Conversation 858-004

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Why don't we sit over here?

How are you?

Just sit here, that's what we're going to do.

I think we've just got to get a press conference.

Thank you.

But there was a groin that you couldn't get away with.

You couldn't beat the man.

That's what happened, right?

Well, there's some people who might have been in this area.

There's some people who have been in this area.

I have a message.

that we're not going to continue our dialogue with the ERC, that we aren't going to go forward with our discussions with the Soviet, but with Europe developing a new electric program, we need to re-evaluate NATO's strategy, et cetera.

We were a great deal of attention

The thing that I see in Europe, and I don't know whether you agree with this perhaps, but there's a very, very strong strain of isolationist growing environment.

It's due to a number of factors.

The Vietnam War contributed to it all over the country.

and all the rest, even though they never had some good, they served them better.

And those, and the interesting thing is that the old internationals, those, as I, who, you know, I have a single standard, I think, the old internationals, too, who supported aid to Europe, the Marshall Plan, and all the rest, way back 25 years ago, have now become living isolations.

And I don't know why this has happened.

For some, it has to do with the U.S. trading position.

Then we had all the chips, and now the chips are passed out, and everybody's flying.

And so it's a different kind of a thing.

For others, it's sort of a split issue.

Most of what I call the old internationals, who are the older liberals, will become isolationists.

What really is happening is that, deep down, they do not feel that the free world should maintain its strength.

They do not feel that there is any potential threat from the communists, because it has received an election.

They feel they're obsessed with the idea

the only major country in Europe that really looks out for the day is Britain.

And that's because of he.

But he has a tremendous lot of opposition, as you're quite aware.

I mean, there again, the old internationalists in terms of being in the isolationists.

But Ted Heath has always been an out-of-the-way follower.

He took the lead in the United States.

At times, he was unpopular.

He keeps Britain looking out for him.

Not a good reason for that.

and were blown out of Algeria.

So they turned, which is their natural tendency anyway.

It was never natural for them to be a colonial daughter.

The Germans, we all know what happened there.

The Germans just went and accepted the field of trade and did very, very well.

They looked after the Italians.

Well, you know the Italians.

So you look at those Scandinavian countries, and they don't have the power or anything to manage them.

So what we had here, it seems to me, I'm just trying to, in this brief monologue, to give you a feeling of what I see the world.

I think we're fighting an uphill battle, an uphill battle in terms of developing and developing real cooperation and constructive attitude between Europe and the United States.

We're fighting an uphill battle, as I told good Pastor yesterday, in getting not only America but the Europeans to maintain our NATO strength rather than to reduce it to

And I think we're fighting not no battle in terms of more outgoing policies of trade, because there are just a lot of Americans, including American labor, American business, the older nations, who sort of have this perception now that the United States should turn inward and look to its own problems.

And with that, inevitably becomes less, you know, a less positive attitude.

of being part of the world.

Having stated all that, let me say that I, somewhat like Keith, by a rearguard action, I believe, as I told the people at Anaconda yesterday, I believe very strongly that if the United States turns in Britain and quits and backs away from its commitments in Asia and in Europe, that we can do pretty well worldwide.

we would be surrounded by, in the end, by both trade and many other areas, by a potentially hostile investment, a neutral in the other side of the world.

And as far as the Europeans are concerned, and Japan being the other side of the world, you and I

I'm on your side, but I think we have to understand we've got a terrific problem.

And so what we've got to do, those of us who are still thinking in international terms, who are still thinking in European terms, we've got to realize the problem, sell it as well as we can.

It wouldn't have been possible three years ago.

And I personally think that the United States hasn't done anything like that.

All that has happened.

I mean, it's the period that's important.

With the world changing, you see, with the opening to China, with the opening to Russia, for us, if we only recognize the opening occurred because we were strong economically, all of us,

I totally understand, but they'll come down.

The fact that, for example, I claim to check glasses with Joe and Ma and shake hands with Ma Sintag and host and pop a few champagnes down and sign agreements with the president.

Now these people get to know each other.

They understand each other.

It's going to be a better world.

They do this because they're interested in all of it.

And we do this because we're interested in all of it.

The British understand this.

a hell of a lot of Americans were the most hopelessly honest people in the world.

The Duke went to his financial remark.

He said, interest never lies.

And he didn't make many remarks.

He usually was a doer.

