Conversation 478-007

TapeTape 478StartTuesday, April 13, 1971 at 11:17 AMEndTuesday, April 13, 1971 at 12:18 PMTape start time01:51:22Tape end time02:48:48ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Scali, John A.;  White House photographer;  Bull, Stephen B.;  [Unknown person(s)];  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOval Office

President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, Henry Kissinger, and John Scali met to integrate Scali into the White House team, specifically to manage press relations and provide strategic counsel on foreign policy. The President emphasized a cautious, long-term approach to publicizing his China initiative, prioritizing secret diplomatic channels over immediate publicity to avoid alarming the Soviet Union. They also discussed future personnel changes within the State Department and Defense Department, the strategy for a potential summit with the Soviets, and the ongoing handling of the Vietnam War.

China InitiativeForeign PolicyPublic RelationsState Department ReorganizationVietnam WarSoviet Union

On April 13, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, John A. Scali, White House photographer, Stephen B. Bull, unknown person(s), and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:17 am and 12:18 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 478-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 478-7

Date: April 13, 1971

Time: Unknown between 11:17 am and 12:18 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman

     President’s conversation with Charles W. Colson

Henry A. Kissinger and John A. Scali entered at 11:19 am; the White House
                                                                     Conv.photographer
                                                                            No. 478-11 was
                                                                                       (cont.)
present at the beginning of the meeting

     Scali on payroll

     Photograph

     Scali’s assignment
           -Orientation
                 -Difficulties
                 -First weeks
                 -Contribution
                       -Long-term
                 -Differences from previous career
                 -Senior consultant
                 -Ronald L. Ziegler
                 -Taking initiative
                 -Colson
                       -Responsibilities
                 -Herbert G. Klein
                 -Staff meetings
                       -Outgoing matters versus internal ones
                 -Decision making
                 -Foreign policy
                       -Kissinger
                       -Peter G. Peterson
                             -International economic policy
                             -Speeches
                       -Kissinger
                             -Relationship with
                 -Kissinger
                       -Importance
                       -Responsibilities
                             -Television commentators
                                   -John W. Chancellor

                 -Priorities
                       -Networks
                       -Wire services
                             -Radio
                       -Columnists
                       -Magazines
                       -Networks
                       -Wire services
                       -Columnists
                             -Stewart M. Hensley
                             -Arthur P. Henderson
                             -Hensley

Scali’s assignment
      -Analysis of television industry
            -Kissinger
            -Klein

President’s People’s Republic of China [PRC] initiative
      -Scali
      -Background
      -Press corps
      -State Department
      -Announcements
            -Timing
      -State Department
            -Foreign Service
            -Kremlinologists
            -Charles E. (“Chip”) Bohlen
            -Llewellyn E. (“Tommy”) Thompson, Jr.
      -William P. Rogers
      -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
      -State Department
      -USSR
            -Aleksei N. Kosygin
            -US policy
      -Ping-pong team
      -Forthcoming announcement [Relaxation of trade and travel restrictions with the
            PRC, April 14, 1971]
      -Publicity
            -Dangers

                -USSR
                -Ping-pong team
                -US goals
                -Benefits
                -Announcement, April 14, 1971
                -Ping-pong team
          -US relations
                -Warsaw
          -Chinese
                -Compared to Soviets
          -USSR
                -Ping-pong team
                -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                      -Announcement
          -State Department
                -President’s Position
                -Rogers
          -President’s initiative
          -National Security Council [NSC]
          -President’s 1969 world trip
          -Dangers
          -NSC
          -Critical areas
          -Sensitivity
          -Scali’s recommendations
                -Ping-pong team
                -President’s image
                      -Demonstrators
                            -Vietnam
                      -Farsightedness
                -President’s schedule
                      -Visit to San Diego
                      -Camp Pendleton
                            -Timing
                      -Demonstrations

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[National Security]
[478-007-w002]
[Duration: 15s]

      Foreign visit
             -The President’s schedule
                    -[Hassan, King of Morocco] [Moulay] King Hassan II
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     Foreign visit
          -Timing
          -News stories

     Kissinger’s schedule
          -Scali’s briefing
          -Peterson

     President’s schedule
          -Camp Pendleton visit

     Scali’s role
           -Advocacy
           -Preparation for Ziegler’s briefings
                 -Benefits
                 -Announcement of relaxation of PRC trade and travel restrictions
                      -Walter L. Cronkite, Jr.
                      -Wire
                      -Television
                 -Framework
                 -Possible changes
                 -Atmosphere
                 -Access to President
                 -Possible use
                      -Consultant
                 -Possibilities
                      -Speech
                      -Television
                 -Problem
                      -Kissinger
                      -State Department

               -State/Defense Department
                     -Ziegler
                     -Robert J. McCloskey
                     -Coordination
               -Haldeman
                     -Need to study problems
                           -Timing
               -Value
                     -Ideas
               -Raymond K. Price, Jr.
               -William L. Safire
               -Klein
               -Richard A. Moore
                     -Location
               -Ziegler
               -Colson
               -Moore
               -Price
               -Safire
               -Relationship with Kissinger

******************************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 12/06/2019.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[478-007-w011]
[Duration: 1m 5s]

     Henry A. Kissinger’s relationships
          -Media reports
          -California
          -Florida
                -Charles G. (“Bebe”) Rebozo
                -John A. Scali’s recent trip
          -Jamaica
          -Bahamas
          -John A. Scali
                -Florida
          -California

             -Camp David
                 -Women

******************************************************************************

     Scali’s role
           -Emotions
           -Issues
           -Publicity
                 -Carl M. Yastrzemski
           -Goals
                 -News stories
           -Foreign policy
                 -PRC initiative
                       -Significance
                       -Press
                       -Credit for Administration
                 -Vietnam
                       -Relation to PRC initiative
                 -Issues
                 -PRC
                 -US initiatives

     Scali’s office
           -Location
           -Executive Office Building

Scali and Haldeman left at 11:46 am
      Henry Cabot Lodge

     Scali
             -Forthcoming Kissinger briefing
                   -Summit meeting
                         -Need for confidentiality
                               -Haldeman
                               -George P. Shultz
                               -John D. Ehrlichman
                         -Dobrynin
                               -Schedule
                   -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] negotiations

