Conversation 449-012

TapeTape 449StartTuesday, September 21, 1971 at 12:35 PMEndTuesday, September 21, 1971 at 1:40 PMTape start time01:28:27Tape end time02:35:59ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Butterfield, Alexander P.;  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  [Unknown person(s)];  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOval Office

President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman and other staff to review administrative and political matters, including the handling of the Pentagon Papers and the reorganization of the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP). The President emphasized the need to move beyond current staffing limitations by centering economic policy work around George Shultz and John Connally, rather than Peter Peterson. Additionally, the group discussed potential candidates for Secretary of Agriculture, the legislative strategy for a Supreme Court appointment, and the necessity of managing Vice President Agnew's role leading into the upcoming campaign.

Pentagon PapersCouncil on International Economic PolicyGeorge ShultzJapan textile negotiationsSpiro AgnewSupreme Court appointmentCabinet appointments

On September 21, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, unknown person(s), Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:35 pm to 1:40 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 449-012 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 449-12

Date: September 21, 1971
Time: 12:35 pm - 1:40 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield.

H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman entered at 12:36 pm.

     The President's schedule
          -September 21, 1971
          -Exhibition of race cars
               -White House south grounds
                      -Race cars
                           -Number
                           -Types
                           -Race drivers
               -Photo opportunity

Butterfield left at 12:37 pm.

     The President's schedule
          -Race car exhibition
               -Location
                      -Press
               -Photograph

     Pentagon Papers
          -Haldeman's meeting with Henry A. Kissinger, John D. Ehrlichman, and Charles W.
                Colson
          -Meeting between Ehrlichman and Kissinger
                -Colson's absence
                -Kissinger
                     -Understanding of situation
          -Ehrlichman's call to Melvin R. Laird
          -Haldeman's call to Ehrlichman
                -John N. Mitchell
          -Kissinger's objections

                -Ehrlichman’s view
          -Release of Pentagon version
                -Public interest
                      -Personal
          -Ehrlichman

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 12:36 pm.

     [Delivery of voting results note]

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 12:46 pm.

     Draft bill
           -Senate vote
                -Cloture
                      -Vote count
                      -Timing
           -Administration’s position
                -Public relations
           -Note
                -Final passing of bill
                      -Cloture
                            -Procedure
                            -Votes on bill
                            -Michael J. Mansfield

     Foreign policy
          -Effect of release
                -Pentagon version of Pentagon Papers
                -Vietnam
                      -Political aspects
          -Kissinger's statements on Pentagon Papers
                -Vietnam
                -Moscow scenario
          -Release of Pentagon version
                -Effect within Vietnam
          -Ehrlichman's previous conversation with Haldeman
                -Kissinger
                      -Release of Pentagon version

     Council on International Economic Policy [CIEP]

-Haldeman's previous conversation
      -Meeting
            -John B. Connally's presence
                 -George P. Shultz
                 -Kissinger's forthcoming talk with Connally
-Connally's view on CIEP organization
      -White House office
      -Conversation with Ehrlichman and Kissinger
            -Responsibility for CIEP
                 -Kissinger
                       -Staffing problems
                       -Knowledge
                       -White House
      -Peter G. Peterson
-Shultz’s view
      -Peterson
-Peterson
-Shultz
      -Responsibility for CIEP
      -Staff
            -Camp David meeting
      -Work on CIEP
-Kissinger
-Peterson
      -CIEP work
      -National economic policy
-Shultz
-CIEP members
      -Kissinger
      -Shultz
      -Connally
      -Paul W. McCracken
      -Swing votes
      -Study on issues
            -Subcommittees
                 -Shultz as chairman
                       -Staff for research
                             -Peterson
      -Connally's view
            -Shultz
      -Kissinger's view

                       -Shultz
                            -Loyalty
                            -"Honest broker position"

     Textile negotiations between Japan and the US
          -Leak
                -Brussels, Belgium
                      -Peterson
                -Date of US decision
                      -Trading with the Enemy Act
                -Release
          -Peterson
          -Paul A. Volcker
                -Location

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 12:46 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Air raids
                -POL [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants]
                -Effectiveness
                     -Storage for the Ho Chi Minh Trail
          -Weather
          -Supplies
                -Dong Hoi
                     -US position
                           -Reiteration
                -Airplanes
                     -Air Force

     Military leadership
           -Air Force
           -Army
                 -Gen. C. William Westmoreland
           -Air Force
                 -Gen. John D. Ryan
           -Marine Corps
                 -Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.
                       -Position at Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]

     Military service draft bill

     -Cloture vote

Kissinger's schedule
     -Dates
           -Visit

Peterson
     -CIEP
     -Japan
          -Textile negotiations
                -Leak
                -Possible actions
                     -Responsibility
     -Previous conversation
          -Lack of leadership

Japan textile negotiations
     -Leak
     -Trading with the Enemy Act
            -Policy issue
            -Japanese reaction
     -Nobusuke Kishi
            -Visit to the US
                  -Date
                        -Negotiations
                        -Request from Japan
            -Information of US actions
                  -Kissinger's possible actions
     -US Ambassador to Japan, Armin H. Meyer
            -Compared with D[avid] Kenneth Rush
                  -Middle East
                        -Vietnam
                  -Rush
     -Textile negotiations
            -Peterson's report
            -Kissinger's strategy
                  -Peterson
                  -David M. Kennedy
                        -Negotiations
            -Strategy
                  -Peterson

                  -Talk with Kishi
                        -Discussion period
            -Date of announcement
                  -Simultaneous announcements
                        -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
                        -Trip to the People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                        -Japanese
       -Kishi
       -Meeting between the President and Takeo Fukuda
            -Anchorage, Alaska meeting [With Emperor Hirohito]
            -Informing Fukuda of US position on negotiation by William P. Rogers
       -Previous conversation between the President and Fukuda
            -Japan response
                  -Time requirement
            -US position
                  -Dateline
       -Rogers
            -Meeting with Fukuda
                  -Strategy
       -Possible meeting between Kissinger, Peterson, Rogers, Kennedy
            -Preparation of plan for negotiations

CIEP
       -Kissinger's scheme on staffing
             -Shultz
                   -Peterson
       -Previous meeting
       -Responsibility for CIEP
             -Shultz
                   -Inclinations
                         -Free trade
                         -Taxes
             -Peterson
                   -Chairman of subcommittee
                               -Shultz
                                     -Staff
       -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with Connally
       -Peterson
       -Removal
             -Acceptable recommendations
       -Shultz

     -Leak
          -Brussels
                -Sources
                      -Volcker
                      -Peterson
          -Effects on textile negotiations
                -Textile people [producers]
          -Details
     -Need for committee
          -Members
                -Kissinger
                      -Need for political understanding
                            -Issues
                -State Department negotiators
                      -Political compared to economic aspects
                -Connally
                      -Economic points
                -Shultz
                      -Economic point
                      -Domestic political
                -Peterson