That's right.

Now this person there, in many ways I think although it's a sadness that the community was not enlarged ten years earlier when he and I by his side were trying to negotiate.

You were right with him.

I was right with him.

I was Minister of Agriculture and then on that side of it, what he was doing.

We went in thousands the same day as he and I.

We were very close to him.

And he wanted me to come and do this job.

Now why?

Because he thinks that this is the only feasible in which

be a European voice for the moment.

There's got to be eventually a European political voice, and before that the European monetary voice.

But the only voice that exists at the moment in Europe is on trade matters.

This is the only one where the Commission has, under the Treaty of Rome, to handle the situation.

And this is my job.

Now, how do I seem my job?

Which has happened that Europe has in fact been enlarged at a time when taxes were all that you could have done.

The world is on the move again, and it ought to be possible for Europe also to seize this opportunity and to find itself in this new and changing world and find its position, find its personality, find the contributions that it can make to the world.

And that is good.

That is a plus.

Although we should laugh at that here, it's a good one, thanks to the increase which you have made possible.

But it's a bad moment.

Insofar as the United States is European-related,

And because of this malice, largely over the deep center, it seems to have been really worrying people to an extent.

And I'm surprised, yesterday, at all the talks I had, the extent to which this seems to be on top of me.

Now, I think, in particular, when you look at the United States of America, with a trillion-dollar economy, exactly.

And so you have a $6 billion trade on it.

That's not one in the hell different

I got this all the time.

I know.

I got it from morning to 8.

I got this.

This was the real problem that this must be kept.

Now, and I've seen it.

I've seen it.

Yeah, I've seen it.

But Europe is sort of being mixed up with Japan.

This is a problem.

It's a problem lost in Japan.

Very nice.

In Europe, you don't agree?

No, sir.

You don't agree?

Well, Japan is an immediate problem.

The $4 billion to the $6 billion deficit is Japanese.

Yes, sir.

We have a $10 billion deficit in our basic balance, and that goes on year after year after year.

Well, I think we are.

I mean, I think Japan is a big problem.

Now, how to deal with it?

I'm interested in the European side, and what can I do?

I think that these negotiations are beginning to enter into a French clear board.

Not so much on what's going to come out in trade.

All right, I mean, we'll give a bit here, and we'll get an agreement here on this, and on a bit of tariff, on a bit of non-tariff barrier, and on the safeguard draws, and we'll be looking together to how we can handle the Japanese situation.

We're doing this quietly with ourselves.

and out of it will come some trade benefits.

But this is nothing compared with the political advantage that's going to come out of it, and this is a doubt, and we're on the bicycle, we're peddling along, we're talking.

But we must be very careful, because if it goes wrong, and we don't reach the end of the road, then the political disadvantages would far outweigh any trade advantages.

Now, what worried me in my talks yesterday

As I got straight from the shelter, as a negotiating position, we've got to get a good deal, unilaterally, out of the negotiations which are starting on the 1st of March on Article 246 of the GATT.

We've got to get something on the fact that EFTA, countries who are not members of the community, are being given free trade area status, and this is going to affect American trade with Europe.

When it comes to the multilateral negotiations, then this isn't just something which we've got to give and take on both sides.

This is something which has got to come out in American favour, so that the main contribution to rectifying

I know that Europe put in a thing saying, we don't reckon we owe anything.

And that's the starting point.

But of course it is true that where the United States and indeed all our trading partners are concerned under 24-6, where actual cast-iron propositions are put to us, the effect that we have lost out by virtue of this, by virtue of that, by virtue of the other, each one must be properly examined.

And if it is true that they should be met,

Now, we've got the whole world involved.

It isn't just the United States.

It's Canada that comes into this.

It's Australia.

There's a lot of other countries coming to this as well.

I'm not saying there's a tremendous lot to give.

I'm going to have difficulty in making them give anyhow, making the nine countries agree to give in, because that instinct is going to be to keep everything for the month of September.

But there must be, it must be, everything properly that is properly presented must be properly looked at under 24-6.

Where the after-legation issues are concerned, yeah, I would...

If I may give a little warning to the effect that I know that Europe is convinced that legally speaking, where the gap is concerned, there is nothing wrong with what we've done, nothing that requires any compensation under the gap, but the fact that we have brought with us into Europe a free trade situation that existed between Britain and Austria and Switzerland and Norway, who haven't become

we brought with them a free trade situation with us which couldn't be allowed to go backwards.

