Nixon, Rogers & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

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Oh, sure.

They don't want to have it.

People are better than the Russians.

Well, that's right.

And that old boy took a lot of them, right, and said, you know, don't give them a chance to manage you over there or anything, you know.

Remember when he was one of those former commies, like, who don't say anything.

So I think that's the right thing.

Yeah, go.

We'll stop this way.

It's all right.

Okay.

You've got a good day.

Beautiful.

Three in the spring.

Too bad you don't have a place here where you have a little privacy.

This isn't the place.

You can't really walk out of the lawn.

You can see the fence.

You can see the height.

You've seen Johnson's exhibition.

People have to go down to the fence.

Just the babies and all that sort of stuff.

I didn't...

I've been thinking about our office, and I've had this very well, and I've had it very well in mind.

What I think is best is, first of all, I think it's the easiest thing.

The business council, of course, is a good VIP group.

They, uh, that's what those, uh, sponsors here, you know, they want to be with us a thousand percent, but most of them aren't much in the way of character.

Well, Peterson and Flanagan are supposed to be putting it to them.

You know, because we've, we've had this problem.

The business council always, they talk about their great support of the president, and everything, everything about their meetings is adverse.

I thought what I do is, it's almost what I did in the sub cabinet, because I've got a good emotional response.

It's the emotional response.

And, uh,

And I just, I think if you could emphasize, Bill, that this was a very hard decision, as you said, and that we sat there, you were there, we sat there for three hours.

We heard every argument.

We could have done it either way, and that I rather did it the easy way.

I did it the hard way because I think it's the right way.

And also the political race.

Bill Smalls will understand that.

But the little of that could get across to them.

That group was quite, interestingly enough, quite well covered.

because the people who are down there, it can affect their morale and the market.

Mark, that's not... Mark, that's going to put the heat on them to personal support of the president.

You can lay the backdrop.

You don't have to do it.

You don't need to do it.

That's the job.

You lay the backdrop, then let them go.

It's the administration, the planning administration.

Mr. President, really what I'd like to just find out from you,

General attitude, because I testified open Monday, too, in a public session once in the Senate, once in the House.

Yeah, that's what the question was.

But the thing that I, the other point I was going to make is that, which I had thought earlier, I thought this week, I thought that,

It seems to me that it would be better if you would hold until Monday.

In other words, not until tomorrow.

Whatever you say, I don't know about you.

Let me tell you why.

I mean, I'd like to get your judgment on it.

The reason I have a feeling is this, that, as you know, it's somewhat surprising to lots of people whether the Russians still are active.

They, you know, this...

Yeah, he said that his visit to the president was known in Moscow.

He said that he was sitting here.

He said that.

So I don't know what that means or do we just .

The Polish message today

Now I am so suspicious of these people.

I remember what the Greenland did to Kennedy's Cuban Missile Crisis, because he lied at his teeth.

That's right.

But on the other hand, they got a creative mind and opposed why maybe they just said this stuff.

But we've got the position very, very low key here.

With Robinson, we say, I only asked whether they discussed it or not.

We said, no, we did not.

We did not discuss it.

By implication, I did.

But, you know, by holding something to carry.

But they knew what that was on.

But I didn't raise a second.

And neither did they.

Not one word.

It kind of wasn't that kind of long.

he came in for what was supposed to be a courtesy visit and he literally talked for 45 minutes 45 minutes about every little thing about you know they'd already talked to this whole uh peterson change about you know

But I said to him, what he said to me was irrelevant, because you know, because he just repeated what he said.

But anyway, then, and post-Peterson, as you know, we're keeping a very tight rein on Peterson, a very tight rein on us.

We don't want to give this away.

We must have in mind that if the Russians do turn hard, we sure as hell aren't going to have access to bank credits and all that sort of thing.

We're a favored nation.

We could never put it in there.

But we're not saying that.

We're just doing it.

The other thing is that I think that over the weekend,

We could acknowledge it.

Actually, the Russian response was not an official response yet, as I understand it.

They have a deliberate push.

It was an official response.

It was the government.

The government handed it to us.

Well, I think we should say we're aware.

