President Nixon met with his advisor Henry Kissinger and senior staff members H.R. Haldeman and Stephen Bull to finalize strategy and logistical details for the President's upcoming historic trip to the People's Republic of China. The participants discussed the management of the official communique, the role of translators to ensure accurate records of private meetings, and the President's approach to formal toasts and plenary sessions. Additionally, they reviewed domestic political concerns, including public opinion polls and the potential impact of a North Vietnamese military offensive on the trip's reception.
On February 14, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Manolo Sanchez, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 6:30 pm to 7:08 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 671-004 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding AidConv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
The President met with Andre Malraux, Sophia K. Porson and Henry A. Kissinger.
[This is a continuation of Conversation No. 670-23; an unknown portion of this meeting was not
recorded while the tape was being changed.]
Vietnam
-Withdrawal
-Relevance
-Chinese power
-October Revolution
People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Japan
-Foreign policy
-Importance
-Germany
-US policy towards PRC
-Time limit
-Vietnam
-PRC activity
Foreign policy
-Japan
-Chinese
-Soviets
-US withdrawal
-Pacific
-Japan
-Economic
-Potential status
-History
-Sense of destiny
-Psyche
-Nuclear commitment
-West Germany
-Defense
-Nuclear commitment by US
-Terms of peace
-PRC
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Japanese concern
-Withdrawal
-Pacific
-US
-Bases
-Japan
-USSR
-Possible threat
-World peace
-European alliance
-Withdrawal of forces
-Germans
-USSR
Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Influence with East Germany
-Options
-“Balance of Power”
-Future
-Strength
-Europe
-Market
-US
-Japan
-US nuclear defense
-PRC
-Potential for safer world
-US
-Critics
-Domestic and abroad
-World role
-President’s view
-PRC
-Chou En-lai
-Mao Tse-tung
-Non-expansionist power
-World role
-US
-Malraux
-Anti-Memoirs
-World power
-War
-Peace
-US
-Responsibility
-Withdrawal
-Japan
-Germany
-Assistance and possible guarantees
-Stable world
-Withdrawal
-Pacific
-President’s view
-Critics
-Abroad
-Isolationist theorists in the US
-Advice
-Europe
-PRC
-Policy comparison
-US role
-Circumstances
-Pacific
-Japan
-Europe
-North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
-Possible consequences Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Malraux
-US
-Withdrawal
-World’s people
-Opinion
-Skepticism
-Pacific
-Europe
-Malraux’s view
-US
-Withdrawal
-NATO
-Bilateral Agreement
-Isolationists
-Gaullism
-United Europe
-Great Britain
-Similarity to the Balkans
-Possible difficulties for US
-Economics
-Politics
-Defense
-Gen. Charles A.J.M de Gaulle
-Britain
-Japan
-Lack of atomic capabilities
-West Germany
-West Germany
-World War II
-Japan
-West Germany and Japan
-Self-defense
-Nuclear
-Sense of destiny
-Protection by another power
-World peace
-Asia
-US withdrawal
-Prospects
-Press
-Mao Tse-tung
-US world policy
-John Foster Dulles
-Japan
-Withdrawal
-Hesitation
-Asia
-US
-World responsibility
-Importance to USSR
Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
The President’s schedule
-Malraux
-Dinner
-Location
-William P. Rogers
-Kissinger
-PRC leaders
-Appreciation for meeting
-Dinner
-Past meetings
-1969
-PRC
Foreign policy
-De Gaulle
-The President’s meeting in 1963
-Prescience
-US
-Policy at that time
-USSR
-PRC
-Relations with USSR and PRC
-Importance
-De Gaulle’s perspective
-Kissinger’s meeting in 1959
Malraux and Porson left at 5:28 pm.
