Conversation: 721-011
Prev: 721-010 Next: 721-012Start Date: 8-May-1972 12:13 PM
End Date: 8-May-1972 1:15 PM
Participants:
Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Connally, John B.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Sanchez, Manolo;Recording Device: Oval Office
Full Tape Conversation Start Time: 00:38:12
Full Tape Conversation End Time: 01:38:19
NARA Description:
On May 8, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, John B. Connally, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:13 pm to 1:15 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 721-011 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid:
Conversation No. 721-11
Date: May 8, 1972
Time: 12:13 pm - 1:15 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Vietnam
-Previous National Security Council [NSC] meeting
-Kissinger's evaluation
-William P. Rogers
-Position on blockade
-Kissinger's evaluation
-Blockade discussion
-Melvin R. Laird's position
-Rogers's position
-Support compared with Laird
8
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-John B. Connally
-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
-United Nations [UN]
-Kurt Waldheim
-Security Council meeting
-Significance
-State Department
-Soviet Union
-Significance
-People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Soviet Union view of
resolution
-Delay
-Waldheim
-Blockade
-President's decision
-Timing
-President's schedule
-Richard M. Helms's briefing
-Content
-President's decision
-Possible delay
-Problems
-Leaks
-Duration
-Advantages
-Public position
-Timing of NSC meeting
-24-hour delay
-Advantages
-Duration
-The President’s schedule
-Soviet pressures
-UN resolutions
-Waldheim
-NSC meeting
-Follow-up meeting with Connally
-Location
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Laird
-Laird's position
Haldeman talked with the President between 12:21 and 12:22 pm.
9
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
[Conversation No. 721-11A]
[See Conversation No. 24-2]
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-Blockade
-Costs
-Connally
-Delay
-Soviet pressure
-President's decision
-Discussion
Connally entered at an unknown time after 12:22 pm.
-Laird
-Connally
Connally's schedule
Vietnam
-NSC meeting
-UN
-Waldheim
-Security Council meeting
-Initiative
-State Department, Soviet Union
-Security Council resolution
-Ceasefire
-Rogers's schedule
-Delays
-Blockade
-President's decision
-Possible delay
-Kissinger's reasons
-Advantages
-Public perceptions
-Disadvantages
-Soviet awareness
10
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-UN meeting
-Waldheim
-Sources
-State Department, Soviet Union
-Reasons
-President's decision
-Delay
-Advantages
-Disadvantages
-Opposition
-Arguments
-Advantages
-Cabinet
-Rogers's position
-Laird's position
-Helms's position
-Briefing
-Support
-Connally
-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
-Gen. George A. Lincoln
-Connally
-Lincoln
-Agnew
-Laird's position
-Rogers's position
-Timing
-Rogers
-Laird
-Opposition
-Connally’s view
-Timing
-Connally's evaluation
-Status quo
-Rogers
-Laird
-Rogers
-Soviet Summit position
-Laird's position
-Disadvantages
-Imports to North Vietnam
-Percentage by sea
11
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-Air strikes
-Impact on supplies and rail lines
-Rail lines
-Problems with statistics
-Gauges in North Vietnam and PRC
-Impact on imports of Petroleum, oil and lubricants [POL]
-Overland shipments
-Rogers and Laird
-Conversation with Connally
-Rogers
-Soviet Summit concerns
-Kissinger's trip results
-Kissinger’s view
-Laird's concerns
-Costs of blockade
-Rogers's position
-Bombing
-Laird's opinion
-Targets
-Connally's position
-Bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi
-Support for President
-US foreign policy
-Effect of South Vietnam
-Rogers and Laird
-Support
-South Vietnamese collapse
-US position
-Advantages
-Rogers's assessment
-Connally's assessment
-Message of retribution
-Bombing of North Vietnam
-Targets
-Civilians
-Fear of deaths
-US message to aggressors
-Kissinger's assessment
-Consequences of failure
-US troops in South Vietnam
-Speed of possible South Vietnam collapse
-Agnew's theory
12
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-Laird's theory
-North Vietnamese objectives
-Kissinger's assessment
-Kissinger’s return from Soviet Union
-Camp David
-Provincial capitals
-Army of Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] collapse
-Dangers
-South Vietnam-US fighting
-Coalition government in Saigon
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Bargaining chip
-Possible ARVN collapse
-Blockade advantages
-Bargaining chip
-POWs
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-South Vietnamese morale
-Impact
-Laird's assessment
-Kissinger’s view
-Moorer's assessment
-POL supplies
-Overland shipments
-PRC and Soviet Union coordination
-Air strikes
-North Vietnamese reaction
-Kissinger’s view
