Conversation 519-015

TapeTape 519StartMonday, June 14, 1971 at 6:10 PMEndMonday, June 14, 1971 at 6:45 PMTape start time04:44:25Tape end time05:11:10ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Woods, Rose Mary;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Rush, [David] Kenneth;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOval Office

On June 14, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Rose Mary Woods, Henry A. Kissinger, [David] Kenneth Rush, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 6:10 pm to 6:45 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 519-015 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 519-15

Date: June 14, 1971
Time: 6:10 pm - 6:45 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Rose Mary Woods

******************************************************************************

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 01/10/2020.
27s segment cleared for release. 53s remain closed as 519-015-w001.]
[Personal Returnable]
[514-015-w001]
[Duration: 53s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

******************************************************************************

[Personal Returnable]
[514-015-w001]
[Duration: 27s]

     The President’s schedule
          -California residence
                -Herbert W. Kalmbach’s role
                -Guest policy
                      -The President’s brother

******************************************************************************

Woods left and Henry A. Kissinger entered at 6:11 pm

     President’s schedule
          -Meeting with [David] Kenneth Rush

     Kissinger conversation with Ronald W. Reagan
          -Briefing

     Message to People’s Republic of China [PRC]
         -Content
         -Answer
               -Content
                    -Trip arrangements

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-028. Segment declassified on 05/01/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[519-015-w002]
[Duration: 29s]

    US message to People’s Republic of China [PRC]
        -Content
             -Trip arrangements
                   -Pakistan International Airlines [PIA] flights
                        -Procedures
                        -Fast response
                   -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]

******************************************************************************

    Message from Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
        -State Department role
        -Content
              -Five Power Conference on nuclear matters
        -Delivery to President
              -Impact
              -President’s Response
                    -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                    -Further discussion
                    -State Department role
                    -Dobrynin
        -William P. Rogers’ role
        -Possible outcome
              -Desirability of Five Power Conference
              -Chinese role
              -Preparation of response
              -Nature of Five Power Conference

    Rush meeting
         -Rush role in negotiations
         -Thanks for Rush role
         -Technical issues
              -Soviet presence
              -Discussion with Kissinger
         -Length of meeting
              -Discussion of German situation

    Willy Brandt meeting
         -Rolf Pauls
         -Rush

          -Necessity
          -Kissinger role
               -Brandt and Egon Bahr
               -Photographs

Rush entered at 6:12 pm

     Greetings

     Secret negotiations
          -Reasons

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 6:12 pm

     Refreshments

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 6:45 pm

     Secret negotiations
          -Reasons
                -Drawbacks of publicity
                      -Soviet reaction
          -Rush role
          -Kissinger role
          -Berlin role in larger mosaic
          -Soviet reaction
                -Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] possibilities
                      -Role of tension
                      -Problems of negotiators

     German-Soviet situation
         -Berlin as key
               -US strategy
               -Role of other actors

     View of President
         -Handling of foreign affairs
               -New York Times

     US foreign relations
          -Location of activity
               -Soviet Union-US

                    -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                    -MBFR talks
                    -Impact
               -PRC negotiations
               -Vietnam
                    -Public attention
                    -Possible negotiations
               -Larger context
          -Europe
               -US-Soviet Union relations
                    -Impact on Europe
               -US troop levels in Germany
                    -President’s decision
               -US-Soviet Union relations
                    -European fears
                    -Willy Brandt role [?]
               -PRC statement of support
                    -Romania
                    -Yugoslavia

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-028. Segment declassified on 05/01/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[519-015-w003]
[Duration: 14s]

     US foreign relations
          -Berlin agreement
                -France
                -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]

******************************************************************************

     US foreign policy
          -Berlin agreement
                     -France
                     -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                          -Soviet strategy

                          -Larger context

     President’s upcoming meeting with Willy Brandt
          -Willy Brandt optimism
          -Bahr
          -US desire for progress
                -Price

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number LPRN-T-MDR-
2014-028. Segment exempt per Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(1) on 05/06/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[519-015-w004]
[Duration: 33s]

     FOREIGN AFFAIRS

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

******************************************************************************

     The President’s upcoming meeting with Willy Brandt
          -MBFR
          -Brandt demeanor [?]
          -Election prospects in Germany
                -Free Democratic Party [FDP] strengths
                -Brandt
          -Economic picture
                -Productivity
                      -Level
                -Unemployment
                -Maurice Schumann [?]
          -Berlin Agreement

