Conversation 016-111

TapeTape 16StartSaturday, December 18, 1971 at 1:40 PMEndSaturday, December 18, 1971 at 1:46 PMTape start time03:48:53Tape end time03:54:28ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Connally, John B.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone

President Nixon and Treasury Secretary John B. Connally discussed the status of delicate international monetary negotiations occurring at a Group of Ten meeting at the Smithsonian Institution. Connally briefed the President on the difficulty of reaching a multilateral agreement regarding currency revaluations, specifically noting holdouts from Canada, Italy, and tensions between French and German positions. They agreed that if a final settlement could not be reached within hours, Connally should issue a positive public statement emphasizing progress and scheduling a follow-up meeting for January, while also establishing that trade negotiations must be finalized before the President’s January 20 deadline with Congress.

Group of TenInternational monetary policyCurrency devaluationJohn B. ConnallyTrade agreementsSmithsonian Institution

On December 18, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and John B. Connally talked on the telephone from 1:40 pm to 1:46 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 016-111 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 16-111

Date: December 18, 1971
Time: 1:40 pm - 1:46 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with John B. Connally.

     India-Pakistan ceasefire [?]

     President's schedule

     Connally's schedule
         -Forthcoming Group of Ten finance meeting at the Smithsonian Institution
                -Possible statements by the Group of Ten and Connally
                     -Possible settlement
                     -Future meeting (January 1972)
                -Potential problems
                     -Canadians
                            -Trade amount
                     -Europeans
                     -Japanese
                            -Devaluation
                     -Germans
                     -French
                            -Adamant about German devaluation

                      -Karl Schiller
                      -Willy Brandt
                      -Italians
                             -Upcoming elections
                             -Pressure by US
                -President’s view
                      -French
                             -Proposed realignment of currency
                      -Germans
                             -Joining the French
                      -Japanese
                -Trade
                      -President’s expectations
                             -Realignment
                             -Timing
                                   -Trade agreement’s negotiated before January 20, 1972
                                        -Congress

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Hello, John.
I just want to tell you that I think you're doing fine.
I think you can't really expect great events like this to be shaped as fast as we would like.
But just hold tight.
It would seem to me, I'll be here until 5.40 in case you still want me to go along.
I'll be here in the office, so I'll be ready to come over or not come over.
We should know about 4 or 4.30 at the latest, Mr. President.
It's not going to hold much longer.
I've been talking around there.
Everybody's on edge, everybody's tense, everybody's tired.
We were at it till 11.30, 11 o'clock last night.
I know, I know.
And if we can't do it in the next couple of hours, I don't think we can do it.
That's the whole purpose.
I'd keep them here if I thought we could do it, but if we can't put it together in another couple of hours, I don't think we can.
I think the important thing, if you don't, then, is to come out with as positive a statement as you can about the future.
How did you plan to do that?
Well, we just put out a statement from the group and not involve you at all, I would think, and just say that we've made very substantial progress.
That's right.
We came close to a settlement and hope that...
perhaps with the changing events and the passage of a bit more time that problems can be resolved where we can reach a final solution or something.
You could say we've come very close together.
We have substantially reduced the differences that we had from the previous meeting.
We're very close together and so forth.
And then would you announce at this time, Marv, when you're going to call another meeting?
Yes, I would.
And that you would have another meeting?
In the middle of January.
In the middle of January.
About the 15th.
There's still a chance we can put this together.
Right.
Right.
We've got four hang-ups, one of which we know Canada has been an absolute bastard.
But we knew that, so that's a problem, really.
So let's just leave them out, huh?
Yes.
We'll have to leave them out.
But, you know, this materially affects what we're going to get out of it.
Because of the amount of trade, yeah.
Sure, yeah.
Well, we'll have to just handle the Canadians in a different way, won't we, John?
Yes, sir.
And by golly, we will.
I mean, they want to be this way.
That's what I told them this morning.
If you want to work out your problems with us, that's fine.
We'll play by any rules you want to play by.
But you see, in terms of the way the whole works, I think making the deal with the Europeans and the Japanese is going to have enormous significance, you know what I mean?
And people will figure we ought to do the Canadians separately.
We've got the Japanese up to 60.
We're trying to get them to 17.
Well, you've done awfully well to get them to 16-1.
I know how tough they are.
I think we can get them to 17 or get them close to it.
And if we can, we'll take it.
That's right.
Now, the hang-up now is two things.
the Germans have to go to five.
The French are adamant about the five.
And I think they ought to go to five, and I think they will go to five.
Schiller, I think, is trying to call Brant to go 5% above the French.
The French will be zero, you see, and the Germans have to be 5%.
Sure, I understand.
That's what they ought to be.
Now, the Italians, of course, are screwed up because of their election.
Yes, and the Italians are...
Apparently, we can't move them, so...
If we can get these other things solved, what we'll do, we'll just all put the pressure on the Italians and in effect make them agree to
say that at least they'll do nothing right now, and then they'll take under advisement what course they may take.
And, hell, with the understanding, you know, two or three weeks from now, they may devalue by a couple of points.
Yeah.
I think, as a matter of fact, with them, my own view is this.
I think it would be very positive.
I don't think it's going to be looked upon as a defeat at all for us.
Well, let me put it another way.
I think what we got from the French, that is, starting with that, was more than a hell of a lot of people thought we were
Second, I think that if you can get the Germans on top of that, that's 13.
That's a hell of an achievement.
And I think, frankly, I think if you can get 16 1⁄2 from the Japanese, that's more than a lot of people thought is possible.
That's right.
People have been talking in terms of 19 and all the rest, but they know that's a going-in proposition, don't they?
That's right.
And doesn't 16 1⁄2, isn't that going to help a lot?
Yeah, sure.
Yeah.
You can try to get more.
Now on the trade front there, I think what you can really expect, I've been thinking about that and knowing
what is possible and what isn't.
It seems to me all you can really do is to set in motion the process on trade.
Well, we can't get it done.
They can't agree on that, but we can say we've agreed that we will move forward on the trade front, and that's to be negotiated.
What we're saying to them is you must have the trade agreements negotiated by the time we go to Congress on January the 20th.
If you don't, we have committed ourselves to the legislative leaders that we would have something on trade to give them at that time.
So that's all we can say.
Right.
And then hope for the best.
Well, anyway, I won't hold you, but I'll be here.
We'll try to wrap it up in the next couple of hours.
Sure.
Okay, I'll be here.
Bye.