On January 1, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 10:57 am to 11:19 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 017-125 of the White House Tapes.
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Dr. Kissinger.
There you are.
Hello?
Mr. President, happy New Year.
Good, good.
You're back in New York now?
Yeah, I'm back in New York.
Right, right.
Okay, well, anything new?
No, to tell you the truth, I just woke up about half an hour ago.
That's good.
I will check right away.
No, I read the papers.
There's not anything in there.
But last night, when I checked last, there wasn't anything new.
There was this fellow Mintoff.
I didn't bother you with all the mutations of Malta.
Oh, the hell with that.
We tried to get you on the phone, and we didn't put him through because whatever you would have said, you would have been in the middle of it.
And we put him on to Ellsworth, who had been out there as your ambassador.
Who?
Bob Ellsworth, we sent out on a special mission to Malta in December.
And so now he's extended his ultimatum by two weeks.
He can't throw the British out.
It would be mass unemployment on the island.
He'd kill himself, won't he?
Oh, yeah.
And he's just trying to drive the British to a too hard a bargain.
And if he gets the Libyan money, even if he got Libyan money, that wouldn't get him 10,000 jobs.
He can't put the whole island on the dole.
Yeah.
Well, I don't know.
I suppose Ellsworth talked about all that to him, yeah.
And the result of all of that is that he has extended his deadline.
And we have said we would.
We didn't say we could mediate, but we said we would keep an eye on him.
And we've told Heath we would up the ante a little bit.
That we would help Heath with the ante.
With the ante, that's right.
Yeah.
We are not talking to him ourselves.
Yeah.
No, never talk to Mintoff.
Let the British do it.
That's right.
But we have sent a message from you to Heath saying we are prepared to help them in upping the ante.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Right.
Right.
Okay.
But that's the only thing of any consequence that's been going on.
I was noting, I just noted Mrs. Gandhi made a speech to the Parliament and she still takes her line that foreign aid has really never aided them, that they'd paid back every bit that they'd ever gotten.
And that she's going to take this line about what she's going to do and so forth and so on.
Yeah, but on the other hand, when she doesn't talk to Parliament, her Parliament is very...
I know, hawk-like.
She's put out all sorts of signals.
Right.
Well, she's taking the public line that we don't understand her and all that.
Yeah, but the Indians are master psychologists.
they've got to deal with us they've got literally now they're in worse shape than ever i guess they must be because now when people say first of all they put themselves on the soviet side in john freeman
told Henry Brandon when he was there, and Freeman, you know, was an ambassador for years, that they in 67 cold-bloodedly decided they needed the Russians to deal with the Pakistanis.
And that we just weren't enough of a factor in that area.
That's when they made their move.
But now their problem is they cannot permit
for their own domestic reasons, if the Russians become too influential in India, the Communist Party becomes too strong.
I know.
That's a real problem for them.
And they can't have that.
this problem of East Bengal is going to become harder and harder for them.
Now they have the problem that Pakistan used to have.
How the hell to feed them and govern them?
How to feed them and how to govern.
They can't govern their own Bengalis.
People keep forgetting that they have martial law in Calcutta.
They kept yacking about martial law in Dhaka, but there's martial law in Calcutta also.
Yep.
With regard to the question of recognition of Bangladesh, I think the answer should simply be very, well, it's premature to talk about that.
Isn't that about what we say?
First, Mr. President, no one has recognized Bangladesh except Bhutan and India.
No one, not even Russia.
Yeah.
I think we should just say it's premature to talk about it.
That's right.
And not go into it any longer, any further.
That's right.
Or unless we, I don't think we ought to hang out there, dear.
Well, it might get gotten to Pakistan and all the rest.
I don't think we should reject it, but... No, the fact of the matter is that at this point, the Chinese would take violent objection because of their parallels to Tibet and Manchukuo.
Yeah.
But...
That's just something to keep in the back of the mind.
But if you say no more, then it's premature.
That's fine.
Oh, yes.
To just say, well, we have nothing on that.
We're premature, and we can't yet determine.
Only India and Russia have recommended them.
No, Russia hasn't.
Russia hasn't.
That's right.
That's right.
I would just say up to now, there are only two countries that have recognized that this is not an acute issue.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
Of course, we have a consul in Dhaka who's already put up a map calling it Bangladesh.
Yeah, I know.
The same bastard that was there before, isn't it?
Yeah.
He's really an all-out Indian lover, isn't he?
That's right.
And poor Keating and the other place.
I have to say this for Keating.
He's pleaded and he's wept and cried, but he hasn't actually leaked to the press against you.
Good.
Well, he probably knows that there's problems.
Well, it's difficult.
You know, the Indians just smother you out there when you come, you know, with all their devious, tricky things.