Other negotiations
     -Relations with foreign countries
           -Canada
           -Surcharge tax
                 -Strategy
                       -Rules
                             -US actions
                                   -General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]
                                   -Staff work
                                         -Camp David
     -Staff work necessary
           -The President's options, role
                 -Implementing
           -Peterson
                 -Briefings
     -Peterson
           -Staffing limitations
                 -Shultz's offer of Office of Management and Budget [OMB] staff

USSR summit
    -Kissinger's conversation with unknown man
    -Andrei A. Gromyko
         -Forthcoming conversation with the President
               -Rogers
               -Cabinet
    -Summit invitation
         -Informing Rogers
         -Announcement
               -Kissinger's role
                     -Rogers's Reaction
               -Date
               -Secrecy
                     -Compared with PRC announcement
                           -USSR
               -Effect of Announcement
                     -Public Speculation
                           -USSR
                           -PRC
    -Alexei N. Kosygin
    -Gromyko
    -Kosygin
         -Visit to United Nations [UN]
         -Itinerary
               -Canada
               -UN
               -Meeting with the President
    -Speculation on the President's forthcoming trip to Alaska
         -PRC trip
         -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
         -[Emperor of Japan] Hirohito
    -Value of surprise
         -USSR position
         -The President's attendance at signing of Accidental War Agreement
               -Gromyko
               -Soviets
    -Announcement of Summit
         -Date

Textile negotiations
     -Kissinger's role

             -Japanese negotiations
       -Peterson
       -Connally
       -Waiting Period
             -Length
       -Kissinger's Meeting with Kishi
             -Rogers's meeting with Fukuda
                   -Date
                         -Agreement
                         -Negotiations
                              -Dates
                                    -Kissinger's schedule
                                         -Return from the PRC
       -John N. Mitchell, Harry S. Dent
             -Relations with textile people [producers]
                   -Textile groups
                         -Kennedy, Peterson
                              -Commitment
                                    -Time
       -Quota bill

CIEP
       -Shultz
            -Responsibility
            -Kissinger's working with Shultz
       -Connally
            -Economic
            -Political
       -Shultz
            -Initiative
            -Staff
                   -Proposals
                        -Effect on opponents
                              -Economic platform
                              -International Monetary Fund [IMF]
                                    -Meeting in Washington, DC
       -Connally
            -IMF
            -European trip
                   -Reaction
       -Shultz

             -Peterson
                   -Reaction
             -Camp David
             -Connally
             -Kissinger
             -McCracken
                   -Committee
                   -Program

The President's schedule
     -Connally
          -Meeting
          -Time

Plans for working group
     -President’s schedule
           -Racing group
           -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with Connally
           -The President's previous conversations with Kissinger
                 -Shultz
                       -Working group for CIEP
                             -Members
                       -Haldeman's attendance at meetings
                             -Meetings
                       -Peterson
           -Peterson's memo to the President
                 -Kissinger's signature
                 -Organization of new group

Polls
        -USSR and PRC
        -Colson
        -George H. Gallup
        -Louis P. Harris
             -The President's popularity
                   -Comparison with Democrat candidates
                   -Effect on foreign relations
                   -Trial heats

Military service draft extension legislation
      -Senators

                 -Debate
                 -Final vote

     USSR
         -Soviet public opinion on the President
              -Dobrynin
                    -View of the President
                          -Change
         -Willy Brandt

Kissinger left at 1:08 pm.

     Peterson

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 1:08 pm.

     Letter from John C. Stennis
           -Liaison from White House
                 -Delivery from the President
                 -Tom C. Korologos

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 1:40 pm.

     US Supreme Court
         -Recommendation from Stennis
              -James P. Coleman
                   -Mississippi
         -Mitchell
         -Votes
         -Stennis
         -Mitchell

Haldeman left at an unknown time after 1:08 pm.

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Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 1:08 pm.

     Placement of object

Bull left at an unknown time before 1:40 pm.

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An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 1:08 pm.

     Margaret Chase Smith

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 1:40 pm.

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Haldeman entered at an unknown time before 1:40 pm.

     Haldeman's previous meeting with Mitchell and Bryce N. Harlow
          -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
          -Agriculture Secretary

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 1:08 pm.

     The President's schedule

     Refreshment

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:40 pm.

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MANOLO SANCHEZ ENTERED AT AN UNKNOWN TIME AFTER 1:08 PM.

SANCHEZ LEFT AT AN UNKNOWN TIME BEFORE 1:40 PM.

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     The President’s schedule
          -The President's Question and Answer [Q&A] at Detroit Economic Club, September
               23, 1971
          -Possible meeting with Agnew

     J. Edgar Hoover
          -Tenure in office

          -Robert C. Mardian
          -Richard G. Kleindienst
          -Conversation with the President
          -Mitchell
          -Ehrlichman
     -Leaks
          -White House
          -Department of Justice
          -Network
     -Mardian
     -White House

Agnew
    -National Security Council [NSC] meetings
    -Behavior
          -Raising negatives
    -Dwight D. Eisenhower administration
          -Cabinet meetings
                -Nixon as Vice President
                        Cheerleader
    -Demonstrations
    -Cabinet meetings
          -Connally
          -Rogers
          -Testimonial
                -White House staff
                -Campaign
                      -Build-up
                             -Organization
                             -Leadership
                      -Response
    -Haldeman's call to Agnew
          -Mitchell's call to Agnew
                -Political responsibility
    -Testimonial event
          -White House staff
          -Kissinger
          -Dent
          -Robert J. Dole
                -Cabinet
                -National chairman [of Republican National Committee]

               -Connally
                   -Democrat
     -Connally
           -Support for administration
                -Cabinet
                      -Mitchell
     -The President's possible dinner meeting with Agnew
     -Situation
           -Action
     -The President's Q&A at Detroit Economic Club
           -Connally

Candidates for Secretary of Agriculture
    -Louie B. Nunn
          -Harlow’s view
                -Congressional approval
                      -Federal system
                      -Democrats
                            -Support of farmers
                            -Farm issues
    -Henry L. Bellmon
          -Harlow’s view
                -Farmer credibility
                -Experience with federal system and Congress
          -Mitchell’s view
          -Harlow
    -Bellmon
          -Albert H. Quie
                -Farmers
    -Administration strategy
          -Farm program
          -Secretary of Agriculture
                -Receptivity to farmers' concerns
                      -Bellmon
                            -Compared with Nunn
                      -Nunn
                            -Relations with farmers
    -Bellmon
          -Congressional seat
                -Election outcome
                      -Ed Edmondson