                      -Need for confidentiality
               -PRC

     US/USSR relations
         -Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin’s replacement
         -Berlin
               -[David] Kenneth Rush’s meeting with Pyotr A. Abrassimov
               -Arrangements

     Henry Cabot Lodge

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 10/17/2018. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[478-007-w004]
[Duration: 13s]

     Henry Cabot Lodge
          -Possible conversation with Giovanni Battista Motini [Pope Paul VI]
               -Italy
               -Communists

******************************************************************************

     Henry Cabot Lodge
          -General Nguyen Van Thieu
          -Lieutenant General Duong Van (“Big Minh”) Minh
          -Forthcoming trip to Vietnam
          -Health
          -Beverly, Massachusetts
          -New York establishment
          -New England upper class
                -Harvard University
                -Cambridge, Massachusetts

     Eastern establishment
          -Barry M. Goldwater

                  -Opinion
             -Boston

     Vietnam

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 10/17/2018. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[478-007-w006]
[Duration: 14s]

     Vietnam
          -Henry Cabot Lodge’s view
               - Giovanni Battista Motini [Pope Paul VI] and Prisoners of War [POWs]
          -Timing

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     Vietnam
          -People’s Republic of China [PRC] and USSR relations
          -North Vietnam
               -Negotiations
               -Hanoi

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 10/17/2018. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[478-007-w012]
[Duration: 37s]

     Italy
             -Henry Cabot Lodge’s view
                  -Giovanni Battista Motini [Pope Paul VI] and Communist countries
             -US and Vatican relations
                  -John A. Volpe and Giovanni Battista Motini [Pope Paul VI]

                -The President’s possible conversations with American cardinals
                     -Communists
                     -Catholic Church
                     -Protestant churches

******************************************************************************

     People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Taiwan
          -Lodge’s view regarding US/Japanese initiative
                -United Nations [UN] representation
          -State Department
                -Sponsorship
          -Dual representation
          -US policy
          -John B. Connally’s views

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 10/17/2018. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[478-007-w013]
[Duration: 56s]

     The People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -Chou En-lai’s analysis
               -Enemies
                    -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                    -Japan
                    -US
                    -Japan
                          -Ping Pong team

     People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Japanese relations
          -US policy
          -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
          -US and Japanese joint initiatives regarding United Nations [UN] representation
               -Henry A. Kissinger’s view

******************************************************************************

Japan
     -Textiles
          -Eisaku Sato
          -Armin H. Meyer

      -David M. Kennedy
      -Marshall Green
      -Taiwan
      -Korea

Korea
     -William J. Porter
          -Assignment
     -Green

State Department
      -William H. Sullivan
      -Reorganization
           -Scope
                 -Assistant secretaries
      -Resignations
      -Replacements
      -Promotions
      -Secretary

Cabinet
     -Resignations
     -Melvin R. Laird
     -Rogers
           -Career aspirations
     -John N. Mitchell
           -Martha (Beall) Mitchell
     -Maurice H. Stans
     -George W. Romney
     -John A. Volpe
     -James D. Hodgson
     -Shultz
     -Elliot L. Richardson
           -State Department

State Department
      -Nelson A. Rockefeller
      -Richardson
           -Qualifications
           -Career
           -Conditions

Defense Department
     -Resignations
     -David Packard

President’s second term
     -Changes in government
     -First term

Vietnam
     -Kissinger’s conversation with Frank F. Mankiewicz
           -Democrats
                 -Hubert H. Humphrey
                 -Robert F. (“Bobby”) Kennedy
                 -Troop levels
     -Kissinger’s call from McGeorge Bundy
          -USSR
     -Kissinger’s response to Bundy
     -Moral issue
     -Deadline for withdrawal
     -Negotiations
          -Issue
          -Withdrawal
          -North Vietnam
          -Deadline for withdrawal
           -US options
           -Cease fire
           -Deadline
           -Bombing
           -Withdrawal
           -Bombing
           -Prisoners of War [POWs]
           -Cease fire
           -Residual forces

        -Bombing
            -USSR

USSR
    -Summit

Vietnam

Bundy
    -Telephone calls to and from Kissinger
    -Career

Secretaries of State
     -President’s conversation with Charles G. (“Bebe”) Rebozo, 1967
           -Dean G. Acheson
           -John Foster Dulles
     -Bundy
           -James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
                 -1960 recommendation

Bundy
    -Career
    -Qualifications
    -Harvard University
    -Haldeman
    -Shultz
    -Liberal position
    -William P. Bundy
    -Call to Kissinger regarding Vietnam

Vietnam
     -Mankiewicz’s views
     -Bundy’s defense of administration’s Southeast Asia policy
          -Bombing
     -Robert S. McNamara
          -Compared with Bundy
     -Mankiewicz’s views
          -Liberal

Press
        -Time

                 -Ziegler
             -Newsweek
             -Hugh S. Sidey

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:46 am

     President’s schedule

Bull left at an unknown time before 12:16 pm

     Press
             -Phone calls to Kissinger
             -Ziegler

     PRC
             -Press
             -US initiatives
                   -Timing
             -President’s position
             -USSR
                   -US relations
             -Vietnam
             -North Vietnam
                   -Chou En-lai’s visit to Hanoi
                   -General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                   -Negotiations

Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:46 am

     Ziegler’s schedule
          -Location
          -Cabinet briefing

Bull left at an unknown time before 12:16 pm

     PRC
             -Intervention
                   -Laos
                   -Cambodia
                   -Administration’s position
                   -State Department

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 04/30/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[Duration: 5s]

     People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -US reconnaissance flight
               -Possible People’s Republic of China [PRC] response

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     People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -North Vietnam

     Press

     Vietnam
          -Bundy’s reaction
          -Mankiewicz
                -Reaction to Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr.
          -Calley case
                -President’s role
          -George C. Wallace
          -Ronald W. Reagan

