Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 20 › Conversation 020-037
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Edmund Muskie
Wednesday, February 2, 1972 · 7:43 PM–7:52 PM ET · White House Telephone · 8 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed a coordinated public relations strategy to counter recent criticism from Senator Edmund Muskie regarding the administration's Vietnam policy. The two agreed to maintain a firm, unified stance through rebuttals from White House staff and congressional allies while dismissing the civil conflict in Northern Ireland as an internal matter. Furthermore, they reviewed military contingency plans for Vietnam, with Nixon directing the immediate deployment of air and naval assets to South Vietnam to prepare for a potential North Vietnamese offensive.
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Hello.
Hello, Henry.
I wonder if you have any ideas about the Irish thing as to whether we ought to... You notice they burned down the embassy on top of the day.
I would stay out of it.
That's my feeling, too.
I really think...
It's the agony of Ireland and England that's gone on for 500 years, and I don't think we'll do a goddamn thing.
You'll infuriate the British.
I mean, you'll pay a price with the British beyond anything.
The point is, of course, all the Irish fanatics here in this country.
You couldn't say enough about it by the Irish here.
Just stay out of it.
Internal problem.
Right.
That's my feeling.
Okay, what did you think of...
On the muskie thing, Ziegler gave him a little shot.
Is he good for him?
What's he going to say?
Actually, the other side, you know, made a little switch today.
They didn't make an acceptable cut.
I know.
This is a terrible, terrible thing this man has done, you know.
Good God, he's a candidate for president.
He tells the enemy, in effect, wait for me, and you'll get a better deal.
If I had done that, the New York Times, the Washington Post would have ridden me out on a goddamn rail.
And it's a total distortion of our position, as well as everything else.
Yeah.
I hope that some of the boys in Congress said a few things.
I think the Congress, we ought to get some shot in Congress.
Well, they've done it, but nobody carried it, you see, because that's the problem.
And Bob tells me that Buchanan has written something for Rogers.
Yes, which he will do tomorrow, I hope.
Which I think maybe he should tomorrow, in the event this story, depends on how big this story plays.
I think Raj should do it anyway.
Yeah.
So that he's positioned.
Right.
That's right.
And also so that the other... That's right.
We should be positioned.
Goddamn it.
We can't have State Department going running off on this goddamn thing.
That's right.
And I think we should have... One of the reasons we get attacked so much is because it's too safe to attack us.
There's enough people hitting back.
Well, that's why I, you know, got Haldeman and Ziegler over and got the Ziegler line out.
And I said...
And I dictated, you know, the whole thing for Buchanan.
I dictated the eight points.
I said, now, God damn it, take them all.
So we'll get something out.
But the point is that with all of the things that are plus with what we're doing, good heavens, the support that we have, Manfield withdrawing his amendment, for Christ's sake, this is the time to be strong and not to back away.
If he had...
It serves no conceivable purpose.
Of course, I think he's hurting himself.
Well, we never, we always assume that, you know, like, but we never know.
I mean, what is it, I mean, first of all, his statement about this is just totally wrong.
Sure.
But secondly, even if it were, before the other side had gladly turned it down, for him to turn it down and make arguments the other side had made is an outrage.
Correct.
But it shows how weak and foolish he is.
Well, in the morning, I told you, 8 o'clock, and we'll put you on very soon.
Because he has said, not just because of our offer, but that's one of the reasons, but for that and other reasons, he's not resubmitting the amendment.
Well, that's all right.
We won't mention that.
We'll just let that go.
Right, right, right.
Okay.
Tomorrow we'll see Keating and Bucker, right?
Right.
Now, I talked to Keating today, and I gave him a rather full picture of some of the moves we had made so that he's not sniping at us.
I also told him if I talk to Jan, I'll send him either a back channel or a letter.
Now, you might have confirmed this to him that we'll be in touch directly.
He's been hacked on, as they say, to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee, and he will.
If you could give him a word that he really should protect the credibility of the White House, it would help before we get the standards and papers.
Right.
Because if we are attacked, we have to respond with things that will hurt our relations with India.
And that he'll understand.
Oh, yes.
Okay.
But he's in a pretty, he's in a friendly mood.
He's a good man.
He's for us, you know, politically.
And I called Nelson, and Nelson's going to give him a little help.
Good.
So he'll be disposed to be... Well, in any event, I think today we've got our contingency plan well positioned.
I thought, Mr. President, your handling of the energy meeting was superb, because Moore really gave you a lousy briefing.
You think so?
Oh, yeah.
Well, I kept digging it out of him.
Well, sure.
What he said, he acted like a smart lawyer, not like a military man.
He said the right thing if you dug it out of him.
But if, say, you had been a musket and it had just gone over your head.
Well, I noticed that he had a red thing and a black thing.
And I said, all right, we have done this.
We haven't done this.
What about this?
What about that?
By the time we got through, boy, he knew what the hell he was up against.
Oh, yeah.
Well, that's the point.
And so did Laird.
Oh, Laird called up to that, you know, and asked whether you were giving him hell.
I said, no, you weren't giving him hell.
You were just wanting to make sure he understood what you wanted.
Right.
And let me say, when I look at that community plan, it's going to be tough.
It's going to be goddamn tough.
There's not going to be any complaints.
that as a result of our failure, we lost this.