                      -Democrat candidate
                -Dewey F. Bartlett
                -Mitchell
                      -Control
                      -Special elections
     -Support for administration
     -Re-election of the President
           -Support for the administration
-Harlow and Mitchell
     -Outcome of meeting
-Harlow’s view
     -Nunn
     -Bellmon
     -Other candidates
           -Publicity
-Harlow
     -Possible appointment as Secretary
           -Congressional relations
           -Haldeman's conversation with Mitchell
-Clark MacGregor
     -Background
           -Minnesota
           -Agriculture
           -Analogy to Richard H. Poff
     -Present position
     -Speechmaking
-Nunn
-Bellmon
-Harlow
-Haldeman's conversation with Mitchell
-Harlow
     -Changes in administration
-Nunn
-[Dole?]
     -National chairman
     -Senator
-Other candidates
     -Leslie C. Arends
           -Career
           -Age
           -Congressional relations

                -Background
                -Department of Agriculture
                      -Undersecretary
                            -J. Philip Campbell
     -MacGregor
          -Congress
     -Possible election outcome
          -Republican Congress
                -Gerald R. Ford
                      -Speaker of the House
                -Arends
                      -Majority Leader

Supreme Court appointment
     -Harlow's conversation with Emanuel Celler
           -House of Representatives Judiciary Committee resolution
                 -Poff
                       -Possible endorsement
                       -Nomination
     -Ford
     -The President's morning meeting with Carl B. Albert
     -Support for Poff
           -House
           -Circulate letter to House members
                 -Endorsement of Poff
           -Cellar
                 -Democrats
                       -Ford's possible conversation with Cellar
                       -Harlow's possible conversation with Cellar
                              -Endorsement of American Bar Association [ABA]
                              -Reflection on Judiciary Committee
                 -Letter circulation
                       -Congress
                              -Republicans
                                   -Civil rights
                                   -Judiciary Committee
                                   -Southern Democrats
     -Background
           -Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.
           -G. Harrold Carswell
     -Poff

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                    -Southern Manifesto
          -Ku Klux Klan

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     The President's schedule
          -Breakfast meeting
          -Call from Connally