See, they took three days to respond to us, and we will take three days.

I think really the question is whether we should give a quick and sort of noncommittal response, which we could do.

or just delay.

I think maybe a delay will make it look as if we were thinking of something.

There isn't a hell of a lot to say because their statement was fairly mild.

Well, didn't you think it was?

Yeah.

All the people around here are telling stuff that was mild, too.

Well, I think we ought to do, Mr. President, I'll have drafted and send it over to you.

Responses are quite appropriate.

and decide how they should maybe just send Ron in, or Bob McCluskey in, or wait until later.

Your view is that it should not be, they'll have to do it.

It's the right level.

Henry had to be a new ship, because he said that would help.

I don't really see it.

They didn't do it at their high level.

Well, they just made an announcement.

They opened an announcement, that's all.

I think the thing is, a few of them maybe haven't worked out the drill there.

I think we could wait until they hand it to us officially and then in a low-key way reply to it.

I think frankly they're not eager for a reply.

I don't think they want a long debate with us on it.

I don't know.

You think they may?

I just don't know.

I mean, it's mild enough in one way.

On the other hand, it would be perfectly good if John worked in life and would take some other actions.

In other words, they can play both ways.

They can.

We'll soon know.

I would say that's my guess, is that they...

that they would consider it a rather risky business.

I mean, in terms of their own interests to wait until, say, Tuesday or Wednesday of next week to cancel the summit.

I think they're going to do it.

I think they have to do it tomorrow or Saturday.

Well, they could provoke something.

They could send minesweepers down and challenge us, I suppose.

be challenged and then they could call it off, or if we committed them to go ahead in the mine troopers, then it would look as if we'd back down.

I think one of the things we've got to be sure about, and I spoke to Henry's wife earlier, if we're not going to answer, then I think we've got to get all our people to keep quiet, because it's going to be a hell of a temptation to say they blame to the, this is a winter or some silly thing like that, which is... And if we start...

There is a hell of a lot of leaking going on right now.

I was saying to him, Bob, I've never seen it like that.

I said, where the hell is it coming from?

But God, the whole radio this morning is full of it, and it all says White House sources, too.

There was NBC and CBS.

Nobody here is talking to anybody.

Well, I mean, you have, but where is this coming from?

I have checked.

No one in my office has talked to anybody.

No, I don't know whether any of the public...

relations people have, or whether they're just making it up.

Do you know what the situation is?

No one has any of that.

David's working on the... Well, the whole point of this, the main thing is, is that obviously we've got to get Scali, and just anybody, I know Zipper won't say a thing unless he's told.

You control all that.

You see that... Well, that's simple, sir.

It's New York Times.

Well, we'll handle that.

Bob, you can do that.

I mean, as for people outside of the...

But I agree with Bill completely.

We ought to all keep quiet now for a couple of days.

I got my State Department building.

We had 20 meetings, and everybody's kept quiet.

I'm going to go to Camp David, so it's going to be on a certain date.

There are two or three specific things I'd like to talk about.

I mean, one is the Security Council has turned off.

That doesn't have a chance.

It never did.

And the Russians are against it.

The Chinese are against it.

It doesn't make any sense to begin with.

I think we shouldn't appear to be thinking negative on it.

I mean, we've got to make it clear that somebody else has turned it down.

But I don't think you have to worry about that.

It's even a possibility.

On the incidents of sea negotiations,

They've come to an impasse based on a Russian position that we've had to talk about fixed distances.

This is something you decided some time back.

The Defense Department has been against it for a few reasons that I don't think are very good.

The Russians say that they're going to know by 6 o'clock whether we'll talk about it.

My own recommendation is we ought to talk about it.

We have our own... We have our own...

It's really a matter of whether we have some limitations on how close we can come to their ships with our planes and how close we can come to their ships with our ships.

Now, what we've suggested to the State Department is that we have these types of discussions about that and not have any limitations that are not already imposed by ourselves on ourselves.

We have limitations.

I don't know.

I think...

The problem is, this was looked at very carefully, and the problem with it is the intelligence people, for reasons which may or may not be good, are violently opposed to these, to fixed limitations, partly because of some penetrations of the waters which are in any event illegal, and, I mean, and partly...