The President’s forthcoming trip to the PRC
-PRC leaders’ expectations
-The President
-View of history
-Malraux
-Health
-Forthcoming dinner
-Mao Tse-tung
-The President’s age
-World leadership
-Age
-John F. Kennedy
-Mao Tse-tung’s possible opinion
-De Gaulle
-Historical figures
-Bluntness
Foreign policy
-Chinese
-US understanding
-International situation
-Unimportantance of tactical details
-Chou En-lai Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Mao Tse-tung
-General discussion
-Vietnam
-Malraux’s views
-US
-Withdrawal
-Japan
-Europe
-US world role
-Domestic critics
-Lack of understanding
-PRC
-Withdrawal
**************************************************************************
[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-034. Segment declassified on 05/24/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[671-001-w001]
[Duration: 53s]
Foreign policy
-People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Chou En-lai
-Talk with Henry A. Kissinger
-Principle
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] troops
-People’s Republic of China [PRC] northern frontier
-Number
-The President’s forthcoming trip
-Provide information to People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] forces
-People’s Republic of China [PRC] frontier
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Richard A. Helms
-Private meetings
**************************************************************************
Foreign policy
-Malraux
-Kissinger
-Agreement
-Chinese
-Compared to Soviets
-History
-Confucius
-Philosophy Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Differences
-Principles
-World domination
-Malraux
-Soviets
-Future Presidents
-USSR compared to PRC
-Relations with US
-Balance of power
-USSR
-PRC
-Vietnam
-Conduct of war
-Consequences
-Choices
-Malraux
-De Gaulle
-Meeting with the President
-Statement
-PRC
-PRC
-Ambivalence toward US
-India-Pakistan War
-US stance
-Asia
-US relevance
-Vietnam
-Kissinger’s view
-Withdrawal
-History
-De Gaulle
-Algeria
-North Vietnamese
-Meetings with Kissinger
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Impact on domestic opponents
-Sense of urgency
-Importance
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Secret meetings
-Cambodia
-Laos
-Public opinion
-Points in agreement
-South Vietnamese
-Structure
-Non-Communist
-PRC
-Malraux’s view
-Southeast Asia
-Domination Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Numbers
-Means
-Subversion culture
-Communism
-Japan
-Standard of living
-Communism
-PRC
-Competition
-Vietnam
-Withdrawal
-PRC
-Southeast Asia
-PRC
-Malraux’s statement about foreign policy
-Posture
-Reception for President of Somalia
-Kissinger’s concern
-Counterweight to USSR
-Subcontinent
-Global policy
-Domination
-USSR and PRC
-Japan
-US relations
-Importance of maintaining alliance
-Malraux
-Experience and age
-Cambodia
-Prison
-US invitation
-President’s questions to Malraux
-Chou En-lai
-The President’s forthcoming questions
-Tone
-US
-World role
-Withdrawal
-Formosa [Taiwan, Republic of China]
-PRC
-Communiqué
-PRS
-John B. Connally and Rogers
-Lack of experience with leaders
-Connally
-Talk with Kissinger
Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 5:28 pm.
Location of a briefing book
Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
Butterfield left at an unknown time before 6:00 pm.
**************************************************************************
[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-034. Segment declassified on 05/24/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[671-001-w003]
[Duration: 45s]
Foreign policy
-People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Communiqué
-Two-China policy
-Withdrawal policy
-Formosa
-Vietnam
-War’s end
-Mainland
-Defense
-Japanese
-Troops
-Formosa
-Independent movement
**************************************************************************
Foreign policy
-People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Communiqué
-Language
-Agreement
-Formosa
-Possible criticisms
-James L. Buckley
-William F. Buckley, Jr.
-South Korea and Japan
-Treaty commitments
-Formosa
-Separate section
-Formosa
-Treaty
-Rogers
-Connally
-Involvement
-Rogers
-Connally
-Europeans
-Chinese Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Kissinger’s view
-Foreign relations
-Desire to maintain a peaceful settlement
-Language
-Rogers
-Kissinger
-Formosa
-Re-write
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-First draft
-PRC commitment
-Force in lieu of a settlement
-Formosa
-Treaty
-US Commitment
-Difficulties
-Mao Tse-tung
-Talk with Kissinger
-State Department
-Language
-South Korea
-State Department
-The President’s meetings
-Construction of communiqué
-Difficulties
-Chou En-lai
-Mao Tse-tung
-Chou En-lai
-Message from Kissinger
-Meeting
-Plenary session
-Workout strategy
-Chou En-lai
-Chou En-lai
-President’s upcoming meeting
-Mao Tse-tung
-Rogers
-Kissinger’s possible explanation
-Bermuda
-Sir Burke Trend
-Kissinger
-Rogers
-France
-Germans
-Established practices
-Trip
-Need for success
-Communiqué
-News magazines
-Foreign policy
-Renunciation of forces Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Establishment of common principles
-Conduct
-Opposition to hegemony in Pacific
-Possible interpretation
-Danger
-Sino-US alliance
-USSR
-Japan
-Rogers
-Kissinger’s view
Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 5:28 pm.
