Conversation 701-005

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Well, how are you?

I'm fine.

You're ready to go, huh?

I sure am.

Sit down and face it out.

All right.

Let me, uh, not, uh, at least in the timeline, I don't know if it's your problem, but you're so saturated with interest in the city.

You, uh, you've heard about the enemies, the militias, all the problems that we, uh, there are some of them have, and will have, and so forth.

They're our sons.

And, uh, how you're supposed to report them, so forth and so on.

because you heard the things that any ambassador is supposed to hear.

I think the important thing that I want to get across to you is that your role as ambassador now, and I do not say this lightly, you have the most important ambassadorial assignment of any American at this point.

I would not have said that a year ago.

like Russia was negotiating the Berlin Agreements, but now that they are completed, the German post is important, but unfortunately, why do you have that in there in particular?

Who goes to Russia is making a different expression, so I'm talking about the same topic.

Japan is the most important for a variety of reasons.

In the beginning, you must get across, and we'll get across to Sato, and assuming that Kuda is going to be a successor to Kuda, and any of the other, you know, there's a power league over there.

And if you look at that power league,

There are others who would be coming along.

You know who they are.

Pay attention to old men that are older than that, like Ishii, who has enormous influence, although he's out, because they're all very incestuous.

But the first thing you've got to get across is that, one, you have a very close personal relationship with the president.

Therefore, your ambassador did not minor.

See, that's, that's one thing they've got to know and say, look, I've brokered that for a once-worth, even on the president, for 20 years since he was a congressman.

I used to come down here.

In fact, it's a very close personal relationship that he asked you to take this post because he wanted a man who would be able to represent not only the government, but representing him personally there, you know, his personal confidence.

And second, that here's where you've got to be very skillful.

As you know, you, or anything that you consider terribly confidential, and I wouldn't do it very often, but you should use a special channel to arrive at it.

But you must not tell anybody.

That would mean not even your DCM, the most trusted people.

And there are good men in here.

of them, and you're to use them and not let them use you.

But as far as the Japanese are concerned, they should be the Japanese that you are accredited to, including the Japanese business community and the big traders and the rest of the unions.

Point out that you have this close personal relationship.

Then bridging from there, you go on to a second point.

You should tell them that the president

probably in our history, who knows Japan better and who believes that the Japanese-American alliance is more important than this government.

I attended Japan at least now eight times as private citizen in this government.

One time as vice president, the other time as private citizen.

I've known Japanese leaders.

I consider the

Japanese-Japanese relationship indispensable now and indispensable for the future.

Because I, however you can, however Japan, whatever its economic power is now, its economic, political, and potentially military potential in the future is unlimited.

So American-Japanese

And I want you to say that you've heard me say that.

And I said it with very great emphasis.

Now, having said that, then you must go on to say, if you will, that we have to realize that because we are so much alike in our business abilities, that we are inevitably going to be competitive.

That we have to understand that.

that I have immense respect for their capacity as competitors, and they naturally have for ours, but that we have got to find ways that this competition does not set forth in our country isolationist protectionist forces, and it does not set forth in their country on our counter-reaction.

Now, here you're going to have to play a very hard game, and you don't.

you know how damn tough they are.

They're not very tough, but they keep their deal.

But you can handle them.

And handling them in a decent, gentlemanly, but firm way is the way to build it.

You know, I just shot it.

I just talked a little over and I got the word.

You'll always notice the Japanese hiss whisperer in there.

Anyway, that's one trade you have in common.

Yeah, that's right.

Now, you could say, you could say, now this business thing, Paul, say that I'm totally reluctant, but I think that's the least of our problems.

Because I think that it's so important that we have to live together.

We have to live together.

Now, Connolly has, and this is something that drives me right up the wall, but you can play this game.

Connolly has this theory that with Europe in the league,

that it might very well be in the interest of the United States to form a closer relationship in an economic way with our friends in Japan, as well as Latin America and Canada, all of which you didn't call.

But you can say that, I mean, when you're talking around, go into that just a little bit, that the fact that we want a close relationship and that you're here to hear.

Don't take us soft by the book.

We want to get along with Japan at any cost because they'll run right over

And we've told our people we've got to get good, too, but we don't want an anti-Japanese thing developing here.