     1972 elections
          -President’s re-election
          -Foreign policy
          -Economy
                -Research and Development [RAND] Corporation Board

     Stock market
          -Rise
          -Howard Stein

     Vietnam

          -Kissinger’s possible conversation with Stein
          -President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
                -Press reaction
                -Structure
                -Emotion
          -Congress
          -President’s speech, April 7, 1971
                -Compared with President’s November 3, 1969 speech
                -Withdrawal issue
                -Resignation
          -Possible consequences of a loss of Vietnam
                -Public reaction
                      -Casualties
                      -Calley
          -Negotiations
          -Settlement

     USSR
         -Summit meeting
         -SALT negotiations
         -Summit meeting
              -Leonid I. Brezhnev
         -USSR/US relations
              -Brezhnev’s position
         -Summit meeting
              -Possible trip to Moscow by President
              -Attitude of Russians toward Americans
              -Symbolism
              -SALT negotiations
         -Non-aggression pact
              -Dobrynin

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 10/17/2018. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[478-007-w010]
[Duration: 22s]

     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
          -Non-aggression pact
               -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
               -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] possible response

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                Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]-European Security Conference
           -Negotiations
           -US policy

     President’s re-election
           -Importance
           -Connally
                -Tenure
                -Qualifications
          -Richardson
          -Connally
          -Richardson
                -Cabinet
          -Connally
                -Qualifications

Bull and an unknown man entered at an unknown time after 11:46 am

     President’s schedule
          -Ziegler
          -Yastrzemski
          -Press

Kissinger left at 12:16 pm

                -Wire service
           -Open Door Hour

Bull and the unknown man left at an unknown time before 12:18 pm

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 12:16 pm

     Unknown activity

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 12:18 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