They are really something.
The most difficult questions that I'm going to have are, I think, going to be on Vietnam.
Not in terms of the bombing, so that's no problem, but in terms of
of POW when it ends and so forth.
You see, we're now coming to the moment of truth in terms of we've been able to put the press off and say, well, we'll have another announcement and we'll do this and this and this and this and this.
But I know because some of the POW wives have put in a question for rather to ask that we're going to get a tough one on that.
But why don't you talk just a little bit about how we can say something on this without saying anything.
This is the tough problem.
It isn't a question now where we can go back and argue about what a good job we've done.
What I meant is that there's got to be...
I mean, I'll make that point, of course.
Yes, we've withdrawn 400,000 and our casualties are down.
We've made a peace offer.
Couldn't we say that the first thing that one has to remember...
is that the other side is using, I mean, with some indignation against the other side, that they are using them brutally, using the prisoners brutally.
I know.
I will say that, but then, of course, Henry, the question is, what are you going to do about it?
But secondly, we have made every reasonable offer that can be made.
Now they say, well, now all those offers haven't been...
They don't stop there.
All those offers have been turned down, and they don't expect them.
What are you going to do?
Well, but then what I have always said to the wives is, I don't know whether one can say that to a national audience, I have always said to the wives that I don't believe your husbands want you to have America just surrender, that we've gone nine-tenths of the way.
towards the other side.
It'll work with them because they're still basically patriots.
It will not work now with the national audience.
I mean, putting it in terms, it's been very, very heavily pulled in the last couple months.
That is, you see, that's the thing, the new factor we've got here as to what we can wheel, and they're quite aware of this.
It's just the attrition of the support for the war.
That's the basic thing, problem, which is changes.
But I think the problem is also what the Australian prime minister said to me, that the top ANC prime minister, that if he goes around the country, he's the only guy that's speaking for the war.
I know.
And no one ever speaks up for it, and the people get confused.
true but don't uh don't get any we can't be on any illusions that we can you can do this before certain intelligent audiences and the rest but uh uh and my line of course will always be more hawkish than others but we are in a position now where just saying well we can just wheel it up like we did in november of 69 isn't it that time is gone you see no i'm not it can't be done it can't even be done in terms of a of the cambodian period we're in a
We're in a different period.
But be that as it may, the question of air power, how long it's used and so forth, what's your suggestion as to how to handle that?
In other words, the point is that we get back fundamentally to the question that everybody knows, we come to an election, and then the question is not how much we have reduced American casualties and how many less Americans there are there, but did we or did we not end the American involvement.
Of course, Mr. President, I believe if you watch, to give my honest conviction, if you watch the history of the war,
The opponents have always focused on one thing.
I don't happen to believe, but you may have polled it, that the use of air power upsets the American people.
It does some, but it's not the use of air power.
It has nothing to do with that.
It's just the fact that it's the war.
You see, because the media puts it in terms of the continuation of the war.
No, I don't think you could say that you could just continue
air power for four or five years no you can't say it's not gonna it's not gonna work won't will i mean you just that means that then you have failed and an effort to and to bring the war to an end and you've uh you've left them uh well uh i i just don't have the benefit of these polls i don't have the sense that vietnam is that much of an issue in people's minds
It's not a big issue in the people's mind, but it's a very negative issue to the extent that it is now.
That's the problem.
And will continue to be.
And it will become one more as these guys... See, this is stuff, not polls that we've taken, but that Harris and Gallup have taken.
They'll all be our democratic friends.
That's why they're jumping on this at this point, you see.
And they'll do their best to make it an issue.
Well, be that as it may, the fact is that the Soviet, that the other side is getting close to a billion dollars worth of military aid a year, and it's invading all of the surrounding countries.
That's correct.
I mean, that is the fact.
And that all we are trying to do is to interdict the movement of the supplies.
Besides, if we promise to end the war, to end the bombing, if we do all the things which our opponents now drive, then within three months you will be in a debate of overthrowing Q.
And that one is going to be harder to conduct.
Because no one gives a damn about him.
That's correct.
I'm not suggesting that for now.
I'm trying to set the stage of where we're going to be in
in june as you know the thing we were talking about yesterday yes so that we have met a lot of so that we can so that we can i'm trying to figure out basically so that we have a way to just uh take the issue out of the out of the out of the out of the debate for about three months that's what we're really trying to do it'll be a very very clever move if we can do it
Well, it's certainly a very intriguing idea.
Let's face it, Henry, the bombing halt was a totally political move.
You know it didn't mean a goddamn thing in terms of that.
And it damn near won the election for Humphrey.
Now, we've got to be smart enough to do something.
That was at a time when Vietnam was the only foreign policy.
Don't make any mistake, though.