They say by 6 o'clock tonight.

Anyway, my people say that that's exaggerated.

First place, I think we have rules ourselves that we don't permit our planes to fly closer than 300 feet to another ship.

It's just dangerous as hell.

And I thought it was that why not at least talk to them about the restrictions that we have on ourselves?

Not by disclosing it, but well, if we don't have the...

Could we get, I mean, let's talk to them about it.

The issue is really, if you talk to them about it, you've already given me that.

Could we get a position within our government and get a paper to you which gives the arguments in a more systematic way, because I'm not in detail up on that, and I'm not sure what the bill is.

Well, I think they'll agree to extend it 24 hours.

I think they would if we'd say we let them know.

If we tell them, we'll let them know by tomorrow.

Let me see it so that I can speak.

Because my main problem is going to be keeping the military happy, the military intelligence people.

And so get me something so that I can say I'll leave it right there.

I think that the Russians have a good point, because they say, well, we're not going to talk about it.

What?

There's no point of having a rule of reason.

Hell, that's what we have now.

Why not have some limitation, at least talk about how many feet we should separate when we turn it that way?

All right, let's do that.

And the other thing, really, the thing I'd like to talk to you about, Mr. President, is get your views on the possibility of negotiations in the future on Vietnam.

Now that you've talked about Indochina so much, in all your statements, and particularly the last one,

In other words, we talked about ceasefire all over China.

Now, it really is more appropriate to go and have negotiations dealing with that subject to bring in the others.

And Cambodia and Laos.

Now, the British, as you know, have been very supportive.

They've issued another good statement.

And so did Trudeau, by the way.

Trudeau did?

Oh, yes.

I know that came to your attention.

And Belgium did.

Even Malaysia has.

all the other .

But the question I think that is worth your consideration, and we don't have to decide it, but just think about it, is whether we should be actively attempting to find a formula for a Geneva-type convention, which is negotiated by Great Britain and Russia.

This is what the British are being focused about.

Well, at some point, I'm not sure how you do it.

If you decide to do it, we can talk about it later.

But whether that's a good concept or not, instead of Paris, and particularly with the British being as active as they are, it would include a Geneva-type conference.

It would probably include the British, the French, the Russians, the Chinese, the United States.

lost Cambodia and to Vietnam, something in that.

I'm just thinking about the point.

Now, the British have already proposed it.

The Russians have resisted it.

Although the last, Alec Hume just made his proposal to the Russian ambassador, who said he wanted to take over, get discussions with his government.

The British are also talking to the Chinese about it.

Now, I think that we don't have a problem.

Publicly, I think the real problem is, is this something we would like to do, to accomplish?

Is this a... Tell you what I'd like to do, I'd like to...

I think a lot depends upon

what does happen, and we should know that in three days, certainly on Russia land, if the Russian thing goes forward, then I think we might have a few things which tentatively might be under consideration.

I just have a feeling that we should not move over the next three or four days in any of those directions.

I think what I'd like to do

if we can, is to keep it all, to keep a posture where we're taking a very strong position.

We've made a very forthcoming offer for a negotiated settlement.

And I would not try to spell it out too much at this point.

Like they say, well, what is a ceasefire?

Is it in place?

Is it a withdrawal?

And all the rest.

And they say, that's why it's so important.

Why didn't we work at this point to get into the conference business?

I think they caught Mel on that a little bit.

Yeah, yeah.

Well, anyway, what we want to do, I'd rather just leave it because that's going to be, if they do buy it.

Well, I wasn't really talking about making a public comment about it or anything of that kind.

I'm really talking about it as a possibility, even when you go to the Soviet Union.

Of course, if there's something else that you're working on, you know it.

No, I don't know.

I don't even know where we're going.

No, I mean, anything.

There's nothing going on.

Not a thing.

Well, it seems to me that this is something we ought to think about as a possibility for you to discuss.

It seems to me that... At the summit?

Yeah, at the summit.

Or it might be something that will come out of the summit.

You see, the end of the conference in 54 dealt, in a sense, with the same issues.

It dealt with the issue of ceasefire.

