← 002-025002-027 →

Conversation 002-026

TapeTape 2StartWednesday, April 21, 1971 at 7:47 PMEndWednesday, April 21, 1971 at 7:54 PMTape start time00:38:10Tape end time00:45:17ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceWhite House Telephone
AudioNARA Description

On April 21, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez talked on the telephone from 7:47 pm to 7:54 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 002-026 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 2-26

Date: April 21, 1971
Time: 7:47 pm - 7:54 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.
                                             15

                         NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. 9/08)




     Tass article on People's Republic of China [PRC]-US relations
          -Contents
          -Negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]

The President conferred with Manolo Sanchez at an unknown time between 7:47 pm and 7:54
pm.
                                                                     Conv. No. 2-24 (cont.)
     Weather

     Kissinger's letter from Sir Robert Thompson
          -Vietnam
          -Laos
          -Cambodia
          -Administration critics
          -Army of Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
                -Capabilities
          -Laos
                -Operations

     Vietnam
          -Koreans
               -Melvin R. Laird


*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security]
[Duration: 6s ]


     INTELLIGENCE


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

*****************************************************************


               -Nguyen Van Thieu
               -South Vietnamese troops
                                             16

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. 9/08)



          -Casualties
               -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yes?
Dr. Kissinger.
All right.
Ready, sir.
Hello?
Mr. President.
Hi, Henry.
Sorry to disturb you.
It's all right.
No, I'm not doing anything.
Well, two things.
One, there's a lengthy article that has distributed on this Chinese relation to us, which is very interesting.
They're saying that what China is trying to do is to get the United States and the Soviet Union into a war with each other.
so that they could emerge as the great superpower, but we wouldn't fall for that.
But they wouldn't fall for that.
Mm-hmm.
And very heard.
Very what?
They seem to act very heard.
Yes.
Very interesting, yeah.
And I just thought you might like to know that.
Well, it's, what do you think it means?
Well, I think I still am fairly optimistic that the Soviets will be fairly forthcoming.
If not that, they're going to go very tough.
I mean, they've got to break out one way or the other.
Yeah.
Also, I've had a letter from... Just a minute.
Just a minute.
Yeah.
It's raining, sir.
Raining?
Okay, we skip it.
Yeah, go ahead.
I've had a letter from Sir Robert Thompson, which is very optimistic about how things are going.
Oh good.
What does he say?
Well, he says that he doesn't think that the North Vietnamese can launch any major attack through 1972.
He considers Laos was a great success.
And I have to take him seriously because he said the same thing last year right after Cambodia.
And I thought he was exaggerating.
It turned out he was right.
I'm having it summarized for you and soon for you.
Well, he certainly is going to give us his best judgment on this.
I didn't even ask him for it.
He volunteered it.
Here it is.
He says...
Well, he is very violent about our critics.
Is he?
About our critics.
What did he say about them?
Well, he said they don't realize that it was successful.
Many of the critics in the United States do not realize that we are not dealing with the Arvin of four years ago, but with a new breed.
They are now good professional soldiers and in combat commands.
lower down, who have the training, the experience, the determination to match anything that the North Vietnamese can provide.
And he said... Coming from him, that's quite significant.
Exactly.
And well, about Laos, he says, this brings one to the Laos operation, which have been the scene of some of the toughest fighting and worst reporting that I can remember.
And worst reporting, isn't it interesting?
I certainly think that the operation has achieved the shorter term tactical aim of cutting the trail in addition to destroying guns already there during what should have been its peak operating period.
Publicly, one may have to be a bit cautious, but I would say that there's no possibility of the North Vietnamese mounting or sustaining any offensive against South Vietnam right through 1972, except in the immediate vicinity of the DMC.
It's going to be a case just like Cambodia last year of not seeing the real effects for several months.
I see.
Well, it's good to get that kind of appraisal.
And repeat, it's unsolicited.
That's right.
And he was there when it all happened.
He sure was, yeah.
We are having this breakfast, Mr. President, with... Blair, yeah.
And he will hit you about...
pulling out the Koreans.
And I also think that that is an unnecessary strain to put on him.
Yeah.
They aren't very good, but they're at least holding some area.
And they're there, yes, that's right.
Now, Laird has the argument that we can get South Vietnamese more cheaply, but that's a purely theoretical argument.
There aren't more South Vietnamese to be drafted.
And you don't have to rule on that, but we have a review going on of the whole strategy.
And you could just defer your decision until that review is completed.
Sure, I'll do that.
I would just be careful not to say anything that he can use to pull them out.
Because we are pulling things out just about as fast as they go now.
I'll say we are.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
How are the casualties running this week?
This week they seem to be lower, Mr. President.
These are incomplete daily reports, but they seem to be lower this week.
They're above 50, actually, going to be announced tomorrow, I think 56, for the week just concluded, and I think they'll be significantly lower next week.
I know.
56.
Well, that's, why is that?
Because of the... Well, that includes those 11.
Yeah.
It'd be 56, you say.
I've asked Moore to give me some reason, some feel for why the casualties are running as they are.
Of course, there are always some wounded that are left from a military operation.
But they'll run 56, you say, next week, this week?
This week.
In the week after this, I think they'll be lower.
Well, we're in that week now.
That's what I meant.
Oh, in the week at which we are, they'll be much lower than 56.
It would seem so.
Oh, yes.
Well, we had on Sunday, there were none at all.
And I just have to look at the daily figures, Mr. President.
I don't have them at my fingertips.
Well, we can't tell.
Let's see.
Thursday, we've got three more days yet.
That's right.
Mm-hmm.
Well, the drop may occur next week then rather than this.
Right.
This week, of course, it won't be reflected, but next week it might be.
That's right, Mr. Brett.
So it would be announced the day of your press conference, which wouldn't be bad.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
That's right.
Well, good.
Don't worry, we'll handle Laird with great caution.
Right, Mr. Brett.
Okay.
I'll be there in the morning.
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