Conversation 003-178

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Hello.

I have Secretary Rogers returning your call.

Yeah.

All right.

Hello.

Hello, Mr. President.

Bill, I just got rid of your friend, King Faisal.

Oh, gosh.

Did you get a call from Haldeman yet?

No, I didn't.

Oh, I see.

Well, I'll tell you what.

I will not talk to you now, then.

He is trying to reach you about two poles.

on red china which coincidentally both gallup and harris have just taken they're quite significant in in this respect harris is not significant so significant because his are not as reliable but gallup polled in october on the admission of red china and uh the uh the the and he'll explain he'll show and the of course the the uh

vote was negative.

He's just polled over the last month since the China so-called initiative, and the vote now is positive.

Now, this shift, what is significant, is among Republicans.

In other words, Republicans who we negative now shift the other way.

The thing that could give the results of it, the thing that I think this bears on in terms of our conversation is this, that

that we now have in terms of our domestic situation a different problem.

The problem is still

will still be the significant one of those who oppose it but it will be a minority of people in other words it'll be basically the walter judd and other types but but it's still pretty good it's about 35 40 anyway but that we will have to handle anyway the other side of the coin though and this is the new factor is that

a majority of people now favoring the admission of red china you know they're they're sort of following what we've done see what i mean having been affected by that then we will have probably a very difficult issue domestically i'm trying to get that all in context so we can get in our own thing domestically if it appears that we just stonewalling it see now where we come to here is this that i'm going to handle it in the press conference tuesday in a way that i have

You know, I've been discussing this with the Secretary of State and so forth, and we are considering our policy in this respect.

You know, we are reconsidering.

Well, I'll just say we are considering the problem.

The thing that I think that in terms of your situation is that to the extent you can, if you can, I think the real problem here is to give the reassurance, the best reassurance you can,

to Taiwan.

The Harris Poll, I think, both come out Monday, incidentally, these polls, at Taiwan.

That, look here, we are your friends.

We're going to do the best we can by you.

Now, on the other hand, it also would lead me to conclude that our timing is about right about the 15th of July.

In other words, after you've concluded all this business, either that or maybe around

Or maybe better, maybe around the 5th, if you can put your Senate hearing on the 4th of July, to do it before the Senate.

I'm inclined to think that's a little better.

I do, too.

Because I think a live audience in England is sort of catering to those people.

But if you could put your Senate hearing around the 5th or 6th or so, whatever it is, I would like for you to still take the position so that we can get our ducks in a row

that we have not decided it but that we are considering this problem now one thing that that after you left by that henry brought up which i think is very important is the way you formulated this thing the way that you will have if we present it that you were presented as a resolution where we will

we will say that expelling a country is a two-thirds matter and admitting a country is majority.

That is something we can broker with our friends.

Now, frankly, I know that's what I mean.

That's what he pointed out.

The proposal, therefore, had within it, the way you have reformulated it, has something that we can sell.

Now,

frankly my own view is that that is that probably the best thing in the long run is to get it over with on the other hand we have we've got to do it in a way that is uh you know is not considered somebody running uh running off just because of a public opinion and all that sort of thing and uh i think that the

I think the idea that while you're consulting, there's a change in the United Nations.

We've had this vote all this time, so we're trying to see how we can, and also there is a change in our relations with China.

And as a result, we're trying to see how we can

accommodate both views and so we we feel maybe this is the way to do it now my own guess is that we could get rolled on the second proposition in other words if we're going to do that we want we want to do it no no no i wouldn't worry about it here's my point you know i get the uh i wouldn't mind i wouldn't mind you see if you have your resolution

One on the first and the other on the second, on the other property.

One on admission and the other on expulsion, see.

And then we vote yes on the one and we vote, of course, yes on the other and lose that.

See what I mean?

I think you could lose the two-thirds vote.

I think you might.

I don't know.

What do you think?

I wonder if they'll even think it's an important question to expel them.

That's my point.

uh well i think let me say this i i i think you have to find out that's the point that's the issue i met with a chinese ambassador this morning jimmy chan yeah yeah and uh we're not going to have any problems with them he uh what'd he say well the way i put it to him as i said look at first let's talk about what's going to happen if we follow the present course of action

Do we agree that we're going to be defeated?