And they discussed the matter for four or five months, and then there was a ceasefire.

And they had the problem of regrouping, and whether it would be in place or not, and that type of thing.

Now, if we were looking for a device to gain some time, and somewhat a safe, face-saving device, particularly for the Russians, and you give a statement because that does put them on the spot.

If they do anything now, it's going to appear that they did it as a result of your strong stand, which probably, from their standpoint, looks as if there would be nothing down.

if they're looking for some kind of a device to get a little time and still go ahead with the acceptance of your proposal, which is certainly fair, I don't know how anybody can expect you to do more, that the Geneva-type conference, not necessarily exactly that, but the Geneva-type conference makes some sense.

Furthermore, the Paris negotiations as a forum are not very appropriate because Laos and Cambodia are not involved at all.

So the Geneva-type conference, which included both Laos and Cambodia.

And in a sense, it turned out pretty well, because they even permitted French troops to stay in Laos and Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Small contingents, but still some troops.

So there are a lot of analogies which would be appropriate for this type of thing.

And my suggestion really is that we think about it, not say anything about it, as far as

The British will be asked about that.

I'm sure they'll be asked, wouldn't they?

But in there, I just think we can say, well, the President's made it clear that he's prepared to take part in a conference and he sets out a speech and not get tied down to a section.

I actually haven't given him any thought.

I don't know what he's got any reaction to.

I'd like to look at any proposal.

I think we ought to think about it.

I personally, there's only one reason I'd like to give it a little more.

It's British.

I've been damned good.

It's a little different from 54 because the French, for example, now, at that time, they were a principle.

Now they are sort of a negative, but it's real.

I think we ought to study it.

Well, I think it's worth considering because we can let the British take the lead off the French, right?

If we propose it to the French, they'd be negative because they don't want to have anything to do with Paris.

But the British are quite...

You know, they couldn't have a better ally.

And if we indicated to them that this was something that was desirable,

I will say this.

It certainly should indicate that we are not simply taking a negative approach on anything.

When it started with that problem, it was the second that we had been down this negotiation.

It was so long, and so long, that we, frankly, were somewhat pessimistic about it.

But we'd like to...

I think we ought to look at it.

Oh, sure.

Could I raise another thing that's related to it?

I'd like to hear your opinion about it.

Do you have any thoughts on it?

Our supporters on the Hill are very anxious to see if they can't get something where they can vote for us.

Now, as I understand, Bob, they said they could wait for a month before they had the virus.

My immediate reaction is that I personally don't think you could get them to be supported and they would not be down.

You see, if they were...

First, it would be very easy to say, well, gee, people in the Hill want to support what I offer.

Fine.

But the real question is cutting off funds after four months.

It's not a proposition.

Now, to cut off the funds after four months, then you'd have to have in some kind of like offensive action or something like that.

To cut off the funds, I think, would be very great between our decisions.

Well, that proposal, I don't think that's the problem with the proposal.

The problem is whether we accept the principle of cutting off the funds.

That proposal is exactly, the very proposal is exactly the one that you made, except it says that if this happens, if there's a ceasefire, and the prisoners are released, and we would be able to accept that thereafter, no funds shall be spent.

That puts you in a position, potentially, of not being able to

take any defensive action after the ceasefire, after the troops are withdrawn, after the POWs are returned, and they resume.

They will say, at least they tell us, that they will

make any effective commitments you want.

In other words, anything of that kind, they'll live with.

But what I suggest is, I would play, I think we ought to play a very, very firm line with them through the weekend.

I don't want to start on that now, because I think that we, uh, we've made a very heavy price given that we've done it.

Uh, we now, uh, certainly have, uh, an RFE at the Navy that's pretty well-shaped.

i think that we have this but i think that we we should not be moving away moving

in any perceptible way away from the very strong position that I've taken on the negotiating side.

If it appears that we are backing down the negotiations that I have, the problem that I have, say, with the funding, which would worry me, would be the fact that I have the software.

You see what I mean?

If you just leave it where we are, you know this caused a little trouble.

He didn't say it publicly, but that four-month thing, it didn't go very good in June, but he took it.

I put that in myself at the last moment.

