Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Secret negotiations

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

Hi, Henry.

Are you where you can talk?

Yeah, yeah, just if you can, please.

I just wanted to tell you, I worked on the draft in Florida, and on the way back, and I have, Rose is going to type up a new draft in the morning.

She'll probably have it, well, she'll have it maybe by 10 or 11 o'clock, I suppose.

And there are a couple of points that I've asked, that I've heard about.

Just two things that I wanted to...

check your feelings on.

One is the concern that I have that I'm just trying to think of the questions that be raised by others.

I suppose one, which has to be really handled very directly, is that the average person says, well, what the hell is all of this secrecy about?

And, of course, so I have made a little note to Sapphire and we're giving him, telling him to go back to my original very rough notes and just strengthen that part, indicating why we had secret negotiations in the first place.

Let me say that I think it's done the way it's in the present draft.

It's very, very understandable to any sophisticated person, like they all know what open covenants openly agreed that was

But that's World War I and Wilsonian, and the average guy doesn't know what the hell you're talking about.

Yeah.

That's right.

Yeah.

That's right.

Yeah.

Well, that particular point, as I said there, it might be that that really ought to come out.

The way I had it in mind was really to be quite direct and say that

our study of the situation indicates that wars usually are ended by, more often than not, by negotiations which take place in secret as well as in public channels.

And this was true in World War I, it was true in World War II, it was true in Korea.

And we felt that we

should of course negotiate in public and were negotiating in good faith but that we should explore we had to explore also every possibility of finding a way to end it in another channel through a secret negotiation so we participated on both tracks what's that well I think we ought to answer it though before they these idiots on the other side raise it you know

you see my point we can assume Henry that they're going to be pretty flabbergasted by this don't you think so maybe maybe but so you don't reveal them and they've been going on for three years that's the whole point I think we've got a pretty good case there we've been

That's right.

Right.

But I do think that to the average American, we've got to say, look, we've been negotiating in secret for this reason, and now we're making it open.

I think the case for revealing them that Sapphire in his draft makes very effectively, saying that, you know, well, it's now time to lay the whole record out for everybody to see because this is a time to know.

Yeah.

well that was the way i had dictated rosary called in my own rough notes which i didn't have in the first instance and uh then bill and refining it came up with this which sounds rather clever but i don't think i think misses the mark because

Basically, the Open Covenant's opening year, we all crapped around about it, but we all know it was silly in retrospect.

Yeah.

Right, right.

I've also written in, I've also developed two very strong paragraphs indicating that we refer to, that it is, we have made a generous offer of peace.

We are ready to negotiate immediately.

if they reject negotiation, we will continue our program of ending our involvement through vehementization.

And if their answer to our peace offer is to step up their attacks as its commander-in-chief, I will direct air, et cetera, to protect our remaining forces, and so forth.

So I've got that in there.

We'll see how it looks and how it feels.

But I have a feeling that we ought to prepare the way for what is inevitable.

In other words, that we are going to have to crack them.

And that we ought to say so.

And I don't think that it will detract.

But we'll take a look.

Whether we want anything warlike in a peace speech.

Yeah.

That's correct.

Well, Hal, that's what your whole conversation with the Brennan very well illustrated.

The other point is that I think I've strengthened the conclusion, too.

I didn't know that it was a little weak.

But I went at it a bit.

But we'll have plenty of time on that tomorrow.

But I think that the thing that

what we really want to do here is to try to answer the various things in advance.

And the only reason you see that I think the secret stuff is the reason that we should say, look, we've negotiated in secret and take a very positive line is that I wouldn't do it except for the fact that the public is so goddamn confused because of the Anderson papers and the Pentagon papers, see?

we have to realize that we're talking in that climate so the average so our some of our critics might just distort the whole damn thing beyond belief and say well what the hell is this see what might see my point well yeah that's why we did it in y yeah well when you

If you will, before Rose gets to him with Myra, I as much as tell him to take it out or tell him that I'm not too keen on it, but you might give him a call, a Sapphire call, 8.30 in the morning or so before he gets to work and say, look, that thing just doesn't, that we ought to make that stronger and that I've dictated some stuff that he ought to be thinking about how to state it more frontally.

Because I don't think, Henry, we ought to be in a position of saying that we ought to negotiate in public

sure sure well these things we can work out come on right but we'll do it we'll take a look also at the other now with regard to the with regard to the warning deal uh the only reason that i i feel and we can think this over too that it ought to go in is that uh that uh

I think the American public also, I've got the warning in and the connotation also, POWs.

I say it in effect that as long as they continue their attacks, as long as they, while we are withdrawing, as long as they hold POWs, that we will continue our attack.

You know what I mean.

Just lay it right out there for people to see.