Do you understand?
I think when the attack starts, Mr. President, we ought to pour everything in, every place except North Vietnam.
Exactly.
And I mean really pour it in.
That's right.
And that's why we need more forces in there.
And all these royalty rates are just average figures.
They don't help us on a one or two days' drive.
The point is, that's why we've got to get that carrier out there.
We've got to get the other planes.
I don't want that.
I hope you ordered that today.
I've already ordered that.
The carrier's got to move today.
The B-52s move today, the A-1s, the F-4s, today.
Get them all there.
That'll have a psychological effect.
And then we'll put them in South Vietnam for a couple of weeks.
And then, right after we return, we'll blast the hell out of North Vietnam.
Exactly.
Don't you agree?
Absolutely.
If they've started their offensive.
But I think we should wait now until they've started the offensive.
We can't achieve enough.
That's another thing.
I agree.
Because if you hit them first, then eventually you'll be blamed for having triggered the offensive.
I know.
We're not going to do a thing.
I understand that.
But I'd get the forces in there.
That's the reason.
Get the forces in.
It might blunt their offense.
It might take a couple of times.
That's right.
I think they're going to go through with it.
But Bunker, who you'll see in tomorrow, is really quite content, quite confident that they can handle it.
You know, I think they can, too.
I didn't want to say it there, but I have a feeling the South Vietnamese are much stronger than the North Vietnamese are realized.
Lam Son proved it.
And by God, they're going to get a hell of a shock.
But if we get the same ratio, if we can kill 20,000 North Vietnamese in just a time, then I think we'll have a negotiation.
Well, this year.
We've got to have it this spring.
Well, we had one last year.
And I still think they were thinking very seriously.
Until they sent its keys up.
Well, one thing we can be sure of, Henry, let me say, talking to our friend...
Rylan today, and I said, you know, I said, did you notice how India-Pakistan ends?
Everybody's forgotten the goddamn thing, because we've done something else.
We've kept these bastards on the, we've got them on a hot griddle, Henry.
We really have.
That's right.
There'll be a little blip again tomorrow, and then as we wait, as we wait, we ought to tell him that he ought to protect his life.
Do we see him before he testifies?
Yes.
Don't worry, I'll tell him.
Hard.
Okay.
NARA Description
On February 2, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 7:43 pm to 7:52 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 020-037 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 20-37
Date: February 2, 1972
Time: 7:43 pm - 7:52 pm
Location: White House Telephone
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.
Irish situation
-Embassy burning
-Dublin
-History of conflict
-Great Britain
-Settlement prospects
-Irish-American supporters
Edmund S. Muskie speech
-Ronald L. Ziegler rebuttal
-Melvin R. Laird
-Conversation with Laird
-Laird’s forthcoming statement
-North Vietnamese
-Impact of Muskie speech
-Media reaction
-Congressional rebuttals
-William P. Rogers
-Patrick J. Buchanan
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman’s conversation with Kissinger
-State Department role
-Need for sharp rebuttal
-Haldeman
-Ziegler
-Buchanan rebuttal
-President’s role
-Eight Points
-Support for President
-Michael J. Mansfield Amendment
-Kissinger’s critique
Kissinger briefing
-Timing
-Mansfield
-Andrei A. Gromyko
-Chou En-lai
-Mansfield amendment
Kenneth B. Keating and Ellsworth F. Bunker meeting
-Kissinger talk with Keating
-Updating of situation
-Kissinger’s possible talk with Lakshmi Kant Jha
-Backchannel or letter
-Testifying by Keating before Foreign Relations Committee
-State Department
-Jack N. Anderson papers
-US relations with India
-Charles Nelson aid
Contingency plan for Vietnam
-National Security Council [NSC] meeting
-Adm. Thomas H. Moore
-Briefing
-Muskie
-Laird role
-Need for toughness
-Military effort
-Bombing
-Extent
-North Vietnam
-Military augmentation
-Sorties
-Timing
-Carriers
-B-52’s
-A-1’s
-F-4’s
-Strategy
-South Vietnam
-Beginning of North Vietnamese offensive
-US response
-Bunker view
-South Vietnamese strength
-Lam Son
-Battlefield prospects
-Effect on negotiations
-Timing
-Senate
Public relations
-The President’s talks with Dr. W. Kenneth Riland
-India-Pakistan War
-Anderson papers
-Foreign relations committee
-Keating testifying
-Protection of White House
-Keating’s forthcoming talk with presidentAlso recorded on February 3, 1972
- 020-041 8:00 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and William P. Rogers talked on the telephone from 8:00 pm to 8:09 pm.
- 020-038 8:09 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 8:09 pm.
- 020-039 8:09 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 8:09 pm.
- 020-040 8:09 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 8:09 pm.
- 020-042 9:18 AM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:18 am and 9:52 am.
- 665-001 9:18 AM · 1 hr 32 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, unknown person(s), William P. Rogers, Stephen B. Bull, Kenneth B. Keating, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:18 am to 10:52 am.
- 020-043 9:52 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers talked on the telephone from 9:52 am to 9:55 am.
- 020-044 9:55 AM · 12 sec — the White House operator and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:55 am and 12:49 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 020-037, February 3, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/020-037 (accessed October 12, 2026).