I said, I've got to put in four months.

In fact, I almost did three months, but I just knew that would come out.

We've gone through this every year with the legislative people, because once you go this way, then you're going to get congressmen coming in and want to

improve what you start out with.

What this proposal says, in effect, is let the president settle it, but we trust him so little that we're going to cut out his funds and deprive him of all options after four months.

They can then break the ceasefire on the 121st day in an ambiguous way, and you'll be in the position of having to decide

what you legislated with respect to, I think, particularly with regard, I think the most important thing now, though, is the thing that you mentioned with respect to cancer.

The main thing about this is the main point, too.

Now that we get across to Vietnam, we must do nothing, nothing for the purpose of getting support of the Congress, nothing for the purpose of getting support of the country, which in any way weakens our ability to make this one.

If this, for example, has a, could have a broken, a bad morale effect in the South, the other piece, I would, I have to then talk to you against it.

And I just stick up there.

Well, I assume that's what I'm worried about.

I don't know.

I think we, well, I'm just trying to, I know that you're just, they'll all be talking to you in this, and I think that we can take the line that, look, we made a very bad proposal here, and I don't think we've got a point to stick with the president today on this.

I have no difficulty with that.

I think, just to be sure you understand, Senators Byrd, I'm not saying, Senators Byrd are saying, we recognize that.

We don't want to do it that way.

We really want to say something that's totally consistent with what the President's done.

We'll award it any way you want.

Now, I agree with you.

This is probably not the time to even talk about it.

And I think we can argue about that.

The only reason we don't have any options, because they're going to be talking about it starting tomorrow.

The only reason, the only reason my race, we're being raised by case and church, I wouldn't raise it.

Stennis and Bird, that's the thing.

Stennis and Bird are different, and I don't think we should be unreasonable with it.

Stennis has been a hell of a good soldier, and he's, you know, he's not going to find a problem with it.

No, he doesn't want to do it.

He's trying to get something that he can vote for.

And he's trying to get something that's totally consistent with your position.

And I think that what they have a feeling, I think, about is that they have a feeling that we are just kicking the teeth no matter what they do.

The only text I've seen did have a punch cut out of it.

Yes, but I mean... No, I mean the text, the supported text.

No, no, the text which was brought to us

as an elected supporter.

That's not what the president wants to do.

The one you've seen is a herd proposal.

I don't think we have to do it now.

I don't agree with this, but one argument that's raised the other way is that you could have a unanimous vote

in the Senate in favor of a resolution that laid out all the specifics of your thing and said, put in that it is the sense of the Senate so that it didn't make it legislation.

uh or the sense of the congress that no funds shall be used for after 120 days after the president after all that time the argument for that would be the value to you of a unanimous senate vote in support of the president by getting the argument against is what it does with regard to

with regard to one overriding concern, that is, coming all the way to Vietnam.

I mean, that's all right against public opinion here, and public opinion here is a problem.

But if anything erodes our ability to pull off the Vietnam thing,

It's all about the children.

The main thing is to keep that on the Senate.

You've got congressional action one way or another.

You can get the House Armed Services Committee now.

If we have it, it's going to be anything.

There's another thing, Mr. President.

We've got to get funds for it.

Well, I'm trying to find money.

But we don't get the appropriations.

If we don't get the funds, we don't have it.

Well, anyway, we can certainly think this one over over the weekend.

Yes.

I do think that we've got to think very hard and long before we totally get any extents.

Oh, absolutely.

Something's not very extensive because he's a key man.

I think we've got to talk about it.

Well, I think we've got to talk about it.

But I'd like to say that from what we're doing now on Monday, I think the best thing to do is to keep everybody just discredited in the speculation about the point of the decision, as we've made with our position.

And it's been a pleasure to have more of it talked about.

I'll be remanded to be quite outstanding.

I don't know if it was me, but I don't know if it was him.

He mentioned to spread some blood over the weekend.

Do we have any other military action from over the weekend?

I just meant to tell him.

I meant to tell him.

I'm sure he must be here.

I don't think there's any distance you can get the railroad to.

The actions now are limited to what you said, the railroad, the POL.