Haldeman left at an unknown time before 1:40 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yeah, that's the whole thing.
What I just heard this morning was, what does it say, South Brown?
Cars, just to pick out how the cars are going to do.
They're going to have five, four or five different types of cars with the driver reaching straight for police cars.
We'll let them do the picture there, and then they'll go inside.
That'll be a different kind of picture.
And then inside, without pressurization.
Let's see how it goes.
I suggest that you participate also in that meeting.
Henry and John, of course, if they haven't had it already, you might try to participate in it.
Let me put it this way.
John has already met with Henry.
He's probably without Colson and Stoughton
what the situation is, Henry understands, and has been overruled.
And John has called the letter that puts them back on the track.
I just talked to John briefly on the phone about this yesterday.
I was hanging with Mitchell, and he asked me to tell Mitchell that I was going to be sure to do more than I understood to.
And John says Henry's objection appeared to be, as he asserted out personally, and that's at least the way he evaluated it.
He just thought it wasn't a good idea to get this stuff out and put interest on it again.
And, well, that's not personal.
No, but for the reason that he didn't, you know, they're getting into the people.
So, at least that was John's team.
Thank you.
John, I guess they did.
61 to 30.
Good.
Jesus Christ, 61 to 30, we got about one vote.
Good.
Well, that is damn good, because they won votes.
They expect us to lose the cloture vote today and to win it on Thursday.
We knew they were close.
Didn't think they'd make it.
So, the Senate may be counting on little Pete for being so goddamn irresponsible.
Nobody in the crowd, I guess.
We're on the wrong side of that, like, from any other thing.
Public relations lies there.
What's the name of God you need to do, Bob?
Well, then hold it.
This note says they're now voting on final passage.
That's surprising, because they, after cloture, they've still got an hour per senator.
They decided to hold it.
I think they just decided to get it out of the way.
Obviously, if they've got a cloture vote, they've got the vote on the bill, so there isn't any point
I hope so.
Never know.
interventionist.
The thing about this is that I don't want to do anything that her support policy has to do with me.
Yeah, it's most important to have that come out.
On the other hand, at a particular time, the political side of this Vietnam thing has got to be, has got to come out of him.
I think you ought to remind Henry that it was he who said, once this thing is over, we've got to turn on these people.
Remember?
Yeah.
Didn't Henry say that?
Damn right.
Well, of course, he doesn't think it's over yet.
I thought once, well, if not, it's still going to be a Moscow scenario.
Well, maybe we'll try the Moscow scenario.
Maybe we have to put it past that point.
I would even be willing to do that.
But that's going to run off pretty soon.
This isn't going to affect that in any way.
No.
I guess what he's concerned about maybe is the effect it's going to have.
Maybe within Vietnam.
Because from what John told me, quickly at least, Henry ended the conversation agreeing that it would be done.
Now, you had this conversation with regard to this international situation.
All right.
Further from that, did this kind of conflict was not there last night?
No, sir.
Well, then this view that Charles should do this has not been yet run by Connolly.
No, and that was the next step, was that Henry was going to talk to Connolly and say that that's how, but somebody, I got to view the thought that maybe Connolly thought it was a good idea that it would be done at the White House.
Connolly does.
I haven't told her other than that yesterday, and I told Kissinger that earlier, and I asked Kissinger if he would do it, and Kissinger said no he couldn't, he didn't have the staff or good enough knowledge to do it.
But agreed that it should be done in the White House.
Yesterday, Conley said to Whirlwind, it's got to be done in the White House.
And, raised the question of how, he said, you know, you've just got to figure out a way.
And, but expressed his concern that Peterson couldn't do it, and
Henry also concurred to that.
Schultz thinks Peterson could and should do it.
He thinks he could do it.
Oh, boy.
That shows a very, very lack of understanding of people by Schultz.
He's usually not that far wrong.
I close the bar because he brought it in.
I mean, and suddenly, if you discuss the Peterson witnesses at all, what Schultz said, he doesn't agree with it.
He kind of sees it.
But, uh,
Then again, this morning, said he was in an awkward position.
He'd love to do it.
He's started building a little staff to be, because he did all the staffing on the Camp David stuff, and Treasury really didn't come through with anything.
And he's working to try and keep going on that, just as a backup.
And so he's, he'd like to do it.
He's concerned about maybe Peter's situation.
I don't know if he's having a relationship.
Well, he thinks he can, if they keep it in the council.
No, the International Economic Policy Council.
Peter's council.
Yeah.
Yeah.
They're all on it.
Henry's on it.
Schultz is on it.
Conn is on it.
Cronkite's on it.
And they would just go on there and organize a swing vote on that.
Because they want to do some thinking about this thing and give their input.
That's what I think.
And then they need a special, maybe go to a subcommittee of the council on this particular question and ask Schultz to chair that because he has a staff facilities for research on which Conn, which Peterson doesn't.
See, Peterson doesn't have a staff.
And Schultz does.
Connelly's only potential objection to Schultz is that he feels that Schultz is an ideologue in this area and will therefore openly stand up, you know, properly.
And that Kissinger does not believe is the case.
He knows what Schultz's beliefs are, but thinks Schultz will...
As long as there's a forum that Schultz can't get away with that anyway, and that Schultz wouldn't, I don't think he would.
Schultz will argue his point, but he will also move to the unsprokered position, spending up in labor and stuff.
Sure, I'll do that.
I've got the immediate problem with the Japanese specials.
Yes.
And that is tough right at the moment because of, there's a leak, you know, in the old...
What does the leak say?
The leak says that we're going to make a decision by October 15th.
It talks about the use of the Trade with the Enemy Act and the whole business.
I haven't seen it, but it's apparently in the book.
No, it moved yesterday afternoon.
Oh, that was very close.
Who in the hell put that out?
That's the one problem that I have with Peterson.
He is a hell of a talker.
Poker.
Some fires go up to 7,000 feet.
And they claim they've knocked out most of the oil in that spot.
If they hit, they're just letting up there.
They're going to storage for the whole shipment.
The weather is clear.
I'm looking at another wax tomorrow for a couple of hours.
It sort of breaks my heart to see these supplies lined up at Dunn-Hawaii tonight.
Getting that up.
The only thing is, if we don't say it's terminated, no one will believe it anymore.
And we already said it's terminated.
I think we said it's terminated.
Well, then that's, if you said it's terminated, you can't do it.
But if it hasn't been said, I'd do it another way.
I mean, tomorrow, I wouldn't, I wouldn't give that away, which is trying to hold it from saying it's terminated.
We can't.
It isn't too late.
I'll check this.
Of course, that was our instruction, wasn't it?
It was our instruction.
We wanted one wagon.
They would have flown 400-plus planes.
They had done it when you said they could have flown the mantra.
We did clear for 5,000.
It's some goddamn outfit.
The Air Force is incredible.
And the Air Force and the Army and the military leadership is impossible.
Impossible.
Westmoreland, you have all the top of the Air Force, and it's just unbelievable.
I'm not sure about the gun right there.
He sure hasn't played our game.
C.I.A.
That's because he's a drug and I'm looking at the water.
He doesn't understand.
Well, it doesn't mean he's a Marine Corps, nobody can spoil it.
He won't spoil it.
No, he won't spoil it.
They're not a major factor anyway.
He's not a major factor.
He'll just feel like a good show.
We want a good show.
Yeah.
So that's one extreme thing.
I think we've got things going pretty well now.
Well, if you'll take a look at that...
and the possibility of meeting again.
I think we've done this October situation now.
Yeah, a few other conversations.
Sit down for a minute.
We can talk about it a few years from now.
Thank you.
On the Japanese thing, I understand you can lean on it.
What is the next step?
Well, Mr. President, there isn't a game plan that I can discover right now.
Now, whether you should or shouldn't use the Trading with the Enemy Act is one policy issue, but to hit them with it, I don't believe that the Japanese believe we're going to do something.
And therefore, it's going to come as a surprise.
Now, I think we ought to tell them at the latest when Kishi is over here.
If we have a date for him yet, I don't know.
