Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 20 › Conversation 020-092

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on People's Republic of China and Mao Tse-tung

Monday, February 14, 1972 · 10:32 PM–10:40 PM ET · White House Telephone · 8 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation020-092 on Tape 20 (tape position 02:54:28–03:02:36)StartMonday, February 14, 1972 at 10:32 PMEndMonday, February 14, 1972 at 10:40 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 020-092 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417192865 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger debriefed on a recent meeting with French intellectual André Malraux, focusing on his insights regarding the upcoming presidential trip to the People's Republic of China. They discussed the historical weight of the visit and the significance of Mao Tse-tung’s leadership style, comparing it to other world figures. Nixon emphasized the need to approach the China summit with confidence and dignity while dismissing the necessity of discussing economic aid, a topic he felt was better left to the Chinese to initiate.

Audio

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NARA Description

On February 14, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 10:32 pm to 10:40 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 020-092 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 20-92

Date: February 14, 1972
Time: 10:32 pm - 10:40 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

     White House dinner
          -Andre Malraux
               -Quality of meeting

          -Malraux speech
          -Kissinger view
                -Afternoon meeting
                -Economic aid
                      -Mao Tse-tung
                      -Liberals
          -Mao’s forthcoming meeting with president
                -Reason
          -Comment to president
                -People’s Republic of China [PRC] trip
                      -Gen. Charles A.J.M. de Gaulle
                      -Effect on world
          -Effect of occasion
                -The President’s comments
          -The President’s forthcoming trips to Soviet Union and PRC
                -Comments on Mao Tse-tung and Jawaharal Nehru
          -Feeling for mystique
                -American mystique
                      -Abraham Lincoln
                -French view of mystique
                -PRC view of mystique
                      -Kissinger’s trip
                           -Discussion with Chinese Marshal
                                 -Mao

Handling of PRC trip
    -Need for dignity and confidence
    -Ability of others to handle
          -PRC trip
          -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
          -John B. Connally
    -President’s qualification to understand PRC
          -President’s schooling
Show the rest of the log (29 more lines)
    -Tragedies
          -PRC
    -Kissinger role in setting up trip

Malraux
     -Comments
     -Health
     -Economic preoccupation
     -Interpretation of Edward M. Kennedy remarks

     Forthcoming PRC trip
          -Reason
               -Fear
                -Malraux’s view
                      -Economic aid
                            -Marxist view
               -Legitimacy
               -Malraux’s view
                      -Mao’s desires
                            -Chines unification
                                 -Taiwan, Republic of China
                            -Respect
                            -Economic progress
          -Historical significance

     White House dinner
          -Malraux
          -Howard K. Smith
               -Soviet Union trip

