Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 001-101
Date: Thursday, April 15, 1971 at 7:31 PM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); White House operator; Kissinger, Henry A.
Recording device: White House Telephone
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/001-101

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[3:25:12] Hello?
[3:25:12] Mr. President, Mr. Schultz is in the loop back to his office, and I have Dr. Kissinger on.
[3:25:16] Yeah.
[3:25:18] Hello, Henry?
[3:25:19] Yes, Mr. President.
[3:25:20] I just wanted to ask you, did you get along with Newsweek?
[3:25:22] Are you still there?
[3:25:23] No, he's just left.
[3:25:26] Oh, I got along.
[3:25:27] Did you shake him?
[3:25:28] Oh, yeah.
[3:25:29] Oh, I really gave him hell, and he said, and I believe him,
[3:25:34] He said when it's in the international section, there's almost nothing that can be done because Christopher is practically a pacifist.
[3:25:42] They're foreign affairs.
[3:25:43] I see.
[3:25:44] While if it's in the national section, then it's more balanced.
[3:25:48] And that is true because the week before they covered Lars in the national section.
[3:25:52] I see.
[3:25:53] And he said, well, in any event, don't worry about it because I have concluded Vietnam has disappeared from the front pages forever.
[3:26:01] He said that?
[3:26:03] I'll be damned.
[3:26:04] They're, of course, overreacting, aren't they?
[3:26:06] Yes.
[3:26:08] You know, isn't it funny?
[3:26:09] But you see... Henry, you know, we don't realize, I think China more than Moscow is a goddamned nerve thing for these people.
[3:26:18] What do you think?
[3:26:19] I don't know.
[3:26:19] Because it's so new.
[3:26:20] Yeah.
[3:26:22] And, of course, there's... And, of course, let's face it.
[3:26:25] In the long run, it's so historic.
[3:26:27] You know, you stop to think of 800 million people, where they're going to be.
[3:26:30] Jesus, this is a hell of a move.
[3:26:32] Of course, I don't want to get our hopes up too much, but one of the things that has occurred to me that I did not tell to this fellow is that it is conceivable, and indeed it is very possible, that they know Hanoi is going to make a peace move, and they don't want to be left out.
[3:26:49] Mm-hmm.
[3:26:52] Yeah.
[3:26:53] Well, that'll take care of itself.
[3:26:56] Getting back to the Russian thing, I was concerned about the TASS thing.
[3:27:01] I don't know, are you concerned that much?
[3:27:05] Are we, can you call Voronzov again?
[3:27:09] I think it would make us look too eager, Mr. President.
[3:27:12] I don't want them to think, though, that, you know what I mean?
[3:27:15] Maybe you should call Dobrynin.
[3:27:18] No, Mr. President, call Dobrynin once.
[3:27:20] All right.
[3:27:22] I've had Vorontsov in.
[3:27:25] I've called Vorontsov this morning.
[3:27:28] And I've had Ziegler put out a statement.
[3:27:31] Right, that's enough, okay?
[3:27:32] And I think any more would really be over-eager.
[3:27:35] Yeah, and now at this point, basically, TASS is simply...
[3:27:38] But TASS, that shows that they must be hysterical about this damn thing, huh?
[3:27:43] That's right.
[3:27:43] Because they said this removed the mask of U.S., China... Shit, we don't have any relations with the Chinese.
[3:27:50] They must think we're doing something.
[3:27:51] Well, they're also using it against the Chinese.
[3:27:54] Oh, how's that?
[3:27:55] Well, because one of the things in which the Chinese have been driving them crazy
[3:28:00] is by claiming they were revolutionary purists while the Russians were opportunists.
[3:28:04] I see.
[3:28:05] So this is part of their internal problem.
[3:28:08] I see.
[3:28:08] So they're saying that we are the...
[3:28:10] They're the Chinese colluding with the capitalists.
[3:28:13] That's right.
[3:28:14] I think this was more directed at them.
[3:28:16] You know, I would say this.
[3:28:18] The columnists and the rest, they should have enough to write about for at least two weeks.
[3:28:21] I don't say it's not better two weeks.
[3:28:23] Of course, at the end of those two weeks, we may have something else to tell them.
[3:28:26] Yeah.
[3:28:28] Turkish...
[3:28:30] So, Hubbard thought this was gonna take Vietnam out of the play for a while, huh?
[3:28:34] For a year.
[3:28:36] Really?
[3:28:37] Yes.
[3:28:37] He must be quite emotional about it.
[3:28:39] Oh, God, and he, well, I have to say in his defense, he is more intelligent than the time people.
[3:28:44] He's somewhat decent.
[3:28:45] Yeah, and he's really quite decent, and... And then it ventrises a snake.
[3:28:50] Yeah, and I said to him, look, if you want to write an interesting story here, don't write it as if Drew and I woke up one morning and decided we're going to have good relations.
[3:29:00] Good God.
[3:29:00] Write it in terms of a man...
[3:29:03] who's been thinking along these lines since 67 and who carefully deliberately moved in that direction sure and and incidentally i hope you've mentioned the fact no democrat could have done it oh yes i thought and the fact that here i have done it because frankly the hawks trust me and have you made that point to a few oh yes and i said also
[3:29:27] it is a success of your speech and of your general policy if they thought you were on the verge of collapsing they couldn't do it right and i also i said to he remembered that during the campaign you had talked along this line too that's right and uh oh i well also to howard k smith
[3:29:46] after the July broadcast, you recall, when I, when I, that we did it with the four network commentators in California.
