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Conversation 020-084

TapeTape 20StartWednesday, February 9, 1972 at 2:52 PMEndWednesday, February 9, 1972 at 2:57 PMTape start time02:28:30Tape end time02:33:45ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AudioNARA Description

On February 9, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 2:52 pm to 2:57 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 020-084 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 20-84

Date: February 9, 1972
Time: 2:52 pm - 2:57 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

[See Conversation No. 321-11]

     Vietnam
          -Bombing strikes
               -B-3’s
               -Schedule
                      -Weather
                      -Timing
          -Nature of strike
               -Maximum effort
               -Agreement of military
          -Targets
               -Infiltration intensity
               -Troops as targets
               -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer view
                      -Talk with Haig
                      -Communication fixes
                            -Regimental and division headquarters
                      -Duration of strike
          -Advantages of 48 hour strike
               -Tactics
                      -Communications intelligence
                      -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. view
          -Haig view
               -Psychological impression
                      -Enemy psychology
                            -US withdrawal
                                  -Sortie levels
                                        -Melvin R. Laird
                                        -Abrams
                            -Perception of US strength
                            -Price of enemy activity
                            -Carrier arrival
                                  -Number
                                        -Gulf of Tonkin
                                  -Press coverage

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

[National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number LPRN-T-MDR-
2014-012. Segment exempt per Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(1) on 10/17/2017. Archivist:
MAS]
[National Security]
[020-084-w001]
[Duration: 20s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

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     Vietnam
          -Haig view
                -Psychological impression
                     -Enemy movement in Laos
                     -Enemy coasts
          -South Vietnamese Navy
                -Success of coastal strikes
                     -Problems
                           -Weather and navigation
                     -Moorer
                     -Prospects
          -Weather
          -Navy and Air Force ability
          -Forthcoming bombing strike
                -Moorer
                -Use on other occasions
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

General Haig, sir.
Yes, sir.
Al, I wanted to ask you, how about that B-3 strike?
Is it going to get off, or do we hear yet?
Yes, sir.
As of now, it's on schedule, and the weather's favorable, and that would be the only thing that would be postponed.
That would be starting tonight, then, or today.
Good, good, good.
And you're convinced now they're going to carry that out and at least...
They're delighted with it.
Do their best to concentrate, will they?
They want to do it because they want to first exercise the system completely to a max surge and to enhance their responsiveness.
They're in total agreement with it.
Al, do you think they have...
really now looked around to see if they've got any targets in the damn area yes sir they do i mean uh being there must be if uh there must be with all the infiltration and if they're expecting a thing aren't there there must be troops that's what i mean i realize those are secondary targets but god damn it if you had enough of them they're not no sir i think they've got some good targets uh i talked to admiral moore last evening he said they're very pleased they have uh
communications fixes on regimental and division headquarters, and they're just going to just pour it in there for 48 hours.
Yeah.
What is the advantage of doing 48, you know, if you hit them, you mean that they will then try to, wouldn't they move out?
I'm just trying to figure out how does it work.
Well, what they hope to do, sir, is to put this concentrated load in at max effort.
They are going to have to
to recycle a little bit, and if they wanted to get a read from the communications, it'll give them a sharp new communications.
Yeah, the intelligence.
I see.
And then they can do it again.
And, you know, I think General Abrams wants to do this.
Yeah.
Well.
I think it's going to be a very effective psychological, if not even if they miss.
It's going to be psychologically damn impressive.
Because why?
Well, the enemy has not seen.
They've been deceived because as we've drawn down, we have held down our sortie levels.
Laird's done that for economic reasons, but Abrams has actually gone along with it.
So I think they have the impression that perhaps we're a lot weaker than we are.
And when they get hit with this kind of a massive firepower demonstration, they're going to know at the outset what price they're going to have to pay.
When they start.
I get it.
And they have picked up already that there's a third carrier in the Tonkin Gulf and a fourth on the way.
Now, this is a hell of a...
The North Vietnamese know this.
Yes, sir.
I'm sure they do.
That's good.
The press says it's good.
Yes, sir.
That's good.
That's good.
That's more of that psychological.
That's right.
The only thing that I left here that I don't know is
Let's see.
That might have them watching that part.
Keeps them off balance, doesn't it?
Yes, it does, and they're very reluctant to move too much of that stuff down into Laos.
They've got their coasts bare now.
Oh, they are.
I was wondering for one other thing whether the...
No, I guess they don't want to do anything in the north.
I just think of the South Vietnamese Navy.
Did they have any success in those Navy runs up the coast?
No, they didn't, sir.
They had a weather problem and a navigation problem.
I've talked to Admiral Moore about it.
He is working on something that's realistic within their capabilities.
They just didn't make it last time.
The last time it didn't turn out well.
But I think they can do something.
Well, just hope for the best.
Just hope that weather holds up because, you know, just one time if the weather holds up and everything goes right, that Air Force and the Navy is likely to knock the bejesus out of something, aren't they?
I think they are, sir.
I think this is a damn good thing to do.
It's something they should have come in with themselves.
Yeah, it's a concentrated smack.
Well, I don't know whether they should or not, but we haven't done this yet, and let's try something that we haven't done, that's all.
And I must be, you know, other...
other things.
I hope more begins to think of a few.
Well, if this pays off, sir, I think it's the kind of thing that we can do as soon as a threat develops.
Yeah.
In other areas.
That's right.
And just mass it and hit it for a couple days.
That's right.
Okay, Al.
Thank you.
Fine, sir.
Thank you.
Thank you.
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