And it is now, the negotiations say that that should be extended to the community as a whole, and it has to be with Britain and Saudi Arabia.

And we believe that this is legally right.

I'm told that the impression I got from the State Department yesterday

making them your enemies.

Now, let's push at doors which can't be opened any more than is necessary, and let's concentrate on pushing at doors that are openable.

And I think that the 24-6 is a more fruitful act to follow along rather than the 18.

None of the main negotiations are concerned.

You know, Mr. President, I had an awful lot of ideas

unrequited satisfaction to the United States.

What is the situation?

On agriculture, in fact, the common agricultural policy that we had in 1964, between 64 and 72, there's been very nearly a 50% increase in agricultural imports into Europe.

So I don't think that's a bad thing.

Then, where the industry is concerned,

there is a 6.5% tariff, which is not a very, very high tariff.

And, of course, there can be improvements, and there must be improvements, both in tariffs and in non-tariff banks.

But I think that the trouble again is that Europe is sort of lost up and mixed up with the Japanese situation, which is a very difficult, difficult situation.

And what I am frightened of is that if, because of, first of all, the internal need to which you were referring,

And secondly, because of the Japanese situation, you find yourself having to, the American administration finds itself having to make noises, which are construed in Europe as being protectionist noises, that in order to get the bill through, okay, it has to be dressed up in such a way as to get what is designed to be, as Ted East told me a bit before I left to come here,

a liberal will, a liberalizing bill.

But there's too many noises, you know, it's a question of the balance here.

And if it comes out too much as if there's just one little paragraph about liberalizing and the rest is all about protecting, this in itself is here to make it difficult.

Now, we've, it was agreed, I think, after the Smithsonian agreement that there shouldn't be this discussion, there shouldn't be these negotiations.

And the idea should be mutual liberalisation of trade.

And that is fine.

That is fine.

I've got to, what I see my job, is that I've got to provide a mandate, put up a draft global approach to the Council of Ministers which has to be politically realistic.

I have to do this at the end of March.

And to be politically realistic, it has to do, as I see it, two things.

It has to be likely to be acceptable within the round by the nine

And it also has to be something which our trading partners, particularly the United States, sees as a reasonable negotiating position.

Hence my reason for coming here as president.

And hence my, as I said, I understand, I see the difficulty, but I think that it should not be for too much.

I mean, I heard, I would really rather

rather than a bit disappointed in the sort of message that I was getting yesterday, which was that, look, we've got this deficit, you've got to put it right.

Now, hey, I'm not sure about all this fuss about the deficits, in fact, but if it goes on and on and on, and I see that this will create difficulties.

But as to who's going to put it right, I don't know, I would have thought, I was talking to Mr. Sonnenfeld just outside before we came in, I would have thought that there were sort of two broad approaches to this.

One is the one I had yesterday, which is we've got to go on with our attempts, we've got to go on with our aid, and therefore you've got to give us and make it possible for us to put our deficit right, turn it into a service.

That's one approach.

The other approach is that the hard fact is that the United States in the immediate first four years, where it had big services, got accustomed to them, was one big industrial nation.

that could export very easily throughout the whole world, with no range of projects.

Others have now bought up, and others have been doing a great deal of selling.

Others have taken export markets.

And just so you know, you don't want to end up just with jumbo jets and with grain and with agricultural produce.

I mean, there is a whole range of goods.

You're suggesting that we ought to get off our tails and do a little bit more.

Excuse me, Mr. President.

What I think I'm suggesting is that you want to give... We've forgotten about exporting.

It's been such a small...

It's been such a small part of the American economy that you've forgotten about it.

The problem there, of course, is the American market.

like a magnet draws the world and draws our own producers because it's such a good one.

On the other hand, out in this great big world where I have a lot of other markets and some of ours,

Your people are out on the floor.

That's right, you're out on the floor.

We are not eating that.

That's Japanese.

Why are the Japanese not so?

Well, let's look at that stinking little land.

The less arable land in California.

Boy, they are exploiting those markets.

That's exactly it.

I mean, we had the atheists.

It's much more serious.

But the old saying is much more serious.

And what we had to do, we had to devalue, we had to devalue, and we had to constrain on exports, make it harder to purchase on our own market, make it harder to sell on our own market in order to push into exports.