[3:29:54] Afterwards, I talked about China a bit.
[3:29:56] Well, I had clippings, Mr. President, of all the things you've said at news conferences and so forth since you've come in here.
[3:30:02] And also of what you said at Toast to Kochesko and Tito.
[3:30:08] And I sort of said, you know, you can assume that he probably said more privately than he said at the Toast.
[3:30:13] Right.
[3:30:15] And...
[3:30:16] Which is putting it nicely.
[3:30:18] Right.
[3:30:19] And, uh, no, he is, uh, he is... Do you think he wants us to lose?
[3:30:26] No.
[3:30:27] No, Hufford wants us to win.
[3:30:29] Really?
[3:30:29] Yeah.
[3:30:30] But he's changed then.
[3:30:31] He didn't want us to win at the beginning.
[3:30:32] Maybe he's one convert then.
[3:30:34] Why does he want us to win?
[3:30:35] Because he was really against us a year ago.
[3:30:37] Yeah, but I think he's really developed a lot of respect for us.
[3:30:41] Do you really?
[3:30:41] Absolutely.
[3:30:42] I don't say this about Fentress.
[3:30:44] No, no.
[3:30:44] Fentress is a snake.
[3:30:45] And I know he's always been a snake.
[3:30:47] But I'd say it about him.
[3:30:49] Very interesting.
[3:30:51] And... Why does he want us to win?
[3:30:53] Well, I think he likes the fact that you've stuck to your guns.
[3:30:59] And... And he's developed a grudging respect.
[3:31:04] You don't acquire taste for him.
[3:31:07] But that's my impression of him.
[3:31:09] He's been very...
[3:31:11] And he sees the danger of the right wing.
[3:31:15] I sort of, I hinted at some, I said, look, if Vietnam ever breaks, and I'm not saying it will, it will break as suddenly as this one did.
[3:31:24] And so don't put yourself in a position.
[3:31:26] Do you really believe that?
[3:31:27] I happen to believe that, Mr. President, yes.
[3:31:31] What makes you think that Vietnam would break suddenly?
[3:31:33] I just don't see this.
[3:31:35] Because this is the Asian way of negotiating.
[3:31:37] We negotiate after there's an agreement that we should move, and then we gradually compromise along the way.
[3:31:46] The Vietnamese act...
[3:31:51] that the major negotiation is before the negotiation starts.
[3:31:55] That is, they want to be sure they've squeezed the maximum out of the situation that they can unilaterally.
[3:32:01] Once they're sure of that, then they will move to their new position.
[3:32:06] But they don't see any sense in approaching their position in stages.
[3:32:10] I see.
[3:32:13] If I had to predict, Mr. President, I would think there is a better than even chance now that in the next three months something will break.
[3:32:21] In Paris.
[3:32:23] Even in Paris, huh?
[3:32:24] Yeah.
[3:32:30] Well, if it does, we'll be ready.
[3:32:36] The main thing, I think your fear is well justified.
[3:32:40] I wish we, you could see them before they move.
[3:32:44] I think we should send a message to them by the end of next week, no matter what we hear from Dobrynin.
[3:32:51] Oh, hell yes.
[3:32:51] Yes.
[3:32:52] Look, whatever Dobrynin does, you've got to move on this front.
[3:32:55] Right.
[3:32:56] Yeah, because the Chinese worry them, too.
[3:32:58] That's right.
[3:32:59] No, no, I will propose a meeting to them probably next Wednesday for two weeks from now.
[3:33:04] They need two weeks to get ready for it.
[3:33:05] Mm-hmm.
[3:33:15] Say one thing, we really got the liberals worried.
[3:33:18] Well, Mr. President, if you hadn't stuck to your guns, you wouldn't be worth dealing with.
[3:33:24] Yeah, you know, it's a funny thing.
[3:33:26] They don't, none of them admit it, but the April 7th speech was the key to this whole thing, wasn't it?
[3:33:31] Mr. President, if you had given a deadline, if you had acted like the man on the verge of bugging out of Vietnam, you would literally not have been worth dealing with for them.
[3:33:44] But on April 7th, they watched that speech, I'm sure.
[3:33:47] And they saw it a tough nut to crack.
[3:33:50] Where I said, all right, I'm going to stick it out, and I don't give a damn what anybody says.
[3:33:54] That's right.
[3:33:55] And that has some effect.
[3:33:57] They knew they'd be in it until 73, and that's too late for them vis-a-vis the Russians.
[3:34:05] Well?
[3:34:10] The Murphy thing you worked out, you talked to him a little bit more?
[3:34:12] Right, and I'm giving him some papers tomorrow, Mr. President.
[3:34:15] Right.
[3:34:16] Well, he's just the right man.
[3:34:18] He'll do a good job.
[3:34:19] Right.
[3:34:20] He'll protect us with state and let him tell old Green that he's gone.
[3:34:24] But, you know, all that sort of thing.
[3:34:27] No, we've got it all set.
[3:34:29] Good.
[3:34:29] Okay.
[3:34:29] Good, Mr. President.