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Conversation 637-011

TapeTape 637StartFriday, December 10, 1971 at 11:04 AMEndFriday, December 10, 1971 at 11:14 AMTape start time01:47:58Tape end time01:59:11ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Sanchez, Manolo;  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the escalating India-Pakistan military conflict and formulate a diplomatic response to the Soviet Union. They focused on drafting a high-priority hotline message to Leonid Brezhnev that emphasized the urgent need to prevent the situation from spiraling beyond their control. Kissinger was directed to convey this strategy through established channels, ensuring that U.S. efforts to shape international opinion and manage the crisis remained firm despite bureaucratic resistance.

India-Pakistan WarSoviet UnionLeonid BrezhnevDiplomatic CorrespondenceHotline communicationUnited Nations Security Council
AudioNARA Description

On December 10, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Manolo Sanchez, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:04 am to 11:14 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 637-011 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 637-11
                                             18

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. 10/06)
                                                                        Conv. No. 637-9 (cont.)



Date: December 12, 1971
Time: 11:04 am - 11:14 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Manolo Sanchez and Henry A. Kissinger.

     Envelope

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 11:14 am.

     India-Pakistan situation
           -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] message
                -Contacts with Indian Government
                      -Indira Gandhi

The President talked with Alvin Snyder between 11:05 am and 11:07 am.

[Conversation No. 637-11A]

[See Conversation No. 16-100]

[End of telephone conversation]

     India-Pakistan situation
           -USSR message
                -Gandhi
                      -Military Action
                -Pakistan Government

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 11:07 am.

     Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 11:14 am.

     India-Pakistan situation
           -Indian government
                 -Military action
           -Statement
           -Hotline message to Leonid I. Brezhnev
                                                19

                              NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                       Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. 10/06)
                                                                   Conv. No. 637-11 (cont.)


                -Contents
                       -Vladimir V. Matskevich
                       -Yuli M. Vorontsov
                       -United Nations [UN Security Council
                       -Wording
                             -Emphasis on urgency
                                  -Possible settlement
                                  -PRC
                                  -UN Security Council
                -Ronald L. Ziegler
                       -Talk with Kissinger
                -Wording
           -Public statement
                -Indians
                -Bureaucracy
                       -PRC
                -USSR
                -Indians
                       -World opinion
                -Kissinger’s possible comments
                -Hotline
                       -U. Alexis Johnson
                             -Vorontsov
                -William P. Rogers

