Conversation 019-134

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Hello.

Senator Mansfield.

Yes, Mr. President.

Mike, I just wanted to tell you that I'm very grateful for your statement that you made on our proposal the other night, and I can assure you that we'll keep

hammering away on it and do everything that we can to try to get it you know to get some progress and also i am not as pessimistic as some with regard to what can happen on it i think that what my my own judgment is that they are going to have another little pop it might be a very good pop but in in uh

February-March period.

But then at that time, they have to make a very big decision.

Are they just going to sit here and continue, or are they going to negotiate?

And it's at that time, I think, that we want to have on the table a very forthcoming offer, which they will, in good conscience, be able to accept.

So our intention is to keep it on the front burner and front and center and do just as

Well, as we possibly can.

I can assure you that it hasn't.

I know that some fellows, and I understand the politics and the rest, they seem to think that maybe we just put this out for political purposes.

No, no.

It doesn't mean anything.

But you know, you remember when we had breakfast a couple of times, I told you we were doing a few things.

And, you know, I just said, and you know that we're just doing our best.

That was all.

And maybe it's different, but it's the best we know how.

Well, I know.

It's a good best because it's under the most difficult circumstances, like you.

Right.

I don't think Hanoi has closed the door all the way.

No, sir.

That's the important part.

You see, we've got the... Now, one other thing we're doing here is this, and this was the only risk of putting this out, as I saw it, and I had a long, soul-searching talk with both Bill Rogers and Henry before on this point.

I said, well, now, if we put this out, does this mean that they will not talk secretly again?

We do not think so.

We believe that... That's one of the reasons that I have not let...

Henry, of course, he didn't ask to do it, but I've said, do not put out the whole record of the conversations.

All you can do is to put out the fact, the fact of what we offered and what they turned down, because both sides said things in those conversations that went further than this, as you might well guess, see?

And so, but we're protecting that confidentiality because in the final analysis, these kinds of things are usually, are usually, as you know,

They're settled by secret as well as public things, but there's got to be.

Remember, World War I, World War II, everything, there's always a threat.

So we've got that open.

I want a couple other things for your own information you should know.

We're in very close touch.

Now, we would deny it if it were said with the Chinese on this situation.

Oh, good.

We are in very close touch with the Russians on it.

Now, I am, of course, praying that it will not be an issue with the time.

we get toward Russia.

I am convinced that if it is, they then will move, but they have not been helpful up to this point.

But my point is, that's awful late, but I must say that on this proposal, we informed, in addition to everybody else, we informed both the Russians to bring it, of course, here.

through our channel and the Chinese through a special channel well in advance.

So we're going down that road as hard as we can, but not putting them on the public spot, because if we ever said we were doing it publicly, you know, some of our fellows, they don't know anybody, but they say, well, why don't you say you're doing something with the Chinese?

The moment you do that, they each have got to claim that we're colluding with the enemy, you know.

That's it.

No, I think you're just right.

One other brief thing.

On the 17th, and we'll be in touch with you later at this, but before we go off on the Peking thing, I'll have to leave on the 17th to be there in order to get the time clock turned around, and then we're going to stay a night in Hawaii and a night in Guam.

But on the 17th, I would like to have a bipartisan meeting

a leader's breakfast here at the White House.

That's a Wednesday the 17th, if you think relevant.

And then just to sit down and go over everything that we plan to talk about, you know what I mean, as freely as we can.

And then, of course, when we come back, we'll repeat.

So does that sound like a good proposition?

Sounds good.

And I'm leaving early.

Well, the reason I am is that we sent the advance parties over.

It's a very interesting thing.

And there are 24 people that went.

18 got sick.

Now, they were sick from fatigue and hours and so forth, but they all recommended to be sure to spend, in other words, not to just go all out.

They said, you've got to be there in shape for these talks because the talks are interminable, apparently.

Oh, yes.

They drag them out in the morning.

They go out in directions I know are that way.

So they thought that I'd better go to Hawaii first, and I'm going to go there and spend the whole day and the night.

Good.

then to Guam a whole day and a night, and then fly over to Peking the next day, hoping to be in reasonably, because the talk's gone for four days.

That's the real energy.

After that, I've got to visit these other two cities.

Now, the other thing I want you to note, too, is that I'm going to take up directly with them, if you'd like to work with them.

The thing we've talked about before, I think that...

that whenever your schedule will permit, that I think that we should, I would say that we ought to have a top person.

And I'm going to suggest that you would like to go and that you stop.

They aren't going to take numbers.

And I'm going to ask them about that now.

I mean, put it to them directly.

We think they will be very, very receptive to the idea.

So we'll throw that in if you have no objection.

I certainly do not, Mr. President.

Yeah, because I know you've always wanted to go.

So have I. Yeah.

Okay.

Fine, Mike.

Thank you.

Okay, Mr. President.

Thank you.

Bye.