There it is, all set, all framed.
It's all you get free, everything else you take for it.
But I suggest that John will be very difficult for you for a while.
And it's a pleasure to actually get to know you.
start charging and so forth and so on.
But feel within that first couple of weeks, do anything you want.
Move around, talk to people.
Just get the feel of everything.
Get the feel of the system.
How you want to sit in the meetings and so forth.
Talk if you want to.
Don't talk if you don't want to.
Don't feel that you're expected to do anything.
You're not expected to do anything.
If you've got thoughts on that, you know, mention race and so forth, but don't, what I'm getting at is that you don't do, you don't do press, don't do anything.
There will be basically your contributions are a long range rather than just a...
a short range contribution.
Don't think that you have to do something on this or that or the other thing at the moment.
Because this is going to be a very different kind of a world for you.
It's going to be a very, you've got to work with a lot of different people and so forth and so on.
So just Uber out, bail in, get your, get acquainted with everything.
Take time off to think.
You know, do anything you want.
Just be allowed to do that.
Don't expect that you have to do anything.
You have to do it, but don't expect you have to.
Sometimes I know it.
Why else?
Jesus Christ, I've got to start right in there and get something to prove it on.
Here, we don't expect any of you because you're a senior consultant in the
You're not in the group, you know, all the young charters and so forth, and we expect you right away to start burning the place up.
And you watch your judgment and so forth.
Now, in that line...
As I've told you before, you can actually, we'll have no problem in your, I mean, you as a sailor, you as a sailor should hit it off extremely well.
But it's very important that you take the initiative to sit down and talk with Ron about all the problems and so forth and raise any questions.
You know Colson well, he actually is in charge of another, he's not a press man, but he does do a lot of work on following up on a number of things we do with the press.
So you should feel free to talk to him, right, about various things.
The client saying, you know, just chat.
Do you have feelings that some of them may be missing opportunities, that they may be
overstepping, understepping, or not stepping at all, they should be, then you just, you know, step in, talk to them.
Much better meetings are even if you sit in.
Don't waste your time on meetings if you're going to avoid it, but which ones are worth a dance?
The ones where they're working on, yeah, things that relate to what goes out is not trusted to them, just, you know,
You know, when we get into decision-making things, it just got to be, you know, that's right.
Well, let's go forward.
Let's go forward.
Your primary assignment is, of course, in the foreign policy area.
And in that area, you have to be very close to Henry.
And also, Henry said I'd be close to Peterson.
Now, it's very important to Peterson because that's an economic policy, and that's a fascinating area, which isn't going to be
It doesn't appear to be sedentary at the moment, but it will become so as time goes on.
I think you would be very hopeful to sit down and talk with Peter.
Peter's got some ideas about, you know, speeches and things of that sort that you think we should make in this field.
And you, of course, know a little bit about that, so we're getting ready for the end.
It's the most important relationship that you have and the reason I asked Henry to get you to come in now is the relation with Henry.
And it's going to be difficult for both of you because you're going to be in his job and so forth.
But on the other hand, there's nobody more interested than Henry.
trying to get this, get our program to sound right.
He has the private responsibility for selling it.
The main thing that I want you to have in mind with regard to Henry is this.
He's our biggest gun.
He's our biggest gun in terms of, not public statements, but in terms of background, and he has believability, credibility, et cetera, et cetera, respect among, you know, people you can count on.
Now, we can't use that gun.
I don't mean to, for the time that I've been here, just see it as sort of an old-time saving, or it's not happening.
On the other hand, the main thing is to be sure that gun is used with great effect.
Where are we to count?
For example, Henry did a very good job last week.
He spent a lot of time with the television companies.
He met Chancellor and a lot of others.
And it pays off.
These people that, my goal is to spend more time in the order of priority.
There are these.
There are the networks.
And next time, the two-wire services.
And when I include the networks, I throw in a radio, perhaps, two-wire services.
And then a much lower form of life, the comms.
Virtually hard to show.
And about that same low form of life that we
networks, wires, just, you mentioned, for example, Stuart Hensley.
Hensley is a fellow that we should know better.
He's a hell of a good writer.
I wrote something in the new summary today that he does.
He's a great writer in depth.
And I'd like, for example, for you to put Hensley with Henderson, you know Hensley.
I've met him once, but I wouldn't recognize him.
Oh, he's the heartiest John.
He's the best, by far, foreign policy writer, right?
Yes.
The most experienced, the most reliable.
And an advocate.
And an advocate.
He's not out to cut us up.
Right.
He's out to just give us what our czars do or hate us in the ass sometimes, and that's all we ask.
He's a close personal friend, and he can be reasoned with if you have a case.
Right.
And Stuart Hensley has enormous influence with his colleagues.
So, this is one.
Are there any others?
In other words, I'd like for you to sit down and analyze the whole television business.
I mean, I don't mean by that that a person can't be over the right field or center field and so forth.
You can't reach them with the edge of your head.
You just reach them off.
I don't mean by that.
But you know very well, very well that it is important to
When you've only got a few bullets, you've got to go use those bullets against the most vulnerable targets.
And that's where Henry is concerned, where, of course, Klein and the other people in their various respective fields, where they can use that something else again.
Hold on.
Now, one area that is particularly, that will be particularly important is when I noticed,
comment on the China thing.
And it's important that you have a talk with John about how all this began.
There's much more than meets the eye here.
For example, you probably were under the impression that much of the press corps is that the China Initiative came from state.
It may surprise you to know that the China Initiative
I think it started 20 months ago, the first time, I'm saying 13 months ago, was thoroughly opposed by the Foreign Service.
You know why?
Well, they're not there for it now.
You know why?
The criminologists chipped both of them early in the memo.
Tommy Thompson did it.
The State Department for it, so it's people not fit.
Will Rogers plays the game the way that he's supposed to.
They opposed it because they said it was going to make the Russians mad.
It sure made the Russians mad.
We didn't do it for that purpose.
Oh, maybe I did it then.
Who knows?
It makes them mad and it helps us.
But the point is, from the beginning, they only came around on it.
in the last, perhaps, two or three months.
Now, the reason being that is that they had the idea that we needed to account for the Russians.
We must do not interfere with the Russians.
Eric Anderson came to see anybody in state or anybody in the White House.
He raised a whole deal about what we were doing with China.
And he scared them all, but not me.
I feel that China makes for a long range of very, very important reasons.
Now, that brings us to the present.
It's very important now, we're going to have another announcement tomorrow, which you should go, John, now.
It's very important now that we, what we want to get every dividend we can out of this, that we not appear to exploit it.
The reason is that much as we want publicity, we're playing for much higher stakes.
We're playing for much higher stakes with the Russians.
