Conversation 460-005

TapeTape 460StartFriday, February 26, 1971 at 12:35 PMEndFriday, February 26, 1971 at 12:48 PMTape start time00:19:33Tape end time00:31:30ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Laird, Melvin R.; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.); Kissinger, Henry A.; Henderson, NigelRecording deviceOval Office

AI Summary

President Nixon met with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Henry Kissinger, and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson to discuss the strategic importance of NATO and global defense priorities. The participants analyzed the role of conventional versus nuclear deterrents and evaluated international security concerns in regions including Vietnam, the Middle East, and South Africa. Nixon emphasized the necessity of maintaining alliance cohesion and credible defense capabilities while monitoring Soviet geopolitical ambitions and SALT negotiations.

NATOUS Foreign PolicyDeterrence StrategySoviet UnionVietnam WarDefense Spending

Audio

NARA Description

On February 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Melvin R. Laird, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Henry A. Kissinger, and Nigel Henderson met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:35 pm to 12:48 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 460-005 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 460-5

Date: February 26, 1971
Time: 12:35 pm - 12:48 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Melvin R. Laird, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, and Henry A. Kissinger;
members of the press were present at the beginning of the meeting

     Greetings

     Photograph

     Seating

     Schedule

Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson entered at 12:38 pm

     Photograph

     US foreign policy
          -Vietnam
          -Middle East
          -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
               -President’s position
          -Soviet Union
               -Soviet Union’s concern about People’s Republic of China
                     -NATO
          -Soviet Union’s Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] positions

     NATO
        -Future NATO bases
        -Types of deterrents
             -Moorer
             -Conventional
                   -President’s view
                   -Dwight D. Eisenhower

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-020. Segment declassified on 09/21/2018. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[460-005-w001]
[Duration: 5m 16s]

     World trouble spots
         -Type of deterrents
               -Nuclear
         -British viewpoint
               -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
         -National self-interest
               -Weapons trade
               -Libya
                     -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ [USSR] presence
         -Third world nations
         -The President’s view
               -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] allies
                     -The President’s previous conversation with Edward R.G. Heath
                     -Belgium

                            -(Democratic Republic of the) Congo
                 -Effect on other countries
           -South Africa
                 -Arms embargo
                      -US position
           -Black nations
           -US defense
                -Compared with the United Kingdom
                -The President’s previous conversations with Henry A. Kissinger
           -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
                -Importance
                      -The President’s policy
                            -Disagreements among members
                            -US interest
           -Europe
                -European defense program
                      -Cost

******************************************************************************

     Farewells

Laird, Moorer, and Henderson left at 12:48 pm

     Middle East
         -Briefing paper

Kissinger left at 12:48 pm

Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I'll take care of it.

All right.

How are you?

She's very good.

Ladies, we have a long meeting today.

I know it's been a while.

You're a busy man.

This is the second one.

I'd like to hear from you.

If you'd like to get a little photograph of your private album, we wouldn't wish.

We have a lady's bike.

Which is the lady's bike?

Is it right?

I don't know.

We have some battle speakers now, though, and you can send those over and put them on his plan.

I thought I made those available.

Yes, sir.

Sit down here.

I know you're having lunch with the secretary.

I know he's busy out here.

All right.

We'll be right back.

At the present time, we are concerned about the hotspots in the world.

Actually, for us, one is Vietnam, the most immediate hotspot.

And that is a very dangerous one.

And it has been hard to stare unnaturally on NATO for reasons of your harm, Major, than I am.

I have always believed, long before I came to this office, since I have been here, that when you look at the important rather than the urgent, NATO stands at the top of the list.

And we have to realize, too, that as far as our Soviet jets are concerned,

That's still what they're getting into.

Oh yes, they're worried about China, but that's 10 years from now.

You know, that's what they are.

But then they're all, when you look at their, whether it's, whether they're talking about a soul, you look at the soul, their soul positions, their soul positions,

while it's encouraging to know they're not run cold, their salt positions aren't always trying to get our forward areas.

They know that's the move, Jim, that they had to burn the land for all these other reasons.

For that reason, at this time, we can't.

to keep the screw lines together and find a new basis, or a better basis for a future supporter.

And in particular, because I'm a horrible type, and I said it in 6th Street, if we had...

we can develop what I think is a more credible, conventional deterrent.

Because we, in all ways, how much has happened even since you took over, but I remember we could talk with great credibility about

Well, we just wanted to know that this nation, as well as all the other nations, and they all do a very great job.

And we, if you wish, we hope to be successful in, shall we say, cooperating with you.

Well, we'll see you later.

I'll try to get a further response there.

Can you, can you, can you, that's all right.

You can't do anything about it.

All right, thank you.

Right.

But, you know, I don't get it.

I don't get it.

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