Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 17 › Conversation 017-146
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and POWs
Sunday, January 2, 1972 · 3:40 PM–3:50 PM ET · White House Telephone · 10 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed strategies for addressing critical media coverage regarding the bombing of North Vietnam, the Laos operation, and the India-Pakistan conflict. They focused on countering public misconceptions—specifically claims that U.S. actions were provocative and the notion that setting a deadline for troop withdrawal would secure the release of POWs. The two concluded that the administration should maintain an aggressive, confident stance in upcoming media interviews, emphasizing the President's overarching grasp of foreign policy strategy rather than getting distracted by the minor criticisms of biased outlets.
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Hello.
Mr. President.
Hi, Henry.
I've gotten your last notes that Buchanan had sent over, and I think I have everything in mind.
Only a couple of new minor items that have come up.
I noticed, according to the weekend news summary, that
I just got the weekend news summary, and I was just noticing a couple of minor items.
One of them, the Washington Star had a rather curious piece to the effect that the bombing of North Vietnam might well result in the loss of Laos because the Laotians, because North Vietnamese figured that now they would, because we had bombed them, they'd better take it.
You know, they were, in other words, we had provoked them.
The other line was that, the line that, which I checked to see what that POW line meant, and the thing is that they have some, they've got some POW wives who have said they object to the bombing because they think it risks getting back their husbands and wives and so forth and so on and so on.
That's the line, you see, that they're following.
But those are the only two things that I see that are any different from the other.
And, of course, there's the usual heavy play on India and Pakistan, and that's about it.
Well, on the Laos, they put an extra division and a half in there two months ago.
And given what any operation in Laos always takes about six weeks to two months to mount.
Yeah.
So to say that they were provoked is simply totally not borne out by the fact.
And it's the same story that happens any time we do something.
We are told we are provoking them.
Yeah, I know.
And the opposite is always true.
Now on the POW wives,
That's probably a sporadic number.
The argument has to be that we have tried everything else.
The only reason the war is continuing is because every reasonable proposal has been turned down.
that everything we've ever been told we should do, we've done, and nothing has ever led to anything.
Well, this story says that the wives were saying that they, these wives, at least the ones that are quoted, were saying that the president should set a deadline so we could get our people back.
It's that old story, you see, which we know will not work.
They've already turned down a deadline.
That's the line I'm going to take.
I just say that's...
They've already ended it.
Well, but I think even from the statements of the North Vietnamese, we can say that they have never, they have said a dozen times in recent months, it isn't a deadline they want.
It's that they want a cutoff of all American military assistance.
And in other words, they want us to overthrow the whole political structure in Vietnam.
And Laos and Cambodia.
And Laos and Cambodia.
We know that.
We know we're on the right side.
It's just a question.
It's a question of having to get it in some understandable form.
But we'll see.
We'll find out.
Well, I think one should hit the argument that the deadline is keeping them from releasing prisoners because it isn't true.
Well, I'm going to go so far as to indicate that that's been tried and they won't take it.
You know what I mean?
Well, that would go very far.
Well, it has because it has been tried by the people of the Congress has floated it out and they've turned it down.
That's what I mean.
Yeah.
I mean, one can certainly say that they have themselves said that that isn't it.
That's what I'm getting at, right?
That that is what they want.
No, I won't say we've tried it.
I'm just going to say that.
When we say we've tried it, then the next thing is we'll be asked where.
That's right.
But it has been put up and they've turned it down.
They have repeatedly stated that that isn't enough.
Okay.
I think that's about the sum of it in terms of the... Of course.
these newspapers, they go through cycles like this.
Six weeks ago, they were all jumping on carnally for screwing up foreign economic policy.
It's whatever they think they can carry at the moment.
And in no case do I think does it have a lot of popular support.
Oh, that's right.
Sure.
They're on this...
I mean, they are desperately looking for some issues.
That's right.
That's right.
And then after we
After we move the Connolly, after we move to really a major triumph in the Connolly thing, it rides for a couple of days and they forget it.
Exactly.
You know, you stop to think of that.
I've been reading the year-end summaries.
They don't even mention the Moscow summit.
Don't they?
Is that right?
No, they don't mention Berlin.
Accidental war.
No, that's not mentioned at all.
See, yeah.
It's old.
The only thing they mention, I mean, the New York Times has a summing up editorial, the only thing they mention is China, and they say, but even there, we didn't really have to make it a summit, we could have gotten everything at a lower level.
God almighty.
You know, which is really malicious.
Yeah, yeah.
One could conceivably make that argument with the Russians, but the only level you can deal with the Chinese is at the top level.
Of course, there are no lower levels at which we have communications.
They well know that.
There is no lower level.
Yeah, that's right, that's right.
Oh, well, the Times has gone so far, Henry, they're really using...
I mean, as far as even among sensible people, they're losing their credibility.
Oh, yeah.
God almighty, the Times and the Post both, because they just...
Although I think the Post is worse than the Times.
Yeah, I agree, I agree.
But what I mean is they both are very, very bad in terms of the...