And this thing was sending them right up the wall.
And we also were fighting for high station for the Chinese.
It makes good, it's very good copy here for us to be the people that are opening up the Chinese thing and so forth and so on.
But our major goal is to open it up.
and whenever a propaganda initiative will have the effect of hurting that goal we can't do it now there are reasons why at this point i think we can get when we and this is this is where subtlety is involved where we can get massive benefits this announcement is made tomorrow we're going to read into it a whole lot more and so this announcement is going to be made tomorrow we've been planning for months it just happens to fall right into the big bomb team see we didn't know the big bomb team was coming
We had some feeling that something was going to happen.
Oh yeah, because they had been dropping little hints around the world at the very same season for months.
We had been expecting some thaw.
But I suppose we were looking more to the fact that the thaw might come in Warsaw.
for the Chinese with their usual subtlety, as a thaw, call a thaw to the lack of something else, and press them all right in that way.
It comes in another way, right?
You'd never predict how the Chinese would act.
They're much less predictable than the Russians.
The Russians aren't there.
The Chinese are not predictable.
Because they are Chinese.
They're not predictable.
They're doctor and hair and blah, blah, blah.
You can tell that in yourself.
I can almost tell you what the reason is that he's back.
And particularly on this announcement.
Well, if the president were here, he'd be over here already.
So my point is, and this is the thing where John can probably get the word out.
He said, we don't want to start a blanket state about this.
And I say with the career guy, we're not trying to, even though they've got some, and they try to cut us up, but the White House,
We don't want to, we don't want to particularly have anything with regard to, say, with regard to Rogers, you see, because that's very important to maintain that.
But on the other hand, we cannot allow the men to exist, to get admitted that this whole thing, which was mine alone, and you recall I put it out, it didn't come from the NSC Saturdays, I put it out,
I think we should get a little further.
The danger is that this whole operation will stop again.
We've had it started once and it's done.
We shouldn't crow too early.
We don't want to crow.
We simply want to say we're watching.
The point is that I think it's important for John to know what the game is.
John, the main thing that you have to know is that the person
Everybody around here and everybody in the government and the NSC is not told everything.
They are not.
But I told Henry that I want you to know anything in these critical areas.
You must remember that when we are telling you these things, as I'm sure you know, that
Usually, there's a awful good reason not to tell others.
And so, you know what I mean?
And that's the reason I use the China names, because I don't know the better one.
It's a very doubtful situation.
Maybe in three weeks we'll want to tell them our story.
Maybe not this week.
Maybe a little of it comes out this week, as I suggested this morning.
We can get a little... Well, I want to be in the position of knowing so that I can recommend to you, perhaps, when.
That's right.
That's true.
The judge should always be in the position of how, not just when.
How, yeah.
Right.
Right.
Now, when I made that recommendation to you, to welcome the ping-pong team, I was knowing part about this background.
Yeah.
But I saw it as an opportunity to project it even further as the man who, at the time, demonstrated as a place he came about Vietnam.
We were already thinking far ahead of that.
That's right.
All right.
And that's what we must do.
I thought we could combine this with that other suggestion that I had made, namely to visit to San Diego.
You have a regularly great company.
Yes.
And we're looking into that.
I think that's a good idea, that Camp Pendleton, I think it's a good idea.
There's something to be said for doing it the week after.
Rather than, oh yeah, rather than, well, you see, I can't do it, I can't do it, basically, on the 17th, because that would be expensive.
Well, we can do it, but I can do it on the 9th or 30th, which is just about right, it might be just as well.
But, you see, there's a trade that's going on for the whole week.
They have another one anyway planned for May 1st.
Well, anyway, the time is, all these things can come at the right time, and sometimes it's best rather than to hit something far away and try to compete with it and start hitting it the week, three or four days later, and overwrite it.
You see what I mean?
I'm quite going in.
I understand that.
I understand that.
As long as I know what's going on first.
Correct.
Well, I'm going to meet with John this afternoon, Mr. Franklin, and I'm going to...
The point is, Henry, that John has to know the background on this stuff, and then he can give his feelings as to, now, this ought to move here, this ought to move here, here's what I mean.
I'll make sure that John is... Because he's... His value is going to be directly related to how much he knows.
And as a matter of fact, I do not have the opportunity to talk, but you talk.
Also, with Peterson, it's well in the heat.
There's a difference.
You'll hear his news work.
But it's interesting.
Well, when John was considering this job, I told him that if he came aboard, I'd see to it that he would be fully free.
Sure.
And then we can see what we can do.
Valid things.
The other thing John knows you should always do is be the advocate for whatever.
Getting things out rather than for coming up with the understanding.
Oh, absolutely.
Oh, absolutely.
The other thing you have to bear in mind, too, is that you always should advocate whatever you think should be done.
And maybe about one out of three times it will be done.
So you should advocate.
You should be the advocate.
I think, too, that he can be very helpful in terms of the preparation of Sigrid on his breathings.
Sigrid is extremely good on breathings.
Very good.
But, you know, it's good for him to sit around.
You don't know what the guys are going to pick up.
Of course, Sigrid will know, too.
He'll have some feelings.
But I think that he can sit in with those, with the breathing thing.
I mean, for example, Sigrid comes in and talks about what the hell I'm going to say about my wife's name on me.
But today we're both here because we have an announcement tomorrow on trade.
And, you see, we don't want to blow up the day.
We practiced a little yesterday, probably, if you were a principal, we could say, that's all right.
It won't be official until we say tomorrow.
But nevertheless, it's interesting.
Ziegler and John can be ashamed.
He's very sensitive to what the wires are likely to use, what the TV are likely to use, and how we sometimes may play it the other way.
That's really what we're getting down to.
Now, does that sound like a... No, it sounds like a highly workable framework, Mr. President.
Now, let me say, take a couple of weeks, though, to live with it, and then we'll talk again.
And if you think the framework is not, it has to be a moderation.
We can't change it.
But this is something where you're going to have to sort of feel it along and so forth.
Don't be too anxious.
I find so often that in this highly charged atmosphere around here,
that the first impression may be the wrong one.
And you'll probably find that after a couple weeks, well, no, this is the way it worked.
It worked this way.
If there's a door that is closed, then it should be open, let me know.
Or if there's one that is open, it's going to be closed, which might be the case, let me know.
In the meantime, however, our purpose here, as you know, is not to have you as a breeder.
We're not to have you as a leader.
in your ears and so on, where maybe at times, maybe at times when the issue is enormously important, you will have to be used as a big gun.
You understand?
You may have to make some, but you will have to determine whether that's right.
You'll know, you'll know.
We don't want you to get in the position
And so forth.
We have others who do that.
On the other hand, not being in that position, I think you can be even much more effective when you do something.
