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Conversation 019-065

TapeTape 19StartTuesday, January 25, 1972 at 8:55 PMEndTuesday, January 25, 1972 at 10:03 PMParticipantsKissinger, Henry A.;  Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AudioNARA Description

On January 25, 1972, Henry A. Kissinger and Anatoliy F. Dobrynin talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:55 pm and 10:03 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 019-065 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 19-65

Date: January 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 8:55 pm and 10:03 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin.

     Vietnam
          -Negotiations
               -Tone
          -Kissinger’s schedule
               -Meeting with the President
          -Possible resolution of conflict
               -Possible military outcome
               -Kissinger's conversation with the President
                      -Possible Moscow meeting
               -Dobrynin’s telegram
          -Negotiations
               -Publicity
                      -Advantage
          -Possible North Vietnamese actions
               -Possible US response
          -US negotiations with North Vietnam

     Kissinger's schedule
          -Dobrynin’s conversation with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

     Negotiations
         -Dobynin’s possible transmittal of message
                -Dobrynin’s schedule
         -North Vietnam

     Kissinger’s schedule

     Negotiations
         -North Vietnam
                -Possible military action
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Ambassador De Bruyne.
There you are.
Hello.
Hello, Kennedy.
Anatole, how are you?
Thank you.
How are you?
Okay.
I called you to...
I told you to tell you that if there is any way you can get to your allies, then make clear to them
that now they can, of course, start raving about us.
Or they can try to make a...
They can start raging and use their usual adjectives.
And that would be a very unhelpful approach.
I'm here with the president, so in the residence.
On the other hand, we are willing, if there's any chance at all of a constructive outcome, to meet with them again and to bring this board to a reasonable conclusion
but they cannot tempt us into a military, they cannot force us into a military outcome or there will be very serious consequences.
I beg your pardon?
Well, I said if they try to force a military outcome, there can only be very serious consequences.
But I want you to know
that if they behave in a reasonable manner, we are prepared to meet them in the spirit which I described to you.
And the president has again asked me to say that if your government thought that a meeting in Moscow would speed things up, I remain ready to do that.
So...
Very well.
Now, two top men are out of country, but maybe they already did, but I am 100% sure that they were prepared for that.
But now, I don't know really.
It sounds that even without waiting for their response, which I hope to get, I really certainly keep hope to get it within a week.
But now it sounds rather, for us, this might not be accurate.
I expect to do.
Sending this proposal, sending everything to the public, it's a bit complicated.
Well, it makes it complicated, but on the other hand, making the proposal public also has the advantage that it commits
us and the Saigon government to a certain outcome.
Yes, but our experience in this has just not been good enough.
And what they have to understand is that we are very serious, we are prepared to be very generous,
and that we would like to proceed in the spirit with which we talk because we don't want to be in a position where they launch an offensive and we then react to their offensive without having made it clear and because we will certainly in case of an offensive have to take drastic measures
But we certainly want to proceed in the most conciliatory spirit possible.
And if you and I can have lunch on Friday, I know you asked, hey, Friday would be good for me.
Well, let's do it Friday over here.
One o'clock.
But if you could transmit this, and if you found some means of getting it to them before they do something irreparable, it would be helpful.
Well, it's up to you.
Well, it is that, you know, that's anything that...
But it would be important that they don't breed themselves into a profession that
that would have consequences we'll all regret.
But they have given us no choice.
They have given us no choice.
It's simply not proper, simply not to respond to a serious proposal transmitted
through another government and then separately at their own request.
Well, that's, you know, Anatole, that's their problem.
And we are perfectly willing to have another confidential channel or to do it in other channels.
But that's entirely up to them.
We have kept every secret where there was any prospect of a constructive outcome.
Exactly.
Well, let's see.
That is the reason, that is the exact reason.
Good.
I see you Friday at 1 on the show.
Good.
Good.
And the President found our talks on Friday very constructive.
Good.
Well, that is the problem that occurs
When one side tries to impose a military solution, if they hadn't done that, we would have had more time.
Within the next two or three weeks, yes.
And we don't want...
It isn't so much a question of how dangerous it is, it's a question of if there's a major offensive in two or three weeks, we cannot then respond with a peace proposal.
Exactly.
Good.
Okay.
Bye.
Right.
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