Well, we didn't have a date at any time, Mike.
Yeah.
I know, but we don't have a requesting.
So we get a request for a date.
I said it's not a date.
Damn it.
I asked him to put this in.
I may have it this morning, but I didn't.
That's all right.
That's not a fine.
Anyway, the date's easy.
It's Kishi.
All right.
At any rate, the latest, when Kishi comes here, we've got to tell him what we're going to do.
So what the hell, I don't know whether that's the way to get in or whether or not you can get a hold of your contact again.
I don't know.
I must say, we've got a weak son of a bitch as an ambassador over there on the minor.
Yeah.
He can't contribute anything.
That's what you ought to do.
If you had a rush, you'd go in there and pound the table and get something done.
No, he would have had it done a year ago.
You know, that shows you what it means to have a good ambassador in place.
You know, I was thinking this morning about how to set up that Middle East thing if we use it as a bait for the Vietnam.
Yeah.
If we had a rush,
We can't move him now, and it'd take him too long to learn it.
Yeah.
But it makes a hell of a lot of difference to have our... On the Japanese thing, how do we leave it?
I'll go call Peter...
I'm going to get a 30-page paper from Peterson here, and he'll tell me not to.
And it'll be too late.
I'll get a game plan out of Peterson, and then I'll edit it down if verse comes to verse.
Well... You'd better get... You'd better get Peterson candidated.
I don't know, but I think he's all negotiating something.
He's turned into a niker in that new job.
But let's get Peterson in, and let's see what the alternatives are.
Maybe we buy a contract by saying, well, we talked to Chief Schuster, and they want 30 days to discuss it, and we take 30 days to tell the Japanese, God damn it, they've got to go.
We can't put up with the sword between the October 9th.
It's a bad date.
We can't do it in the light of this other thing.
To do it with...
You know, in the week in which you make the Russian announcement and you announce the Chinese trip.
And they kick the Japanese.
And then you kick the Germans again.
They're about to come through and I just don't know how the hell to do it.
I don't know what to tell the chiefs who's going to do it.
If you kill them, of course, I'm going to see you in Anchorage.
That may be Roger's or to tell Fukuda now.
We really mean business.
I think that's what should be done.
and that this is what they plan to do.
When I talked to him, all he said was, they need more time.
I said, we're going to run out of time on October 15th.
That's what I said.
Oh, you did tell him that?
I told him that, but didn't.
But Rogers, I don't think, has told him a goddamn thing.
Rogers has not talked to him.
I know that.
Well, Rogers is going to see the difference there.
So why doesn't Rogers?
That should be part of the game plan.
Yeah.
Why don't you pull together Kissinger, I mean, you, and Peterson, and Rogers?
Well, he's got to be in his theater.
If he's not here, it's better he not be here.
But I think we have to get the plan for that and for what the hell's going to happen.
We just can't let this train run down there and go off and end the thing.
Now, the second point is, I don't know if you're
without telling Peterson.
I think what it has to do, I just told Peter Peterson, well, I think you're right.
I just openly say, well, we need a subcommittee on this or something like that.
That was one thing you were somebody really honest about.
Another, Shultz, Shultz is so good a man to be in charge, provided he doesn't lean in too much in terms of his doctor and their ideas of free trade and getting rid of the border tax and all that sort of thing.
The only trouble is that Shultz will want to chair, that Peterson will want to chair the subcommittee too.
Well, just say it has to be Shultz because he's the guy who has the staff that can work on this.
In what border tax?
Let me talk to Connolly to see whether he had any idea.
I think we ought to get moving.
We've got to get it out of Peterson's, frankly, out of his hands here, and into somebody's hands to give us a recommendation.
I can live with it.
And where we can get some movement.
And I think Schultz...
Hence, if you, this leak that occurred in Brussels might have come from Volcker, according to Bob.
I don't know.
You were just asking who.
Peterson hasn't been there, so I think Peterson is capable of leaking, but I don't think this one could have been him.
I don't either, the way you talk.
today, but I think he's, well, the poor guy can't blame him for these things.
He's doing very well, but you were asking who else knew about it that could have done it.
I don't think it was the one that comes to mind, because he was, you know, in discussion about it.
God damn, this is an irresponsible thing to do.
We haven't even totally touched on people yet.
That's right, we didn't.
I don't know.
I didn't really know about the details of it until last week.
Right.
I'll get after this.
There needs to be a debate.
I think you have to be on it.
For the obvious reasons, it will be political to keep it political.
The United States has not reached a point.
These are the issues that they have not reached.
That's what I'm saying.
But it's very technical again.
I'll get over it.
The point is that there's no understanding on the part of any of the others.
Now, the state people understand the political side, not the economic.
Connelly understands the economic, or at least the domestic political and economic the best.
And Schultz understands the economic, not the domestic political one.
So Peterson has a pretty general-facing understanding of the plan.
My worry is that when we go down, we're coalescing these people against us without knowing what it is we want them to do.
We've also quickly gotten to decide who we want to break off.
I'd like to see us break off somebody soon.
Well, but preventing us to have the scheme, we could break off the Canadians.
If we lifted the surcharge selectively against those countries that have played the game that we want them to play,
Then we could certainly get the Canadians.
And we might get one or two others.
And that's probably against the rules.
What the hell with that?
We've probably broken the rules already.
It is against the rules.
That's the problem with the selected regime.
It's against the rules, right?
Direct opposition, again.
Yeah.
Yeah, true.
Well, maybe you can't do it, but when we talk about something that we can't do, there's another thing.
See, we can't have these things thrown out there.
That's why they need a stand.
That's why you need that guy's system.
That's why you were able to work out the stuff you did in Camp David, because they had figured out what was doable.
And we shouldn't blow things by you without knowing what you can decide.
It's a waste of your time to listen to another idea and say, this sounds pretty good.
And then when we shut it in to rendition.
Well, I get some of that from Peterson.
Peterson sometimes hasn't had a chance to really discuss thoroughly enough.
He's talked to a hell of a lot of people.
So you finally got to squeeze it down and say, well, it's doable, you know?
He has some stuff.
He has some stuff.
And he has, as Joe said last night, he's awkward.
Peter's in the whole F.E.
staff.
He said he was in the whole F.E.
staff.
He's not a staff-oriented guy.
He's an idea man, not an advertising guy.
Let me say, your conversation with your friend was very interesting.
I thought it was very important.
And then they start feeding out this stuff through a lot of other channels.
And I particularly like the idea that you have a room of mine.
And the way I want to do it this time, I'm not going to tend to another room.
I'm just going to ask Rogers for what else to do.
See, I'd like to speak with her.
Or I'm sure we'll go home for a while.
We go to the cabin.
We get to help out.
Absolutely.
No reason for me to get down.
And I'll say, well, I'm going to try to tell you about this.
And he, at that time, should give us some invitation.
Right.
He doesn't have to do it.
We just say he doesn't.
Well, I would say that when I speak to him, I'll say, I'd appreciate it if some of the petitions over.
No, but that is the basis of telling Rogers.
And that gives you an explanation of what you spent half an hour listening on.
We'll just tell Rogers you agreed on this part to the announcement.
That keeps me out of it.
His credence won't be heard.
And it focuses it all on you, and then if they leave...
The minute that he's done, when he's called in and say, well, he made the summit thing, I just agree that we have the announcement on the 12th.
I agree it should be in May.
I think that way you can very quickly.
I mean, you then tell Bill not to tell anybody in the state?
It is.
You're goddamn right.
I'll say we're going to have the same rule on this.
We have a chance to inform them right before, because the Russians are just as sensitive as the Chinese about religion.
But you agree?
Absolutely.
Everybody always forgets about it.
Anyway, there isn't the same problem with the army.
People expect us to be with the Russians.
Well, that's what makes them wrong.
I understand, but it isn't the...
It's not the bombshell.
The funny thing is, it's getting kind of big as God, but no one is speculating on it.
Not anymore.