We finished the union.

The railroad plumbing seems to be fairly successful.

I didn't think so.

But the other thing, the other action, I was afraid to insult you.

B-52 strikes, which is 75 in the handlock area today, 75 in the contour area tomorrow, 75 other than the next amount.

And that's what I meant when you shaved it down.

Who is going to shave it?

Whether handlock can save the nose, contour the nose.

I don't know whether the 21st Division, which is five miles away from these consoles, may not be so terrifying.

That's it.

That's why I say that.

They will not move the greens.

But anyway, what I meant is, we actually see that we're over the hump insofar as actions that might irritate the Russians and everybody else.

We have one.

We are...

We're not getting any place like the... We naturally aren't in the dock areas because the ships are still in there.

But this gives the Air Force exactly what they need to be able to do it.

And how specifically you're going to knock those damn railroads out.

And to get the DOL on those two things.

And this is one of the only other pilots that has power.

Is that right?

There are no...

Everything that's going to be hit has been discussed in West, and Alex knows about it.

There's no increase, except for these B-52 strikes, which are the same.

The main thing is, it seems to me that we must use the ultimate power at the time that we have the most support, because support erodes as time goes on.

And before that, somebody does come and stop.

And also, because the psychological impact of these meetings will be a whole lot greater than they think it may be.

What do you think about it, Monday, putting the V on the Congress for endangering the summit in case they take some action?

That's not a bad thing to say.

Look, why don't you lay off now that everything seems to be moving along all right?

If Congress acts adversely, it may have some effect, not nothing.

Well, I think you can say, you know, the way I think, you know, is this.

If you could put it rather in a general sense, you could say the President is the one in charge of institutions.

You know, we are, he's attached to what we've been, you know, we've been breaking our backs, negotiating with the sovereign government.

Negotiating, this is the course we've received, and we prefer it.

But...

The Senate must think very, very carefully for the Congress before taking any action which undercuts the President's ability to negotiate.

We're willing to negotiate.

And whenever the Congress acts, all it does is an incentive for them to not negotiate.

It's true that it's just unconscionable for these people to be under pressure.

They're still not all pretty.

Now, they may be old, but maybe that's not going to be a problem.

So it's going to be a rough time for them.

I would see a couple things to sign.

To sign?

Yeah.

And that Geneva summit conference was just so lovely that I received the hand of the British, French, or Cambodian countries that have no interest or knowledge in Russian, Chinese... Well, banking is the way to handle those things.

Oh, no, you handled it perfectly right.

The thing about this, I told Bob to raise it, but I thought I already had it built.

I was sure, so I'm guessing that people are already working on it.

Let me say...

My only reaction at the present time is that I want you to think about the problem of anti-Semitism.

Do you understand that?

I can handle Senate.

I want you to talk about the issues you have now.

What I do is that, by God, I have told Bob, and I've met him, and I've met Bill Whittemore today, right at the important time, we must rely, even at the cost of public support for this country, even at the cost of Senate support, congressional support, which undercuts our firm, strong, if you want to describe it, ferocious... Mr. President, you've shaken, for example, all the newsmen at their teeth, practically dropping out of their mouths with a rush to die next week.

You, every day, are more visibly preparing for the summit.

Who, in God's name, is going to pass a resolution?

I can't believe it.

Well, but the thing is, I would, next week, I would hardline it, because you've got ten days while you're in Moscow.

Hanoi must be shaking to its...

to its core.

I mean, here they are on the morning that the mines activate.

Three hours after the mines activate, the Russian foreign trade minister comes to the White House, and I don't know whether you know what he said to the NBC News.

They captured him in front of the Soviet embassy, and they said, did you discuss the summit?

He said, why should I have?

He said, well, is the summit still on?

He said, was there any question about it?

He said, well, they said to him, well, what about this?

I mean, he said, the only ones that seem to have any questions about it is you.

I have one.

Really?

Yeah.

It's on all the tickets.

That's great.

Jerry Schechter said, you guys had this all worked out ahead of time.

And... And...

They can still say this.

What about the bills quite about the freedom line that Kennedy's in?

First of all, I'm not sure that...