It's a question, though, that anything, anything may change, change 1%.
See, that's what we're talking about here.
So we are, and as I said, gives our people a positive rather than simply a defensive, an offensive rather than a defensive thing.
Well, we don't have to answer that now, but...
With regard to the dates, incidentally, we're... That will be after the Moscow summit, so then we will be in a much better position to judge what the necessities are.
Yeah.
The dates for the, the date for the next announcement, we're trying, I walked, talking to Haldeman, he's going to get me some report later today.
It's, we've got to work it out in terms of, Humphrey's going to make an announcement, and I don't want to do it too close to that.
And I have to
except the New Hampshire delegation's letter, which of course will be tantamount to a formal announcement.
I've got to put it in that category.
But in terms of playing it around, what's the earliest that you can have, or are we talking about now?
President, first we have to get you aboard.
Secondly, this peace program, I have thought a lot about it.
It's going to set off a shockwave in Asia again.
uh because it's absolutely sweeping uh it may kick over thailand completely now then we won't don't do it if it goes that far well no i think it's it's a good one to do but it shouldn't be sprung very suddenly now uh no i'm speaking in terms of the period between the 10th and the
and the 18th.
That's really the ballpark.
Oh, I see.
I thought you wanted it even earlier than the 12th when we spoke yesterday.
No, no, the 12th is out because I think that's Humphrey's date.
But one of the things I wanted to suggest...
I don't want to do it the same date one of those are moving.
You see, we have to move all of these away from the political stuff.
But one of the things I wanted to suggest for your consideration, Mr. President, I have already wired the whole program to bunker.
and i've asked bunker to take it up with jew so we will know monday or tuesday how we stand there if he approves it and if we don't have to spend any time there modifying it we can go literally any day you say from the tents on uh the thing that i was going so the date is in itself not so crucial if it isn't before the 10th uh
Because before the 10th would be next week.
No, I don't expect to before the 10th, but we might have to consider that early, depending upon what my own New Hampshire thing turns out to be.
Well, what I wanted to put before your consideration, Mr. President, is whether going anyway in the period before the Congress goes back isn't a mistake.
Sure, they may put in a lot of odd and end resolutions, although they probably won't do it the first two.
Well, Henry, there's another reason we have to do it.
I cannot have it left at the time of the State of the Union because I can't get up and make the State of the Union address.
And if I haven't said something on Vietnam by that time, which is on the 20th, I will have to spend a good part of my time on it there.
You couldn't just have a paragraph and say you'll discuss it more fully in the following week?
No, that won't work.
Not on that.
It'd be a real dud.
No, I want to...
It has to be done before then.
Well, then, we'll do it whenever you say.
We'll be ready.
Of course, if they don't get ready there, then we'll have to make it a different kind of proposal.
We'll just make the announcement or whatever we're going to do
We can do it anytime.
My instinct is that the later the better.
Because once it's out there, then they have something to react to.
Then they can frame all their proposals in reaction to what you've put on the table.
Their proposals are going to go anywhere near as far as what this has gone.
They're going to do it anyway, Henry.
I mean, whenever we put it out, we put it out the 22nd and on the 24th.
The closer it comes to China.
True, but they'll still have a month.
All the restraints will be off once this proposal is on the table.
It won't make that much difference, Henry.
A week, whatever the case might be, isn't going to make that much difference.
Two weeks would gain us two weeks closer to China.
Well, we'll have to do it before the State of the Unions, so that's the latest, the 20th, and we can move back in that period of time any time we want.
I'm going to get the dates from Haldeman that all these people are going to be filing, and we'll try to fit one to fit this in.
But okay, so let's figure any place between the 10th and the...
No, we can be ready between the 10th and the 20th.
The 10th and the 20th.
Yeah, the 10th and the 20th.
Wait a minute, 9th, 10th.
Well, actually, the 11th would be the first day.
I can't do the 10th, so I won't be back in time.
The 11th.
Between the 11th and the 20th.
That's the game we have to play.
That's right.
Okay.
Okay.
You've...
It'll be interesting to see what Tu reacts at the long last now.
He may be in a position where he feels he's too strong to get... Well, it's a hell of a thing to have public.
Yep.
And if he doesn't want to do it, we won't do it.
We'll just do something else, you know.
Put in what we've already done.
It's a pretty good proposal without that.
Yeah, yeah.
I think it is.
I don't think his bringing to get out is all that big.
Well, it's a symbolic thing, you know.
But there are a lot of factors in that proposal, like agreeing to curtail military aid.
Yeah.
If they do.
Yeah.
Like agreeing that South Vietnam would have a foreign policy of neutrality.
Right.
I know.
It's really great.
Well, okay.
I'll be in touch with you when I get any more specific questions on the book.
Okay?
All right.