I mean, we had to do it, and I think that in terms of the American image to the world, and it's enormous responsibility, it is really to looking to

itself is a much better one than saying, look, we've got this paper, we've got this thesis, you've got to give us enough to get it out.

And what I feel is that we have a chance, and I will put hope, Mr. President, as I said to Mr. Kennedy yesterday, that both of these initiations, it's fragile and important, but there are a lot more political initiatives.

I could be able to serve some purpose in coming out.

I have the confidence of he, of Pompidou, and I think of Brandt, and I hope that during the course of the negotiations, in exactly the same way, the role that I play in the negotiations, negotiations get into the market with Pompidou, which was the Frenchman,

And the boys were fighting in Brussels, and they were going to battle in Brussels.

And in fact, behind the scenes, we were very, very setting up a very detailed meeting, which resolved the situation.

And I think that between Europe and America, this dialogue is going to be one of the secrets.

We don't know about it.

The outer and visible signs will be these negotiations, which get out before tough and hard.

But I will do my best to get out of the night.

I promise you that.

Let me suggest a couple of points.

Agriculture, a few lemons or whatever we sell over there, isn't going to make that much difference.

The problem with agriculture, as I told you, and even for us, is that agriculture provides the books that we need to pass the trade level.

You see, the agriculture is going to make it worse in all these small states.

and out across this great land of ours, over half the Senate is basically agriculture.

So the distinction of British Parliament for even there, you still have an agricultural lobby.

The chairman's got an agricultural lobby, which is far more important to a giant standard conservative government there than a liberal government.

France competently needs the environment.

Here, it isn't a question.

This administration has the mark and all that stuff, but it isn't a question.

It's a question of the Senate.

Getting any kind of a trade bill through the Senate requires us to be able to do something.

So the agriculture thing, to the extent that you can be forthcoming on that, it will help us a great deal on both things.

That's what we're really talking about.

Second, what we're really talking about here is basically a rearguard action.

And you heard this Burke article.

That has the support of labor.

It has the support of some segments of business, you know, the old-type businessmen.

And as Nasseri has supported the more radical, we are opposed to it.

It will not go through in its present form.

But what we have to do is to find a position which will reassure the more moderate, reasonable people who would be frankly plagued by their constituencies by supporting the bill, reassure them that we were going to see that American products were in fair shape inside the world.

So, now, the third point is that, while it is true that you say Japan is the major part of the problem, there are just a lot of men here that are more sophisticated people.

A lot of American businessmen.

I'm not speaking to them a lot.

just a lot of our business people.

I think they're scared.

They think it was a mistake for us to press as I did.

I was always used to make those nice speeches for the fact that Britain should get a sugar.

And frankly, the reason I thought Britain should get a sugar, it had nothing to do with economics.

I think it was harmful to Britain

The only major country looking outward, and Britain with its sophistication among its leaders and so forth, is needed in Europe.

Britain's political voice is needed in Europe.

That's what is needed.

That's why Britain's vision is so important, in my opinion.

Because none of these other people are going to look outward.

They're going to be looking there.

I'm not worried about the fine versus the dollar.

I'm not worried about the East Germans.

Andriotti is worried about 18 political parties.

So who else is going to do it?

I'm aware of the fact that the Wall Street people up there have no understanding of the American economy at all.

They never have had.

They don't always bet wrong and then catch up later and all the rest.

The idea that they predict what's going to happen in the bull, they don't.

Don't ever take an issue out of the room.

Wall Street does no goddamn thing.

The point is, however, that what you have here is that these people,

You see, America is crisis-prone.

Read Farrelly's book on Kennedy's thing.

Read Expectations.

Don't read it because it's what it tells you about Kennedy, but read it because it tells you about America.

Americans love to hear the vice presidents.

They feed on crisis, crisis, crisis.

Now, consequently, whenever we see America in a crisis, it's $6 billion.

We should have known better.

We're graduates of the best schools and all that sort of thing.

Probably the reason.

Because we're graduates of the best schools, they're the students.

So here they are.

They come out of here.

And they go up and say, oh, this is terrible.

The market dropped 50 million dollars.

It should have dropped 50 million dollars.

No, it didn't go up.

Oh, somebody will say, but if that continues over 10 years, that's 60 million dollars.

So it's 60 million dollars.

What's that mean?

