Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 1 › Conversation 001-004
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and White House messaging
Tuesday, April 6, 1971 · 11:53 AM–12:10 PM ET · White House Telephone · 9 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the messaging strategy for an upcoming speech regarding the Vietnam War, focusing on maintaining resolve despite internal criticism. Nixon expressed frustration with administration staff—including figures like George Shultz, John Ehrlichman, and Donald Rumsfeld—whom he dismissed as being overly concerned with domestic political pressure and ignorant of foreign policy complexities. The two agreed to incorporate specific data points regarding reduced bombing and lower casualty rates to counter narratives promoted by critics and "doves" like George McGovern, while Nixon instructed Kissinger to maintain an inscrutable demeanor when interacting with skeptical White House staff.
- Vietnam War
- White House messaging
- Administration credibility
- Foreign policy
- Domestic political pressure
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
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Hello?
Hello, Henry?
Mr. President.
Well, since you got back, have you been infected yet with the Washington virus?
Not yet, Mr. President.
I think we're on the right course.
I've led the speech over, and I think it is very strong now.
Yeah, it's a pretty good speech, actually.
I think it's an excellent speech.
Yeah, it's got a lot of tone.
Let me say that I think it's important.
I told Rose to tell Buchanan that you and you are the same thing that
both you and Buchanan say, you don't know what the hell's going to be in it.
Right.
I think it's very important to do that for the reason that I might change it.
And second, I just think it's just as well to know that, you know, because I know that, you know, we get the usual staff jitteriness and Congress and all the rest saying to do this and that and the other thing, you know, and I understand all that.
They're all, you know, wobbling around and
And hell, I'm just not going to let them think they affected me one way or the other.
Absolutely.
And I, because I know, the point is that they, the fellows, they may think they tell me things I don't know, but I'm aware of all these things.
I mean, I know them more deeply than they do, you know.
Well, John Haley called this evening, and he had a number of hot ideas.
But, you know, that is a syndrome of all people who just leave the news field.
Mm-hmm.
They want to do it the other way, the traditional way.
What is his idea?
Just to... No, he doesn't have a concrete idea.
He just wants some sort of smashing announcement that would diffuse everything.
Well, now, what the hell would we do?
You mean, like, announce we're going to get out tomorrow or end all combat?
Well, he doesn't have...
He admits he doesn't know what it is.
Mm-hmm.
Can't be done.
It can't be done.
In fact, November 3rd, it just seems...
In that respect, it's like November 3rd, because basically, I mean...
We'll listen to him later, but the point is that at this point we cannot just do something that we know isn't going to wash.
I talked to Garland, and he said he's become totally convinced that if we appeal to the doves, we'll be destroyed.
And he said he read the world report.
He had to give a speech at the Federal City Club.
He thanked you for foreign policy holds together.
And it's got a good philosophical foundation and we should fight for it.
Yeah.
And that coming from him since his instance about the other way is particularly interesting, I think.
Well, we're not going to go.
We'll play, incidentally.
Once we get something to play with, if we get anything from Gabriel or anything like that, we'll then go to John and Scully and...
By God, we'll broker the hell out of it.
We've got to do a better job.
But then we do it to destroy the doves.
But not for the purpose of catering to them.
This idea that you can defuse them as bull, it will not work.
I agree completely.
I know, for example, I mean, John Ehrtman, you know, was raising the credibility problem today, you know, on various things.
And he was doing it, you know, at the best of feelings.
And I said, well, John, I said there.
And he wasn't trying to advocate a change, but he says there was a problem.
Hell, I know there's a problem, but it's not what we've done, it's what they've created.
That's right.
I mean, what the hell have we done that is...
The only stupid thing we did, actually, when you look at Laos, the only stupid thing was that goddamn blackout, which I didn't order.
Which we thought would end within 24 hours.
Yeah.
If it had ended within 24 hours, no one would have paid any attention to it.
I know.
Well, Abrams in this whole operation has been a disaster.
I've got great credit, but he's not been good on that.
Well, anyway, the part is that that having happened, we, well, it is true that if you read the polls and everything else, there is a credibility about us.
They don't believe us.
They don't...
There's a lack of confidence in the conduct of the war and so forth.
That is no reason to cave.
We just stayed it out there the best we can and hope for the best.
Because if we start, you know, simpering around and catering to these bastards, hell, they'll just eat us alive.
And Garment sees that, doesn't he?
Absolutely.
In fact, and he came to this conclusion entirely by himself and, as you can imagine, against his first instinct.
No.
Well, I would, when you're talking to my staff, because I won't see them, I would take a line where you're concerned.
Why don't you appear to be a little dovish?
I mean, just say, gee whiz, you know, I don't know what he's going to do.
I mean, he's done what he's done and did before.
He's thinking about it himself.
He's going to make his own decision, and I can't predict at all what he's going to do.
Absolutely.
I just keep on guessing.
And if they wail and go around saying, now look,
You can wail all you want, but he's the guy that's going to do this.
And that I've considered all their views and all the rest.
I mean, Schultz and Ehrlichman and, you know, McGregor and Rumsfeld and Finch and all the rest.
They don't know a goddamn thing about this.
They don't know what it's about.
And they don't know what we'll be hit with if this whole thing comes to pass.
They don't know a thing about foreign policy.
Exactly.
They're only concerned about...
frankly, peace at any price, really, because they see, well, all they're concerned about is, well, revenue sharing and the environment and all that crap, which doesn't amount to anything, in my opinion.