-North Vietnamese leadership considerations
-Division supplies
-Impact
-North Vietnam logistical system
-Difficulty in changing
-North Vietnamese campaign
-Hue
-South Vietnam response
-North Vietnam method of operation
-Inflexibility
-Reaction of Soviet Union and PRC
-US domestic support
-Soviet reaction
-Pressure on North Vietnam
13
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-Summit
-Cancellation
-US statement
-Ronald L. Ziegler's release
-Kissinger’s possible briefing
-Rogers's position
-Connally's view
-Announcement of agreements
-North Vietnam offensive
-South Vietnam military situation
-Laird's assessments
-Cambodia, Laos comparisons
**************************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[National Security]
[Duration: 18s ]
CAMBODIA
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
**************************************************************************
-Effect of blockade
-Diplomatic
-On South Vietnam collapse
-On bargaining for POWs
-Military operations
-North Vietnam
-South Vietnam morale
-North Vietnam
-POL supplies
-Air strikes
-Impact
-Utilities
-Communications
14
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-Latest strikes
-Damage reports
-President's options
-South Vietnam collapse
-US efforts to prevent
-Rogers
-Protests
-Domestic
-Senate
-UN
-PRC and Soviet Union
-President's East-West policies
-Impact
-Press
-American people
-Support for President
-Opposition to war
-American spirit
-Connally’s view
-Possible US withdrawal
-Timing
-Forthcoming election
-Means
-Diplomatic efforts
-North Vietnamese response
-Military efforts
-POWs, troop withdrawal
-Intensity
-Laos, Cambodia
-Necessity
-Support
-Duration
-Time
-Possible US withdrawal
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Duration
-Impact of blockade
-Weather
-Hue
-Future strategy
-Time
-Democratic National Convention
15
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-Movement of roops
-B-3 front
-Cambodia
-October offensive
-Effect of blockade
-Blockade
-Necessity
-President's speech
-Haldeman
-Time
-Forthcoming briefing for Congressional leaders
-Content
-Notification of Rogers and Laird
-Peace offer
-POW exchange
-Ceasefire
-US withdrawal
-Time
-Hugh Scott
-POWs
-Ceasefire
-US withdrawal
-Trade
-Advantages for North Vietnam
-Rogers's and Laird's notification
-Use of term blockade
-Domestic response
-Soviet response
-Press use
-Mining
-Interception of ships
-Contents
-Mining
-Instructions for US forces
-Interdiction
Connally left at 12:59 pm.
-Drafting
-Kissinger's schedule
-Haldeman
-Notification of Rogers and Laird
16
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-Kissinger
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Time
-Rogers
-Soviet Summit
-The President’s view
Haldeman and Manolo Sanchez entered at 1:00 pm.
President's schedule
-Executive Office Building [EOB]
Kissinger's schedule
-Soviet embassy
Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:02 pm.
Vietnam
-Democrats
-Senate caucus
-Possible meeting with President
-Arrangements
-Clifford P. Case-Frank F. Church amendment
-Michael J. Mansfield's role
-Blockade
-President's speech
-Television time
-Notification
-Cabinet
-NSC
-Andrews
-Time
-Rogers and Laird
Kissinger left at 1:02 pm.
-President's possible meeting with Democratic leaders
-Mansfield
-Time
-Press reports
-NSC meeting
-Democratic leaders
17
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-J. William Fulbright, John C. Stennis
-Delay in antiwar amendment vote
-Soviet summit
-Hawks' position
-Stennis
-Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson's statement
-Ground troops
-Bombing
-Hanoi, Haiphong
-Time
-Need
-President's speech
-Briefing of Senate Democratic leaders
-Time
-Mansfield's call
-Delay in response
-Notification
-Announcement of television time
-Time to release
-Ziegler
-Briefing for Congressional leaders
-Attendees
-Kissinger's opinion
-Allen J. Ellender
-Fulbright
-Mansfield
-The President’s view
-Briefing for committee chairmen
-Rogers
-Blockade
-Chances of success
-Rogers's assessment
-Support for the President
-US military strength
-Options
-Laird's view
-South Vietnam's strengths
-Deterioration
-Rogers's argument compared with Laird’s argument
-Alternatives
-Connally's view
-Need to try
18
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)
-US credibility
-POWs
-US credibility
-Rogers's view
-Compared with Connally’s view
-PRC
-Soviet Union
-Soviet Summit
-President's strengths
-Chance of success
-Outcry
-Rogers's view
-Connally’s view
-Soviet Summit
-Kissinger’s role
-The President’s view
-Laird
-The President’s view
-Opposition to blockade
-President's decision
-Chances of success in Vietnam
-Effect on Summit
-Cancellation
-Probability
-Timing
-Public opinion
-Expectations
-Separability
-Effect of military situation
-Time
-North Vietnam offensive
-President's forthcoming speech
-Arrangements
-Cabinet meeting
The President and Haldeman left at 1:15 pm.