And if you're there to develop those things.

Now, that brings you to the China problem.

On the China problem, you should be very, not a bit defensive, and say, look, the great question that we have to ask ourselves, we and the Japanese, is, is it to our interest to have a China?

mainland China, that is isolated and not communicating with us, growing in its nuclear capability?

Or is it our interest to have a mainland China, still with a totally different economic, political, and social philosophy, but one where we at least will be in some communication with the possibility of influence?

Possibility, not influence.

And the answer is, we can't all be sure

with a power that is so totally different from us in terms of their philosophy is going to mean that we aren't going to have a conflict with them.

But we are sure that if we don't have communication, we do have conflict.

We had it in Korea, and we're having it directly now in Vietnam.

So this new game, and of course there's another reason for that game, which you must not mention to the Japanese, although they will see it.

The more important part of the game, of course, is the only way to keep the Russians in line.

We would deny that, but the Chinese know that.

That's why they're with us, and that's one of the reasons why we're with them.

That's right.

The Russians know it very well.

But the point is, with the Japanese, they should realize that our ties to Japan have in no way an affection for Japan and our feeling for the alliance.

There's no way that we can, by reason of our move to China,

The basic reason being is that with Japan, we have a tie that we will never have with China.

And that is a belief in a similar social, economic, political system.

And that's a very, very powerful tie.

And we're going to have an enormous trade with Japan.

We're never going to have a trade with China, not long.

The context country, you know, we should believe in Russia.

We have very little with Russia.

even though we'll dabble around a little more.

But in terms of that, it's in the drop in the bucket.

And the Japanese know this because they are China's biggest trading partner at the moment.

But it's minuscule compared with even what they trade with Canada.

And they know that.

But nevertheless, you can say that, look, you can be concerned.

But what we have to realize is that you have to have some confidence in the president because he has no illusions about this.

He believes that it's in the interests of security for all of us to have U.S.-Chinese relations, and that it does not, and that means in the interests of Japanese security as well, that it's not directed against Japan.

We're not trying, we're not in a race to be king, as far as we're concerned.

What this is really about is trying to develop a viable policy

that will make it possible for Japan and all the great countries that surround the mainland of Asia on the ground will be able to survive.

They will not become the inevitable victims of the osmosis of 890 million people just seeping down through there, which may still happen anyway, but maybe not.

One thing that I think is particularly important to bear in mind is that you could say that it was the president who insisted in our joint communication in a very significant statement that we place the highest emphasis on developing, developing, which is a positive order.

our friendship and so forth with Japan.

They struggled bitterly against it.

The Chinese didn't want that.

They wanted us to maintain it, but we stayed developing.

And incidentally, in our private conversations, I do cannot pass this to the Japanese, because nothing ever did bear in mind, no matter how good friends are, the worst leaders, perhaps next to the French, that we had.

The French aren't so bad on the business, better than some, except that

The Japanese are unbelievably bad leaders.

And you know, the Billings are worse.

The Billings are worse.

The Japanese are awful.

And I had that experience in the business of Billings.

Well, at least I have.

But let me tell you that in my talks with Joe and I, I didn't take the life of the Jewish and American people, and I don't want you to ever take it.

And look here, the whole purpose of the Nixon Doctrine is to withdraw from Asia.

You know, and as we have,

This is the purpose of an economic statement.

It is a policy that has this purpose, developing a viable way that the United States can be a great ascending power.

We're in Asia.

We're there to stay.

Our presence in terms of ground forces will be at a lower profile as others develop their capabilities, but we're there to stay, and our commitment is there.

I would say in terms of, but I think you, but coming back to the point, the line that I suppose

that most people were talking to the Chinese when the Chinese, of course, they were from the United States.

They said that Japan should be neutral, the United States should be out of Asia.

And then the response that some of our people made, they said, but we are getting out.

You notice the next doctor there.

I didn't take that line at all.

I took exactly the opposite.

I said, we're not getting out.

I said, and it's not in your interest that we get out.

Because I said, the concept of a neutral, unarmed Japan

is totally a dream.

And there will never be a neutral on our Japan.

You can't have an economic China that will be satisfied with being a military picnic, particularly when you have eight people who have the drive and all the frustrations and hatreds and so forth going out of their way to the Chinese.

