Nixon phone call with Kissinger on SALT and Vietnamization

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Dr. Kissinger's on the line, sir.

Hello, Mr. President.

When are you leaving for California?

Oh, I'll be back tomorrow.

I'll be coming back tonight right after your broadcast.

Oh, you're going out with us?

I'll come out.

I'm spending the day in Washington tomorrow.

Oh, I see.

Very full schedule.

Oh, I see.

I thought you were going to go out there so that you could be out there tomorrow.

Well, then I'm not going till 5.30.

I want to have a meeting on the Laos situation and just get everything gone over.

We're having Smith in tomorrow, right?

That's right, Mr. President.

And I have a talking paper for you, and I could come in for a few minutes before, and I think he should be kept on a tight leash until Dobrynin gets back.

Right, right.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

He'll be going to Vienna?

He'll be going to Vienna.

There's one technical point.

We had stated the limits on submarine missiles in terms of numbers of submarines, and he would like to do it in terms of the total number of missiles.

regardless of how many each submarine carries.

And that's actually a rather good proposal.

In other words, rather than say the limit is 41 submarines, we would say 600 missiles or whatever the figure is.

Right, right, right.

And if he can make that concession, and also he should say that the treaty, that the ABM thing should be a treaty and the other an executive agreement, those would be two things that would keep him busy.

Right, right.

Good, good.

Okay, on this stuff that I'm preparing, there's nothing particularly, a couple of points that came to mind as I was reading here today was the, they might dig in on the point as to how long, leaving out Vietnam, our air activities in Laos will continue.

Of course, I understand how to answer all the Laos questions, that we don't have any ground combat people there.

And we understand that it began long before and the like.

And they might add, or Laos and Cambodia.

So what's your suggestion on that?

We know what we're going to do.

The question is, what do we tell them?

Well, my suggestion is to put it on the infiltration.

Yeah, but after we're gone, I mean, assuming we have, assuming that we have, you see there, the separation of South Vietnam from the rest, I mean, infiltration we justify on the basis of the threats to Americans and so forth.

Well, we can probably keep going.

I would try to avoid it.

You see, the problem, of course, is this.

To what extent are we going to commit ourselves for the defense of Cambodia and the defense of Laos as distinct from Vietnam and Vietnamization?

See, that's the critical question, which any smart guy will ask.

That's right.

On the other hand, the two are, of course, related.

And I think, but I think the point to make is we are committed to the defense, to Vietnamization, and we do those activities that are related to it.

I mean, I would not, but if you say flatly we are not committed to the, we are not going to do anything for the defense of Cambodia, we just may invite an attack this year.

That's the dilemma we have.

Oh, I understand.

I understand.

That's the problem.

Whatever my assessment is worth, I think, Mr. President, that they are getting themselves into the same past stress they did at the time of Tet.

Except they don't have the capabilities they're going to try to do to us in Cambodia and Laos.

In my view, they will certainly do something on the negotiating front this year.

They are not going to gamble in an election as close as this.

on one party.

Well, you would think so, yeah.

That is not their style.

With regard to another thing, India and Pakistan, the movement of the carrier force, how much do we want to leave the thought that that was being moved for other

uh contingencies than evacuation oh i i would say this was because the situation was deteriorating so rapidly that we just didn't know what contingencies involving american lives might be involved leave it on the uh i would leave it on that on the evacuation thing right yeah well the talking people here on india pakistan uh john freeman i i don't know what i told you who was ambassador in india for four years

told Henry Brandon that in his view India moved towards Russia deliberately in 67, that in his view we were absolutely right, that we didn't do anything to drive them over.

Actually, when you read that speech of Mrs. Gandhi, that's fairly plaintive.

That isn't all that aggressive.

And the question I always ask people is, what is it that the Indians are going to do now that they didn't do before?

I mean, when they say we've been squeezed out of the subcontinent, how?

I mean, because India will now say they don't want our aid, is that it?

They won't say that.

Yeah, well, that's the whole, it's ridiculous.

Of course, they're not going to say that.

And the point is, we have nothing else there.

And I think the answer one should give is that India is a proud and great country and it will pursue an independent policy based on its own self-interest.

Oh, well, the India-Pakistan things don't worry me.

I'm not going to... No, our people don't give a goddamn about it.

I think that's right.

We're not going to... Just going to finesse them very easily.

Very easily.

In regard to the...

amnesty question for Vietnam for deserters it occurs to me that the that we might approach that in terms of a you know I'm flatly positioned that we do nothing now but I think we have to position it in terms that we do nothing until the our involvement in Vietnam is completed and the prisoners of war are returned

And then, of course, we can consider those matters on their merits.

Isn't that the way to handle it?

That's right.

I think perhaps one could put it on the basis of saying then we'll come in any event and time in which we have to look at the whole situation of what the war meant to us and so forth.

But not until it's over.

No, I don't see how we can.

Absolutely not.

Somebody told me that Taft was going to put in some amnesty resolution this year, but it won't get off of first base, in my opinion.

Not with these... Not with POWs over there.

Boy, that would be a tragedy.

I think that's right.

Okay.

All right.

What else is new?

Anything that you see in there?

Everything.

I've checked the situation room this morning.

Everything is quiet.

There's some shelling in the Long Tian area, but that's not worse.

Well, we can't live and die about Laos every week, Henry.

We've done this for three years, six years.

Exactly.

and you know what i mean i've been reading this and long chin and the flame desires and so forth and everybody mocks about it but we do the best we can and we that's all we do and that's what we're doing now exactly well and i don't think and i think if you are asked about the defeat in northern laos i think that's the answer to give it to say let's take this in perspective this has been going back and forth across the plantation

With stories of defeats every January and stories of victory every July, a great deal of it is dictated by the weather.

Yeah.

Yeah, that's right.

That's right.

I'm not concerned about that.

Okay, fine.

Thank you.

Right, Mr. President.

What?

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on SALT and Vietnamization

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Also recorded on January 2, 1972

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