Conversation: 529-014
Prev:  529-013 Next: 529-015Start Date: 27-Jun-1971 8:18 PM
End Date: 27-Jun-1971 9:14 PM
Participants:
Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Butterfield, Alexander P.; Andrews, Mark; Recording Device: Oval Office
Full Tape Conversation Start Time: 00:38:26
Full Tape Conversation End Time: 01:33:34
NARA Description:
On June 27, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Mark Andrews met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:18 pm to 9:14 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 529-014 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid:
Conversation No. 529-14 Date: June 27, 1971 Time: 8:18 pm - 9:14 pm Location: Oval Office 10 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) The President met with Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger’s trip to Paris Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm. Item for President Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) Butterfield left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm. Vietnam peace negotiations -Kissinger’s trip to Paris -Le Duc Tho -Xuan Thuy demeanor -Set up of negotiating area -Discussion of US proposals -Le Duc Tho speech -Consequences of failure -North Vietnamese questions -Kissinger’s response -North Vietnamese counter proposals -Precedent -Significance -Details -US withdrawal -Time frame -Prisoners of war [POW] release -Time frame -Political settlement -Nguyen Van Thieu -Nguyen Cao Ky -Political settlement -US response -Letter from President -Details -Laos and Cambodia Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 -Disposition -Indochinese future -Signing of agreement -International guarantees and supervision of ceasefire -Significance of counter proposals -Possible overthrow of Thieu, Ky and [Duong Van Minh ?] 11 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) -Next meeting -US changes in proposals -Focus on South Vietnamese government -Kissinger’s questions on North Vietnam counter proposal -Possible Thieu, Ky and Minh overthrow -South Vietnam acceptance of North Vietnam terms -Assurances -Coalition government Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) -International supervision -Thieu and Ky status -Next meeting -Danger of leaks -Consequences -North Vietnam counter proposal -POWs -US leaks -Benefits -Kissinger and David K.E. Bruce conversation -Chance for progress on China -Briefing of Bruce by Vernon A. Walters -Timing -Prior breakthrough -Significance of proposal -Future negotiations -Next meting -Secrecy -Timing -Bruce -William P. Rogers -Bruce and Rogers role -Further information -Kissinger’s conversation with Bruce Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm. Refreshments Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm. People’s Republic of China [PRC] negotiations -Significance -Kissinger’s conversation with Bruce 12 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) -Revelation of PRC contacts -Secrecy -Rogers -Discussion of PRC contacts with others -Bruce Soviet Union summit -Possibilities Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) Vietnam negotiations -History of Soviet involvement -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin -Le Duc Tho's role -Earlier proposals -Japanese parallel -Significance of Laos -Reports -I Corp Area -Past involvement -Possible impact -PRC -Thieu -House and Senate -Mansfield resolution -Pentagon Papers -Totality of story -North Vietnam intentions -US options -Kissinger's trip to San Clemente -Thieu's response -US options -East German report -Cambodia -PRC -North Vietnam activities -PRC announcement -Timing -Alexander M. Haig Jr. -Related to Soviet Summit announcement -US support for Thieu -Ky -Critique of President's policy 13 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) -Lyndon B. Johnson’s reaction Pentagon Papers -British Press Regarding Pentagon Papers -Roy H. Thompson lunch -John Freeman British government Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) -Edward R.G. Heath -Regards to the President -Demeanor in adversity -Reaction to Pentagon Papers -Effect on domestic politics -Official secrets act -Need for secrecy in diplomacy Pentagon Papers -Supreme Court action by President -Effects -Democratic Party -Effects -Hubert H. Humphrey -Humphrey and Johnson relationship -Edmund S. Muskie -Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy -Eventual result -Johnson -John F. Kennedy -Kissinger's comments to British press -President's reaction -Integrity of government -Justice -Freeman’s comments -President’s morality -President’s religious background -[Unintelligible name] Vietnam Peace Negotiations -Thieu’s fate -Impact of US Congressional action -Survival potential -Pentagon role 14 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. -Bombing -Bruce -Political implications -Nature of agreement -Ceasefire -POWs -Compromise of US and North Vietnam proposals Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) -Withdrawal offer -Date -POWs -Thieu and Ky -Thieu election strategy -Relationship to US presence -US role -Cambodia -Laos -Bombing of harbors -Size of US Army in Asia -Compared to PRC Army -Future US role -US position -Need for withdrawal -Role of bombing -Role of bombing -Effect of Senate actions -Mansfield Amendment -Kissinger’s talk to Hugh Scott -Gerald R. Ford -John C. Stennis -US meetings with PRC and Soviet Union -Kissinger’s conversation with Chou En-lai -PRC influence -Further Kissinger and President Contacts -Help for Kissinger -Haig -Security leaks -Winston Lord -Impact of announcement of PRC trip PRC -Announcement of President's trip 15 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) -Timing -Impact -Effect on Paris talks -Contact with Soviet Union -Bruce's mission -Kissinger trip to San Clemente -Informing William P. Rogers -Other travels Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) -Camouflage for PRC trip -Prevention of leaks -Dobrynin's contacts with Kissinger and Rogers -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] -Mutual and Balances Force Reduction [MBFR] -Bruce -Rogers and Congressional committees -Dean Rusk Foreign Policy initiatives -Announcements -President's visit to PRC -Bruce's mission -Soviet move -Presidential visit to the Soviet Union -Timing -[Richard A. Moore ?] Vietnam negotiations -Support for Thieu -Effect of other as President -Humphrey -Muskie -Edward Kennedy -Need to prevent Communist takeover -Risk of settlement -Communist takeover -Timing -Effect on US policy -POWs -Congressional pressure -Length -Effect of PRC announcement -North Vietnamese flexibility 16 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) -Soviet Pressure -Berlin talks -D. Kenneth Rush -Dobrynin -SALT -North Vietnamese flexibility PRC initiative Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) -PRC cooperation -Possible price -Taiwan -US support -Announcement -Timing -Coverage -Impact of PRC and US talks -Substance -Nature of US and PRC relations -Taiwan -Japanese and US long term relationship -Expansion -Reasons -PRC expansion -Reasons -PRC image in other Asian nations -Thailand -Burma -Indonesia -Philippines -US and PRC detente -Impact on Asia -Balance of power -Soviet desire for summit -Timing of summits -Soviet Union compared with PRC -Bruce -Rogers -Middle East negotiations -Kissinger’s view -Conduct of negotiations -Bruce -Bruce's ability 17 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. 10/08) -Rejection of publicity -Use of Two-man team -Soviet Union -PRC General foreign policy performance -Melvin R. Laird -Rogers Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.) -President's role in history -Kissinger’s view -Letter to Kissinger from Harvard "dove" Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm. President's schedule Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm. The President and Kissinger left at 9:14 pm.