They're going to need something in the world.

Believe what you once said, you can't tell the most capable people in Asia, and he's a Chinese,

most capable, driven, driven is the word, people in Asia, that their destiny for the rest of their lives is to build transistor radios and teach the Africans how to grow rice.

They're going to be a great power, an action economic power, unless, unless the nuclear guarantee of the alliance with the United States is firm.

In other words, if you cut that, you cut that guarantee,

You cut that alliance.

What's Japan going to do with China sitting there and revolving?

They're either going to re-arm, or they're going to have to deal with somebody else.

They don't have a choice, sir.

We know that.

So my view, our view is, which we have strongly stated, we are going to continue to develop our ties with Japan.

That's that.

Now they'll come home and say, well, the secret deal is with China.

It's, of course, what we receive from China.

They'll go out and say, what should they do about China?

There isn't a hell of a lot they can do.

There isn't a hell of a lot because, except to try to open up the discussion.

We would reject the bank.

Well, they're going to do that.

They're trying to do that.

Well, they're trying to do a trade.

They want a trade.

I think, Mr. President, we have to get across to them that if they start raising us to P.K., it's going to be...

They're going to lose.

A, they're going to lose, and B, it's going to be a misfortune for both

We probably will take ten years before Joe and I and Moss and Hunter Denton, before we can put it out.

But I think my conversation shocked Henry a little, although he heard exactly the same line.

But I was doing it at my level.

Henry thought he was being pretty tough.

And you hit them more frontally than I did.

Absolutely.

No, the president used what I had suggested as a possible rebuttal.

If they attacked us, the president used it as his opening statement regarding a different way.

Henry had set it up beautifully.

But anyway.

I think you should know that in terms, so that you can know, you're not buying a pig and a poke.

If you talk to Japanese, you can tell them very honestly, we have stood firmly for our commitment.

We're going to continue to do it.

But the race that we came in, let me say, we must move together on that issue.

That's the real thing.

Because if they do not, if they go racing off on their own, we can't just pick one off for the other.

And also, you've got to remember our Russian friends are sitting over there, too.

But we will work closely with them.

Now, in this whole connection, the trip that Henry comes and takes over there will be significant.

Henry is going to work it out.

He's supposed to go and give them some, and actually he's gonna make a speech and get some reports and so forth, but he will work it out so that you and he meet, you know, on one occasion at least, so that you meet with him so that they know

They will insist on seeing him alone, which they should do.

I mean, he's got to have a private part so that they think they're getting something, which is confidential.

But on the other hand, the point that he will do with you is, which Henry has talked about this morning, he's going to work out a drill whereby Henry insists that the ambassador come, but without your DCI.

You're right.

Oh, I understand.

about a translator.

I don't know about any translator.

Well, of course, he's fine.

He'd use it here all the time.

I don't mean the empathy translator.

No, no, no.

I mean the empathy translator, the one that comes with the song.

But then use him, and you're going to have to stonewall it with your decency.

I'm sorry.

See, 90% of what you do

But there will be a lot of things that will be terribly important that we cannot run the risk of a leak, of a co-fill, but there's also something else.

We need to raise the risk of our own space.

You understand?

So, because they've done this to Fort Watson, I don't mean to lose the risk to something else.

And it's almost made us, in fact, all the way up in California,

except on average.

We've cut it straight out.

We set up a special channel for him.

But I think that the important thing here is that you can work it out.

I think that the way that I would suggest it is that you and the ambassador, Fukuda, and Sato, all have a private dinner.

They'll want to give it to you.

The way it's set up now, he doesn't want, Sato doesn't want Fukuda present.

And the other way around.

Second place, it's now set up.

which was before the ambassador came out, and Sato's placed an enormous stress on seeing me alone.

I think it's mostly symbolism.

As soon as I get there, I told the ambassador yesterday, I will see whether I can get him in.

But I can't get him in on at least one of those meetings.

Well, I'll tell you what, you're going to get a note from one of the persons.

I think the important thing is that you could, I think the important thing is that at the beginning you could say to the Fusaro, let's have a talk with the ambassador, and then you say, now, Mr.

