On January 2, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 6:35 pm to 6:44 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 017-150 of the White House Tapes.
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Hello.
Dr. Kissinger, Mr. President.
There you are.
Hello.
Hello, Henry.
Mr. President.
I just got a note from Buchanan which bore out my hunch on that POW thing.
Mike Wallace had POW wives on his program 60 Minutes tonight, most of whom have turned against the administration.
I don't know what he means by that.
I have trouble hearing.
Yeah.
He had POW wives, Mike Wallace.
Oh, on 60 Minutes?
Yeah, 60 Minutes.
And the memorandum says, most of whom have turned against the administration.
Most of them, even former supporters, expressed doubts that the president is leveling with them, giving the whole truth.
Some expressed the thought that they had been misled by promises of an end to the war and talk about negotiations going on.
Wallace closed the show.
negative from our standpoint by asking if there was any question these women would like rather to put to the president tonight.
One of them said, we are expecting that the president and hope that the president on his trip to Moscow and Peking will raise this as the first question and will bring back some hope.
If he does not, she will abandon hope and go to work for a Democrat, anyone who will give a deadline.
So that was the, that you see is the hunch that I had that they were working on something through some, because we also had a report from the Pentagon that they have
CBS checked about a letter they had received from somebody and they were checking him out to be sure he was a POW.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Now, I can't tell how far the, I mean, how many they had and all that sort of thing.
We know there is a group that are dissidents and that they aren't representative of all.
But have you had any report on this thing yourself?
No, I haven't, Mr. President, but that wouldn't prove anything.
Yeah, because you'd have...
I just wouldn't be getting it that quick.
You wouldn't get it from Hughes, probably.
Well, anyway, it doesn't affect... No, I haven't had any report from the POW wife.
It may affect whether we go with that speech a little earlier after all.
Well, it could, yes, because the...
because that deals with that.
I mean, it will at least deal with the deadline.
Well, it will put the deadline question to rest completely, and it will make clear that we have been negotiating actively.
Yeah, well, if we can...
I mean, you can certainly say that you will... that you can certainly make a very strong statement about your negotiations.
Yes, that we have negotiated it, and...
In many forums.
Many forums, fine.
But your hunch on these things is, unfortunately, almost always right.
Now, with regard to the situation on the China and Moscow thing, I suppose there's no harm in saying...
There's no harm in saying this will be one of the first things I will raise.
Yes, and indicate that, for example, we have expressed interest in the ones that are in China already.
And that would in fact be a context in which you could mention that, of course, it has been raised in every conversation previously with respect also to the prisoners held by the Chinese.
Yep, that's right.
Well, I don't know how much they can...
how much the UW people can get off between now and the speech period.
What is the present date we have on that?
The present date, the ideal date if we could do it, would be the 13th for the troops and say the 24th or 25th for the others.
Yeah.
That may be a little late now.
You see, what I mean is that you could have quite a build-up, Henry, for particularly using these people as the pawns.
That's what this is all about, you know, just using them as pawns, the networks, and, of course, the politicians who get on it, too.
And then the deadline thing will run in there, and we appear to... No, I can see that, and we can...
Well, we will see tomorrow or the next day what the response in Saigon is.
I mean, we are going as if you were going to do it next week.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Mm-hmm.
Well, and then we have to see whether they'll go along with it.
Right.
That's right.
Well, if they won't go along with that phase of it, we'll just go with whatever phase of it we can.
That's right.
We don't have to put out the whole damn thing.
If Q says no go, I will put out the rest of it.
Right.
That's my feeling.
We can make up our mind as late as the middle of this week, in fact, as late as the end of this week, in which order we are going to do these things.
Mm-hmm.
I mean, we don't have to make that decision tonight.
No, no.
I'm just thinking of it in the context of the response.
That's all as to how I want to position the thing.
Right.
But in the meantime, we'll simply say we've been doing everything and we have some, as a matter of
As the record will clearly show, I better just say something like that.
That's right.
We've got to put that much out.
We don't need to worry, Henry, about the North Vietnamese getting sensitive about channels being exposed and all that bullshit.
I mean, they haven't been sensitive about our side.
No, I wouldn't be worried about that.
No, no.
So we can... No, I wouldn't have any worry about saying, as the record will plainly show.
Yep.
Well, you can check with Hughes' people tomorrow to see to what extent they're going to position these people and to what extent CBS was working on a few, how representative they were and so forth.
Would you do that?
As a matter of fact, you might check with him now and call me back.
Okay, fine.