I understand that.

You understand.

It should have got everybody all that excited.

But the point is, the fact is, it does.

We shouldn't be all that excited about agriculture products, whether we can get and sell them, or soybeans, or bananas.

We don't have bananas.

Or oranges, or whatever we sell.

We shouldn't.

But we do.

It's a political fact of life.

That's what we're talking about.

So we'll have to bargain.

I will not let you say, for the worst thing that could happen in the world today would be for Europe and America to get into a ugly confrontation.

I know that.

But on our side, you have to realize, we are going to be fighting in the way.

Actually, you've got to explain to the nine.

We've got to help the political problem.

We'll do the best we can on your side.

The more important the coming, you can be, both in your statements and so forth.

I'm not making you .

You see, then the easier it's going to make for us.

The last point I would make is this.

All of us have got to think of a way to bring Japan into this act.

I mean, I don't know how this is going to be done.

I think we've got to get Japan.

can't be out there as a wild card.

They can't be a wild card, right?

I don't know what you're saying.

What do you think it is?

We've got to get them to let us in.

We've got to get into their markets.

Sure.

Well, how does an American insurance company that can sell one bit of insurance in Japan?

But there are two ways of this.

One is to put a fence around the United States, a fence around Europe, and a fence around the Third World.

And it's just as harmful if they get that as if they get your market or the European market.

That's one way of trying to get this to me is an impossible way of doing it.

Absolutely impossible.

The only way to do it is we've got to absolutely force them to let it in, to do it in our trading, in every way the services, trading, the lot.

And this is what we've got to use the international, the multilateral negotiations for.

We've got to absolutely pound them.

Now it mustn't look like we have, because this is...

But we've got to

The only long-term solution for Japan we can't join, we can't answer this defense.

I mean, we can have safeguards and all that.

I think we've got one, and it's going to have a look at what ours is like.

And we realize, when you talk about safeguards, it is, in fact, pan-Eurania debt.

But Europe, they're not talking Europe, thinking that it's Asian Europe, too.

But Europe has done pretty well in keeping Germany's stuff up, much better than we have.

Well, to begin with, we've got two oceans between us.

You've only got one.

That's right.

That makes quite a hell of a difference.

That's right.

And secondly, they've been conquering the American market, and they're not

We double what it has been in the United States.

They've already done that.

They've killed Zeiss in Germany.

They've already done that.

They've knocked it through six.

In Denmark the other day, they went in service for big earthenware equipment and things.

They did a market survey.

They moved in, and within 18 months, they captured the whole market.

They sold 30% under anybody else, and they did the whole market.

And they're picking off things one by one in country by country, and they go to one country, then they'll leave that country alone, go to another market, and no one.

No, it's all coming.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

And I don't know whether it divided Europe, and certainly America's divided into so many corporations.

Tell me, just as one last one, I guess I've got to get in there, those cabinet people won't resign, but does your, would you, I know it's not on me, on your, part of your responsibility, but in the group, would you consider such a problem as energy and so forth and so on?

We'd be very interested to have the very closest contact on that.

Do you know what I mean?

We're worried about that.

You see what I mean?

You speak about the Japanese, you speak over there, you go in their number in the Mid-East, you know, and the divide and conquer thing there.

And you know, even the Iranians, we get to act irresponsibly.

Your North-East stuff is going to come in for five years.

So, no, no, no, the Iranians are acting irresponsibly.

God knows what's going to happen.

Let's suppose, for example, the Saudis have, which they might well have, a coup or something.

You know, radicals, I mean, like Mossadegh.

But suppose if somebody kills the king of Iran, or if he just decides to go the other way, so he won't get killed for whatever reason.

Where do we go?

We'd be used to living on this dive edge because we've always had to import about 30 or 40 of those guys.

But, you know, he'd be living on the very edge.

Another thing that I've had to deal with is us, the preferential treatments given to countries outside Europe by Europe.

Again, this divides itself into two categories.

First of all, there are 22 old Commonwealth, I mean new Commonwealth countries, underdeveloped Commonwealth countries, who we had the small training responsibilities, who we were looking after.

For instance, through the International Sugar Agreement, the R.N.

Sugar Agreement, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, we were paying sugar producers in the Commonwealth double the world price for their sugar as a means of aid.

And we were keeping our sugar production down as well.

Now, we have to bring these responsibilities with us into Europe.