They used to tell the Russians sometimes that they...
The one thing they're speculating on now is that, what's his name, he's coming to the U.N.
He'll come down and see you or something.
He's going to Canada or something and they're saying he may go to the U.N. and then he'll come down and see the President or something.
That's not right.
I won't see him here.
They've also got people here in Canada this weekend, too.
They say the Alaska trip is just a cover and that you're really going to China.
That's the reason.
May that do happen, but now do you really believe, can you seriously believe that the president would go from a visit to a video meeting?
You should have known, I agree.
But that's the battle of your surprise that they have.
They're scared to death.
You're probably right.
You can't believe it.
It would be best if you didn't go to this accidental board sign.
I don't want to go.
It makes it too difficult.
But you decided that.
Well, I didn't want to go.
It builds it up too much.
It builds it up too much and also makes people think something else may be going on.
That's right.
And since it's closing out at 12, it's... Well, for me, it goes down again.
That's enough.
We've given that.
That's enough, right?
That's enough.
And then for me to go on, I just don't remember the rushes too much.
That's right.
And then two weeks later, you're announcing on the trail.
Well, I think this, Henry, if I could suggest two things.
One...
If you could try to pull the Japanese hand, it's very sensitive with Peterson.
But we could just say that from a political standpoint, he's got some major problems with Japan.
He's got to understand that.
You've got to pull Peterson's hand.
The second thing is that
I don't know.
I just don't know what to do.
I just think we've got to probably give the Japanese another 30 days.
Give it all to make it to Kichijin.
Rather than say, all right, we've got October 15th, and we've got to have some new negotiations begun on as of that time.
If we could do it in November, it would be better.
Well, all right, let's plug this.
Let's search for that.
Search for that.
And you've got to get Mitchell and Denton tied in so they...
Keep the Texel people down because they're standing.
They bought two months from those people and bought two months from them, but they, on the way, on notice, on faith, they and Peterson's made a commitment to them.
That's right.
And you know, you've got to say this, for almost three years we've been promising these Texel people to do something.
We haven't done it, not yet.
Put yourself in their position.
Oh, no, please.
Of course, I wish we had just gone fuller, but screw it around.
It's an important bill, and that's the best way to do it.
That's right.
That's right.
What are you going to do then?
Then on the other hand, you think the best thing is to get Charles in charge?
I think so.
Actually, let him down, and you'll work with him.
And I'll do it with him.
He's very open-minded.
And even though I'm not going to put anything against Conway on the economic side, I can handle the political side.
Right.
to make sure that it worked, but let's get something where we have some initiative.
And Schultz had particular staff work, and if you can get ahead of the power curve and make some proposal within the next two or three weeks that enables us to split our opponents.
Two or three days.
Well, if you could do it at the economic club or at the latest at the IMF reception, that would be another good thing.
place to do it.
I think we can do it while they're in town.
Rather than mine, I'd let Connolly do it.
Let him get a good building.
I could put him out from here.
He's had to take the heat in Europe.
Now let him be positive when they come.
If Connolly could come up with something.
But we've got to get going on it now and do it.
So Tulsa's got to get going right now while we try to push Barton around.
I agree.
And don't, I mean, if Peters is sensitive about it, that's too bad.
He just needed an ability.
No good.
One way to do it, Mr. Chester, would be not to say anything.
And Chester's left.
Oh, Schultz.
That's what you did before Camp David.
Schultz did it all then.
Hell, if you have Schultz, Connolly, me, and McCracken, or whoever else you want, do it.
All right.
Instead of not having a committee.
Yeah.
Once we've got it broken down.
Am I trying to get, uh, not go down?
No, have Connolly.
Connolly, yes, he is.
Who do we choose?
Connolly, he is.
Why should I change it to somebody at Bioclub today or something?
Let me talk to Connolly and see how he feels.
You talk to Connolly and say, how about this?
Let's have a little rough deal and so forth.
We were talking about it.
And I feel that you feel, tell me you have recommended that I want to run by him.
Put him on the basis not of my name so that you recommend that he keeps it one step away from me.
And that you think the best thing is to have Schultz head out of the working room.
and it should be, and only the four of you should know it, you just do it, and get something good.
So then once we got it, we can't worry about, you, you, you attend a lot of these meetings, right?
Sure.
At the time, I mean, it was through the one who had proposed for us, and every one of the weeks, every one was pre-positioned, and then that way you'll get Peterson and the others along, and that we do.
Now, he doesn't want me to sign a memo to you with him recommending setting up some other group, and I may do it just to keep him quiet, but you know what my views are.
Yeah.
You know, is there, like, one thing that may have helped us a little?
I was reaching out, of course.
One thing that may help us at the present time with both the Chinese and the Russians is that, uh,
We have a situation where both Gallup and Harris have reported within the last two weeks
President has moved ahead of all three Democratic candidates.
Now that, we haven't moved yet in arms.
That's what Henry was talking about.
That's what I was talking about.
I was talking about the fact that if the trial needs you go ahead of them all by then.
You won the draft, 55 to 30.
And last week, at this time, everyone told us that the fallout in votes was due to the fact that many Senators thought the debate would go on, so they walked off the floor and missed the final vote.
Oh, they held it for a while?
Yeah.
And the 85 voted on 91.
No, but it ended up in the Senate, which the President said, you know, I did it.
70% of it out of all fundamental freedoms says that a lot of these people used to think that you couldn't be dealt with, that you'd be better off with another president, and that it had changed completely.
That's a gratuitous comment.
It doesn't have to make a track.
And since it had essentially the same things abroad, if that would get the deaths as it must... Yeah?
You know, you're having to drive to get up here or something.
I can't.
Whoever received the senator's sentence from our office, deliver that to me.
They're the one that's closest to him.
You have a letter from Stennis, here, recommending a candidate to the court.
Circuit Judge James D. Colvin, Mississippi.
Now, I'm going to ask him not to call in the 5th District.
I'll just leave this over to Mitchell.
That is the reason I'm voting.
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
We had a long session with Mitchell and Otto this morning on both VE and agriculture.
We'll catch this later.
I'm going to let you know.
I'm going to let you know.
I'm going to let you know.
I'm going to let you know.
I'm going to let you know.
I'm going to let you know.
I'm going to let you know.
Well, what's the sentence?
Well, the sentence is, I'm the vice president.
They both, I start talking about, you know, just the doability of acting.
Both of them jumped on me on the question, there's no point talking about that unless you have an alternative.
And I said, well, talk about it in the abstract.
And he said, you've got to look at it in a Conley context.
So I said, okay, look at it in a Conley context then.
They both said he was the only viable alternative.
And Mitchell realized he's the only man.
Substitute, right?
Yes.
But Mitchell says there is no viable alternative because Conley is the only one and Conley would under no circumstances take it.
Therefore, you're talking about something that isn't.
Harlow said also, you've got to face the fact, and Mitchell concurred in this, that there is no use talking about Connelly if he doesn't switch parties.
Oh, I know that, I know that.
It doesn't make any sense.
that you need active as a tie to the right at the time that you are taking heat from the right because of moves you're making.
To the left?
Well, not to the left, but the right mix there to the left.
The whole of that last night or the evening, I don't know, was so ridiculous that it was.
But this is the line again.
They, but we cannot, if we keep playing too much for them, we lose the election.
Harlow feels the resignation, if all the hips fall together, that the resignation is probably the right thing to do.
Mitchell feels that it's absolutely out of the question.
possible that he can do, and far more desirable from your viewpoint, as well as being more impossible, is to make the decision that he will not stay on, if that's the decision.
Make the decision as to who the other guy would be, or no.
And my pen, I left in my pocket, my spork of Count David,