There's no use to leave any illusions, is there?

on that point yeah well we'll see i mean we can well i when i say it's against military installations the way i put it so that kind of stuff that's what i mean oh i'd have it very carefully worded but well

well we've always got a play to them too and if we just make a totally peacenik speech that look we have offered everything and now please won't you accept without indic see without it you see that's what the thing that concerned me about him the reason i felt that i ought that we ought to consider putting him is that as i read it and i said try to sit back as a critic i thought well what the hell we're just simply saying that we've been begging for peace and we're begging again you see my point and and and i don't want to be in that position

I think we've got to know that we can go a different course as well as they can.

You know, it's interesting to me that the, Bob, I was telling you that the Washington Post had some editorial, of course, which we'll blast right out of the water with this, that why haven't we negotiated and offered a deadline for prisoners and all that sort of thing.

This really kills them on that stuff, doesn't it?

I know because we have ceasefire in there, but let me tell you, nobody can object to the ceasefire.

No, hell no.

And we'll just frontally hit that and say, yes, we've offered prisoners for deadline and ceasefire.

And they say, well, but you just should offer prisoners for deadline in there.

That is a direct route.

But I think it's interesting that they...

Yeah, they've turned down prisoners for deadline and ceasefire, haven't they?

Alone, yeah.

Sure, sure.

In other words, they say overthrow the government.

But they've, in fact, done the same with them as they've done to us.

But isn't it something, though, that our goddamn press, after they've turned it down, will act as if it still hasn't been offered, you know?

It's the same thing as I pointed out in my interview with Rather.

I said, well, it's a moot question.

They've already turned it down.

And it's true.

Now, well, anyway, this will... That's right.

Well, we have a particular, with the other thing coming up, too, as I told you, the other thing, though, that will be coming up is that amendments to every damn bill

We'll have, you know, Manfield amendments and this and that.

Now, damn it, let's let them put in their amendments.

But we have a position from which our people can fight.

Isn't that really what it gets down to?

Oh, yes, we're going to have, well, we're going to have a legislative leaders meeting, a Republican legislators meeting, meeting Wednesday morning.

And I think you should just lay the hook right to them.

so that they have the arguments.

I'm going to invite a few extras like Goldwater in so that we can have some of our hawks.

God damn it, our hawks have got to get up and start flipping around a little here, too.

The other thing is, let's see, one other point I had here.

Well, most of it is self-explanatory, but the

The whole thrust of this must be one that is strong and not totally defensive.

That's my feeling, you see.

And that's what concerned me.

I thought we went a little overboard on the draft I saw.

I may be wrong.

I may be wrong, Chris.

Yeah, you know, Altamont told me that.

He said, now some of the wise guys are saying we're withdrawing too fast.

Who is saying that?

Henry, the whole point is this.

We have to realize that deep down, this is something that we can never say publicly, but deep down, you know the problem here.

Well, it's not only that they want to lose, but the reason they want to lose is that this is the fundamental struggle that's been going on since the Spanish Civil War.

It's the left versus the right.

In other words, they want the left to win and the right to lose.

Now, God damn it, that's what this is all about.

They're always, they're always for the goddamn communists.

Now, you know that, huh?

I know, I know.

That's right.

But basically, when you come down to it, let me say that if we were fighting a fascist government here, that's right.

But because it's a communist government, believe me, it's the left-right thing.

We must not overlook this.

This doesn't mean they're communists, but the liberals are blind on the left.

They're blind to the danger on the left.

They always have been.

I know them.

I know the communist elite you can deal with.

What's an interesting thing, it must drive the Salisbury types.

He's not a bad guy himself.

He's

Yeah, yeah.

But what I was going to say is the thing is that it must drive them up the damn wall that here the Russians are dealing with us as well as the Chinese.

Doesn't that kill them?

Well, I will be, as you know, we've got somebody from the United Nations coming in tomorrow, and we'll take him out, and I have the budget at 10 in the morning.

Anyway, after Waldheim, Sapphire, we should have another draft, and we'll take a look.

And strengthening that thing is probably a good idea.

Well, coming to think of it, it's worth putting in for that.

I don't think we're going to lose anybody that we would not have lost already by threatening to continue to bomb.

Well, you know what might just turn around?

They have, I think, constantly underestimated the South Vietnamese.

And, you know, they've constantly underestimated what Vietnamization would do.

Everybody, including, and incidentally, so have many of our people.

The damn South Vietnamese are stronger than they think.

I'm just confident of that.

And if we're wrong on that, then we deserve to lose.

Yeah.

But for Christ's sake, if the South Vietnamese with American air power can't do well against the North Vietnamese who have no air power, then what the hell, they can't ever hold it.

That's right.

Well, okay.

We'll see you tomorrow.

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Secret negotiations

AI Summary

Audio

Transcript (AI-generated)

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on January 24, 1972

Cite this conversation