Ambassador, and the Prime Minister and I want to have some private talks on this thing, and the ambassador goes on, and he'll do you an honor.

Well, we'll work it out when I get there, because it may be that if this offensive continues, I'll have to put off my visit for two or three weeks.

Yeah, we'll let you know.

Well, maybe you can tell them that.

in the north, in the east, and that's it.

We won't want to be there at that time.

It might not be a bad time to go there.

But we'll arrange that your position is protected on this.

Now, another way that we'll do, Henry, I want letters prepared, not the State Department coming through, but I want letters prepared.

I've already given you some ideas on them.

From my signature to Sato and to Fukuda.

stating what I had said in the first part of this conversation.

As I have considered this relationship with Japan of enormous importance that I have imposed upon my longtime friend of 25 years, Mr. J. R. Saul, who you know is one of our outstanding businessmen, to come to accept the appointment as ambassador to Japan.

He has my total confidence.

You can talk to him and you can meet.

See, a letter like that should go.

And incidentally, that does not mean that it should not be sent to State Department files.

No, the only trouble now is when I'll get it to you.

You pretend you'll get it.

No, no, no.

I don't think he needs to present.

I think that letter should just go.

Yeah, by mail, by cable.

Can you send that to your ambassador or to your chancellor?

Oh, sure.

I just think of, I just think of a message, do you understand?

I don't need an answer.

I'll give it to the Japanese ambassador here.

Give it to the Japanese ambassador here.

It's definitely, it's a good thing right now.

But give it to the Japanese ambassador here that says, that has a message.

Just say, the president, or he's in the letter.

No, no, that would be good.

Give it to him in the letter and say that I think he should cable it to them, the contents, so they know before they get there.

I can see the letter there.

Well, then it says, it's on the stage for his arrival, to be honest with you.

Because they know Meyer's in there, and they know about that.

I mean, they know that, actually, everybody loves Meyer, but that they know he isn't my man.

You know, he's basically my career man.

President, there's one statement you made this morning about that he did not want me to communicate this to the Japanese.

Was this that we are not withdrawing from Asia?

I think you want me to tell him we're not withdrawing.

I don't think so.

No.

You should quote what the president said to the Chinese.

Yes.

Anything about what I said to the Chinese should not be quoted, except what's in the communique.

You could say, no, look at that communique.

The communique is there because of the president's strong conviction.

That communique speaks volumes.

That one sentence is very important in indicating where we stand with regard to Japan.

You should not tell them that the president sent this to the Chinese.

No, but the one point that I think is important is that we are not withdrawing from Asia.

Therefore, they don't need to try to stand alone.

Oh, absolutely.

You can say it to me.

We know you're not withdrawing, but we believe the Japanese-American alliance is essential for peace in Asia.

Now, if they get into Taiwan,

I would simply say the community covers that.

I mean, looking to the future, nobody can say that we're continuing our relations with Taiwan.

I can simply say that.

Korea, the same.

But mainly, leave it on Japan.

They'll talk about Taiwan and Korea.

They only care about Japan.

But I think that the most important thing for them to realize from the very beginning is that you're there as a president's personal ambassador, as his personal friend.

I will cover that through this message.

which will be fired, which I, in fact, I didn't intend to carry a letter.

That isn't considered.

Will I get a copy of that letter?

You'll get it.

We'll just send it for your file.

But we'll fire it off.

I think they're going to find it.

a very exciting time to be there and so forth.

Oh, one last thing that I thought.

Visits and so forth.

They have danced around about visits this year and so forth and so on.

You know, Henry will go now, or he has to postpone.

He'll come right after Russia, which might be a better time, by the way.

But nevertheless, the thing about presidential visits, and I said Eric comes up, they don't really want me to come

uh, this year, because they're not sure how the damn thing is going to be handled.

They really aren't sure.

You know, they're, they're paralytical here for the time being.

They don't know what they're ever going to do about the possibility of, of, of, of an episode like that with Eisenhower in the city.

They lost lots of faith on that, they thought.

Remember when they had to cancel the U.S. because of the riots.

So, and they have said, well, we ought to have the emperor here first.

Well, of course.

We need that like a whole day of this year.

And maybe it won't come until next year.

But the point that I should make is that you can simply say, as far as the president is looking forward to visit Japan at some time.