See?
Now you'll have to play that role.
For example, I have a mind job.
Not now, but after a month or so it may be that we'll want to make speech.
Maybe it's talking, then talk.
He'd be an excellent to do that.
He can go on television.
He can do the things, he can do all these things, provided you recognize that you have one very serious problem, and it's the same problem Henry's got, and that is the relationship with the state.
Do you understand that?
Because he's been over there.
And we are about to, we're not about to try to exacerbate it.
I think it's very important that you keep your, and actually your contacts around the state the best.
And I know you don't get the impression that our relations are sicker and sicker.
It's very closely coordinated.
But you can see some of these things rising and rising, and when you do, maybe this ought to be knocked down, maybe it ought to be built up.
When I talk with visitors,
And he asked me what I proposed to do.
I said I proposed to do virtually nothing except study what was going on for the first three weeks.
And it's going to be very difficult for me because I think you're right.
I am an activist.
And I want to get things done.
I want to get them done immediately.
I want to get them done well.
That's right.
Thank God.
And I have the ideas I think I can contribute.
Well, let me say that even in the first three weeks of your round, what I mean, don't be afraid.
Because I think you'll be more valuable in your own self if you get to feel it.
But at the same time, don't hesitate.
in one hour or not.
He's got an idea to put it out.
Don't worry.
It's one of the great ideas.
I think it's important, too, that you get people who I don't know very well, people like Ray Price, Staphire.
I mean, research and writing teams.
As I said, Klein.
Dick Moore.
Dick Moore, he's here now.
He'll be here next week.
And Dick Moore, that's about it.
Yes, that's right.
Ziegler, of course.
I think you should stick, though, at the top.
There's Ziegler, Coulson, Moore, Price, Sapphire, and so forth.
But the most important relationship you have is with Henry.
I understand.
And Henry, you'll have no problem working with him.
John, if you don't mind, is extremely, I just find it interesting and exciting.
Very frustrating, especially from time to time.
Frustrating, particularly when ideas that you have are not immediately implemented.
But the main thing that I think we all have to feel is the whole, and as I said, everything, of course, where the big issues, where the small issues have been sent to hell, the nickel-dime stuff, making publicity and so forth,
We're the big place of consent.
There are going to be times, and it's going to be terribly difficult, when we will have to sublimate our desire to make a good story to what we know is a larger goal.
We can't assure the larger goals because of the stories.
We've been very careful that way.
And right now, we're about to reap, we think,
I'm not sure that we could.
But I think the China story is the most fascinating story, and when it comes out, as it will, it'll be something for the history books.
I think it's completely opposite from what the press thinks.
I think we should get credit for it, and I think it could help you in the Vietnam picture.
I agree with Handel, if it's Handel's work.
Right.
Well, I guess people's minds often rely on something else.
But as a matter of fact, we are very anxious.
There are several things that can move in that direction.
The more Vietnam, the less can be out of the news now.
The more that other foreign policy issues can be in, the better.
The China thing is part of it.
That could just be the tip of the iceberg, and that's what we want to maintain.
We just want to maintain it for a little while.
That would be a few little things.
Where'd you put your office?
Where'd you put your office?
Where'd you put your office?
Where'd you put your office?
Where'd you put your office?
Where'd you put your office?
Where'd you put your office?
Where'd you put your office?
But the main thing is, the main thing is, I would love, and I don't think you're, and I know you have no problem with
I won't tell him, though, about the sun that came yet.
Oh, God, no.
I don't want anybody to know about the sun that came.
The only one that knows is Paul.
Paul says it all.
Jesus Christ, if that ever gets out, gets down the drain, the sun that came should be absolutely between us until the river again gets back.
And also the salt came.
Don't talk about the salt came.
It's all games, I mean, but the China game is something else again.
They should know their background and tell them why we don't want a broker.
Stanley, I thought I'd have to bring in three placement in for five minutes this afternoon because there's a meeting.
It's just a technical thing between Russia and the Prasimov that I've set up for Berlin for Friday.
And I'll just review the arrangements with them.
It will take five minutes, but it shows them that this channel has some uses for them.
I won't say anything else except the technical arrangements of that meeting.
There are team men out there going in and calling on big men.
It wouldn't take much to tip him.
That's right.
In the other direction.
Oh, he wouldn't talk a lot before he goes.
Oh, yeah, he's an honorable guy.
He's stupid, but he's honorable.
But he's weak.
He's weak and stupid.
I'm surprised.
He isn't very smart, is he?
No, he's not smart.
And he's also been declining.
He wasn't much to begin with.
Of course, living up there in Beverly, you just have no idea what's going on.
Well, let's just New England.
And then the New York establishment isn't much good, but they still have a certain vitality because New York is a vital city.
But the New England upper class is a really boring bunch.
They're really incestuous.
That's right, and they only see each other, and they take in each other's washing, and then they're terribly influenced by the harper.
Nothing is more boring.
Everyone says how exciting it is to live in Cambridge.
It is the most boring city ever built, and unbelievably boring, because people are so excited about something else.
Well, you know, I've been fascinated by the gold business.
Goldwater was really right about the Eastern Statue, wasn't he?
Oh, yeah.
He was stupid the way he did it, but he was right.
Oh, yeah.
He was absolutely right.
And the Boston one is particularly weak.
President, if we get a Chinese relaxation going and a Soviet relaxation going, I think we have an almost 50-50 chance to settle with Hanoi.
Hanoi will not be able then to stand alone.
What do you think about his thought?
I agree.
What the hell is he talking about, this business about an initiative for Japan?
I think this would be a great mistake.
Well, I didn't see this paper.
No, for two reasons.
Well, what he in effect is saying, he is recommending the State Department's position with accepted Japan, and we should put it forward simultaneously.
I agree completely with Connolly.
There's no sense sucking around the whole...
Did we ever get a reply from Sato from our ex-combatant?
No.
What the hell was he doing?
Well, he was weeping all over our ambassador, but he didn't give us a formal reply.
Oh, yes.
and it it works you know it's about it it's going to require a much greater bucking give it a title a little more or something and give it a career a little more
In fact, the quicker we can get John Porter out of Korea, the better off we are.
Well, he's going to be assistant secretary here.
He'll be better than...
He's more manageable than Green.
Yeah.
Well, Mr. President, after you get re-elected... Well...
After you get re-elected, the State Department must be cleaned up.
Well, a whole bunch.
A whole bunch.
Because this, the country really cannot afford it.
Listen, the very Assistant Secretary is going to go.
Every goddamn moment.
I mean, they're all going to go.
And I don't know where we're going to find others.
Wow.
That can be done.
Outside of government?
Some from outside of government, and I just lop off the whole top echelon and promote some younger guys.
Yeah.
Who then always, if you get a strong Secretary of State over there, who is, you're a man.
That's right.
And then they're oriented towards him.
He's got to work them harder.
But he doesn't want my ideas.
He has an opportunity.
