's not supposed to say.
He shouldn't have a press conference this week.
There's nothing but trouble that can come up with a press conference.
We are well-prepared.
I don't like to have one, but...
coming up with legislation and all that the president's made a very generous peace offer and Congress should be supporting the president's peace offer.
Well, you don't want to do that.
You've got to face the fact that he was telling us that, which I had already started, that he's got to be told that on an authoritative basis.
We don't want that.
The legality, first of all, the environment is relevant.
It is not worth thinking about it on the issue of what we will never do.
I don't think it's necessary either.
We might want to have a .
And I've said what there needs to be said about the peace after this.
Just I think we are now so well positioned that we ought to keep quiet.
He can get away with that.
I don't think you want to say any more about him being soft.
Is that soft in your position?
He will.
I know Bill.
He will interpret the people in such a way that...
He will.
He'll phrase it to the stars.
He'll kind of say...
He'll say, well, does that mean they can stay in place?
He'll say yes, or he'll say something close to being soft.
People who are confused are not confused.
The next problem is he's got to testify on the Hill.
I'm not very much a business counsel.
I'm not very much a business counsel.
... ... ... ... ...
But in my view, it is not .
No, I wouldn't do that.
But it isn't .
No, the Russians .
I don't know what she's going to say today.
I mean, I don't think she's going to say something.
I've taken that son of a bitch here today.
They're not going to have the summit because of you.
If they have the summit, what you said this morning, that was very powerful.
Uh-huh.
But we'll have to work.
We have knocked out most of the British by then.
I just don't like to go spend my waste my time every other
My grand position was that the Americans don't want to graduate here.
But so said, how do you know?
Oh, I know.
No, no, I meant it.
I don't think you do that, because I think people will think you did something, and you won't just listen to them.
But if you have a plenary that week, I mean, you can have that.
But we'll present our plan after this.
without instructions.
He didn't directly talk about it somehow.
He was very careful.
It was implied throughout.
But all of what you said is going to be done into something.
You know, Stan, we're not going to get credit for the reference.
We'll take half of the time.
And that's for sure.
None of this can happen under certain circumstances.
But when he had instructions, it is just no way a Russian minister of foreign trade would come bolting into the White House.
Without instructions, would he pass as a member of the Central Committee sitting next to him?
We're mining the harbors of Iran.
And an American minister was sitting there smiling along with Bradford.
I don't think the Shah of Iran will get this incentive very soon for a trial.
And we're mining, if they're mining the harbors, if we start yakking about a trip to the sea.
Why don't you get Rodgers in and just tell him that we should let a lot of the rest
you're going well.
Correct.
What he wants to know is what's the line that he wants to know.
All right.
I think you're right.
And that president's going to give you credit.
Well, we've got everything out in town now, and that's where you want to leave it.
Then they'll say that I was presented by Big Bird to tell you about it.
By Monday or Tuesday, they'll have this thing in the back.
They're going to cancel it.
They would want to do it with the maximum humiliation for you.
Because they're going to hurt you.
They know they're going to screw up their own position anyway.
They might not be able to get the most out of the place.
I think we have a problem going from now on.
I think the thing is totally separate, right?
I think we could have gone any other way.
Do you disagree with that?
Do you disagree?
Do you think we're going to take the hard action for that?
Not because of the science.
It is going to create a hell of a lot of stir up in the country.
Don't be disappointed.
Be aware of the natural.
Be aware of the things that you build.
Here's the interesting thing.
In the process of pissing on you for screwing up the sun, they're trapping themselves.
They have trapped themselves into bracing everything you've done up to this.
You need a sub-incentive in your whole building a structure for
And they praise the hell out of them because they think the more they go down, the more they hurt you by saying you rapped.
In the process, they're pointing out that you go.
If it stays on, there's not going to be any big acclaim for the fact that it stays on.
But if it goes, well, they accept it, but we strike consternation in them.
.
.
.
.
.
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.
Did you hear any sun go in there?
I'm wondering if maybe he's letting his grandmother be asked to stay.
I hope she won't let him go.
Well, the world mission ain't got nothing to bother him.
Either that or he's letting his grandmother go in, which he's probably more likely to be in his position to go inside.
He went, he had a lot of simple things.
I can't believe he did that accident.
I'm sure some blasters here.
We're going to go around the car and find out what the background was on that.
Decision.
What John gave him was a damn accurate, and I'm sure it wasn't a top-level error.
I don't know.
John Oswalt asked him.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Thank you.

— 2 min 58 s with no transcribed speech —

Thank you.
  • 024-074 11:34 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 11:34 am to 11:35 am.
  • 338-039 11:34 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 11:34 am and 11:35 am.
  • 338-040 11:35 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 11:35 am and 11:43 am.
  • 024-075 11:43 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:43 am and 11:49 am.
  • 338-041 11:43 AM · 52 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Charles W. Colson, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, Hugh Scott, Robert P. Griffin, and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 11:43 am to 12:40 pm.
  • 024-076 11:49 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Hugh Scott talked on the telephone from 11:49 am to 11:51 am.
  • 024-077 11:51 AM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:51 am and 11:56 am.
  • 024-078 11:56 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Robert P. Griffin talked on the telephone from 11:56 am to 11:57 am.

Conversation 338-042, May 11, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/338-042 (accessed October 28, 2026).