Now, as Europe is constructed, we can't say we bring them us.

We could never have got it through.

We couldn't have got it through unless we took these responsibilities with us.

Now, these are responsibilities for us to take their policies.

It is not responsibilities for us to make them take ours, which is the reverse of it.

And, yes, I would absolutely agree with that.

There are those who I've had here saying, well, why should you take their signature?

Why shouldn't we?

Why should you take theirs any more than ours?

But the answer is, in fact, that we carry this obligation with us that we had before.

We carry it with us into it here.

Then there is the military, which is outside this aspect of those who are ex-combatant countries.

with whom the old community of six said, now let's have one special relationship with the Mediterranean.

This is a trickier subject, I will agree, but I think that it is in the interest of the free world as a whole that Europe should take a considerable interest in the Mediterranean and should drop and bind those countries to Europe, make them Europe-orientated.

I mean, they can't sell here anyway.

I think that it is in interest of the free will that this is one of the places where perhaps we can take some of the pressure off.

I saw that quite a bit, Pete, and saw a lot of talking paper, Pete, on that, and he impressed me.

Well, in that kind of situation.

Now, there's one, of course, in another way, another problem we have, of course, which I think we're aware of.

of Latin America, we're gonna have to develop some relationship with Latin America.

They, to us, are somewhat like the Mediterranean Sea.

And I want that thought through.

I have no thought on it.

Let me talk to Pete about that.

I understand we're trying to write it in such a way that Latin America would sort itself out, right, and get the benefit of it, whatever.

Is that right?

Yes, sir.

The design would not explicitly say that.

Only if it would be more better.

But we've got to understand that, you see, in the, this is more for you, in the, now I'm going to argue in your case that on this particular point and on the others, we'll show you.

of a stability in the world for Europe, and that the British, the French, the Dutch, the Belgians, to continue and to even expand their economic ties to their former colonies.

In my view, very important.

I know I open to it.

It can't be a new component, but it is important.

Rather than have the United States have to dabble around the Congo,

Now, this may mean, therefore, I can put it in a political context, getting away with the trade deal if the cost is not too great.

In my view, if the political ties are proved, you see, by this sort of thing, we've got to weigh that and not just the economic situation.

You see what I mean?

Absolutely.

That, of course, is the same game you've got to play with the black market.

But we have that in mind, as I understand it, in our discussions.

But you have, out of 37 black African countries, we have 34 of them are ex-colonial, British or French territories.

And we've got this on our back.

But we're not making any hells in doing this.

We're not trying to create.

We're not trying to, you know, we've got it.

We're not with it.

And we've made this do the best we can with it.

And...

Politically, there's much in my view that it is not a dangerous sort of world.

And we're not going to agree we're not going to be in a certain United States.

For us to dabble in every little country in the world, and particularly Africa, we've got to take our shoes off.

I think our African department, the State Department, goes right up the wall when I say this, because they want us to have a mission, an upper vote.

a program for Chad, they wanna have something for Keegan, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

No, except there's a little problem that's not, that's not our problem.

That's the way we go at it, right?

Do you want to agree?

No, I don't.

That's all we can do.

We've got to do it in a way that we don't get a backlash here.

Let me say, I'm talking politically.

I've got to get back in there.

So, anyway, we've...

We'll do the best we can with mine here.

But as I say, I want you to know that this new isolationist that's developing here is right in Europe, all over Europe, and in Britain.

You know, everybody's turning inward.

It's fine to take leaders, leaders like Pete, God knows others who are more like him, here, and step up there and say, I'm going to listen to them.

I'm sure they'll fight for their art.

I find so much about the relationship between Europe and the United States, and I'm so pleased that I've got the opportunity to speak about it.

But it's what really comes to me.

This isn't a great thing in the politics.

It's a whole other matter.

Yeah.

I don't know if it's right on our side.

I don't see it.

But when he's there, we can board the schedule and see that.

Sure, sure, sure.

We would expect it.

Now, what do you think I should tell our captain about?

Tell him that you're all protectionists trying to raise hell in the United States.

With the liberal protectionists?

Yeah, yeah.

They're right.

The liberal party and...

I think it's important to say that it's important for the United States and Europe not to engage in competitions and that we, that you, of course, do a barking heart and so forth.

What are we getting from that?

A couple of minutes.

Three minutes.