And he agreed.

Well, he said that's the way it looked.

Yeah, right.

I had told him when he presented his credentials that that's what we thought.

Then he tends to say, well, here's what we want and we can't admit.

I said, look, I agree with that.

We don't either.

This isn't a matter of policy or anything.

This is a matter of procedure.

Do we follow the course we're following or do we change?

Then I said, we're inclined to think that if you insist, you'd be better off following the President's policy.

I said, the President will seriously consider that.

I said, I don't think on reflection you'll do that.

Well, he said, it's difficult for us publicly to change.

I said, well, we're not talking about publicly.

We're talking about how you react to what we do.

I said, President Nixon is very fond of your president.

He's very fond of your country.

And we're now talking about what's the best course for us to follow as far as you're concerned.

And I said, here's what we think is probably the best course, but we'll consider something else if you...

Then we went through it and I said, now this has got nothing to do with ping pong diplomacy.

This isn't a change of policy.

This is just tactics.

How do we proceed?

And when he finished, I reiterated it.

I said, first, you tell your president that if he's serious about it and wants us to follow the present course, I know President Nixon will give very great weight to his view on it.

But not a veto.

I don't know.

I know.

I tried.

Secondly, I said, if we decide to change our course, we don't want you to agree with us publicly.

We want you to acquiesce and indicate to your friends that what we're doing is the wisest course for you.

I said, because we don't want trouble here.

Yeah.

And incidentally, it seems to me that...

On that, if we come to this point of view, you can tell them that, yes, we'll fight for your Security Council seat.

We'll lose that.

Well, I told them, I said, look, first, we want your support.

We want you to say it to your friends.

What the United States is doing is acceptable to us.

It was the only way they could handle it.

For a very practical matter.

That's right.

Third, we will do everything we can to help you retain your Security Council seat.

We can't guarantee it because it's beyond our control.

All we can tell you is we'll use our very best efforts to achieve that result.

Four, we understand if you lose your Security Council seat, that you do not feel you can stay in the United Nations.

We understand that.

Let us know what your views are.

Now, he didn't, he responded quite favorably, really.

He said, I've got to check with my government.

You know, he said, there's a limit to what I can say.

But I don't think we're going to have any trouble.

I don't think we're going to have any trouble with Walter Judd.

Yeah, let's not, let's not him, get him.

Well, I won't talk to him.

Well, what I meant is, I think the way to get Walter is after you've talked with the people abroad, then you come back and you tell me, you see.

Then I'll get Waller in, and I think I'll just get him, frankly, and say, Waller, I need your help.

Tell him what the cold turkey facts are and what we've got to do and that he's got to help us.

He won't agree with it, but he'll at least cool him.

I'm not so sure, Mr. President.

Why do you say you won't agree with it?

Oh, you know what I mean.

Philosophically, he'll say you're for principle.

But what I mean is he will do exactly.

He may agree that we ought to do this, but he will not agree.

I don't think he'll go out publicly and say.

Oh, no, he can't.

See what I mean?

No, he won't.

You can't publicly be against a thing like this for years on principle and then shift the position.

That's what we ought to do.

But you see what I'm getting at is that he may say, okay, I understand it.

you know how to talk and uh so uh now on your talks with our friends over there why uh just explore it as best you can you've got all that and uh then too in your uh i think this may set off a it might set off a rash of questions and so forth in your place as a matter of fact

Looking at it in view of this coming up, the leak, frankly, was probably fortuitous.

Oh, I think so.

See my point?

I think so.

Because it just shows that we're thinking about it.

It was well presented, too.

It was presented in the terms that we're thinking about it because of the Republic of China.

Yeah.

And I think if you could add to that, if you could sort of keep the speculation down public as much as possible so it doesn't appear that we're...

Well, you know, that we're just following the public opinion and all that sort of thing.

Oh, no, I don't think anybody's going to think that.

I think it's a pretty good question.

But I do feel that, I feel, though, that the more I think about it is that when we do make our decision and when it's presented, the most statesmanlike, I mean, the most, not only statesmanlike, but the best way to do it is through you and a testimony.

Yeah, I agree.

