Conversation 020-003

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I just wanted to tell you that I have noted, was noting your comments on that

very difficult problem we've got and that I just wanted to give you my assurance that my of my commitment to the welfare reform and to ask your advice on one point I know the budget problem concerns you as it does me I know also that from a practical standpoint we've got the problem of Russell Russell Long and of course on the Republican side quite a few there with Bennett and the rest yes sir

What I was going to suggest, if you think well of it, is, and perhaps we'd want to wait a few days to set this up, because you have to broker it with the others.

It seemed to me that if Russell Bennett...

you and I could sit down and have a talk, that possibly we could work out maybe a common ground.

If not, at least some way to get some decision.

Now, I'd like to ask you what your suggestion is.

Well, Mr. President, my feeling is that you're not going to be able to get a common ground in the Finance Committee.

I think the Finance Committee's attitude is a very punitive one to even go retrogress from the present welfare system, as I smell this thing.

Now, I think it's going to be impossible.

I think Senator Bennett, out of loyalty to you, will go along with whatever you want, but I don't think he can influence the other Republicans on the committee.

I don't think that you could take men like Talmadge, Byrd, and influence them.

They're both on finance, too, of course.

They're on finance, too.

Now, the problem, as I have seen, and from my experience, and I talked to Secretary Richardson this morning, and I said, this is something Republicans should understand because, and I said, I'm just as guilty as anybody that I have come to the conclusion that no great social program should ever be imposed upon the American people in its entirety at a multi-billion dollar cost.

without pre-testing.

I said if...

I saw your speech on that about last week.

Medicare and Medicaid, if we had tested it out, the country would be better off.

Particularly Medicaid.

Medicaid.

Which, of course, I remember that.

And health insurance.

Now, I think the problem you've got, and that, frankly, that I think, if you would consider it, it would almost break the back and we could get a decent one out.

If I say what sticks in everybody's craw...

your most imaginative program, which is taking the working poor, 11 million of them, at a cost of, I think you have 5.5 billion.

I think it's higher, really.

I have said 6 billion more than you in my proposals.

With the budget being what it is, and the resentment of adding 11 more million people on the rolls, I think that will sink everything.

Now, the committee today would unanimously say,

vote to pilot this out.

Now, your present program, Mr. President, doesn't go into effect until January 1, 1974.

In your present budget for 1973, you have provided $450 million for welfare reform.

I told Eliot,

As far as I was concerned, I would give him a blank check.

Spend that any way you want.

$450 million and pilot it out substantially so he can get some results back and have the confidence in the country.

He can try it out in urban areas.

He can take a state.

He can try it out in rural areas.

He can try it working with private industry and the public service sector.

And you would save all that money, and then you would feel that you've tried out

a scheme that we don't know what's going to happen with it.

Now, this is the only point that I think you could get unanimity in the Finance Committee.

Now, once you broke the back on what is sticking in the craw of most of the members,

My feeling is the rest of your welfare reform, your family assistance program, which I approve with some liberalization, would then be subject to debate on the floor, and the worst you would get would be H.R.

1, as you now have it out of the House, with some possible liberalizations from me.

Now, this is my suggestion, having lived with this so long... Yeah, and fought the battle, I know.

...and fought the battle until I'm bloody from all over.

You've been bloody in battles, but that doesn't bother me.

Sure.

But I'm trying to give you my appraisal for living with this so long, Mr. President.

Right.

Well, your view is that then a...

Well, let me say this.

If you remove it in that direction, that's a direction that probably possibly could be discussed with Long and Bennett.

What I'm trying to think of, Abe, is this.

It seems to me that for us to just – and I haven't – Elliot was in today on the cancer thing, but we didn't get to discuss this –

It seems to me that for us to just run into a bitter confrontation in the committee will likely sink it again.

It will.

And if we can work something out, I don't know, but what you have just described, do you think that has a possibility in the committee?

Yes, my feeling is this is what would happen.

If we could agree to pilot out the working poor, which you could get unanimity, I don't think you can get unanimity.

unanimity between wallace russell and myself but what you can get once you remove that is you will get a bill out is the bill that you will get out on hr1 will be more restrictive than the house

I would say on the floor, the worst you can get is H.R.

1 on the House.

You might get some liberalization from some of my amendments, but you would get a program.

My feeling is that if you put in this 11 million working poor, you won't get anything.

At $5.5 billion, you won't get anything.

Now, that's my practical suggestion, Mr. President.

Let me ask you this.

Because he has to wheel a lot of the congressional types and the rest, I was wondering if you would be willing to talk to John Ehrlichman and go over this whole strategy with him.

He was in this morning right after he saw Elliott when I was meeting these other people.

And

then let's see what the situation is.

I, of course, want to...

I have to maintain my present position because I'm supporting... As you know, you've been on the opposite side yourself as a secretary.

So we'll support our position at this point.

But on the other hand, when I read your speech...

I put a little note in my news summary and I said, well, since what's happened here, if Ribicoff has changed, what's that do to the rest of the thing?

So I'm glad we've had this talk.

And what I will do is this.

I will...

I'll have John.

He'll give you a ring and drop down to see you.

Maybe Elliot will come with him.

All right.

And then I would... And then you recommend... Yeah, go ahead.

Then, of course, once I talk to them, then you can get Russell and Bennett, myself.

They can give you an appraisal different than mine.

I think your main thing is to get that on the floor, let it be debated out what passes will pass,

But I think that if you took this proposal of piloting out the welfare poor substantially, you would, forgetting the editorial writers, and I've just been home in Connecticut, and of course, as you know, the atmosphere in Washington has nothing to do with the atmosphere out in the country.

That's right.

And everybody likes the idea of why don't you try something out before... Before spending all the money.

Before committing all the money.

Right.

All right.

Well, he'll be in touch with you, Abe, and give him your best views.

I will, Mr. President.

And then tell him what you think about this meeting thing.

And then once it's worked out, then before we make a final decision, I would like to have a talk with you, in other words, and we'll bring the others in if they think it's a good idea.

All right, Mr. President.

Thank you.

You're welcome.

Bye.