The Los Angeles Times seems to be going the other way right now.
Is it?
Yeah.
A little better?
Yes.
In fact, I was wondering whether while I'm out there I ought to do a meeting with them.
Well.
I am meeting with the conservatives on Wednesday.
That's the important one at that point.
They've got a really all-star turnout.
They will have.
That's good.
That's good.
And, uh,
I'm not sure.
No, I wouldn't do the Los Angeles Times this time.
I'd wait.
Okay.
You've done them every time, and I think they shouldn't get the feeling that they're totally there.
Unless it just happens to fit in without too much trouble.
I have no objection to it.
Well, I haven't even made a move.
Yeah.
Generally speaking, we've got to consider that we're coming up pretty well here in view of the fact that, you know, you take both India, Pakistan, and naturally the bombing bit, that naturally they're going to seize on that because they
Maybe they're pretty goddamn desperate because of the success that we've had, you know, the whole man of the year stuff and so forth just drives them right up the wall.
But they cannot describe on India-Pakistan just what it is.
We have lost.
I know, I know.
While if we had gone their route, we would have lost the China option.
We haven't lost India.
Oh, hell no.
There's nothing to lose anyway.
And our relations on all the essential items aren't any worse than they've ever been.
Oh, no, they still want to have aid.
Well, the privilege of giving aid isn't the purpose of foreign policy anyway if one never gets any support.
That's the damn truth.
It's the damn truth.
We shouldn't be on our hands and knees saying, please let us aid you.
That's...
They desperately want us.
That's all there is to it.
They need some balance.
I think you have every reason and right to be confident and aggressive.
I mean aggressive in substance.
You're never in manner.
Oh, of course, of course.
I'm not going to take anything from it.
Not at all.
I'm just picking these little ones out so that we've got to know how to slip off of them without getting caught, you know, because you've got in, I mean, the rather CBS crowd are the most vicious, you know, and they're...
They're always there, even worse than NBC.
He's one of the better ones of them, though.
You think he is?
Yes, I think he's basically a fair man.
He's not very bright.
Well, we'll see.
I don't care whether fair or not, but he will have to, in order to imp up to his colleagues, he's got to take a rough line, and that's perfect.
But the way he operates, I watched him, I mean, having read the news numbers, he picks little things out.
That's right.
So basically that's why I'm studying these little angles that he might be seizing upon so that he doesn't come unawares.
But one of the great assets you have is that you can fit them into a big scheme.
And the thing I think that will impress the average listener is your overall grasp of the foreign policy strategy.
Yeah.
Okay.
Okay.
Fine, Henry.
Well, I'll be watching.
Fine.
Bye.
We'll see you later.
NARA Description
On January 2, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 3:40 pm to 3:50 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 017-146 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 17-146
Date: January 2, 1972
Time: 3:40 pm - 3:50 pm
Location: White House Telephone
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.
[See Conversation No. 311-46]
Kissinger's note sent over by Patrick J. Buchanan
Weekend News Summary
-Washington Star's article of US's bombing of North Vietnam
-Effect on Laos
-Prisoners of War [POW] wives
-Effect on their husbands
-Objection to bombing
-India-Pakistan conflict
-Heavy press coverage
Laos operation
-New divisions
-Duration
-Provocation
POW wives
-US policy
-Every proposal turned down by the North Vietnamese
-Getting POWs back
-Deadline for US withdrawal from Vietnam
-North Vietnamese negotiators
-US aid
-Cutoff
-Political structures of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
-Deadline for US withdrawal
-congress
-North Vietnamese negotiator's response
-US proposals consistently turned down
Newspapers
-John B. Connally
-Foreign economic policy
-Duration of story
-Connally
-Year-end summaries
-News items not mentioned
-Moscow summit
-Berlin
-Accidental war
-Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
-New York Times
-People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Editorial
-US dealings
-US
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-New York Times and Washington Post
-Credibility problems
-Los Angeles Times
-Improvement [?]
Kissinger's schedule
-Kissinger to meet with conservatives in California
-Kissinger's interviews with Los Angeles Times
India-Pakistan
US bombing of Vietnam
Man of the Year
-Time magazine
India-Pakistan
-US policy
-PRC
-US relations with India
-Aid
President's interview with Dan Rather
-President's style and ability
-Aggressiveness
-Rather and Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS]
-National Broadcasting Company [NBC]
-Rather
-President's knowledge of foreign policyAlso recorded on January 2, 1972
- 017-144 3:30 PM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone from 3:30 pm to 3:36 pm.
- 311-044 3:30 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 3:30 pm to 3:36 pm.
- 017-145 3:36 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:36 pm and 3:40 pm.
- 311-045 3:36 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:36 pm and 3:40 pm.
- 311-046 3:40 PM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 3:40 pm to 3:50 pm.
- 017-147 3:50 PM · 25 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:50 pm and 3:58 pm.
- 311-047 3:50 PM · 33 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:50 pm and 3:58 pm.
- 017-148 3:58 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone from 3:58 pm to 4:07 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 017-146, January 2, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/017-146 (accessed October 12, 2026).