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-028. Segment declassified on 05/01/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[519-015-w005]
[Duration: 1m 57s]

     The President’s upcoming meeting with Willy Brandt
          -Berlin Agreement
                -European Economic Community [EEC]
                      -French ambassador
                      -Benjamin [last name unintelligible]
                            -Maurice Schumann [?]
                            -European Economic Community [EEC] sessions
                                  -Moscow
                            -[Unintelligible name]
                                  -Secretary of Berlin
                                  -Federal Republic of Germany
                      -Japanese
                      -Territorial structure of Berlin
                      -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin visit with Henry A. Kissinger
                            -French

******************************************************************************

     The President’s upcoming meeting with Willy Brandt
          -Berlin agreement
                -Negotiations

     Rush’s qualities

     Appreciation for President’s time

Rush and Kissinger left at 6:45 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I don't know what else we do out there.
Just say when the president is here, shall we put it that way to him?
When the president is there.
That's there.
We have a rule.
We have a rule.
We just have a rule that nobody, that we've got problems with his brothers.
I put it that way.
Don't you think so?
And until the next election, every time you come here, you're going to need that time to not be disturbed.
And you just know that we're not going to do it.
Okay.
I want to see a minute before you say that.
gave him a briefing.
I think we got him in a happy frame of mind.
We sent a message to the Chinese on Tuesday and said we had to have an answer because we had to set up the trip.
The answer came back today, preliminary, I mean, not formal yet, but on the essential points that suggest the dates are acceptable.
That they are going to let...
PIA start flying to the airfield so that they can test procedures and so that the surrounding countries are used to flight from that direction.
And they are really valid.
It's amazing how they did it so fast.
Yeah.
The majority of the Russians could do it just as fast as the Russians could do it.
Well, they don't have one-man rule.
The freedom has a message for us.
in which they are asking for a five-hour conference on nuclear matters, but which they are addressing to all heads of state, he thinks if he could come in for five minutes to hand it to you tomorrow, it would make a good impression in Moscow.
And all you have to do is to say you'll study it.
Five more hours.
It was an impression at the 24th Party Congress, please.
anything else with it.
But five or 10 minutes, and then we can ship it right over to the state.
It's not something we want to handle here.
That it's addressed to every head of state.
Well, we'll tell Rogers that he asked to see me, and then since you were free, we'd let him deliver it here.
Also, it means that something comes off it.
It's your channel.
Something may come out of that.
Well, they're delivering it anyway.
Not particularly, but we can handle that one other subject we can discuss with the Chinese when we see them.
This will take two or three weeks to prepare a reply for, and we will require preparedness.
It's not a summit meeting.
We can't refuse it, really.
Do you trust Russia very well?
Russia, yes.
Do you want to have a minute now?
Yes, that's what I wanted to tell you.
You could thank him.
All he knows is the Berlin part of the negotiations.
He doesn't even know about the summit.
He just knows that for reasons of your own, you want to be forthcoming on Berlin in a separate channel.
But if you could thank him for the discretion and delicacy with which he's handled it, it would be very much appreciated.
He has a number of technical issues.
I don't know whether you want to get him to the degree of a Soviet president.
I don't know.
Well, I can... You tell him to...
You don't need a long meeting as long as you thank him for this.
Yeah.
And let him tell you about the situation, shouldn't he?
Well, let's not.
Well, he must be here with Brandt, too.
Yeah.
But at the minute, I don't think we should have him with Brandt.
We shouldn't have Pauls and Rush sitting in the meeting.
Why do we have to have a talk with Brandt?
Well, if Pauls is in, you can discuss DeSantis with him.
Yeah.
His grandmother is a separate negotiator.
Yeah.
I think the best would be if you and Rob talked alone in his bar, and I came through another door, so that the picture touched you.
Do I see it right?
With Rob, with Barb.
Well, how are you?
Nice to see you, Mr. Mendocini.
Well, you seem to be surviving this over here at the church.
Well, I'm having a very interesting time, and I'm very grateful for the fact that you have requested that I meet you and that we stay at the Altman House.