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 2 minutes of this recording (about 22% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Hello.
Hi, Henry.
How are you?
Well, that was an interesting evening.
Yeah, and it was interesting for all those other people to hear these, you know, hearing talk and so forth, and really hope somebody will make a mental note of the whole thing.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah, of course, our afternoon session was more profound, actually.
He said it very distinctly.
The evening was a little bit too heavy on economics, because I'm absolutely convinced.
Yeah, I know, I know.
But that's the kick that all the lips are on, you know.
But we can tell them we're willing, but they don't want that.
Mr. President, I don't even think we should tell them we're willing.
Oh, no, no, no.
We can tell the libs we're willing, but we're not going to tell Mao that.
Hell no, because he ain't going to ask.
But he's going to ask, and he's going to consider it himself.
That's right.
And I don't think he's going to ask through a second liner either.
He's going to ask through a fourth line.
Right.
The reason he wants to see you is because you're the only world figure right now.
He doesn't see this as anything else.
Incidentally, he said a very interesting thing at the end of the evening as I was in the car, and I want you to get the translator to see if he can recall it.
He probably can.
He didn't write it, but he said, before he got in the car, he said, I am not General de Gaulle.
But he says, if I were General de Gaulle, I believe I would say that virtually is the fact that your trip can change the whole future of the world.
I wish you well.
I completely agree with that.
I don't know whether I didn't get it.
He said something in more detail in that, but that was the sense of it.
But if you could be sure the translator sees it, he can try to remember that part, because that was the most significant thing he said.
I thought that was a very nice touch, wasn't it, though?
Absolutely.
I think he was kind of moved by the evening himself, too, and the afternoon.
But particularly, they told me that he was tremendously moved by your talk.
Oh, did he?
Oh, yeah.
Sure.
See, I think the difference between the Moscow and the Peking summit is the difference he described between Nehru and Mao.
Oh, wasn't that brilliant?
Incidentally, I was leading him on there because I read his stuff on Nehru.
And he described Nehru as a rather cynical politician, you know?
That's right.
Moscow will do policy, and that will be very successful in that level.
But in Peking, we can make history if we have the right force.
I felt it was important to give him, though, a little feeling, as I was trying to do, that we, too, have sort of a sense of the mystery and the mystique, you know, the whole feeling of, you know, that maybe none of the modern American leaders, but Lincoln had that feeling, and people thought he had.
Because, you see, the French are greatly moved by mystique.
Don't you agree?
Absolutely.
And so are the...
Mr. Merrimack, who are the Chinese?
Are they really?
Oh, yeah.
You know, when I left Beijing on my first trip, I was taken to the airport by that marshal who's my number three now.
Yeah.
And he said, as we were driving into the airport, he said, you know, when I joined Mao, I had heard of the teacher who was in the mountains.
You have to remember Mao is not a military man.
I think it is.
We've got to play it that way with great dignity and no abrasiveness, but great confidence.
this is one of the things i really don't think that all of our you know deference to fellows like our like agnew or or even connelly could handle this i think this is one thing one well it isn't that i understand it but it's and it isn't my experience but i i think i'm i once said to when i lived in the west i went to school with chinese
I'm a little more Chinese than many Americans.
It's really true, you know.
Well, and the other thing, too, is that, boy, I'm telling you, you ought to feel pretty good about this day after all your damn suffering and all the son of a bitch trips, right?
you and i know something that none of those other fellows know keep it closed but he didn't say it quite that way he said it better but that was the i think what and if you get the translator if he will give you one we'll never see him again
Oh, God, you know, he gets hung up on the economic thing.
But on the other hand, wasn't it interesting where he said, Senator Kennedy said that.
He misinterpreted it.
It was a social luncheon.
And then he said it was a social luncheon.
And I was simply saying that looking at the situation in the world, this is the poorest country, most populous, and this is the richest country.
So this is the natural way they should get together.
Looking to the future, that may happen.
But it ain't going to happen on this trip.
You know, the one question we didn't really get an answer from him is why he believes the Chinese wanted this.
I know, and I think that's wrong.
See, that's the typical attitude of basically a Marxist, but not the... Well, and he hit that point that they...
He had, when he made the three points that Mao wanted to have before he died, that China must be united, of course, that's Taiwan.
Second, that China should be a great nation, respected, and third, economic progress.
Yeah, well, that's good.
I think they don't want to do it on their own.
Maybe further down the road, but that's relatively easy to find.
We will, you can be sure, we won't raise it.
that's up to them don't you think having him over was a good idea it's good to have smith there he's not going he's going to moscow but not here
Well, get a good sleep.
You deserve it.
Thank you.

Also recorded on February 14, 1972

  • 670-023 4:09 PM · 40 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Andre Malraux, Sophia K. Porson, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:09 pm and 5:28 pm.
  • 671-002 6:19 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 6:19 pm and 6:30 pm.
  • 671-003 6:19 PM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 6:19 pm and 6:30 pm.
  • 671-004 6:30 PM · 39 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Manolo Sanchez, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 6:30 pm to 7:08 pm.
  • 671-005 7:09 PM · 1 min — United States Secret Service agents and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 7:09 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 020-091 10:22 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:22 pm and 10:32 pm.
  • 020-093 10:40 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:40 pm and 10:42 pm.
  • 020-094 10:42 PM · 10 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone from 10:42 pm to 10:52 pm.

All 33 conversations from February 14, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 020-092, February 14, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417192865). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/020-092 (accessed November 2, 2026).