Refreshments
The President left at an unknown time before 6:00 pm.
Sanchez
-The President
-PRC trip
-Attendance
-Schedule
-Key Biscayne
**************************************************************************
[Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 08/19/2022. Segment cleared for
release.]
[Privacy]
[671-001-w004]
[Duration: 27s]
Manolo Sanchez’s schedule
-Fina Sanchez [?]
-Key Biscayne
**************************************************************************
The President entered at an unknown time before 6:00 pm.
Sanchez left at an unknown time before 6:00 pm.
PRC
-Communiqué
-Changes
-Indian section
-Language
-Use of “revolution”
-Taiwan Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Possible acceptance
-Kissinger
-Talk with Chou En-lai
-Mao Tse-tung
-Talk with the President
-US domestic debate
-Bureaucracy
-Rogers
-Chou En-lai
-Promises by Kissinger
-Suggested response
-Language
-Trade
Malraux
-Stature in France
-Gaullism
-Europe
-Balkanization
-Neutral
-Finland
PRC
-Plenary session
-Kissinger
-Draft
-Opening statement
John N. Mitchell
-Resignation
-Timing
-Involvement
Connally
-Praise from Kissinger
Rose Mary Woods entered at 6:00 pm.
Letter
-Mitchell
-The President’s reply
-Copy
-Delivery
Timing
Woods left at 6:01 pm.
Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 6:01 pm.
Porson
-Translation skills Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Malraux dinner
-Possible invitation
-Unknown male translator
-Porson compared to Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters
-Understanding
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-The President’s preference for male translators
-Walters
-The President’s appreciation for efforts
-Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
Butterfield left at an unknown time before 6:19 pm.
PRC
-Trip
-Importance
-Need to avoid irritations to the President
-Rigors of agenda
-Chinese
-Qualities
-Soviets
-Comparisons
-Possible posture by the President
Vietnamese negotiations
-Paris trip by Kissinger
-Knowledge
-Haldeman
-Haig
-State Department
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Le Duc Tho
-Press
-Departure
-Andrews Air Force Base
-The President
-Florida
-Walker’s Key
-Strategy
-Helicopter flight from Key Biscayne
-Strategy
-Return flight to Andrews AFB
-Camp David
-Helicopter to base
-Departure with the President
-Timing
-Peace proposal
-Reaction by Edmund S. Muskie
-Reaction by North Vietnam
-Le Duc Tho
-Meeting with Kissinger Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Lunch
-Answer to invitation
-Timing
-Text
-Walters
-Lunch
-Date
-Walters
-North Vietnamese
-Meal
-Significance
-Communists
-Negotiations
-Korean War
-The President’s actions
-Vietnam as national issue
-Troop withdrawals
-North Vietnamese
-Offensive
-PRC trip
-Effect
-Public opinion
-Tet
-1968
-Differences
-PRC trip
-Publicity
-Moscow trip
-North Vietnamese
-Pressure on the President
-Possible offensive
-Timing
-Moscow
-US position
-Force
-Pacific Ocean
-India-Pakistan War
-Carriers
-Bay of Bengal
-USSR
-PRC
-East Pakistan
-West Pakistan
-PRC policy
-Soviets
-Leonid I. Brezhnev
-The President’s letter
-Chou En-lai
-The President’s letter
-Bombing
-Movement of forces Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Policy
-North Vietnamese
-Offers
-US options
-Communists
-Maoists
-Peace conference
-Versailles
-Chinese
-Encouragement prior to trip
-Peking
-Chinese
-Paris trip by Kissinger
-Chou En-lai
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Kissinger’s forthcoming talk
-Moscow
-Peking
-War
-North Vietnamese casualties
-Italian journalists
-Number
-Compared to US population
-North Vietnamese
-Cambodia
-Laos
-Number of forces
-US withdrawal
-Possible date
-Possible North Vietnamese offensive
-October 1972
-US public reaction
-Withdrawal of troops
-Weather
-South Vietnamese
-Strength
Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 6:01 pm.
Delivery of briefing book
Butterfield left at an unknown time before 6:19 pm.
Vietnam
-US plans
Malraux
-Dinner
-Talking
-Guest list
-Toast Conv. No. 671-4 (cont. )
-Kissinger
-The President
-Speech
-Length
Kissinger left at 6:19 pm.This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.