Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 1 › Conversation 001-101
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on People's Republic of China and Vietnam War
Thursday, April 15, 1971 · 7:31 PM–7:33 PM ET · White House Telephone · 9 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the administration's ongoing diplomatic initiatives, specifically focusing on the recent outreach to the People's Republic of China and the resulting reactions from the Soviet Union and the press. Kissinger provided an update on his interview with Newsweek, asserting that the China initiative had successfully overshadowed Vietnam in the media, and expressed optimism that a breakthrough in Vietnam negotiations could occur suddenly due to Asian negotiation patterns. The two also addressed concerns regarding Soviet agitation and potential future diplomatic moves, with Nixon emphasizing the necessity of maintaining forward momentum despite the delicate international climate.
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Position in tape: 03:23:55 – 03:32:56
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Transcript (AI-generated)
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Hello?
Mr. President, Mr. Schultz is in the loop back to his office, and I have Dr. Kissinger on.
Yeah.
Hello, Henry?
Yes, Mr. President.
I just wanted to ask you, did you get along with Newsweek?
Are you still there?
No, he's just left.
Oh, I got along.
Did you shake him?
Oh, yeah.
Oh, I really gave him hell, and he said, and I believe him,
He said when it's in the international section, there's almost nothing that can be done because Christopher is practically a pacifist.
They're foreign affairs.
I see.
While if it's in the national section, then it's more balanced.
And that is true because the week before they covered Lars in the national section.
I see.
And he said, well, in any event, don't worry about it because I have concluded Vietnam has disappeared from the front pages forever.
He said that?
I'll be damned.
They're, of course, overreacting, aren't they?
Yes.
You know, isn't it funny?
But you see... Henry, you know, we don't realize, I think China more than Moscow is a goddamned nerve thing for these people.
What do you think?
I don't know.
Because it's so new.
Yeah.
And, of course, there's... And, of course, let's face it.
In the long run, it's so historic.
You know, you stop to think of 800 million people, where they're going to be.
Jesus, this is a hell of a move.
Of course, I don't want to get our hopes up too much, but one of the things that has occurred to me that I did not tell to this fellow is that it is conceivable, and indeed it is very possible, that they know Hanoi is going to make a peace move, and they don't want to be left out.
Mm-hmm.
Yeah.
Well, that'll take care of itself.
Getting back to the Russian thing, I was concerned about the TASS thing.
I don't know, are you concerned that much?
Are we, can you call Voronzov again?
I think it would make us look too eager, Mr. President.
I don't want them to think, though, that, you know what I mean?
Maybe you should call Dobrynin.
No, Mr. President, call Dobrynin once.
All right.
I've had Vorontsov in.
I've called Vorontsov this morning.
And I've had Ziegler put out a statement.
Right, that's enough, okay?
And I think any more would really be over-eager.
Yeah, and now at this point, basically, TASS is simply...
But TASS, that shows that they must be hysterical about this damn thing, huh?
That's right.
Because they said this removed the mask of U.S., China... Shit, we don't have any relations with the Chinese.
They must think we're doing something.
Well, they're also using it against the Chinese.
Oh, how's that?
Well, because one of the things in which the Chinese have been driving them crazy
is by claiming they were revolutionary purists while the Russians were opportunists.
I see.
So this is part of their internal problem.
I see.
So they're saying that we are the...
They're the Chinese colluding with the capitalists.
That's right.
I think this was more directed at them.
You know, I would say this.
The columnists and the rest, they should have enough to write about for at least two weeks.
I don't say it's not better two weeks.
Of course, at the end of those two weeks, we may have something else to tell them.
Yeah.
Turkish...
So, Hubbard thought this was gonna take Vietnam out of the play for a while, huh?
For a year.
Really?
Yes.
He must be quite emotional about it.
Oh, God, and he, well, I have to say in his defense, he is more intelligent than the time people.
He's somewhat decent.
Yeah, and he's really quite decent, and... And then it ventrises a snake.
Yeah, and I said to him, look, if you want to write an interesting story here, don't write it as if Drew and I woke up one morning and decided we're going to have good relations.
Good God.
Write it in terms of a man...
who's been thinking along these lines since 67 and who carefully deliberately moved in that direction sure and and incidentally i hope you've mentioned the fact no democrat could have done it oh yes i thought and the fact that here i have done it because frankly the hawks trust me and have you made that point to a few oh yes and i said also
it is a success of your speech and of your general policy if they thought you were on the verge of collapsing they couldn't do it right and i also i said to he remembered that during the campaign you had talked along this line too that's right and uh oh i well also to howard k smith
after the July broadcast, you recall, when I, when I, that we did it with the four network commentators in California.
Afterwards, I talked about China a bit.
Well, I had clippings, Mr. President, of all the things you've said at news conferences and so forth since you've come in here.
And also of what you said at Toast to Kochesko and Tito.
And I sort of said, you know, you can assume that he probably said more privately than he said at the Toast.
Right.
And...
Which is putting it nicely.
Right.
And, uh, no, he is, uh, he is... Do you think he wants us to lose?
