Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 1 › Conversation 001-146
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam and People's Republic of China
Sunday, April 18, 1971 · 10:41 AM–10:48 AM ET · White House Telephone · 7 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss managing public and press perceptions regarding recent foreign policy developments, specifically focusing on clarifying the Administration's position on Vietnam and countering Democratic criticism surrounding the President's initiative toward the People's Republic of China. Kissinger updates the President on efforts to coordinate a consistent response with White House and Defense officials to avoid misinterpretation of abstract military capabilities. They also review the historical timeline of the China opening, noting that Nixon had initiated secret channels as early as February 1969, a fact they intend to use to discredit political opponents who claim the policy lacks foresight.
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Okay.
Hi Henry.
Mr. President, Ziegler is out of town and I've talked to Jerry Warren.
He hasn't had a single press question yet.
And the line I've tentatively established, subject to your approval, is that he was talking about South Vietnamese capabilities, not any particular plan.
That's right.
And he was just talking about abstract capabilities.
Yeah, and hypothetical things.
And not about American activities.
That's right.
If that's agreeable, that's what we're going to stick with.
Would you get Laird, Laird will probably be asked.
I got word to defense already.
How would Laird handle it then?
Laird would say he was essentially the same thing.
They haven't had many queries either.
Well, what this is, Henry, it's the devilish press again, just trying to take one little old word and hypo this thing.
Of course, I think, Henry, basically it's pretty much a defensive thing on their part.
They really must be up the wall, don't you think so?
Well, here they've been going, saying...
everything that we're bringing the Chinese in that allows would lead to a worsening of the situation.
Now they see that they got beaten back from 5A6, military activities dropping again, just as we said it would.
Yeah.
And the China thing breaks.
They're just out of their mind.
Don't you sense that in talking to them?
Oh, yeah.
Well, they're just completely confused.
Right.
They're off.
Now, the way that line they'll probably take, it seems to me, is to come back at it in terms of saying, well, this is really just the Chinese people.
I mean, this is the way we'll get along with the American people and that sort of thing.
But I don't think the CHICOM's government will play it that way.
I think the CHICOM government knows that the American people can't do one damn thing for them.
They're playing for the big stakes, Mr. President.
Don't you think so?
And I've got two books full of initiatives we've taken, and if they press us, we'll just leak them all out.
yeah oh sure they try to say that uh that this all happened because of their initiative and so forth but it's really amusing to me though because it's uh while mike is honorable these other democrats are not the way they're all pandering around and now trying to run over there to china
and so forth.
The problem is they never recommended any of this, Mr. President.
They can say whatever they want.
This is yours.
And neither did the State Department either.
That's right.
I mean, this State Department was sort of crying around with recognition.
That's all.
They were all talking about what was really what you call a tactical, abstract thing, which was really unfeasible.
I showed Osborne that little note you sent me on February 1st, 69, and his mouth really dropped way open.
Yeah.
Too bad that wasn't in my handwriting.
It was, but they copy it off, apparently, at that time.
Well, it's tape, usually.
I may have dictated it on the tape.
That's right.
But it came on with it.
Was it to you from our end?
No, it said to Kissinger from the president.
Yeah, I see.
Well, that's enough.
They know this isn't a fake.
He knows we wouldn't fake that.
And it indicated that we ought to... What was that one?
Well, it said, I want you to explore on a highly confidential basis...
uh how we can improve our relations with communist China and above all how we can establish reliable uh private channels to them good good it couldn't be more explicit yeah good he said you said I want no publicity whatsoever yeah yeah yeah that must have really killed him oh god his mouth really trapped about yeah six inches because I suppose if you see there there's some of his mythology then is
is knocked out, and when he writes something else, he just has to feel he's dishonest.
They know damn well that on February 1st, 69, no State Department had gotten...
This is February 69, before the State Department ever even talked to me.
That's right.
Yeah.
This was February 1st, 69.
Which is basically ten days after we were in office.
Ten days.
That's right.
And, uh...
I think that's very interesting that they... No, I think on this one, sure, the Democrats are gonna start yelling now.
They're gonna...
come up with 50 hot gimmicks, but we are so far ahead.
Sure.
What they'll come up with, Henry, is why don't we now admit them to the UN?
Why don't we recognize and so forth?
Well, that's all premature.
And also, Mr. President, that helped us with the Russian game.
I think so.
Because if the Russians see that the Democrats are more hog-wild vis-a-vis China than you are.
Yeah.
I hadn't thought of that, but it's true.
Then they have much less of an incentive to bring them in.
They already don't trust them on the Middle East.
Then if China, they also turn out to be a disaster.
True, true, true.
So I think that my major worry is that if we get too eager, that the Chinese will start going back into a shell.
And that's why the way you've played it, that's where the Democrats will do damage.
I sure as hell don't expect to get eager at all with the Chinese.
Unless the Russian thing drops.
Then the Chinese may want to be eager.
You know what I mean?
And we will too.
We can't just assume then, well, we'll wait until 1974.
Oh no, oh God.
This is one of those things where I don't believe.
I think our Chinese game, Henry, should be played exactly as it's being played.
Very cool and...
aloof, and yet the door is open.
Now you walk in, kids, and it's your move.
Mr. President, I must tell you, honestly, I believe that we have a 30% chance, even if we play the Russian game, of having a high-level Chinese one next year.
That may not have to wait.
We want to use it.
We want it at the highest level, too.
That's what I mean.
That's not at all excluded.
Let me say that the more I think about it, the envoy thing, if we're going to go, I think we ought to go at the highest level.
Well, I think the envoy could prepare for it.
It might, but it might take a lot of the zip out of it, too.
You know what I mean?
You just can't tell, and I don't know if there's anybody we can trust to send over there.
Right.
Well, that's still... Well, let's put it down the road.
All right, fine.
We need a reliable channel.
All right, Mr. President.
NARA Description
On April 18, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 10:41 am to 10:48 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 001-146 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 1-146
Date: April 18, 1971
Time: 10:41 am - 10:48 am
Location: White House Telephone
Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.
Vietnam
-Press release
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Gerald L. Warren
-Content
-Melvin R. Laird
-Press reaction
-People's Republic of China [PRC] initiative
-Laos
President's PRC initiative
-Administration's policy
-Press
-Democrats
-Michael J. (“Mike”) Mansfield
-State Department
-Position
-President's note to Kissinger February 1, 1969
-John F. Osborne
-Relations with PRC
-Democrats
-United Nations [UN]
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Middle East
-Administration's policy
-EnvoyAlso recorded on April 18, 1971
- 001-139 9:15 AM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:15 am and 9:48 am.
- 001-140 9:48 AM · 26 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Nelson C. Pierce, Jr. talked on the telephone from 9:48 am to 9:49 am.
- 001-141 10:12 AM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 10:12 am.
- 001-142 10:12 AM · 40 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull talked on the telephone from 10:12 am to 10:13 am.
- 001-143 10:13 AM · 3 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 10:13 am.
- 001-144 10:13 AM · 8 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone from 10:13 am to 10:22 am.
- 001-145 10:23 AM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 10:23 am to 10:35 am.
- 001-147 10:48 AM · 3 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:48 am and 11:12 am.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 001-146, April 18, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/001-146 (accessed October 12, 2026).