when I was there, so no hurry, but my silver pen, would you, when sometime one of the voices brings it out.
All right.
Mitchell argues that you can make the decision now, and should, that it ought to be decided that you shouldn't make it, and how long it occurs to that, that then Mitchell argues you can set up a scenario of events
based on your knowledge, the Vice President's knowledge, and John Connolly's knowledge of what you're going to do.
It will set you up as you take steps to do it properly so that you go into the convention and at that time the Vice President informs you that it is not his intention to seek re-election and asks that you, you know, permit him to withdraw from the ticket.
Presumably he could build to a point where at that time he would also say, I observed Secretary Conley in action over the last year and feel very strongly in my own mind that he would be a great vendor.
You know, however, you don't have to write that scenario now, but his point is you can build to things.
Then you start building that new hub in the right way.
to enable him to do that, you start building Connelly up in the right way to enable him to step into it, including possibly a planned move of a party switch on Connelly's part with nothing else done to it, and then abstract somewhere in the year or something like that.
Or maybe a party switch advocate or something like that.
And we're towards Harlow.
I feel strongly, talked to the Vice President on the phone.
The Vice President called him a few days ago, talked about a lot of things, and got to this at the end.
I've got the feeling from that conversation that the Vice President is really completely in limbo.
He just doesn't know whether he ought to stay on or not.
He isn't agonizing over a decision.
It's just that he doesn't have a conviction.
He doesn't want to hurt, I'm sure, but he's a fool.
Mitchell, and Mitchell had a long talk with that, uh, who's that guy from Maryland that's the vice president's closest, so is Iyer?
No.
That, that businessman, the, he's a contractor or something like that.
So much of it all goes to Iyer.
He's a tireless guy.
He's a type guy.
He's an anxious confidante.
Mitchell had a long talk with that guy, I mean, White, Charlie White.
Both Carla and I are absolutely convinced, without any even iota of doubt, that the president is totally committed to doing what is best for you.
That he has his bitches about, you know, their people and situations and all that, but they don't listen to you at all in any way, shape, or form.
So, what they come up with,
And both of them feel that this is the only way to approach this at this point, in their lines, is that you should get the Vice President in for dinner or breakfast or chat in here or something.
They suggest an informal thing.
where you just say all this, you openly discuss it with them.
We've got a question here, as you know, spanning about the public and all, that it's important for us not to go through the kind of thing that we built up on 56, and you don't intend to do that.
that there are obviously, you know, well, what do you want me to do?
That's the argument I made, that how can the president do this?
And he said, well, build towards a decision.
Let the president honestly say, at this point, you don't have to decide it in that first meeting.
What you do is open the ground so that you can start working it.
get his view and yours, lay out the various alternatives.
If there is, you know, there are problems or pluses and minuses, he's got his own future to look for.
They're convinced that he doesn't want to be vice president for another four years.
He has no real ambition to be president.
And, uh, Romeo has that, of course, but nevertheless, not, not in a driving sense.
No, I don't think so.
And, uh,
Well, I think they're right.
But you didn't mention the Detroit economic thing.
No, sir.
I did not do that in any way.
That's such a good play.
I'm trying to do that.
Well, you said not to raise it with me.
I didn't.
Well, that fits into the scenario either way perfectly.
And nothing that they said would get crosswise with that.
In fact, if you were going to have a talk with the VP, it would be far better to do it after the Detroit thing.
That's right.
Because then you set the public record, then you call him in and discuss the private time.
You cannot get from him a feeling of what he really thinks that nobody else will get.
Well, I sure got it in Vancouver.
That's another problem.
Mitchell asked...
He said he'd talked to you a couple of times and you hadn't mentioned it.
You or I or somebody's got to tell him what.
Just say that I haven't there.
Okay.
Just struck out.
Okay.
And that there must have been, however, either he's not particularly, it's about whether he'll pass this on to folks like Marty or something like that and get out.
Right.
Or just say it plainly.
Just say it.
Not plainly.
That's the one he's got to not pass it to.
That's nobody.
Nobody.
Just simply say that we had some discussion about it.
There was no, it didn't go to the bank.
And that therefore I told him that as far as this is concerned, the subject was never discussed.
That's the way I said to a person, now look, we're going to discuss this, but I want you to know that we agree not to do anything.
We agreed to wait and see.
We've never discussed it.
He said, fine.
So I just want Mitchell to know that he has never heard about it.
And that's the way it is.
It's never been discussed.
You know, John Kerr, you just got to say he just hasn't been discovered.
There's the other one that has got to know that, well, he has stated that he just hasn't made it a progress.
I don't understand.
But he's just to assume that he's going to make an accident.
He's extremely sensitive about it.
White House and Justice Department leaks on him.
He's got one hell of a network around him.
He's a smarty and he's a skunk.
He didn't mention it about the White House at all because he's terrible not to fire a man.
I don't think he thinks he has any problems with the White House.
He may, I don't know.
I don't know.
But anyway, smarty and he's a skunk.
With no justification.
One of the things I was trying to say, and I agree with the proposition, is that his...
I notice that our security doesn't really compete.
I think I see the problem today.
For instance, he's got decency and everything, and he's good.
But he basically, Bob, sort of feels that it's his mission in life to raise names.
And God damn it, he doesn't mean it as a positive.
He's just selling it positively, you know what I mean?
I remember, and Eisenhower used to sort of laugh about this.
I was always the cheerleader in God damn camp.
And I raised, you know, it's always easy to be raised, well, this is a problem, and this is a problem.
So more than any of us, of course, we were the main thing, obviously, so we're probably going to have demonstrations.
What the hell does that prove?
But the point is, it's nothing positive.
I wonder if you don't need to have another Conlon-type campaign sometime very soon.
What do you think?
I mean, do you think Conlon and get Bill Rogerson on it?
You know what I'm asking?
Is that a testimonial opinion?
Would that be a good idea?
Two or three top White House senators.
I just wanted to remember, you went through this whole drill on the first of the year.
If you do it again on a different basis, which is we're now launching a campaign.
We're in the middle of it.
We're in a campaign.
We're not against your great assault.
We've got to be united.
We've got to build up the president.
We've got to build up the leadership thing.
We've got to have a location to sell on the squad and so on.
If you do that, I think we're going to get it.
I think you're going to get it.
I think you're going to find great...
receptivity for it.
More than what's on the version a year, a pleasant zone.
And I think they do feel pretty good.
I think we'd be surprised at a lot of them.
That would be like if I went through the cameras and go in on the attack on some things.
Try this other side.
Could you, should you have the bad expression cold there?
Yeah.
All right.
Or Mitchell.
And so they know Mitchell's the political.
That would make it completely political.
Would you have the Vice President think of that?
Yeah.
Yeah, you would.
Would you tell Mitchell to do that?
And I think there should be some of us there.
But that whole year's work at the .
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.
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.
.
Oh, shit.
Yeah.
Well, no.
He's the most president of the union cabinet by a wide margin, including us.
You know, we're going to be politically, you know, everything.
Well, I agree with the energy strategy, and I'll try to have a dinner for him or something next week.
Their thought, I agree, is that the overt move now would rattle things so badly.
I agree.
And we can't measure it.
It's not something we can, we're ahead of it anyway.
We can find out.
We're heading to a Detroit, you know, we're ahead.
cotton and all that stuff.
They'll usually screw up next time.
On the Agriculture Secretary, we'll drive you to the Menarche in Harlow.
makes the point, he's not opposed to Nunn, but he makes the strong argument, in his mind, that Nunn will have the problem, that he will get shot down in Congress, that he doesn't know, he doesn't understand the federal setup.
