Nixon phone call with Rogers on Northern Ireland conflict and US-UK relations

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Hello?

Mr. President, I have Secretary Rogers.

Fine.

Hi, Mr. President.

You went to another reception, huh?

Oh, yeah, the International Club.

What about the Irish?

Well, the Foreign Minister is coming to see me this morning.

The Foreign Minister of Ireland.

And the British Ambassador is in this afternoon.

And it's going to become a very important political issue here at home.

Yes.

Kennedy's trying to make a lot of it.

I know.

And...

I wanted to get your guidance on what I should say.

My own judgment is that I should say something that was really expressing our concern and indicate that we hope that discussion will be held between those that are concerned and involved to see if something can be worked out.

I talked to Cromer about it today and said we didn't want to say anything that was agreeable with them.

But I think that, from your standpoint, you should, because Jim Buckley and Kennedy and all the others are making a lot of it.

And even though it's a little embarrassing with the British, I think that... What did Crummer say to Heath?

Well, he said he understood, and I told him I'd get in touch with him in the morning.

But did you say anything to Heath on this subject?

you remember no yeah oh yes we uh of course it hadn't uh escalated at that point i said look uh that i said and in effect this is the agony of ireland england is something that we don't want to exacerbate that we just hope that we won't say anything that's going to make it more difficult for you but we hope you can work it out i just sort of left it that way i don't want to be in the i don't think we should be in the position of demagoguery

But to say, well, maybe so that we're in a position to say, well, but we're using our good offices to try to work out an amicable solution, but that we're not .

Because it is a terrible thing.

Goddamn people burning down the embassy and the rest of the Irish are wrong.

And the British have been wrong.

But I don't think they've been wrong on this, perhaps.

Historically, they've been wrong.

It's a little different now because before it was an internal matter.

Now we've got Ireland coming to us, you know, the Republic of Ireland, and the British both.

So it seems to me we have an opportunity to say a little bit more than we did before.

Before it was just a matter of Britain.

But now the Irish government is concerned, too.

What are they going to say?

Well, they want, first place, Lynch wants to come to visit you.

And I don't think you should do that.

Well, not now.

We should say, look, we're totally committed until after we get through the China trip.

We'd be glad to have him come then.

Would that be all right?

Yeah, I think that's the way to do it.

They're also going to ask us to put pressure on the British to do different things, like getting out of the Catholic areas and some other things.

And I think we have to resist that.

But on the other hand, I don't think we should remain silent.

Well, my thought was that I would, after the meeting, at 12 o'clock, go down and say a few things to the president.

Then I would use that as an opportunity to respond to some questions about Musk's speech.

That was a shock, wasn't it?

It didn't get much attention.

I was amazed.

But you know, he totally, apparently, has.

studied what we had done what he may have but he studied it and told his representative but he uh he's really giving in the real sense aid and comfort to the enemy but he's holding up the enemy look at the front-running democratic candidate i'm saying just wait we'll give you a better deal than you get now and he in effect he rejected our offer before the enemy did that's right

Well, I thought I'd do the Ireland thing as an excuse for going down and then take him on.

Right.

And on the Ireland thing, I would say, look, this is a terribly difficult thing that's been going on for many, many years, but we know there are decent men on both sides that are trying to work it out amicably.

We hope they can, and we...

We want to use our influence to the extent that it can be a way to work it out.

I don't know.

It's a tough one.

Well, I think I can tell you.

You know, one thought occurred to me, and I talked to Cromer about it today, was whether there would be any point of encouraging not publicly but privately somebody like Sir Norman Hinton Peel or Billy Graham or Admiral Coker, maybe a combination, privately to go over there to see whether there was anything they could add, help with.

And it wouldn't be identified with you, but everybody would know that probably Cook might be the best.

Being a Catholic and being reasonable, he might do it.

I think I'm back with the reason, in my view.

Well, you might even think of Cook and Steele together.

I don't.

Yeah, two of them.

I asked him about that.

He said, well, it had possibilities.

He didn't know he'd let me know.

We don't have to decide that now, but...

We don't want to embarrass the British terribly at a time, but we cannot be in a position to say that we're not concerned about the Irish.

Well, I'll sort of play it that way.

I'll call Kermit a boy or two, isn't he?

We don't want to embarrass you or anything, but we want to keep the forces in this country that tend to have us in line up, we want to keep them muted a bit so we can indicate our concern that will help sort along those lines.

I got a letter from the telegram from Sir Alex Hume today.

Well, he was presenting his point of view and

We hoped that we wouldn't take sides, and we can't take sides.

I wouldn't, no.

But it seems to me we've got to indicate a willingness to help if we could.

To mediate.

Yeah, well, we don't want to mediate, but good officers is a pretty good word.

Good officers, yeah.

We're prepared to be helpful if we can, and we've told both the British government and the Irish government that

If there's something they think we could usefully do, we consider it something of that nature.

Of course, you know, it is a terrible tragedy because the British, with all of their great points, have always mishandled Ireland.

And I don't know whether they're mishandling it now or not, but they probably aren't.

But the historical record is so bad that they now...

just can't look good at anything they do.

It's really a terrible dilemma.

It is terrible.

But you know, and let's face it, the Irish are, these people in the Irish are pretty goddamn bad here.

They're Kennedy-type, you know, raising hell, blowing up the place, burning down the embassy and all that.

Uh, Comer said that the IRA, you know, the guerrillas, uh, getting weapons in Czechoslovakia, a lot of the markings on the weapons are Czech markings.

Um,

I thought the meeting this morning went very well.

Well, I think we've got it pretty well positioned, and I'm going to get, I'm really going to, I'm pressing more, and of course, to give all these options to us so that we'll know what we've got.

But I already decided we'd order in the carriers.

We have four carriers.

Order in more B-52s, more A-1s, more F-4s.

To have them there.

Now,

Prior to the time we go to China, while we're there, hit nothing in North Vietnam.

That would be a mistake.

But we can hit anything in South Vietnam with everything we've got.

And that'll decide that battle or help it.

Then, the moment we return, then we can look at the North Vietnamese situation and give them a crack there.

Don't you think so?

Yes, I do.

I thought it was a good meeting, too.

Well, it was a good discussion.

Yeah, you know, I was just thinking if Agnew were here, hell, he'd be bombing Haiphong.

Woo!

god almighty well anyway do the best we can yeah okay good luck

Nixon phone call with Rogers on Northern Ireland conflict and US-UK relations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on February 3, 1972

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