Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 19 › Conversation 019-119
Nixon phone call with Connally on International monetary policy
Wednesday, January 26, 1972 · 4:36 PM–4:42 PM ET · White House Telephone · 7 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally discussed strategic U.S. positions regarding international monetary policy, specifically maintaining firm control over dollar convertibility despite dissent from Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns. They coordinated plans to exert economic pressure on Canada in trade negotiations to signal strength to Japan and Europe, with Nixon suggesting he might postpone a meeting with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to show dissatisfaction. Additionally, Connally briefed the President on India's financial aid to Bangladesh, prompting a plan to challenge National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on U.S. foreign aid priorities during their next meeting.
- International monetary policy
- US-Canada trade relations
- Dollar convertibility
- Foreign aid
- India-Bangladesh relations
- Arthur F. Burns
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data
· Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).
Each line starts with a timestamp button; press it to play the audio from that point.
Hello.
Secretary Connolly, sir.
Hello.
Hi.
Yes, sir.
I know you're busy.
I just wanted to tell you that I totally...
support the proposition on the convertibility thing.
I've talked to George Schultz, and Stein is lined up if there's any question about it, but Arthur let the cat out of the bag when he said he was talking about convertibility.
That's right.
And so what we do about it, John, I don't know, but I just thought you should know that we're going to stand absolutely firm
If I'm ever asked about it, or if you think I can say something, I'll say something.
All right.
Because, God damn it, we're just not going to allow it.
I don't think it's in much point.
I put it off.
They had a meeting today, and I just told them to, you know, just delay and talk and be nice and talk about something else and say, well, let's consider other possibilities.
Right.
I told them just keep talking, but it gives you nothing.
Yeah.
Now, on the Canadian side, my view is that, and there's no hurry on this, but...
You might, as you say, talk to Henry tomorrow and just say, now look here, we've got to do these tough things.
Because I have another reason for doing it.
I think that doing something to Canada may be...
an indication to the Japanese and the Europeans and other places that we're not going to be pushed around.
This is why it's important.
Otherwise, see, we don't have that much to talk to them about.
Right.
And we don't need them to give us that much, but they ought to do something.
Right.
But the problem is, if they don't do anything, that that's going to be a clear signal.
because they did absolutely nothing on the alignment, you see.
They floated.
They made no contribution.
Now if they don't do anything on trade, it's just going to be a clear indication to the rest of the world that they can just stand firm.
And they're our biggest customer.
That's right.
Okay.
Well, that's my feeling.
And now what is involved here, John, is that
I will, and I'm prepared to use the bullet, too.
What I'll do is to just screw around on the visit to Trudeau and say, gee, I'm so tied up getting prepared for Russia, I can't do it right now.
Just put it off.
Don't you agree?
That's great.
Because you see, once we do these things, as I pointed out, there'll be the damned Canadians, some of those people, they'll stir up a...
tickets and this and that, and frankly, I'm just not going to tolerate that from these people.
Well, we don't have to do anything right now except we'll be up testifying probably within the next two weeks.
And I'll play it cool, of course, and just say, oh, we haven't worked out an agreement with Canada.
But at the same time, I want you to know what the situation was and what it's developing into.
We're going to have a tough year.
We've got lots of trading with these people.
Right.
On the gold thing, you're in charge of that, and you just do what you think is on the timing.
I know the game we're playing, and as I understand it, you're going to push the trade thing forward.
I mean, I'm sorry, not the trade thing, but the gold thing.
We're going to go on just really as early as we can.
We were delaying maybe a week on these trade things just to get them over with.
We're going on with the gold thing.
But, you know, he just pontificates every now and then and acts as if he's the only one that's ever thought of these things.
Yeah, that ever thought of them or that's looking after the United States interest.
Well, hell, every now and then I just get
Every now and then some of the rest of us look it through.
Well, I just wanted you to know that George and I had a talk, and we've got Stein, George, and naturally we're all lined up together, John.
But with Arthur, we just got to, I don't know.
We just play it, and it's tough because he does talk.
He talks to the central backers.
Also, that undercuts you.
Now, the other point that George made to me, which I think is somewhat reassuring,
George says, as long as we do not have convertibility, he says, the Europeans can't do all that much to us.
Because he says, when we had convertibility, then they had a right to lecture us about what we ought to do.
But with convertibility...
without convertibility, that that is not the case and that we just shouldn't get all that excited about the fact that they worry about our budget.
Is that your view?