Actually, this is an election year, and he can't allow any more trips this year.

And we'll talk about that when the time is right.

But I would also say, but I think the main thing to convey that, you can be very strong in the fact as to how much

respect I have for them because I do, how much affection I have for them, how much I know them, and also on the fact that I consider the alliance absolutely indispensable.

But that it's a two-way street, and at the present time we've got to work on some of these economic problems.

With Europe getting together, let the Pacific powers get together.

That might be a good line.

With Europe getting together, let the Pacific powers get together.

I appreciate it very much.

Well, I don't know that I've been there, but I mean, as I said, you've got all of the other things, like the important thing is, well, as you know, I've been there so often, you've got the list of citrulles and tremolos and dinners.

And actually, actually, he's easy to talk to.

He's quite easy to talk to.

He doesn't claim he does, but he has an awful lot.

And some of them are very nice.

I like them all, but the main thing is that we have to bear in mind is that while they're difficult, they're a hell of a formidable people.

Eisenhower once said to me,

He said, they are the best allies in war and the most difficult friends in peace.

And that's the job.

But that's hard for you to see.

Oh, the new American Kodak.

Oh, that's an American Kodak.

Oh, I didn't know we had it.

It's far superior to what the Japanese have.

I'm just going to take it over and show them that we still have it.

Who made this Kodak?

It's the newest Kodak that you can just stick in your pocket.

How much it costs?

Well, this one is $130, but they have four different models.

They start from about $1,000 on that direct.

We didn't have it.

We developed it with a new film.

But that's the only difference.

The other I can show you.

Well, you've got to play.

You've got to play.

They've all got some of my golf posts.

The only thing I'll give you is the going away present.

It's a box with my golf holes up here.

I have great admiration for what you're doing.

It was a great thrill, and I thought of all the tribulations that man had.

And I know you have many.

I want you to know it's worth it.

Well, thank you, and thank you.

I appreciate it.

I appreciate it very much.

I appreciate it.

This is a...

These are the persons you want.

Okay.

And it's taken over with you.

It couldn't be related to Don Kennedy.

Did you kill him?

Did you murder him?

Oh, you know, right?

I'm going to tell him to send you some more.

which isn't much, but it's a little mark of, I appreciate it, a mark of organization.

Oh, wait a minute, let me get you a couple of others.

I've got to get you out of the hands before you leave our time.

Did the photographer take a picture of us?

Get the photographer, I want a standing picture of us.

Would you bring me to the...

because of LeBron's comeback yesterday.

Yeah, we'll get a standing one, too.

He took one and sent it down.

We'll send you one for each.

George, here, that's where Phil thinks he'll get what he's doing in the past.

All right, listen here for a minute.

Well, I'll tell you, you loved to have him.

You know, he was on our... We were fighting in the heart of town.

Oh!

Yes, well, I know him so well.

He's a great important person.

He suggested, you know, if you're trying to look for a good businessman, he says, how about you?

I said, you'd never get it.

So he's a good shot.

He went to work.

Yeah.

But you know, you said you'd get it.

Yeah, well, I say, I was so interested.

Well, he's a perfect, he's a completely selfless man.

He certainly is.

I didn't hire him again on the 7th.

I asked him this time.

I'm writing that in the corner.

Shall we get one of these guys for me standing together here?

We'll be wishing him well.

These are little bronze coins.

And what they have in it is the same as the... Do you have a copy of the presidential copy?

I think of those three.

Well, how do you know?

There you go.

Oh, thank you.

You're tight-washed.

Well, yes.

Otherwise, I'm going to say this.

The presidential seal... And all involved in...

It's on the compact on this, on the money clip, on the copy.

And this does it on, too, you know.

Oh, really?

Yeah, Don had it on that, so...

We should have given you a bowser bag.

Well, the bowser bag, you know, that's what they carry on your food, you know, when you don't eat your meat and they give it to you to take home to the billboard.

Well, we appreciate what you're doing.

We're proud to have an inner soul over there.

Oh, you're a constant patriotism.

You'll do a job.

My father was a female operator.

Oh.

Well, we'll wish you was here, but we appreciate you doing that.

Uh, we'll, we'll get the message.

All right.

Yeah, okay.