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Conversation 016-030

TapeTape 16StartMonday, December 6, 1971 at 10:58 PMEndMonday, December 6, 1971 at 11:05 PMTape start time00:57:47Tape end time01:05:33ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AudioNARA Description

On December 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 10:58 pm to 11:05 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 016-030 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 16-30

Date: December 6, 1971

Time: 10:58 pm - 11:05 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.

     India-Pakistan War
           -Union of Soviet Socialist [USSR]
                -Responsible to Kissinger
                      -Note

[Pause]

           -USSR’s United Nations [UN] resolution
                -Acceptability to US
                -Provisions
                      -Ceasefire
                      -Pakistan
                            -Political settlement over East Pakistan
                                  -December 1970 elections
                      -Withdrawal
                      -Recognition
                            -Bangladesh
                            -East Pakistan
                      -Yuli M. Vorontsov
                            -President’s position
                                  -Pierre Trudeau
                -US possible defeat
                      -Withdrawal
                -Possible strategy
                      -USSR and India
                            -Differences on East Pakistan
                                  -Significance
                                        -Bangladesh
           -US policy
                -William P. Rogers’ statement
                -Ronald L. Ziegler
                      -US position
                            -National Security Council [NSC] meeting
                -Diplomatic wires
                -Rogers’ conversation with Senators
                -UN
                      -Ceasefire

                     -Withdrawal
                     -Political accomendation
                     -India
                           -Responsibility
                                 -Withdrawal
               -Kissinger’s backgrounder
                     -Timing
          -USSR
               -US reply to note
          -Rogers’ statement
               -Economic assistance cutoff
               -Kissinger’s view
                     -India
                           -US push for political settlement
                     -President’s line with Trudeau
               -A. E. Ritchie
               -Rogers’ conversation with Senators
               -Rogers’ comment at afternoon meeting
          -USSR

     State Dinner with Trudeau
           -Jean-Luc Pepin
           -Edgar J. Benson [?]
           -Pierre A. Rinfret
           -Spiro T. Agnew
           -John B. Connally
           -President’s comments
           -John W. Chancellor

     Kissinger’s backgrounder
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello?
Hello?
Hello?
Sure.
Hello?
Hello, Henry.
Hi, how are you?
That's all right, that's all right.
I never worry about that.
I just wanted to call you to tell you about the Russians.
Oh, yes.
Yeah.
Well, they've twitched a little bit.
They've now...
You want to hold just a minute, Henry.
I want to get moved to the other phone.
Just a second.
Hold on.
Okay, go right ahead.
for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and calls upon the government of Pakistan to take action towards the political settlement in East Pakistan, giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population, expressed in the election in December 1970.
Of course, it has no withdrawal, and it has been on the hook for it, but it has the interesting features.
that it does not recognize Bangladesh.
It recognizes Pakistan.
Now, Boronto has been calling me like crazy to see what your decision is.
I said, you're still talking to Trudeau because they're now voting at the UN and they're going to defeat it.
They're going to defeat what?
They're going to defeat the Soviet resolution.
Good, good.
And therefore, we trust them.
I already told them I couldn't get to you in time.
Well, just say that, sorry, no withdrawal on it.
We can't support it.
Exactly.
I've already told him it was my personal opinion that you'd never go along without a withdrawal.
That's right.
But what we ought to try to do is to play a little bit on this difference between them and the Indians from East Pakistan.
Well, do you think it's significant?
Because it may be the Bangladesh thing happened after.
No, no.
This came in tonight on a huge basis.
But
I think it's very small.
It's very small.
It's not enough.
It's not close to being enough.
But at least it shows that if we break it out, but we'll never make it if we don't get Rogers to talk the way he should.
The sort of talk he did tonight is going to kill us.
Yeah.
I mean, Ron, who doesn't know anything about this, just came to me afterwards and said, have we changed our policy?
He was at the NFB meeting, and he didn't think that was our policy.
And because all of this goes on the diplomatic wires, and now when he goes around Europe and says the same thing, no one knows what he's doing.
Well, I don't know what he talked to the senators about.
I hope it was different.
It's actually the same thing.
I've met my father-in-law with a few of his speeches, John.
Well, what an effect he was saying was, well, how would you know?
The main point that was missing was not putting any of the responsibility on the Indians
no responsibility on the Indian, no total withdrawal, and not making clear to them that it's their own future that's involved, not just that we have no national interest in it.
Well, I think you better get your background rough tomorrow, and hard.
Excellent.
What's your intro?
I want to see what happens.
What?
Maybe Wednesday.
Why, wait a minute.
On the Russian thing?
Yeah.
But we can decide it tomorrow morning.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Okay.
But I, but we can, we can let this, this note be overtaken by events.
Well, this is totally understandable.
That's right.
That's just, I don't know.
And then tomorrow morning, it was overtaken by events.
And secondly, it's unacceptable.
Yeah.
Yeah.
But the line must be very clearly understood.
That the, what I want to get across the line is that we have done everything that we can and that the, uh,
that the cutting off, Rogers did have the economic, cutting off of economic assistance.
Yeah, he did.
Nor did he really, he said war doesn't help anybody.
Well, that's just a flatitude.
What he should have said is that war was not justified under these existing terms.
Exactly.
Which is the line I used.
Where the Indians knew that we were pressing for a political settlement.
Well, that's the line.
Well, I think the line we used with Trudeau.
That's what I used with him.
What we did with Trudeau was perfect, but he must have thought the signals had been good.
I don't care so much about Trudeau.
It's what Ritchie and company are going to put on the diplomatic wire tonight.
Well, you have to correct it.
Well, he said something different at the meeting at noon today, didn't he?
Or did he get a different
Maybe was I saying it.
You were saying it and he agreed to it.
That was it.
Because we've got the Russians switching a little bit, considering that we have no cards at all.
It's amazing that they even made a little switch.
But that's just the beginning of the game.
Okay.
But...
I thought the evening was extremely successful.
It was a good turn for me.
It would have been boring for me to talk to that clown for another... That's why I did it.
I thought it was...
It wasn't... And they had a lot of fun, too.
Oh, they did a lot of fun.
And Peppin was funny, and Rich, and Pierre, and Connolly was... Connolly was always...
I think we gave them somewhat of a lift, too.
They've got to keep this.
I always wanted to rub in that point at the last minute, how much things have changed in two years.
Well, coming back to this, though, we've got to clear that record, and we will tomorrow.
Okay?
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