I cannot disclose the reason now, but it's been just absolutely essential that we
We want Berlin to be
A bigger mosaic than just brewing along.
Now, the way that you've been playing it, there's a lot of room to keep that possibility open.
And I'm guessing that each other don't know anything about brewing or something to do with brewing.
Yes, we do.
Yes.
Yeah, let me say this.
It's not a compliment.
Another thing is that I'd like to get the agreement, Henry, for other reasons.
I'll tell you how I feel.
You can't move it now.
You've got to stay with it.
It'll be an enormous achievement in itself.
But when you see this thing open, you'll know what it wants.
historic significance that's why as i'm sure you see all this
All right.
All right.
Of course, it goes without saying that the reason a nation maintains forces is because of tension.
If you produce the tension, you, therefore, then can talk more comfortably about reducing the forces.
If, on the other hand, you do not produce the tensions, it's damn hard to reduce the forces, of course.
So, everything is like that.
We know that.
You know it.
You know it as lawyers.
There's a tendency sometimes that our state people who are good negotiators,
They seek wildly cheap shop to make it all cheap, and they just settle it here and so forth.
We never settled a damn thing.
Nothing.
If you've been sort of tied, it will be your package.
And at the present time, as far as the Russians are concerned, religion is something they very much keep from us.
They follow along with what we need to do.
That's right.
Now, therefore, we are going to pay a three-month retirement.
Yeah, that's correct.
He was just being quite the character, wasn't he?
Never made me work for him.
I must say, Mr. President, as a student of diplomatic history, this is one of the most intriguing.
The technical thing, Mr. President, I can't have an antidote.
I want to see sports.
Yes.
Law and science, gentlemen.
Well, you'll be happy about it if it comes.
If we have a kill, he'll be on the kill.
You might get one.
Absolutely.
Yeah.
I, I, Mr. Commissioner, I'd like to say to plenty of you that in your times, you could, you could, you could have witnessed a bomb.
He's poor swimming.
I had a chat with him one day.
He pushed me.
I didn't find him.
Didn't find him.
Oh, I haven't seen him in a while.
And he, as he was leaving, he said, I don't want to tell you something.
He said, I'm a strong Democrat.
I've been in the 90s all my life.
And so he said, I think the president is doing a masterful job of informing parents.
He said, oh, God, I don't know about the masterful president.
I can only see it from over here.
But he said, I think the pieces are falling into shape.
And he said, he's doing a fine job of telling the president how to do it.
Now that, that was a New York Times.
I haven't pulled it.
They'll flush it.
They'll flush it.
That's right.
But, okay, let me say this.
Let me say this.
Right.
which is most of the public money.
It's a solution.
It's the easiest.
One way or another, negotiation, possibly, looks quite well, but possible.
We also know whether there's any possibilities there, whether a negotiation contract is a dead end.
Once it's done, then we end it that way.
But it will be done.
And we've done it successfully.
If we pull it off,
But if you put it in a larger context, you know, if the question is so different from the rest of the world, it's because of the tempter.
Right.
And I don't want to say give up, but I'm sure it's kind of a responsible way.
All right.
It's a pretty difficult question.
If you had looked at it, you would have said, no, we didn't even tell him about it, but that was not a good time.
We would have lost credibility in Europe, too, if we didn't think about it.
I think we would have been most critical of this.
We'd be the ones who would lose faith in it.
Once it was the minds of the people of Europe.
Very simple.
Very well.
Now, it's your seas.
Yes, you say you can't separate these things.
And if you have the Europeans attending upon our terms, and upon our termination, as their shield against, let's say, the attempts of the Soviets to press their influence, you don't prove credible in Vietnam.
I've been made to feel critical of you for being there.
and have credibility in us to any drug, and then we don't want to use it.
And she was very courageous.
Retention of our food levels in Germany was one of the best decisions she made.
Which it really was essential that we do.
And when you have a movement in Europe, or maybe in some cases, toward the Russians, to indicate a high level of interest,
And the combination of will is data.
Very true.
All true.
It's all part of it.
Part of the grand scheme.
Well, they pointed out that the Chinese had singled out a special price to European countries that you had visited.
The two communist countries you visited.
The remaining you fought.
And you are aware, I'm sure, of the fact that in Berlin, the French have already involved the Russians.
And are showing a...