No.
No, Hufford wants us to win.
Really?
Yeah.
But he's changed then.
He didn't want us to win at the beginning.
Maybe he's one convert then.
Why does he want us to win?
Because he was really against us a year ago.
Yeah, but I think he's really developed a lot of respect for us.
Do you really?
Absolutely.
I don't say this about Fentress.
No, no.
Fentress is a snake.
And I know he's always been a snake.
But I'd say it about him.
Very interesting.
And... Why does he want us to win?
Well, I think he likes the fact that you've stuck to your guns.
And... And he's developed a grudging respect.
You don't acquire taste for him.
But that's my impression of him.
He's been very...
And he sees the danger of the right wing.
I sort of, I hinted at some, I said, look, if Vietnam ever breaks, and I'm not saying it will, it will break as suddenly as this one did.
And so don't put yourself in a position.
Do you really believe that?
I happen to believe that, Mr. President, yes.
What makes you think that Vietnam would break suddenly?
I just don't see this.
Because this is the Asian way of negotiating.
We negotiate after there's an agreement that we should move, and then we gradually compromise along the way.
The Vietnamese act...
that the major negotiation is before the negotiation starts.
That is, they want to be sure they've squeezed the maximum out of the situation that they can unilaterally.
Once they're sure of that, then they will move to their new position.
But they don't see any sense in approaching their position in stages.
I see.
If I had to predict, Mr. President, I would think there is a better than even chance now that in the next three months something will break.
In Paris.
Even in Paris, huh?
Yeah.
Well, if it does, we'll be ready.
The main thing, I think your fear is well justified.
I wish we, you could see them before they move.
I think we should send a message to them by the end of next week, no matter what we hear from Dobrynin.
Oh, hell yes.
Yes.
Look, whatever Dobrynin does, you've got to move on this front.
Right.
Yeah, because the Chinese worry them, too.
That's right.
No, no, I will propose a meeting to them probably next Wednesday for two weeks from now.
They need two weeks to get ready for it.
Mm-hmm.
Say one thing, we really got the liberals worried.
Well, Mr. President, if you hadn't stuck to your guns, you wouldn't be worth dealing with.
Yeah, you know, it's a funny thing.
They don't, none of them admit it, but the April 7th speech was the key to this whole thing, wasn't it?
Mr. President, if you had given a deadline, if you had acted like the man on the verge of bugging out of Vietnam, you would literally not have been worth dealing with for them.
But on April 7th, they watched that speech, I'm sure.
And they saw it a tough nut to crack.
Where I said, all right, I'm going to stick it out, and I don't give a damn what anybody says.
That's right.
And that has some effect.
They knew they'd be in it until 73, and that's too late for them vis-a-vis the Russians.
Well?
The Murphy thing you worked out, you talked to him a little bit more?
Right, and I'm giving him some papers tomorrow, Mr. President.
Right.
Well, he's just the right man.
He'll do a good job.
Right.
He'll protect us with state and let him tell old Green that he's gone.
But, you know, all that sort of thing.
No, we've got it all set.
Good.
Okay.
Good, Mr. President.
NARA Description
On April 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:31 pm and 7:33 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 001-101 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 1-101
Date: April 15, 1971
Time: Unknown between 7:31 pm and 7:33 pm
Location: White House Telephone
The White House operator talked with the President.
George P. Shultz's location
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger between 7:33 pm and 7:42 pm.
Kissinger's interview with Newsweek
-Robert C. Christopher
-Laos
-Vietnam
-Newsweek's reaction
People's Republic of China [PRC] initiative
-Reaction
-North Vietnam
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Tass statement
-Yuli M. Vorontsov
-Kissinger's conversation with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Vorontsov
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Tass statement
-Reaction to President's PRC initiative
Kissinger's interview with Newsweek
-President's role
-Henry Hubbard, Newsweek reporter
-Fentris
-Chou En-lai
-President's policies
-Howard K. Smith
-Kissinger's clippings from President's news conferences
-Hubbard
-Fentris
Vietnam negotiations
-North Vietnam
-Paris
-Dobrynin
-USSR
-Kissinger's schedule
-President's speech, April 7, 1971
-Liberal reaction
-President's Vietnam policy
-Speech, April 7, 1971
Kissinger's schedule
-Robert D. Murphy
-Marshall GreenAlso recorded on April 16, 1971
- 001-098 7:26 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone from 7:26 pm to 7:29 pm.
- 001-099 7:30 PM · 3 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 7:30 pm.
- 001-100 7:31 PM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 7:31 pm.
- 001-102 7:42 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:42 pm and 7:47 pm.
- 001-103 7:42 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:42 pm and 7:47 pm.
- 001-104 7:47 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John B. Connally talked on the telephone from 7:47 pm to 7:48 pm.
- 001-105 7:49 PM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz talked on the telephone from 7:49 pm to 7:53 pm.
- 001-097 8:17 PM · 3 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone from 8:17 pm to 8:18 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 001-101, April 16, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/001-101 (accessed October 12, 2026).