Conversation: 868-015
Prev: 868-014 Next: 868-016Start Date: 3-Mar-1973 1:10 PM
End Date: 3-Mar-1973 2:07 PM
Participants:
Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Pineau, Julienne L.; Shultz, George P.;Recording Device: Oval Office
NARA Description:
On March 3, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Julienne L. Pineau, and George P. Shultz met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:10 pm and 2:07 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 868-015 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid:
Conversation No. 868-15
Date: March 3, 1973
Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:07 pm
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger, Julienne L. Pinneau, and George P. Shultz; the
White House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.
Introduction
Pinneau's departure
[Photograph session]
Pinneau's work with administration
Pinneau's new job
-United States Information Agency [USIA]
-James Keogh
Meeting with Kissinger
Pinneau left at 1:12 pm.
Kissinger’s meeting with Quadriad members
-Length
US monetary policy
Kissinger’s knowledge
-Floating exchange regime
-Intervention
-Willy Brandt's letter
-Europe
-Common float position
-Impact on US
-European integration, world stability
-Kissinger’s viewpoint
-Common float
-Political impact of devaluation
-Speculation, devaluation
-Perception of US weakness
-Consultation with US
-US intervention
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Statement to Brandt
-US procedural objection
-Basis for later action
-Objection to Brandt's letter
-Edward R. G. Heath
-Reply to president
-Shultz’s telephone call to Anthony P. L. Barber
-Position on common floating of currency
-US reaction to common float proposal
-Reply to Brandt
-Exchange rates
-General compared with unilateral action
-Impact of float on Japan
-Need for consultation
-Intervention to defend US exchange rate
-Minimum demand
-Consultation
-US options
-Common float
-US objections
-Paul A. Volcker
-Intervention
-Acquiescence in European integration
-US concerns
-Brandt's letter
-US interests
-European integration
-Benefit to world security
-Conversation with Heath
Floating of currency
-Kissinger
-Political implications of float
-Europe
-Consultation with US
-Options
Europe integration
-US position
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Wording of statement
-Support for integration
-Europe, Atlantic
-Need for consultation with US, Japan
-Monetary situation
-Compared to US-USSR initiatives
-European actions
-Unilateral, consultation
-Japan’s interests
-US actions
Exchange rates
-US course of action
-Massive intervention in currency markets
-Floating exchange regime
-Shultz, Herbert Stein
-US interests
-Devaluation
-International reaction
-Smithsonian Agreement
-February 12, 1973 devaluation
-US weakness
-Floating exchange regime
-Economists’ views
-Progress
-August 1971, February 193
-Milton Friedman
-Support
President's letter to Brandt and Heath
-Active US policy
-Japan, Europe
-US devaluation
-Passive US policy
-European integration
-Substitute for Atlantic, world cooperation
-Consultation with US
Intervention
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Shultz’s opposition
-Risks
-Arthur F. Burns
-West Germany
-Formal US devaluation
-Congress, International Monetary Fund [IMF]
-Dollar reserves
-West Germany
-Exchange rate parity fluctuations
-Japan
-Burns's recommendations
-US bargaining position
-Borrowing against West German Mark
-US intervention to defend exchange rate
-Common float
-Failure
-National float
-Weaknesses
-West Germany
-US intervention
-Obligation
-Smithsonian Agreement
-Letter to Brandt
-Devaluation statement
-Congress
-Critique
-Support for float
-West Germany
-Belief in US non-intervention
-New York bankers
-Alfred Hayes
-Support for US intervention
-Reasons
-Stable currency markets
-Speculation
European integration
-Kissinger’s viewpoint
-Desirability
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Atlantic unity
-US intervention in currency markets
-Moves toward common currency
-US intervention in currency markets
-West German participation
-West Germany’s position
-Cooperation with US
-Common float
US intervention
-Impact on European moves for common currency
-Delay
Europe’s common currency
-Difficulty
-Exchange rate parity
-Italy, Great Britain
-Crisis
-German cooperation with US
US intervention
-Economic impact
US policy toward common float
