Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 6 › Conversation 006-042
Nixon, Hébert & Kissinger on Selective Service Act and Mansfield Amendment
Wednesday, June 30, 1971 · 9:45 AM–9:50 AM ET · White House Telephone · 6 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Representative F. Edward Hébert, in consultation with Henry Kissinger, discussed strategies for the Congressional conference committee regarding the Selective Service Act. Nixon provided Hébert with alternative legislative language that the White House could tolerate, while emphasizing his firm opposition to the Mansfield Amendment or any provision containing a withdrawal date. The President insisted that any language must include requirements for a ceasefire and prisoner exchange, directing Hébert to present the White House's preferred language as his own to maintain the appearance of administration distance from the legislative negotiations.
- Selective Service Act
- Mansfield Amendment
- Vietnam War
- Congressional relations
- Ceasefire
- Prisoners of War
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
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Hello.
Congressman Avier, Mr. President.
Hello.
Good morning, Mr. President.
You sure?
Oh, man, you don't get a long count or a short count.
You're on time.
Eddie, let me say that first, I've been thinking about this, and Kissinger and I have been talking about it.
Let me just level with you what I really think.
First...
Uh, naturally I don't want to see the draft lapse.
That's one problem.
That's what you're concerned about, too.
Second, I'm not sure if any language we get here isn't going to be filibustered, and so be it.
That's right.
Now, the third point is that as far as the language is concerned, to be perfectly frank with you, there shouldn't be any.
In other words, they just shouldn't have any.
After all, we are negotiating for a ceasefire.
We are negotiating for an exchange of prisoners.
We are negotiating for a mutual withdrawal.
In other words, all that stuff's on the table, and you know what I mean is that
We're not going to change a damn thing as a result of this.
Yet I know the problem that you've got when you've got a Senate provision and you've got to come out with something in conference.
Is that basically what you have to do?
We've got to come out with something.
We either have to adopt the language as it is written or else change the language.
Change the language.
Now, I'll tell you what.
Throw it out, all the languages together.
Throw it out.
Well, but if you throw it out, then you won't have a bill.
Don't you think?
They then will definitely... We won't have a bill in time.
They'll filibuster.
I see.
Now, what I would like to do, Dr. Kissinger has worked on this thing, and we will send down by just a second how we'll send it.
He's sitting here.
How do we get this to him?
We'll send down by special messenger to you in your office.
Shall we send it to you in your office?
To me in my office.
All right.
He'll come down right away.
Now, let me be very precise.
This is not language the White House is advocating or urging.
Do you understand?
I don't want to put it that way.
I'm simply saying to you that if in the judgment of the chairman of the conference, who basically is a great patriot in the event...
that you determine that in your negotiating that language is needed.
This is the language that is the least objectionable.
That's really what we're saying, that we would acquiesce in.
But I don't want to... You see, let me put it this way.
We're not trying to be cute.
I don't want, because of things that are going on in the negotiating front, I don't want to have it...
have a new position by the White House to come out of this, see?
Because the guy, here's David Bruce sitting over there, and he's talked to me about this over the last days, and he says, gee, he's just delighted with the House action.
He said that the Senate thing really gave the enemy a lot of hope, and he says the House action shorted up.
but here if it if it appears that we have changed our position even though it's no i understand that clearly so could you handle it that way to say in other words let me repeat yeah you're not advocating the language no that's right find ourselves in the bind it is
the least objectionable it's the least objectionable we could and let me say we could live with it and you could live with it live with it but but i did not want it i but i would be if they because the press will ask you well now did the white house approve this did we write it you say no i'm denied i've even talked to you there in that direction and you could not talk to you anybody and you could say no this is something we worked out in conference no no no no all i
Now, incidentally, any substantial modification of this, we don't mean you have
substantial modification might be bad, but just use your, yeah, but we put in as soon as practicable things like that.
I mean, see our sense of Congress, how about that?
Yeah, that's in.
That type of stuff.
Sense of Congress and as soon as practicable rather than a date.
You see, the date is murder.
The date is murder.
No, you don't want to date on that.
But we do say as soon as practicable.
That's not bad.
All right, now, but now let me ask you this.
Under no circumstance take
the Mansfield Amendment as written.
Never.
Never take it.
Never take the Mansfield Amendment.
That would be murder.
I'd rather go right back to the House on that and let the draft lapse.
Then see the monkeys on their back.
That's right.
And if it lapses, Eddie, we can get along.
We can get along in time, but I agree with your position.
It's time to show position and strength.
That's right.
It is time to show position.
So if they insist, if they're hard-line,
about that they're gonna it's the Mansfield amendment or something cut to it or anything that has a date in it stand like a rock don't give them a date don't give them a date don't give them an inch on the date okay now it'll be no matter what it said it'll be filibustered unless it's let's recognize that fact
no matter what we write, except to get them the Mansfield Amendment without a change.
Right.
It'll be full of... We have to recognize that I don't think that much harm will be done.
No.
But then the onus is going to be on the senators' back.
That's right.
Now, incidentally, the one new factor that we have added, factored into this, which I think you will totally agree with, is this, and I want to tell you why it's and why you should argue it if it's matriarchal.
You see, the Senate Amendment, Eddie, is tied to
tied only to a POW.
Well, now, you can't lose 40,000 men and then throw in the towel because of 400.
You see what I mean?
Now, the second point is, the other thing is, if you have a withdrawal without a ceasefire, you risk the rest of your guys.
So you've got to have a ceasefire in there as well as an exchange of prisoners.
You see my point?
The ceasefire is an absolute condition for us moving up any faster.
See my point?
I got it.
Well, I'll be guided by this language.
So that's what the language, why we've got this language.
We'll look a little bit.
You'll see the nuances when it gets down.
It comes to me.
And I'll get it down.
It's only eight minutes left.
I think we can get there before 10 o'clock.
Good.
I'll be here.
Or five minutes after 10, maybe.
Okay.
All right.
I'll get this language as my language.
Good.
Bye.
NARA Description
On June 30, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, F. Edward Hébert, and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 9:45 am to 9:50 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 006-042 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 6-42
Date: June 30, 1971
Time: 9:45 am - 9:50 am
Location: White House Telephone
The President talked with F. Edward Hébert; the President conferred with Henry A. Kissinger.
[See Conversation No. 532-6F]
Congressional conference committee
-Continuation of Selective Service Act
-President's conversation with Kissinger
-Possible filibuster
-Language
-Ceasefire
-Prisoner exchange
-Congressional procedures
-Administration language
-President's conversations with David K.E. Bruce
-Language
-Possible modification
-Withdrawal date
-Mansfield amendment
-Legislative amendment
-Filibuster
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-CeasefireAlso recorded on June 30, 1971
- 006-043 9:50 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:50 am and 9:59 am.
- 006-044 9:50 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:50 am and 9:59 am.
- 532-007 9:54 AM · 1 min — unknown person(s) and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:54 am and 9:59 am.
- 006-045 9:59 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Barry M. Goldwater talked on the telephone from 9:59 am to 10:00 am.
- 532-008 9:59 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, Barry M. Goldwater, and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:59 am and 10:02 am.
- 006-046 10:01 AM · 16 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 10:01 am.
- 006-047 10:02 AM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 10:02 am.
- 532-009 10:02 AM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 10:02 am.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 006-042, June 30, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/006-042 (accessed October 23, 2026).