That's exactly right.
They can't do one cockeyed thing.
They'll say, oh, well, we've got to maintain our relations.
We've asked them to hold dollars.
I said, no, we didn't ask them to hold dollars.
They've held dollars.
It's been in their interest to hold dollars.
That's right.
And I said, hell with them.
I'm not worried about them.
I'm worried about us.
That's right.
And, um,
No, you go through the same old thing again.
That's right.
Well, we're doing fine on it.
And I think we should talk the fact that things are coming along.
Sure, it takes time, and the Congress has got a lot on its plate, but we're going to push the gold thing and the rest, and we're going to get our trade, and we're going to do that and make the best out of whatever we get out of it.
So I just wanted you to know that after the meeting that that's my conviction at least.
On a lighter note, when I got back to the office, I saw a little secret memorandum where they informed me, my intelligence people informed me, that India had just made a grant to Bangladesh of 13 million pounds sterling.
God, that's 30 million dollars.
30 million.
So I wrote Henry a little note.
And I said, and told him that I understood that India just made a grant of $30 million to Bangladesh.
And I said, if she's got money like this to give away, why aren't we giving aid to India?
That's great.
That's great.
Henry will come in to me tomorrow.
He'll be mortified.
And he'll say, do you think the secretary really thinks this?
And I'm going to say, he sure does.
He called me about it, Henry.
And he's enraged that you would have done this without telling him.
Okay?
Yes, sir.
That's a game I'm going to play with him, and play it right out, okay?
All right.
All right, John.
Thank you.
Hey, John.
Yes, sir.
Ryland's coming down.
You go over there today now.
Well, I can't.
I'm at the airport.
Oh.
I'm going to Richmond to make a speech tonight to the Chamber of Commerce.
Oh, well.
Oh, that's definitely there.
Great fellows.
You might...
I went down to Richmond, and I was a congressman, believe it or not, and spoke to...
I know there's a Chamber of Commerce Rotary Club, and they gave me a wonderful reception, and you just get and say that I have such fond memories of Richmond and great people and so forth.
And for Christ's sakes, don't come out for busing.
I know how strong you are for it, but don't.
All right, I will.
All right.
I will definitely come out for it.
Okay, John.
All right, thank you.
NARA Description
On January 26, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and John B. Connally talked on the telephone from 4:36 pm to 4:42 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 019-119 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 19-119
Date: January 26, 1972
Time: 4:36 pm - 4:42 pm
Location: White House Telephone
The President talked with John B. Connally.
[See Conversation No. 318-7B]
International monetary situation
-Convertibility
-The President's meeting with George P. Shultz
-Herbert Stein
-Arthur F. Burns's comments
Canada-US trade relations
-Connally’s possible conversation with Henry A. Kissinger
-Importance
-Signal to Japan, Europe
-Currency realignment
-Flotation
-The President's schedule
-Pierre E. Trudeau
-The President’s forthcoming trip to Soviet Union
-Connally’s forthcoming testimony
International monetary situation
-Convertibility
-Burns
-The President’s conversation with Shultz
-Stein
-Burns's contacts with the central banks
-The President's conversation with Shultz
-Europeans
-Convertibility
-US budget
India
-Bangladesh
-Grant
-Amount
-Connally’s note to Kissinger
-US aid to India
-The President's forthcoming meeting with Kissinger
Connally's schedule
-Dr. W. Kenneth Riland
-Richmond Chamber of Commerce
-The President’s congressional experience
-Busing issueAlso recorded on January 26, 1972
- 019-115 4:20 PM · 17 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 4:20 pm.
- 019-116 4:20 PM · 16 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz talked on the telephone from 4:20 pm to 4:21 pm.
- 019-117 4:21 PM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:21 pm and 4:23 pm.
- 318-006 4:21 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:21 pm and 4:23 pm.
- 019-118 4:23 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, George W. Romney, and George P. Shultz talked on the telephone from 4:23 pm to 4:24 pm.
- 318-007 4:23 PM · 36 min — President Richard M. Nixon, George W. Romney, George P. Shultz, John B. Connally, White House operator, Peter M. Flanigan, and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 4:23 pm to 5:01 pm.
- 019-120 4:42 PM · 4 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:42 pm and 4:47 pm.
- 019-121 4:47 PM · 39 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Peter M. Flanigan talked on the telephone from 4:47 pm to 4:48 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 019-119, January 26, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/019-119 (accessed October 12, 2026).