-Kissinger's concerns over inaction
-European independence, unity
-Impact on Atlantic alliance
-Kissinger's recommendation
-Letter from President
-Atlantic unity
-Alerting Japan
-US intervention to defend exchange rate
-Kissinger’s recommendation
-US support of Europe’s proposal
-US interests
-Shultz
-US rejection of fait acompli
-Brandt’s letter
-Heath’s response
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Japan
European moves toward common float
-France
-Anti-American rhetoric
-European independence
-West German actions
-Belief in US non-intervention
-Great Britain
-Floating exchange
-Support for fixed exchange in Europe
President’s letter to Brandt, Heath
-Intervention options
-Impact on terms of trade
-Congress
-Reaction
-Currency swaps
-Risks
-Costs
-Burns's forthcoming testimony
-Exchange rate parity
-Price of gold
-Non-intervention option
-US bargaining position
-European moves toward common float
-Disagreement
-Failure
-West Germany
-Consultation with US
-Defense of rate parity
-France’s position compared to US
Shultz’s view of US intervention
-Burns’s position
-Flexible exchange rates
-Burns’s position
-Non-intervention
-Leverage
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Flexible negotiating position
US policy toward common float
-Political implications
-Domestic
-New York bankers
-View of nation
-US leadership
-US interest in a divided Europe
-President's letter to Brandt
-Need for consultations
-Europe’s skepticism
-Independent action
-US intervention
-Conditions
-Europe’s response
-Heath, Japan
-US assertion of leadership
-Consultation with US
-Leverage in other negotiations
-Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR], Nuclear
agreement
US relations with Europe
-US economic strengths
-US interests
Kissinger’s interpretation of Brandt's letter
-Heath
-Deal
-US intervention
-Europe’s rejection
-West Germany
-Need to float currency
-Brandt’s promise
-Blame on US
US intervention
-Imposition compared to offer
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Europe’s response
-Float, consultation with US
-US negotiating leverage
President's letter to Brandt
-Support for European integration
-Impact on Atlantic alliance
-Unilateral decisions
-US, Japan
-Common float
-US input
-Intervention
-Japan
-Brandt
-Agreement without US support
-Dealings with France
-Heath
-Nuclear issues
-Dealings with President
US intervention in monetary system
-Shultz’s viewpoint
-Exchange rates
-Need for convertibility
-Equilibrium
-France’s opposition
-US military and aid operations, investments
-Separation of trade from monetary problems
President's letters to Heath, Brandt, and Japan
-Importance
-Kissinger’s recommendations
-European alternatives
-Responses by Europeans
-Intervention
-Advantages of European initiative
-Question about intervention
-US responses
-Advantage of European initiative
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Compensation for US
-Europe’s position specified
-Intervention, float
-Intervention
European float of currency
-Workability
-Chances
-West Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg float
-Workability
-Chances
-Brandt
-Problems
-Great Britain’s response
-US bailout
-European integration
-Failure
-US response
Letter to Brandt
-Alternatives to common float
-US support
European integration
-US policy toward
-Official
-Unofficial
-Steps toward common economic policy
-Action only by pressure
-US support
-Economic compared to defense integration
-Working against US interests
President's letter to Brandt
-Draft
-Kissinger and Shultz
Shultz's trip
-Europe and USSR
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
-Advisability
-Length
-Energy, tax, trade issues
-Postponement
-Shultz’s return from Europe
-Shultz's trip to USSR
-Impact
Most Favored Nation status [MFN] for USSR
-Helmut (“Hal”) Sonnenfeldt’s concern
-Shultz's talks with Jacob K. Javits
-Trade bill
-Jackson Amendment
-Senate supporters
-President's request for authority
-Congressional veto power
-Advantages
-Jackson Amendment
-Javits’s recommendations
-Sonnenfeldt’s concern
-Kissinger’s critique
-USSR
-President’s support
Shultz’s trip
-Advantages
-Consultation with Europeans
-Problems
-Congressional vetoes
-Kissinger’s viewpoint
-Postponement
-Letters
Kissinger left at 2:07 pm.
William E. Simon
-Treasury Department
-Abilities
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Tape Subject Log
(rev. June-2010)
Conversation No. 868-15 (cont’d)
Shultz left at 2:07 pm.