Because you see...

I could do it and go on, and they look as if I'm just, well, let me put it this way.

It isn't the American public opinion, you know.

They'll say, well, the administration's doing the right thing.

They'll get it.

But if I do it publicly, then that does slap our friends abroad.

That's my point.

I've got to keep the... Don't you agree?

I agree.

I think that's fine.

I'm perfectly happy to do that.

We can always change our mind, but let's just... Yeah, but just sort of think about...

I know you said there was a hearing on the 24th.

If you could get that postponed now to after the 4th of July, I think that'd be good.

Uh-huh.

Let's do it.

That gives us just about the time we need, I think.

Well, let's think about it.

I don't have to postpone it.

Now, if I do that, they'll think this is new.

It may be that that isn't too bad a date.

We can see.

By now, there's one other thing.

you know the uh the uh the thing with bunker and two you know they uh they have come back i told them we couldn't come on the 8th and they have come back with the 28th which is the now the date that we have asked but we've agreed so you've got to hold your i think you should go so you see that's why i'm thinking that's the other reason i think you should do that that's no problem because i think you ought to go over to that meeting it'll be quite uh it might be a little hairy

Well, it may be very good, as a matter of fact.

I think he's going to say some pretty good things at the end.

The end of combat and all that sort of thing.

I don't know.

I hope so.

I think we ought to... Well, I think... You've made a commitment, have you?

On the end of combat, Bunker says that he can do that.

That is at the end of this year.

What I mean is the end of ground combat.

Now that's at the very, very super secret level of Bunker says he's discussed that with him.

Because Bunker knows we've got a problem, see.

And he's been, he says he's talked to him because you know, you've indicated that Laird has, and I've implied that the combat role, you know, was receding and receding.

And he's getting Q, but Q doesn't want to,

habits he i think he's thinking along those lines and that's what we're that's what we're trying to get ready by that time see the only difficulty i see is that you know even in the in the defense department uh budget presentation they said to be out of the combat we would not have combat responsibility after the middle of the summer yeah i know well by combat responsibility uh it does say that i know and it does it may mean that we've already thrown it but on the other hand

We haven't said it at the highest level, and I think to have him say it, to you say it, not me, but him say it after the end of a meeting would be very good.

What troubles me a bit about it is that it may look as if we're nigging.

In other words, it may, instead of coming out as if we've done something positive, it may look as if we're backtracking, that we were going slower than we thought we would.

I think we've got to be careful about that.

Yeah, well, we'll have to take a look at that.

We'll see.

It's...

In other words, he's going to have to phrase it in a different way than we have.

Otherwise, the headline is going to be, we postponed... Well, keep this just between ourselves at the moment because we don't...

It's very delicate with him.

And actually, the combat role in my...

will, in effect, be over by the end of the summer.

You know it and I know it, but you know the problem.

It's a damned election in October that he's concerned about at the moment.

Also, I'm sort of pleased that the damn thing is off the front pages for two or three weeks.

Except the drug problem.

Well, I hate to get it back on, but we did promise him that we'd

give him this meeting and that's all we're doing for him on the election we've got to do it early enough that it doesn't come i don't want to do it i don't want to do it one day after the first of july that's why i wanted her in june 8th but he wouldn't take that so that's that but i sent you a memorandum for the memorandum on the my analysis of the

treaty between UAR and... Oh, good.

...and the Soviet Union.

I talked to Faisal at lunch.

He agrees with my assessment, too.

Does he?

Yeah, he says he thinks it's just a... Did you get him off of that Zionism subject?

Not a little bit.

Not quite.

I'll tell you, you never saw such a collection of oil men in your life as I had for lunch.

Good.

God, if I'd had a Republican...

But did you know that... You know how much they got in U.S. banks?

Five billion dollars.

Yeah, I told you that.

You told me.

Yeah.

But for crying out loud, we just...

Got to go on.

Was he in good humor?

He's in great shape.

Yeah, he feels it.

He struck up a real friendship.

He's quite aware of it.

He's very pleased.

Okay, well, this is the way we'll play it at the moment.

If there's anything else, give me a call before you leave Sunday.

Okay?

Bye.

Thanks.

Bye.