But the freedom is perfectly capable of lying.

Oh, sir, so am I.

And he's perfectly...

The question is, do they want to cancel the summit?

Now, you can say that the German treaty prevents them from canceling the summit.

If that's so, they can't cancel it before the 9th week.

Then, supposing they cancel you on the 20th while you're on the way,

what have they then gained by it?

I think the whole American people, if you then turn around and come back and turn on them, you have everybody with you.

It's one thing if they had turned on you this week, they could say Vietnam.

But next week, when you have done nothing in addition, when you can tell them we've given them these assurances, they've received it all, we went ahead preparing it.

For them to flush their whole policy down the drain and make you a hero in the process is almost inconceivable to me.

This week, they had a good possibility of doing it.

Next week, they would pay an additional price, which is further.

Moreover, if they hadn't canceled it by Monday,

And I don't see how they can now cancel it before Monday because we've got the Brezhnev answer, which is a very...

He read it.

He doesn't know that.

No, he doesn't even know there was a letter.

So we've got the Brezhnev answer.

It's mine.

I've worked out with the premium three principles which he's accepted.

We won't do anything other than what we're already doing.

We won't attack Soviet ships.

and we won't interfere with, in force, and we won't interfere with Soviet ships on the high seas.

I said to Sabrina, this letter can be interpreted in two ways, that we can't do anything, that we have to stop what we are doing, or that we shouldn't do anything efficient.

The first we can do, the second we can do.

He said, interpret it the second way.

Now, this is a record of total treachery if they...

And also being totally treacherous to me is a hell of a lot more dangerous than being totally treacherous to him.

Yes, but what's in it for them, Mr. President?

In the case of Kennedy, they were sneaking missiles into Cuba.

In this case, they're just cutting off the summit.

And what do they gain by waiting for a day?

Well, you can say they're gaining the German treaty.

In the German treaty, they could get into a war with them of wanting to go to the maximum humiliation of the President, which would be to cut him off while he isn't rude.

But I think it would help, but that would, if on Wednesday morning the Russians had put out a statement saying we were preparing good faith for the summit, the Vietnamese people are an oppressed people, the Americans are bombing it and we will not receive the raper of America, of Vietnamese, you know.

They haven't done that.

They have not started a press campaign against you, no meetings of indignation.

So that's the other thing you knew was going to happen, was a great stir.

Now, they have stirred up demonstrations in this country.

Sure.

You'd expect them to do that.

Oh, no, you'd expect them to.

That's right.

But they haven't been terribly effective in doing that, and that must have registered on them, too.

I mean, that must be an attempt to see whether they could do it.

But they haven't done a big thing in Russia.

They haven't attacked you in their press.

And in other words, they've been in very low gear.

Now, you know I expected them to cancel the summit, so I'm not...

But I expected them to do it in direct relation to your action.

Is it that way?

Can I ask this?

What in the hell is this institute who you think has... Bill refers to the police, but I didn't read the papers this morning.

Well, the story that bothers him the most is the Semple story, and that leak was common.

That had to be common.

But I'm not going to tell whether I'm true or not.

I don't think we should tell Roger.

I think it's better for him to think someone in the White House did it.

Yeah.

Then there was the Marvin Cowell.

That's the other thing that he's obsessed with, is a Marvin Cowell story that was... Nobody in the White House talked to Cowell before he was fired.

It says White House sources, and I can't imagine that...

But that was State Department using White House, saying White House.

It has to be, Mr. President.

Nobody here talks to Cowell.

Everybody over there does.

He never comes over here, either.

It was just Cowell's line.

Oh, that the Russians, that the White House glumly expects the Russians to cancel the summit and sees that there's no alternative for the Russians but to cancel the summit.

Now, that was yesterday evening.

Now, any of us who knew anything in the White House yesterday, we're beginning to be very optimistic.

Incidentally, are you really sure in this instance that none of our other press members are going to come for the best of their time?

I'm pretty sure because if they had, they wouldn't have taken that line, they would have taken the other line.

Nobody should ever take the line around here.

But that's it, they weren't.

Everything we were pumping out was the other way.