The one great thing you can allow the Russians to do is to divide.
This is why they want to create every subject as an isolated subject.
Because they have different people to deal with.
They can deal with all the weaknesses of Berlin by itself.
or the Moscow Union, or the US, or the FRC, or the European Security Council, or another group, and if they keep all these things isolated and divided, then if they keep people divided, then, of course, there are those who move forward, which is a very big constraint.
And as you say, I don't have an almost pathological determination.
There shouldn't be a link between just knowing so this all of a sudden people say it is for them, it is for them, and they just don't want to be for us.
They want to take us off.
They come issue after issue and make us do it again.
Now why?
Stay alive.
We just got to do what?
Why is that?
We may have to do better.
Try a little better.
And if we are better, then they're doing it.
Tell me this, what should, you know, branch here on a, it's not really an official, I don't know, but what should he hear from me when I see the car on the stage?
What does he want to say to me?
What should I say to him?
What do you want me to say to him?
Well, he is optimistic now about the progress of the program.
Tell me this.
But that's on the basis of future evidence.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Yes, that's right.
Uh, if we're making progress, I think we just have to use this energy as we've been moving too fast.
Good, Mr. President, but can we use every talent that we've recently gathered beyond just because we didn't seem over-anxious?
Yes, we can.
Not in depth, but offset, if you wish.
Uh, there's a big gap between us.
I'm going to bring up all set with you.
The, uh, the C.S.
and M.B.F.R.
You know, that person.
You said it's going to go through.
I mean, she's going to be so, you know, magnified and trapped.
Okay?
Even I've seen, you know, I saw this before.
I, you know, came up with Max, he played, uh, you know, he's always been a very pleasant dude.
I keep getting, of course, he's nervous, but
The chances are the FTP receives the same power.
for a very serious leadership, uh, struggle.
The whole day, the leader in that, he was thinking he was having a little bit of a possible compromise candidate for my fellow, but he's not for re-election challenge this fall, not for a vote.
So they're, they're faced with a real crisis in leadership.
It says two things.
One thing is, it prevents them from all the doubts and pressure them, because he's none of the hopefuls once again.
I'm curious as to why the Germans had this cushion.
They don't export, they don't export.
They have a practice of getting us to foreign libraries.
They can create a practice in other countries.
They can, but don't let me know how to solve it before it reaches us.
This is right.
I can still have balls.
It's just, uh, if you don't care that you're old, you're nothing.
You're not safe, that's all.
I'm telling you, I'm telling you.
Where did you go?
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
very close
cohesion we've been able to bring about, to demonstrate that at the session before last, this was after Schumann had been to Moscow, Svoboda brought up with the British ambassador the idea of, instead of saying, we are willing to say that the pictures of Berlin are not to be considered as a part of the personal state, as a part of the federal government.
And Sylvaniard said he wanted to take up that day.
He said, I'm trying to find money, but I've got time for it.
Saying that it is not a part of the territory or state structure of the federal government.
And I said, well, maybe we can't do this.
First of all, I obviously wouldn't think of going on something like this without the federal government.
And I said to myself, this is a complete derogation.
I walked with Louisa Dunn.
And the Japanese woke up the same way the British invested for them.
And so when your house is going to be built, it's part of the territorial state structure.
That's the whole thing on the table.
I'd like to pay this blood in goodness to the Germans.
The Jews as well, they're not as smart as the boy.
The reason came in today as four pages of language, which on various issues,
It should be this one.
Yes.
And it's very close to the French fort.
Yes.
Mr. Neal, we can't do that.
They've done a whole series of things since we started the separate channel.
They started a hard line, and they've really come on most of the two-thirds of the way to our position.
I think they've made a bigger concession.
They've made a bigger concession.
And they...
They...
I never thought anyone could tell a German situation with massive deception.
Yes, ma'am.
Thank you very much.
Well, I'm very pleased to meet you, Mr. President.
All right.
And I'm very glad.
As I said, cut it out.
Well, thank you very much.
Yeah.
Get it done.
Get it done.
And remember, it's a bigger play.
Maybe.
Maybe.
I can't promise.
No.
We'll see.
We'll know what the next three months.
Okay.
Thanks a lot.
See you tomorrow.
Yes.
Thank you.
I don't know.