Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 885 › Conversation 885-006

Nixon & Scowcroft on Vietnam War and Airstrikes

Tuesday, March 20, 1973 · 5:45 PM–5:59 PM ET · Oval Office · 12 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Scowcroft, Brent G. (Gen.)Conversation885-006 on Tape 885StartTuesday, March 20, 1973 at 5:45 PMEndTuesday, March 20, 1973 at 5:59 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 885-006 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and General Brent Scowcroft discussed the potential for U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam in response to ongoing infiltration, weighing the strategic military value against the political risks of such action. They evaluated the timing of these strikes in relation to the final scheduled release of American prisoners of war and the formation of a new government in Laos. Ultimately, they examined whether a show of force would successfully deter future North Vietnamese aggression or if it would merely incite domestic Congressional opposition without achieving a meaningful military objective.

Audio

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NARA Description

On March 20, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 5:45 pm and 5:59 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 885-006 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 885-6
Date: March 20, 1973
Time: Unknown between 5:45 pm and 5:59 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft.
                                    -13-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                     Conversation No. 885-6 (cont’d)

Vietnam settlement
     -Infiltration from North Vietnam
            -US responses
            -Provocation
            -Reduction
                  -Reasons
                         -Seasonal weather
            -Annual rate
                  -Effect of cease fire
                  -Decline
            -US message from Henry A. Kissinger
                  -Delays
                         -Signals
     -Laos
            -G. McMurtrie Godley
            -New government
                  -Formation date
     -Prisoners of war [POW] release
            -Timing
                  -Provisional Revolutionary Government [PRG] statement
            -Air strike
                  -Effect
                  -Kissinger's opinion
                         -Second thoughts
     -Laos negotiations
            -Godley's statement
            -Air Strikes
            -North Vietnam’s reactions
                  -POW release
     -Air strikes
            -Timing
            -POW release
            -Effectiveness
Show the rest of the log (52 more lines)
            -POW release
            -Public support
            -Cease-fire
            -Laos
                                             -14-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                           Conversation No. 885-6 (cont’d)

                  -Congressional Objections
                  -South Vietnam
                  -Cambodia
                  -Laos
                  -Infiltration from North Vietnam
                  -Public and Congressional resistance
                  -Value
                         -Symbolism
                         -Military Effect
                  -Timing
                         -POW release
                  -Public objections
                         -Laos
                  -Purpose
                  -Congressional and public reaction
                         -End of war
                               -Perception of escalation
                  -Kissinger
                         -December 1972 bombing
                               -POWs
                               -Settlement agreement
                  -Guarantee for settlement
                         -Promise to Nguyen Van Thieu
                         -South Vietnams capabilities
                               -Air Force
             -North Vietnam testing
                         -US reaction
                         -Deterrence

       Kissinger
             -Return From Trip

       Vietnam settlement
            -US responses
                  Second thoughts

Scowcroft left at 5:59 pm.
                                               -15-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                             Conversation No. 885-7 (cont’d)

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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I was wondering,
Yes, there has.
Yes, and I think the reduction is based on the climate season rather than on
any representation that we have made, as near as we can figure out, their infiltration has been this year just like it was last year.
And that there has been no...
In other words, the ceasefire, the agreement, had no effect at all on what they've done.
Uh...
It is apparently taking off.
Yes, yes, I have.
He is inclined to think that maybe we should delay a day instead of...
He's afraid, I think, that if we don't do something now, that we'll be in worse shape next fall.
And that this is perhaps the best time to send them a signal that's unmistakable.
There is a consideration about the Laos situation, and Ambassador Godley has pointed out to us that the 23rd is the date that the new Laotian government is supposed to be formed.
Right.
It's a pretty bad time.
That's what he said, that the 23rd is the moment of the 25th.
There apparently may be some acceleration in the last POW release.
The PRG has now recommended or proposed the 25th.
The 25th.
The 25th.
That's Sunday, I believe.
Now, Henry doesn't really think that a strike would interfere with the POW release.
Of course.
I think that the closer the two are together, the more difficult it makes it for them to go ahead and release.
But I...
Yes, he has.
As a matter of fact, I got just a brief paragraph here.
I believe Godley makes a good point with the possibility of following up the Laotian negotiations.
However, none of the considerations advanced last week have really changed, which is true.
I don't believe the North Vietnamese decision on withdrawal will depend on one series of strikes.
Another danger is that they will delay release of the POWs.
The counterargument is that they would tend to be much more ruthless next fall.
The President should be made aware of the godly argument.
We should not in any case go before Thursday night.
My recommendation on balance would be that we go then.
The other possibility would be to do it next week after the POWs.
Out.
This makes this one less effective too.
The use of the after they are out, the support here is way down.
It's way down and I think it also breaks the sea star even though it's a monster.
The point is, therefore, they also, they argue, if you get now, and the idea being, well, if you get now, the field of it is still there, and it sort of puts them on notice, maybe you might do it again.
That's going to evaporate, in my opinion, and we have to be candid about what's going to happen, due to the fact that the Congress will insist on approval of any major strike.
but as far as the use of american air power
There are Vietnamese forces coming into the South.
Unless it is raw, they could, uh, they could be terrible.
It would be impossible for you to get it without a congressional order.
You see, that's quite the argument that you could make.
The argument, it's a very nice argument to say that, well, if I take it now, we demonstrate that the president is a kind of guy that would use power.
Fine.
It may demonstrate we use it now, but it is not necessarily demonstrated we use it later.
No, there's circumstances.
That's the problem.
There's circumstances that we should change, and that's
So the real question is whether it's worth it or not, just by its own sake.
Yes, I think that... By its own sake, not because of the calling card or the next election, but by its own sake, whether it's really worth it.
Some of these planes are going to knock out a few trucks, and sure, they only got one of those.
That's the question.
In terms of its military effect, I don't think it is.
That's the point.
You know, we...
We've hit a long road for the first day or two, and it would hurt a lot to say that we've done it for years.
You know, we're talking about a few more days or something to make up for what we lose in it, what they would lose in it if we strike.
I feel that if we're going to strike,
really needs to be before the last POW release.
And I think afterwards, as you say, we're not likely to have any one incident around which we could coalesce.
So, my point is, why do you do it then?
Do you do it now?
For what purpose?
To let them know that, hey, watch out, you're going to lose again.
I know it's going to be very believable.
I've heard a range of stories about how it happened.
the whole feeling in Congress that the country will be in a crisis or not, and let's not go back in.
I don't buy it hardly.
I don't buy it with decency at all, but that's going to be the fact.
There's no question about that.
And I think... See, Henry always is an activist.
He's not very clear.
He's quite risky then, and he did what he did for the church.
There's no question about that.
I think on the other side,
The argument would be that they obviously are pushing against the agreement.
They're testing to see what they can get away with, to see how far they can go.
And that if we hit them now, we will have registered something
With them.
That's right.
And that maybe it would forestall them doing something later on which they otherwise would do, having decided that they could get away with almost anything because we didn't react this time.
Now...
But nothing that we decide today, nothing we decide tomorrow.
No, that's right, that's right.
Now, I have...
When does Henry get back?
He'll be back the night of the 26th.
That's... That's next Monday, I believe.
Yes, next Monday.
Okay.
Well, that's it.
We just keep posting these things.
Yes, sir.
I certainly will.
I certainly will.
Thank you very much.

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All 72 conversations from March 20, 1973 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 885-006, March 20, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/885-006 (accessed October 29, 2026).