I don't believe anybody talked to him, but if anybody had, then I can't believe they would have given him that line, they would have given the opposite.

Our line was, we are preparing for the summit.

It's up to them to see whether they want to cancel it.

We see no reason to cancel it.

We said low-key.

We told them not to say anything about the summit, except the specific line that we told Ron to say, which was we're going ahead with preparations and to refuse to go beyond that.

It is not inconceivable, Mr. President, that next Friday they're going to cancel the summit.

But it would be such a mean, eddy move.

So inconsistent.

Another thing Dobrynin said is, he said, you asked.

He said, of course, you didn't ask us the question.

So we saw no reason to give you the answer.

I said, well, I'm a little bit glad I asked you the question.

He said, no, why make us make a formal decision in response?

You have said publicly you are continuing your preparation for the summit.

Our leaders know you have said this.

Our leaders haven't cancelled it.

Why, that's the issue.

And I think that's right.

And their guys, they're sure at the bureaucratic level they're going ahead because our advance, we have, you know, the advance team in Moscow.

They've been there for a week.

They're going over every kind of language.

They're arguing about where the car can drive and going through what rooms are going to be assigned to who and where the... Our switchboard is set up.

We've got to complete it.

You've got a hotline right now on the White House board in Moscow.

I can get then faster than I get in my office.

It's conceivable that they'll cancel you on Monday.

I would say after Monday, the chances go from 70% by 5% to 10% every day.

So anyway, we don't have to worry about it.

In the meantime, the strategy over the weekend, for everybody to fight back, we can.

Yeah.

And you, uh, it's got to get this over with now.

You've got to have your top of the company on the other hand.

Do that, John.

I can.

I just sort of had my problems.

And I think in the meantime, all of you and Henry, if you could lean on everybody here, I would only suggest that, so that the congressional people know that Henry, in time tomorrow, has spent some time with Stennis.

I'll call Stennis.

I'll talk to him.

I'll meet him.

And just say, and say, Senator, let me just tell you right now, there's a lot going on.

It would be terribly helpful if you could just pipe it down.

to dance this idea, the old model, that Congress wanted to play a part and a role.

Goddamn to hell, why don't we support the president once?

That's their excuse for cutting us out.

They don't want to support us.

Every time, all the leaders who say they want to support us, that's what Frank Church says he wants to do.

Share responsibility with you.

They help you in one of two conditions.

It's either when they think you're down,

or when they think you might be doing so well that they want to get some of the credit.

And right now they don't know which of the two.

They don't know which it is, but they want it either way.

They know it's one or the other.

They know there's going to be a fiasco or a success.

They know it isn't going to be in degree.

But the main thing right now is we're not going to do anything in any way of discounts, downgrades,

reduces the enormous threat that hangs over North Vietnam.

Right, Henry?

Absolutely.

That is the key to this whole thing.

That's why you don't want any more talk, I would think, about the peace operative.

That's right.

And Mr. President, if the bloody thing collapses now in South Vietnam, you have done, you can get out of there from a position of strength.

But I don't think it's going to collapse.

I think what's going to happen now is that there is as good a chance that the North Vietnamese will collapse in the South as there is of the South Vietnamese collapsing.

How will they perform when they're collapsing?

Well, for example, today they captured a regimental commander in Nha An Loc.

That has never happened.

Yeah, a North Vietnamese regimental commander.

Yeah.

that they're taking him to Saigon to have a discussion with him.

Actually, I think we're going to have a very happy weekend, I think.

Like the Godfather, we had a gang with him.

The gang, the father always said, they'd say, how are you going to do this with him?

And he made some weird, some outrageous proposition.

He says, we're making him a proposition he will not be able to refuse.

I think the proposition he made was, we can't refuse.

Anyway, don't.

Oh, I think we've done a good job.

Do you want to get out on some stuff?

I think, well, I think we're basically almost over the top.

I'll say that minister is, if he's wrong, he certainly doesn't look like an answer to the president.

Yeah, but he said it can't be seen.

That's even worse, because he's on public record with that.

There's no publication in Moscow.

Nixon, Rogers & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

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Nixon, Rogers & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

AI Summary

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NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on May 11, 1972

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