← 016-063016-065 →

Conversation 016-064

TapeTape 16StartWednesday, December 8, 1971 at 8:03 PMEndWednesday, December 8, 1971 at 8:12 PMTape start time02:14:11Tape end time02:23:29ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AudioNARA Description

On December 8, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 8:03 pm to 8:12 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 016-064 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 16-64

Date: December 8, 1971
Time: 8:03 pm - 8:12 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

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[Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under PRMPA regulations 06/17/2019. Segment
cleared for release.]
[Privacy]
[016-064-w001]
[Duration: 14s]

     Henry A. Kissinger
          -Meeting with W. Kenneth Riland

*****************************************************************

     President’s trip to the People’s Republic of China [PRC]
           -Guests
                -Dr. W. Kenneth Riland
                       -Physical stress of trip
                       -Press
                       -Nelson A. Rockefeller campaign
                             -Press

     India–Pakistan War
          -Moscow Summit
               -Cancellation
                     -Kissinger’s view
               -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
               -Need for planning
                     -President’s concern
                     -1972 Presidential election
                           -Kissinger’s view
               -President’s forthcoming note to Leonid I. Brezhnev
               -Maurice Stans’ conversations
               -Kissinger’s conversations
                     -Middle East
               -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                     -USSR
                           -Relations with US
                                 -West Pakistan
          -Possible settlement
               -India
                     -Possible military action
                           -West Pakistan
                     -Withdrawal
                           -Pakistan
               -USSR

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2012-005. Segment declassified on 05/28/2015. Archivist: DR]

[National Security]
[016-064-w002]
[Duration: 1m 24s]

     India–Pakistan War
          -Possible settlement
               -West Pakistan
                     US carrier movement
               -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                     -Arming US allies
          -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
               -Possible movement
                     -Effect on Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                     -Effect in Middle East

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     India–Pakistan War
          -Possible settlement
               -Vietnam
                     -Congress
                     -Possible US military action
                           -Timing
                                -Possible message to PRC
               -USSR
                           -Possible message

******************************************************************************

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and
released 06/17/2019.]
[Unintelligible]
[016-064-w004]
[Duration: 7s]

[This portion of the tape is mostly tape noise with some muffled background conversation.]

******************************************************************************

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2012-005. Segment declassified on 05/28/2015. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[016-064-w003]
[Duration: 1m 6s]

     India–Pakistan War
          -Possible settlement
               -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                     -Border with People's Republic of China [PRC]
               -US decision
                     -Meet with People's Republic of China [PRC]
                           -Friday December 10, 1971

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     The President's Schedule
          -Meeting with Kissinger
          -Emilio Garrastazu Medici
               -Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters
          -Kissinger’s schedule
               -John B. Connally
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Mr. President.
He thinks he should go to China, you know.
I know, and there's something to be said for it, Mr. President.
Well, I'm not going to mention anybody, don't you.
What I'm going to do is to just
take a look at the list, and at the last, I'll strike some aid, you know, or a military guy just may have to go.
Because basically, I mean, maybe every day we just may have to be worked over.
But this may be the toughest workout, such a difficult thing, and having to be constantly on your toes.
Right.
Any of us will ever have it.
It'll be good for you, it'll be good for me.
We've all got to be up.
Also, he could be a fellow that could do other things.
He could do the press.
He's great.
What I was thinking of with regard to the options, and I want you to know that I'm supposed to work with him now.
Maybe we have to really put it to the Russians and say that we feel that under the circumstances that we have to cancel the plan.
No, I wouldn't do that, no.
No?
That's too drastic a decision.
Well, I think that depends.
I don't want you to know I'm prepared.
Because these people are, it's a, we've got to, we've got to look down the road.
The things that we've got, you got a minute now?
Yeah.
The things that we've got to consider are these, one,
the cost of this, of letting this go down the drain.
All right, that'll be great.
And then doing the other things.
Then on the other hand, we've got to figure that if we play this out, the fact that we may not be around after the election.
We have to just figure something out.
And it's a tough goddamn decision.
Yet on the other hand,
being around after the election if everything is down the drain doesn't make any difference if you just let it go down the drain
We might say this, for example, and I'll do the note to express it myself, but my thought is to say that I was very pleased with Secretary Stanton's conversations.
I was very pleased with the conversations he had regarding the East's belief in progress and salt.
It's hard for me to understand that all of this could be jeopardized by this area of the world.
But it is being jeopardized.
And under the circumstances, I think we have to take a look at it.
We have to choose as to what we want to do here.
But that's what we've already attempted to face.
And I don't believe that the president should make a problem now if the Russians retain their respect for him.
If they're going to play it into an absolute showdown, then the summit looks good anyway.
If they want to relax with us, we can give them plenty of way down.
Now, with regard to the ways out, though, the missing thing here is what we want as a way out.
In other words, what do we say to them?
What is the method of settlement?
We can't say go back to the status quo and say,
We can say, well, get the hell out of West Pakistan, leave it alone, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
At this stage, we have to prevent an Indian attack on the West Pakistan.
Right.
That is the matrix.
Right.
We have to maintain the position of withdrawal from all of Pakistan.
But that's something that will get watered down as the Fed occupies the country.
Right.
But we have to prevent Westpac itself.
We've got to say that we have a treaty, we can say.
But it's a little premature yet to make people who have said us, they still owe you and ask us to do it.
And therefore, we have to hold it up a bit.
But...
But I think, I believe that if we can come out of this, if they maintain their respect for us, even if we lose, we still come out all right.
Well, don't underestimate the fact that if by good chance the Congress gets out this week and we smack North Vietnam pretty strongly, that'll be somewhat of a message to these people.
That's right.
Huh?
That's right.
Although we ought to time it if we send a message to the Chinese.
i think the message of the soviets
Well, you'll have the, what time do you want to be ready to talk?
I have the, you won't have to be there.
I mean, I've let Waller speak.
I have a message for you.
Well, if Waller's in my hand.
I could do it, I'm staying constantly at 11.
I could do it any time.
Well, I'll be finished.
Good.
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