I think the entire city, the entire cabinet, people's eyes, everyone.
And then, we will, we only have two.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Is he looking down on us?
There he has to go.
Absolutely.
I can't already remember.
He probably has to go.
I don't think so.
Now, Rogers actually will want to.
I think he has to go.
All Rodgers is looking for, I'm sure, is one true bit of, like, so-called, quote, triumph.
And then you want to go back to the good life, because he likes the good life, you know?
Now, what do you do?
Mitchell wants to leave.
Sure, because he's tired.
And he's got a hell of a problem with his life.
All right.
Stan should go.
He's tired and worn.
And he's got a man full of issues.
There's only one man in the group.
Hutch is okay.
I mean, it's hard to find anybody who's a secretary of labor.
You could let me bring him back.
You'd actually keep Jones.
There's only one man in the camp that I would keep.
Richardson.
Richardson.
I have a plan for him.
Now, Richardson.
I just fought them all off.
And then Richardson and I would... We might have to put him in the state...
I don't know anybody else at the moment.
But the problem about Henry with Rockefeller is that I don't think he's trustworthy enough to be insane.
The fella would clean it up, but he'd be tough.
I mean, he'd be, uh... Tough, yes.
Without knowing him.
And he might get under their spell, too.
You've got to remember, he sits around with people, and he could be his man.
He's a radical, so...
But Richardson would clean it up if we told him to.
Or do you agree?
If you want the hell...
Yes, ma'am.
Great honor.
I think if we tell him to, he'll do it.
But he would be a good secretary today.
I would start.
Here's what I would do.
Richardson would have great value there.
I would start.
I would just start.
This is the top of the pool for you.
I said, I want you to know that I, on these conditions, I am naming everybody, every other secretary of state, and every assistant secretary of state, from the dominant, clean house, once and for all.
And the same we do in the defense department.
I clean every bastard out of there.
As a matter of fact, Packard would be perfectly accurate.
Packard's perfectly accurate.
The new secretary at this stage, he's an honest, decent man.
I'm Packard.
He deserves it.
But that's the way I think about it.
I think you've got to think about these things.
But I've been on the market a whole bunch of those.
I think in your second term, Mr. President, you can make a revolution in this country.
In your first term, you'll have saved the country.
But in your second term...
One thing Mankiewicz said this morning to me that I thought was fascinating, he said if you the country were president, or any Democrat, other than Robert Kennedy, he had to say that, were president, there would be more troops in Vietnam today than there are.
The war would be more active.
If any Democrat had tried to do what you did, there would have been a revolution in the country.
That's cosmetic, but... That's a... That's a...
You know something, Henry, your cold fascinates me very much, everybody.
Well, I... You're not overstating it now.
Oh, no, I was sent to...
I transcribed it, but... Tell me again, don't be silly.
See, he called you to go in.
He had called me in the morning about this conversation with the Soviets, and he wanted to know what he should say to them.
Yeah.
And he was ready to battle on about other things, too.
So I called him in the evening to reply to what he could say.
But I didn't raise the issue with him at all.
He raised it with me.
He said he thought you had done it again.
He said there was only one issue.
And I frankly thought deadline.
And I said deadline.
He said, no, no, no, that's not deadline.
That's not deadline.
You know what Deadline is?
It's really only raised by those who question what person wants to lose, but who's first.
That's right.
Has no significance for Hanoi.
It can't do us any good with Hanoi.
You can argue it doesn't do us any damage, but you know it can't do us any good.
It is a direct challenge to you.
If you gave the deadline, moreover, for next year, end of next year, they'd argue it should be six months earlier, a year earlier.
It wouldn't solve anything.
And now he said... Next year we will have set a deadline and we know that for Christ's sake.
We need one quick shot at the negotiations.
We'll either make it or not make it.
We'll bomb.
And then I would say after they turn down the ceasefire and the deadline, we'll say we've got to protect our troops.
The negotiations are ended.
We're going back to bombing.
The negotiations are ended.
We're withdrawing all our forces.
And we'll bomb while we're withdrawing.
And we'll withdraw all our forces.
We'll bomb until we get the prisoners back.
And until all the troops are out.
Right.
Unless they give us a ceasefire.
And I'd put, you can put that to a website, practically, and put it.
Pull it, advance.
And I think that's better than horsing around with residual forces and all this.
The residual forces are going to make it.
The bombing threat, just lay it right out there, all right, in his voice.
And we would.
We'd just bomb the hell out of it.
And we'd race over the Soviet.
But this all assumes that we don't have to deal with the Soviet.
No, not necessarily.
I don't know.
After we've cut the summit from the Soviets, we've cut from them what they can give us.
What can they do if we start bombing next year?
You need to be very cold-blooded about it.
As long as we keep it there.
He doesn't call you given that he's... That's right.
You see, the significant call was the call he made to me in the morning.
The fact that I returned it in the evening made me technically, made me initiated by him.
He put the call in and he doesn't call me unless he is, he's never come through when we needed him.
Never.
Nor has he ever done for anyone.
I've known Bundy for 15 years now, 20 years.
Bundy, he's never going to reach the top either because he never stands up for anything.
That's why he won't go to the top.
That's why I think if you want to get to the top... Me, you know, I told you.
I told you.
When I had a long talk with him in 67, you might know him for your storybook records.
We talked about secretaries of state and the ones he admired.
He admired Atchison and he admired Dawson.
But I said, well, now let's suppose you were picking secretaries of either party.
Well, he's as bubbly as everybody's secretary of state.
Scotty Russell recommended him in 1960.
Yeah, but not anymore, Mr. President.
I don't believe so.
You watch Fundy's career.
He's always done the fashionable thing.
He's always done it at the wrong moment.
I don't know him, sir.
I know him very well.
He's brilliant.
Outstanding leader.
Yeah, he's outstandingly brilliant.
He's totally opportunistic.
And he has no real substantive knowledge.
He's got a good, tough...
He would be good doing the sort of job Bob does, except he wouldn't be loyal.
Yes.
I mean, if you wanted to run something...
He'd be good in Schultz's job.
Those are things he does well and creatively on substance.
He doesn't have any strategic conceptions.
He's always, and he's always on the liberal side, by instance.
His brother, Bill, actually is better off.
He's a better man, a nicer man, too.
He's a nicer man.
But Mack, I take, is a good brother there.
He called, and his view was that
And he has totally initiated the conversation on Vietnam.
I didn't mention Vietnam to him.
Well, then, that's what he thinks, I mean.
Mr. President, if Matt Fundy offers to defend us on bombing in Southeast Asia, you can be sure it is safe in New York.
Because Matt Fundy does not go to dinner parties or offer to speak around
Unless the tide has already turned.
It's not the sort of man he is.
McNamara would do it regardless.
Bundy would do it only if it's safe.
And he thinks right now there isn't as much steam as we all thought.
And...
You know, when Mankiewicz says that, he hopes you won't grow too much.
That means you're in the driver's seat.
Why shouldn't I grow?
I'm not going to.
Of course.
Well, why the hell should we take Mankiewicz's advice on anything?
That's right.
That's what he's done to us.
That's right.
All that all over.
Listen, these liberals, they always have it both ways.
Yeah.
They'll want it.
You watch.
If you put the squeeze on time, can I get a cigarette and tell them I've got a squeeze now?
