Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 16 › Conversation 016-030
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on India-Pakistan War and United Nations
Monday, December 6, 1971 · 10:58 PM–11:05 PM ET · White House Telephone · 8 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the ongoing India-Pakistan War, specifically evaluating a Soviet resolution at the United Nations that lacks a critical withdrawal provision. Nixon rejects the Soviet proposal and criticizes Secretary of State William P. Rogers for undermining the administration's official diplomatic position through inconsistent public statements. Kissinger is tasked with issuing a firm background statement to clarify the administration’s policy and emphasize Indian responsibility in the conflict.
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 1 minute of this recording (about 13% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data
· Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).
Each line starts with a timestamp button; press it to play the audio from that point.
Hello?
Hello?
Hello?
Sure.
Hello?
Hello, Henry.
Hi, how are you?
That's all right, that's all right.
I never worry about that.
I just wanted to call you to tell you about the Russians.
Oh, yes.
Yeah.
Well, they've twitched a little bit.
They've now...
You want to hold just a minute, Henry.
I want to get moved to the other phone.
Just a second.
Hold on.
Okay, go right ahead.
for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and calls upon the government of Pakistan to take action towards the political settlement in East Pakistan, giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population, expressed in the election in December 1970.
Of course, it has no withdrawal, and it has been on the hook for it, but it has the interesting features.
that it does not recognize Bangladesh.
It recognizes Pakistan.
Now, Boronto has been calling me like crazy to see what your decision is.
I said, you're still talking to Trudeau because they're now voting at the UN and they're going to defeat it.
They're going to defeat what?
They're going to defeat the Soviet resolution.
Good, good.
And therefore, we trust them.
I already told them I couldn't get to you in time.
Well, just say that, sorry, no withdrawal on it.
We can't support it.
Exactly.
I've already told him it was my personal opinion that you'd never go along without a withdrawal.
That's right.
But what we ought to try to do is to play a little bit on this difference between them and the Indians from East Pakistan.
Well, do you think it's significant?
Because it may be the Bangladesh thing happened after.
No, no.
This came in tonight on a huge basis.
But
I think it's very small.
It's very small.
It's not enough.
It's not close to being enough.
But at least it shows that if we break it out, but we'll never make it if we don't get Rogers to talk the way he should.
The sort of talk he did tonight is going to kill us.
Yeah.
I mean, Ron, who doesn't know anything about this, just came to me afterwards and said, have we changed our policy?
He was at the NFB meeting, and he didn't think that was our policy.
And because all of this goes on the diplomatic wires, and now when he goes around Europe and says the same thing, no one knows what he's doing.
Well, I don't know what he talked to the senators about.
I hope it was different.
It's actually the same thing.
I've met my father-in-law with a few of his speeches, John.
Well, what an effect he was saying was, well, how would you know?
The main point that was missing was not putting any of the responsibility on the Indians
no responsibility on the Indian, no total withdrawal, and not making clear to them that it's their own future that's involved, not just that we have no national interest in it.
Well, I think you better get your background rough tomorrow, and hard.
Excellent.
What's your intro?
I want to see what happens.
What?
Maybe Wednesday.
Why, wait a minute.
On the Russian thing?
Yeah.
But we can decide it tomorrow morning.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Okay.
But I, but we can, we can let this, this note be overtaken by events.
Well, this is totally understandable.
That's right.
That's just, I don't know.
And then tomorrow morning, it was overtaken by events.
And secondly, it's unacceptable.
Yeah.
Yeah.
But the line must be very clearly understood.
That the, what I want to get across the line is that we have done everything that we can and that the, uh,
that the cutting off, Rogers did have the economic, cutting off of economic assistance.
Yeah, he did.
Nor did he really, he said war doesn't help anybody.
Well, that's just a flatitude.
What he should have said is that war was not justified under these existing terms.
Exactly.
Which is the line I used.
Where the Indians knew that we were pressing for a political settlement.
Well, that's the line.
Well, I think the line we used with Trudeau.
That's what I used with him.
What we did with Trudeau was perfect, but he must have thought the signals had been good.
I don't care so much about Trudeau.
It's what Ritchie and company are going to put on the diplomatic wire tonight.
Well, you have to correct it.
Well, he said something different at the meeting at noon today, didn't he?
Or did he get a different
Maybe was I saying it.
You were saying it and he agreed to it.
That was it.
Because we've got the Russians switching a little bit, considering that we have no cards at all.
It's amazing that they even made a little switch.
But that's just the beginning of the game.
Okay.
But...
I thought the evening was extremely successful.
It was a good turn for me.
It would have been boring for me to talk to that clown for another... That's why I did it.
I thought it was...
It wasn't... And they had a lot of fun, too.
Oh, they did a lot of fun.
And Peppin was funny, and Rich, and Pierre, and Connolly was... Connolly was always...
I think we gave them somewhat of a lift, too.
They've got to keep this.
I always wanted to rub in that point at the last minute, how much things have changed in two years.
Well, coming back to this, though, we've got to clear that record, and we will tomorrow.
Okay?
NARA Description
On December 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 10:58 pm to 11:05 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 016-030 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 16-30
Date: December 6, 1971
Time: 10:58 pm - 11:05 pm
Location: White House Telephone
Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.
India-Pakistan War
-Union of Soviet Socialist [USSR]
-Responsible to Kissinger
-Note
[Pause]
-USSR’s United Nations [UN] resolution
-Acceptability to US
-Provisions
-Ceasefire
-Pakistan
-Political settlement over East Pakistan
-December 1970 elections
-Withdrawal
-Recognition
-Bangladesh
-East Pakistan
-Yuli M. Vorontsov
-President’s position
-Pierre Trudeau
-US possible defeat
-Withdrawal
-Possible strategy
-USSR and India
-Differences on East Pakistan
-Significance
-Bangladesh
-US policy
-William P. Rogers’ statement
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-US position
-National Security Council [NSC] meeting
-Diplomatic wires
-Rogers’ conversation with Senators
-UN
-Ceasefire
-Withdrawal
-Political accomendation
-India
-Responsibility
-Withdrawal
-Kissinger’s backgrounder
-Timing
-USSR
-US reply to note
-Rogers’ statement
-Economic assistance cutoff
-Kissinger’s view
-India
-US push for political settlement
-President’s line with Trudeau
-A. E. Ritchie
-Rogers’ conversation with Senators
-Rogers’ comment at afternoon meeting
-USSR
State Dinner with Trudeau
-Jean-Luc Pepin
-Edgar J. Benson [?]
-Pierre A. Rinfret
-Spiro T. Agnew
-John B. Connally
-President’s comments
-John W. Chancellor
Kissinger’s backgrounderAlso recorded on December 7, 1971
- 016-029 10:56 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon talked on the telephone from 10:56 pm to 10:57 pm.
- 016-031 11:05 PM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:05 pm and 11:11 pm.
- 016-032 11:11 PM · 43 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:11 pm and 11:12 pm.
- 016-033 11:12 PM · 9 sec — Henry A. Kissinger and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:12 pm and 11:28 pm.
- 016-034 11:12 PM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:12 pm and 11:28 pm.
- 016-134 11:28 PM · 4 sec — Unknown person(s) and the White House operator talked on the telephone on an unknown date, sometime between 11:28 pm on December 6, 1971 and 8:06 am on December 7, 1971.
- 016-035 8:06 AM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and unknown person(s) talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:06 am and 6:51 pm.
- 631-001 12:57 PM · 19 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:57 pm and 1:58 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 016-030, December 7, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/016-030 (accessed October 10, 2026).