The Democrats are going to move very strongly to try and shift the farmer, get the farmer over in their fold, and the Congressional Democrats are pretty damn smart in that area, and will use the farm issue, and that Nunn
who don't know his way around here, the players or the game will get cut to pieces.
He argues strongly that Bellman would be far better for a number of reasons.
One, that he would have much greater farmer credibility because he really is a farmer.
He says that he is the best salesman to the farm that there is in public life today.
Number one.
Number two, he knows the federal system.
He knows the hill and how it works and the people there and could handle any little problem.
Mitchell just strongly disagrees.
He said, first of all, he wouldn't be good.
He isn't nearly, he's dumb.
And he started gluing on to learn in a week what it's taken them two years in the Senate not to watch.
I'm sure.
I'm sure.
Harlow was such a... What about Harlow?
Did he come back to him at any time?
Well, he raised a dumb cuisine there, that's for sure.
Thelma suggested Alan Cui, and Harlow and Mitchell both ruled Cui out that, first of all, he's too articulate so that he'd be bad with the farmer, and second, he's not controllable.
You know, you just don't need him in there.
They both agreed that the key, politically, to us as far as dealing with the farmer is, first, number one, not to have a program.
That's right.
And number two, to have somebody who can just sit and talk to them.
That's right.
And when you get that agreement, Bryce says Bellman is infinitely better than Nunn.
That's just sitting to talk to him.
Yeah, because he says Nunn is not a farmer.
He doesn't look like a farmer.
He doesn't talk like a farmer.
He isn't a farmer.
He looks and talks like a farmer.
He isn't one, but he looks and talks like a farmer.
And he's a little polished.
And he's a lawyer.
Farmers don't have lawyers.
He's not very polished.
Most people don't.
I know he was polished.
And Bryce just, you know, he keeps coming back to that.
But Mitchell, and I don't think the Bellman will be able to sling anyway.
I don't think Bowen will sling a girl off of her spot on their seat.
That's the other thing.
Bellman thinks there's no problem losing the seat.
They're definitely going to lose the first seat.
Yeah.
To Edmondson.
Is that right?
Yeah.
He says, God, we don't have any chance of winning.
No, thanks.
But because of that, the Democrats don't have any candidate but Edmondson.
Edmondson is certainly going to win, so they've got that seat.
If the second seat were vacated, there's no way they could win.
Barber would win it hands down.
Mitchell doesn't buy it.
Mitchell says, I don't agree.
I think we win.
No, he was a vote.
He's in a special election.
Don will not vote.
not going for it.
I remember his experience with him before.
He's a wonderful guy, but he's just stubborn and dumb.
He's dedicated to himself.
As Bryce said, Bellin, the reason Bellin was good is Bellin feels that whatever loyal, well, you've got to be reluctant, not just for the country, but for the world, that he's
And we are getting a little left-feeling around now, aren't we?
Yes, sir.
And we're getting people like them who say, you know, whatever I have to do, it's more important for me to be elected than anything else.
Therefore, I will do what I should do.
Some of this left-serving, inclusively,
Harlow failed to nudge Mitchell at all.
Mitchell, well, Harlow didn't say, Harlow kept coming back.
He said, I'm not saying that Nunn would be bad.
He wouldn't be a disaster at all.
I'm simply saying that Bellman would be better.
And Harlow says, I don't have any other candidates.
And I don't see how you can go about trying to find any other candidate.
Because as soon as you talk to somebody, it would be out.
As soon as it's out, you've had it.
His horrible possibility to be with the Congressional.
I think I raised that with Mitchell and he didn't think he was.
The Congressional argument, I had heard before, there is some merit to the probable purpose.
Because we will be getting cut off from Congress.
Of course, McGregor can handle some of that pretty well.
He knows agriculture.
Minnesota and all that, but he's not a farmer.
He's not a farmer, no way.
But that's why Pop isn't a judge, but he's been in that business for a long time.
He'll do a good job where he is, too, I know.
I think he's too valuable where he is.
And I think he could help on that side of the farm problem.
We've got to get him out making speeches, though.
I think there's a hell of a salesman, and he can make it clear to them that that's the way it's to be done.
It can't be done, so let's just forget about it.
What it has to do is to be Indy Harlow.
I don't like him.
I don't know.
I would go through with it.
They're proven instruments.
I already sat with John, and he, by the phone, we were talking about it, and he, he lost.
The thing about Bryce, he'd be goddamn comfortable to work with.
He's totally, you know what I mean, it's just, right at this point, we just don't need many changes that are gonna be bothering us, frankly.
I don't think nothing about me.
I think nothing could be set up.
I don't think so either.
I think Don would.
Don would have had to be honest to himself to go over those things.
But you take that fellow, you take Nunn, he's a smooth... Goddamn, he sounds like a farmer.
Believe me, more than you think.
He works that hill country.
He works that hill country.
The national chairman.
Sure.
Senator.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Here's a fellow that really ought to end his career and move to a better place than where he's at.
I mean, he's over 70 years of age.
He's a good congressional guy.
He's from a farm district.
He'd be a terrible guy to run a department.
He's the typical sedan.
I'm sure he doesn't talk it through for an hour.
I'm sure he's like somebody else from the government department.
Maybe they've got a good undersecretary there.
That's one question that Bryce raised.
Well, the problem, no.
Neither Bryce nor John think he should be promoted, but the problem, what he'll do if he isn't, you know, Cliff leaves and someone else is brought in, will Campbell stay?
Then they concluded, yeah, he probably would.
And that didn't much matter if he did.
He's good, but he's not essential.
It's just thinking about, you know, you can't stay in the Congress forever.
There's no graceful way to quit.
It doesn't look like a permanent life.
It doesn't look like a revision surgery.
Well, if we should get to Congress next year, Jerry would be the speaker, Les would be the leader.
Which he shouldn't be.
It should be bad.
The seller had asked Bryce about getting a House committee resolution endorsing Bob.
for us to go to, no, not to, but to Waco, if Pauk were nominated, when his name was started, that then the rest would really be good.
And John said, you're absolutely right on that, but John said then, however, get them going now on an individual basis.
What I would like to do, I was just kind of familiar, I was going to suggest that Jerry Ford, I mentioned it in Auburn this morning, that people ought to support him in the House, because I said it's a throw-off on the House for them not to.
I think Jerry Ford, for example,
should circulate a letter to all House members endorsing Poff and urging the President to appoint him to the Supreme Court.
Wouldn't it be better for Seller to do that?
Yeah, if Manny Seller would do it, yes.
And then I get a liberal Democrat gathered up in Seattle to ask Seller if he would do it.
But ask Jerry.
to go over and do it.
I can't ask Stuller because I haven't funded him yet.
Bryce can.
Ask Bryce, ask Stuller.
If he would do it that way, and to tell Stuller that the problem is the, is the endorsement of the American Bar because of the lack of, and the President personally thinks that that's a reflection on the judiciary.
But the answer could be very hopeful.
If a letter had come in,
on that and that we'd like at the earliest sentence, see, with a seller that could get a letter.
And by the whole Congress, I go right down the damn line, you get every Republican, I'm sure, every Republican in St. Louis that has civil rights problems.
And you get all the judiciary, you get a hell of a vote, you get a lot of Democrats.
It'd be great if it was Southern Democrats at all.
I just hope that there's, I just hope, you know, I heard it was, there's nothing.
Everybody says, well, check their background and all that.
Well, Christ, there was nothing wrong with Andrew and Kurtz on their background.
But Pop, I don't see anything wrong.
Somebody said there was something about some baby or something, but that doesn't make any difference to me.
The only thing they've talked about is this thing that said it manifested.
Oh, shit, that's all right.
That's for, that's what else is with the Ku Klux Klan seat anyway.
That's a plus.
That's a plus.
But you know, you heard, didn't you, about the soul of something about some babe who wasn't prepared to raise a point.
And hell, I just don't know.
There's nothing open, as I understand it.
I don't think so.
You can't hear anything about that?
That isn't the kind of thing, well, I suppose it is.
Bastards don't raise anything.
No, except if they have that link to it, they never do.
Okay.
Sure thing.