They want to take off the immediate pressure.
This is their overriding concern.
Mm-hmm.
Well, the immediate pressure isn't all that heavy.
And that, I don't believe, can be done.
Yeah.
I mean, it can't be done their way, because once you accept the premises of McGovern, you are fighting on his grounds.
And it wouldn't be in character.
Oh, that's right.
There is one thing, Mr. President, that two sentences we ought to add.
Yeah.
Because there's this cynical comment that the dogs are now making, especially McGovern, that we are substituting Asian for American casualties and increasing the bombing.
And we can do it in two sentences.
One, where you speak about reduction in American deaths, you can say, and South Vietnamese casualties have also dropped by, I think, 50%.
I'll get you the exact figure.
Right.
And why don't we say that our, and then put in,
and we've reduced our bombing by so much.
And the bombing within South Vietnam has been reduced by 90%, Mr. President.
Yes, well, rather than getting into too many figures, you say that we've reduced our bombing by 30% or something like that.
You know what I mean?
Just get whatever the figure is for Southeast Asia, so I don't have to get into separating South Vietnam from Laos.
The significance of the 90% is that in the populated areas, our bombing has decreased by 90%.
Now bombing is the unpopulated areas.
But I know that, but I don't have time to explain that, you see.
I'll get you the right thing.
All we need is just get some figure that makes the point.
We've, that is, we've, we've, we've, well, we can at least try to, try to get that across.
So two sentences is what I would recommend in that place.
And also the South Vietnamese casualties.
The South Vietnamese casualties, I'm getting the exact.
Even with Laos?
Even with Laos.
Yeah.
You can even say that, even with the heavy casualties they took in Laos.
Oh, of course, these goddamn dove things, Henry.
It's just one thing.
They eat you alive.
You take one thing and then they go after another one.
And hell, I'm determined to just see it through and hell with them.
And if it fails, it fails.
Well, it's a heroic path, Jim, isn't it?
Well, hell, hero or not, the point is that there's no other course for the country.
These people, I mean, that's why our domestic side, I mean, well, I'm interested in their views, why they're irrelevant.
They don't know what the hell they're talking about.
That's right.
I mean, now, on the other hand, too, I must say that they are so terribly obsessed with listening to television, reading all of our critics, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and, of course, I must say the Alsop piece probably disturbs them.
But they read all that, and they say, well, now, just a minute.
Is this true?
I mean, have we overstayed anything?
Haven't we really kept our promises?
You see, that's the point.
I constantly get back to the fact that I don't think our own people know enough how to defend us.
That's right.
That's right.
They are astonished by some of these things, or by what we've accomplished.
When we've kept our promises, we will have taken out several hundred thousand, two-thirds of our... No, but they get the impression.
They read the critics, and they get the impression that, damn it, we are lying, and that we are covering up, but there are...
NARA Description
On April 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:53 am and 12:10 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 001-004 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 1-4
Date: April 6, 1971
Time: Unknown between 11:53 am and 12:10 pm
Location: White House Telephone
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.
President's upcoming speech on Vietnam
-Input from White House staff and others
-Rose Mary Woods
-Patrick J. Buchanan
-John A. Scali
-Possible American withdrawal
-Leonard Garment
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-John D. Ehrlichman
-Laos
-Creighton W. Abrams
-Administration’s credibility
-Garment's views
-Kissinger's future statement
-Tone
-White House "Doves"
-George P. Shultz
-Ehrlichman
-Donald H. Rumsfeld
-Clark MacGregor
-Robert H. Finch
-Domestic issues
-George S. McGovern
-Drop in American and Vietnamese casualties
-Bombing reduction
-Regions
-Defense of Administration
-Staff
-New York Times, Washington Post
-Joseph W. Alsop column
Recording ends while the conversation is in progress.Also recorded on April 6, 1971
- 042-020 11:37 AM · 3 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:37 am and 1:50 pm.
- 001-001 11:51 AM · 11 sec — United States Secret Service agents and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:51 am and 11:53 am.
- 001-002 11:51 AM · 9 sec — unknown person(s) and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:51 am and 11:53 am.
- 001-003 11:53 AM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:53 am and 12:10 pm.
- 475-001 11:53 AM · 17 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:53 am and 11:55 am.
- 475-002 11:53 AM · 49 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:53 am and 11:55 am.
- 475-003 11:53 AM · 45 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:53 am and 11:55 am.
- 475-004 11:55 AM · 24 min — President Richard M. Nixon, John D. Ehrlichman, Edward L. Morgan, Dana G. Mead, James McLane, John Gartland, John F. Evans, Jr., Edwin L. Harper, Raymond J. Waldeman, William F. Rhatican, Donald B. Rice, Donald E. Crabill, David Page, Roger Adkins, Richard P. Nathan, William Robinson, James Blum, Harry S. Havens and William Hamm, Wilfred H. Rommel, C. William Fischer, Naomi Sweeney, Richard K. Cook, John Russell Deane, III, Bill Fuller, Murray L. Weidenbaum, Robert Joss, William H. Johnson, Richard W. Velde, Jerry Copf, Charles J. Orlebeck, Henry Ahlgren, William W. Blunt, John P. Olsson, Malcolm R. Lovell, Jr., Christopher T. Cross, John R. Ottina, Ned Granlich, Larry Thompson, White House photographer, Peter Michel, Rainer Barzel, Rolf Pauls, and William Hamm met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:55 am and 12:20 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 001-004, April 6, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/001-004 (accessed October 12, 2026).