     The President's and Kissinger's schedule

Kissinger left at 11:14 am.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

The first contact with the government of India, please convey to President Nixon.
The first contact with the government of India, and personally with Prime Minister Nassif... Ja.
Ja.
Yeah.
Now, will you give me a call when you're ready?
I don't want to come over until you're ready.
What is it?
You're not quite ready yet, are you?
Yeah.
Yeah, they didn't want to come for me.
They're not...
I see.
There is one there.
Fine.
Yeah.
Uh, all right.
Well, then I, uh, what time do you want me to work for that?
Uh, when will she send it to me?
I'll take it.
She's ready for me now.
Well, they can start their party.
All right.
I'll be over in about, uh, uh, about a Sunday time or, or five minutes.
I'll be working for five minutes.
Good.
Uh,
uh the first conduct for the government of india unfortunately the prime minister kindly on the question which was raised by president nixon testified to the fact that the government of india has no intention to take any military action against west pakistan the soviet leaders believe that this makes the situation easier and hope that the government of pakistan
to withdraw from this appropriate situation.
As far as other questions... As far as other questions raised in the President's letter concerning the act, it will be given in this order sometime.
Well, under those marks, he says, not because it does seemly well.
It's only a devil's big military action.
It's just a question of how to wrap it up now.
It's quite a... At least they're trying to get it around and take action in some way.
Yes, sir.
Of course, it depends how we define this.
We've got to turn it another way.
Now, your thoughts, sir.
In fact, I've got to get to the bureaucracy, sir.
You're going to do that in a second.
I've got that here.
I've just received the entry message concerning the grave situation in the Indian subcontinent.
However, after delaying 72 hours in anticipation of your reply to my conversation with Minister Macekiewicz and Councillor Warrantza, I had said in transcript and moved to the United Nations Security Council, at the time mentioned to Councillor Warrantza, these cannot now be reversed.
I'm still prepared to proceed along the lines set forth in my letter of December 10th, as well as in the conversations with your Chargé d'Affaires and my talks with your Agricultural Minister.
In view of the seriousness of the situation and the need for concerted action, I propose that we continue global consultations through established confidential channels.
I don't know if you've got that fact.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that I consider maybe it would be for immediate action to be...
That time is of the essence.
That time is of the essence.
Now, failure, the tides of the essence, just put it that way, the tides of the essence, that failure to pursue, to work on a peaceful settlement could set in motion
I think undesirable, undesirable consequences are beyond our control.
Well, the danger is then they'll think we've colluded with the Chinese and we'd better not do that.
And I can't tell the time, but yes, to avoid, and to avoid, to avoid undesirable consequences or, well, or to avoid...
I don't think that message sounds strong enough in terms of the urgency.
Well, I'll actually...
I try to have this one a little soft because we're kicking them in the teeth at the Security Council publicly.
Why don't we just say view of the urgency of the situation?
And view of the...
Is there a kind of word that the one you had in the book, maybe that's what I'm trying to get at, where you say it's a serious situation, is that a constant?
I said that it's not a serious situation.
I'm not doing anything.
No, it's something of the same kind of word.
I'm sure that he doesn't come to the press before we have done the story.
Oh, I see.
Oh, I see.
Well, why not just say I cannot empathize too strongly with the tiniest of the essence?
The tiniest of the essence, to avoid it.
These events are not to run away with us.
To avoid tragic consequences that neither of us want.
Something like that.
To avoid events running away with our capacity to shape them or something like that.
to avoid consequences that neither of us want to avoid consequences that neither of us want to avoid consequences that neither of us want to avoid consequences that neither of us want to avoid consequences that neither of us want to avoid consequences that neither of us want
We have to do that for the four reasons that we mentioned.
The argument against putting the Indians is, as you know, that, well, if you put the Indians, then they will sit on their backs and say, screw you, they won't.
But my view is that, well, I'm running through this drill, talking to the Iraqis, you know, the Indians.
My answer there is that, well, what do you do with the Chinese?
What do you do with the Russians?
What do you do with our own Indians?
But also as far as the Indians are concerned, they've got to know that they seem to be affected by world opinion.
To the extent they are, God damn it, we're going to get it across.
The world opinion is against it.
They're probably against it.
Don't you agree?
I completely agree.
Mr. President, I'll tell you the truth.
I'm not going to answer any arguments.
I'm going to tell them for 72 hours they're going to play the president's game and we'll stand and fall on our game.
This is the strategy.
This is what you gentlemen are going to do.
Anyone who wants to protest can do it after the event.
But this is it now.
We have 15 minutes.
I haven't got time for an argument.
Sir, you say the president takes it in.
It's fine.
Also, you've got to tell them about the hotline.
Uh, I'm Jeff Johnson.
Jeff Johnson, say I'm good.
Uh, I'm ready to do this.
We have this.
Are you ready?
Johnson knows about the, uh, the conversation we had with Barranza.
I'm sure I'm going to show Johnson this message in Memphis and tell him what we're getting.
This is the beginning.
Okay.
Um, I've got one final question.
I won't discuss it.
About the plan, the plan.
We've got to talk the right way.
And you and I are stepping in.
Let's talk.
How do you want that conversation to go?
Well, get this done.
I can probably get through with the broadcast and see you live.
You want to get through with your trailblazer, we need to draw a board.
We'll have a board here.
I'll see you about 10 o'clock.
Good.
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