Sure.
You see what I mean?
The time is we squeeze them, except for Sagi.
And on Sagi, and I can squeeze the bastards right now.
I can go back to their home base.
I just won't ask again on Sagi.
Don't you answer any more calls from Sagi?
Just the others?
You can do it.
And we've got to get the word to everybody else.
I tried.
I...
But if you want to do that, say it or do it.
Because I tell you, it's the fashion thing again.
Let them sweat for a moment.
By God, they'll be interested in the China story and a few other stories.
You see, if we pull off a few of these things in May and June, this is going to make everybody terribly cautious about tackling you again because it means every time that they've thought they had you on the road, you've had a few aces up.
up your sleeves.
And if China were under considerable pressure themselves, they wouldn't have made this move.
Because they're afraid of the Russians.
They're afraid we may move towards the Russians.
And they may want to get the Vietnam War settled.
Really?
You think that's the problem?
I don't know whether you remember this, Mr. President, but when Zhou Enlai was in Hanoi,
and everyone was yelling about China going into Vietnam, I think I said to you, I know I said to Hank, that it is at least as probable, and maybe, that this is the beginning of negotiations.
That was before, of course, the bad weekend.
That was before the bad weekend.
Mr. President, he's in a briefing now.
He's got about five minutes, but I can come in then.
Would you like me to drop the briefing?
No, no, no.
I don't want to interrupt the briefing.
No, no, no.
Well, that's an interesting thing.
That's an interesting thing.
Of course, you remember, too, though, Henry, and of course, I think even we were a little more junior than you to be, all this crap to the effect that China would intervene.
China would intervene.
They were never going to hit me.
They knew damn well they did.
But you were never worried about it.
I was never worried about it.
I never was.
I never thought...
The state was.
Jeff, do you remember everybody said the Chinese would know what they'll do?
I never saw what was in it for China to get in there, nor what was in it for Hanoi.
And...
He's fascinating.
All right.
I'm going to retract it today.
Well, it's interesting to know that Bundy feels it's turned to him.
That's what he, and... And Mankiewicz must feel the same way.
Mankiewicz was taken by Calley.
He said, you guys, I never believed that right wing stuff.
I don't believe it now.
But he said that Calley reaction shook me.
He said, well, it subsided so quickly, maybe it doesn't mean anything.
I said, well, it subsided in part because the president took charge of it.
If I had flaws around this country, there are crowds of 25,000 or 50,000.
Do you know that?
That's right.
That's what we were playing against here.
Well, if you win the election next year, and if we do well in foreign policy this year, and if the economy is going the way that any corporation, board, is not saying... Yeah, it's way up.
And that's what, of course, Howard Stein also said.
that it would go up to $1,100, $1,200.
Howard Schein may not have liked, I don't know whether he may not have been certain, but disappointed to speak, but he's got to realize that we're doing the right thing.
Mr. President, this thing... We might call him.
Yeah, this thing must go like... And just say, no, look, Howard, I just want you to go to him.
I mean, play the Chinese game a little bit.
Just watch this.
It's very, very interesting.
You know, things like that.
It's just as well to keep him a little closer
What we did here is that despite the fact that the press couldn't bear to give credit for what was really needed, that was a destruction of the emotional impact.
Anybody could have done destruction.
Anybody.
But very few could have done the emotional impact.
Well, Mr. President, not anyone could have done destruction.
I see too many of these speeches done.
Yeah, but to stand up so coldly, I mean, here, the whole country is screaming, or at least the whole literate country is screaming.
And you stand up coldly and in effect say, I'm sticking to my policy, because that's what you were saying.
And then the emotion at the end lifted it up.
but the combination of courage and emotion.
No, that I don't believe.
I mean, at that stage it still had to have some hell of an impact on me.
Well, I remember, Mr. President, on November 3rd...
It was cool.
I mean, now we're... Let us understand.
Not in winning.
People are sick of the war.
It isn't like November 3rd.
They were so glad they believed we'd win something.
It's all gone.
That's a year ago.
It's a year and four months later.
But there is no question that the people now say, well, I want to get out.
That poor son of a bitch wants to get out, too.
So I, that's what will happen.
They may not like it.
You know what I mean?
There's more of that.
It's resignation, not enthusiasm.
That is true.
Yeah, enthusiasm, I compare it there.
Not now.
It's resignation.
That is true, Mr. President.
See, that is the difference here.
Yeah, that is true, but...
the outrage, if we leave 45,000 dead and the communists march into Saigon, then we'll get a Cali reaction, then we'll laugh.
That's right, that's resignation.
But now a few good things happened.
People will think we knew all along what he was doing.
And of course, it re-pulled all the spectacular and such that this year... Let's not even think about that.
The only good thing that I'd like to see
It could happen, Mr. President.
I really think it could happen.
I think that will happen.
I just don't see how they cannot have a summit.
I mean, look at it from their cold-blooded point of view.
They may, after all, you don't like Brezhnev.
And you will just as soon screw Brezhnev.
But why should you expend your capital on somebody who is irrelevant to you?
They may not like you.
If this were 72, they probably would hang on.
But the fact is, President has just been elevated to the top spot, and you would be the first president to come to Moscow.
The Russian people are pro-American.
It would mean one hell of a lot of symbolism to them if they can get a salt agreement signed in Moscow so that they can...
It's a Moscow treaty.
He can claim credit for it all over the Communist world.
Incidentally, could you make a note, and I know that it's a silly thing to even think about, but why don't we consider the possibility of a non-aggression pact?
But what we can do is have a European Security Conference next year.
No, we agreed to that next year.
No, we agreed to it at the summit for next year, so you have a big conference next year.
Have that next year.
What the hell comes out of that?
Nothing but a conference.
But we can have a lot of nice little truisms about travel.
Well, it just keeps things moving.
I mean, at this stage of the game, if we can play a cold-blooded game in which we don't give anything away,
We can make them work for us, because I really think your re-election is essential for the country.
There just isn't anybody else.
Mr. Conway.
To run the country?
No.
He can run.
Not yet.
Maybe after he stays in office for a while.
He doesn't have you suddenly, Mr. President.
He's a great salesman, and he's tough.
No.
My son is something in person.
Only develops after 20 years of doing it.
That's right.
Well, he's been at it 20 years.
But I think it's a way of mine.
It's a...
But I think Connolly...
He's the only one that's got the guts to be president.
That's right.
No question.
Look at the whole group.
Who the hell do you think can be president?
Richardson can do it, but you can never let him.
No, and he wouldn't be tough enough.
He wasn't strong enough.
Connolly would be strong enough, but Richardson couldn't do it.
But Richardson would be a very good cabinet member.
Connolly would tend to be a little bit impulsive at times.
He's a little crude in his section.
President Ronis on the briefing.
This is Carly Skumski.
She's here for our presentation.
Oh, well, I beg your pardon.
President, you're going to have a lot of the water services.
Oh, great.
This is his award.
He's all starting to use it.
Actually, he wanted to do it last year, but the open door hours never really coincided with Boston's plane.
Yeah.
All right.
He's coming in.
Professor, I don't work here because I can't meet in five hours.
Excuse me?
No, sir.