Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 22 › Conversation 022-090

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Military Strategy

Wednesday, April 5, 1972 · 7:00 PM–7:09 PM ET · White House Telephone · 9 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation022-090 on Tape 22 (tape position 03:26:51–03:35:27)StartWednesday, April 5, 1972 at 7:00 PMEndWednesday, April 5, 1972 at 7:09 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 022-090 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the need for more aggressive military action in Vietnam to counter enemy supply movements and boost morale. Nixon expresses frustration with the current lack of concentrated force and instructs Kissinger to arrange a meeting with General John W. Vogt Jr. to deliver a stern directive regarding his new command. Additionally, Nixon orders an immediate escalation in naval engagement, directing the military to bypass restrictive operational boundaries and conduct heavy shelling and air strikes on supply depots like Dong Hoi to provide a necessary psychological shift in the conflict.

Audio

Download MP3 · 11.8 MB

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

· Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).
Hello.
Yeah.
Henry, when is Volk going out there, do you know?
Friday night.
We could have him come down.
Well, I think he ought to.
Why don't we have him do that?
As a matter of fact, I would either come down or... Yeah, I'd like to have him come down, and I should have a talk with him before he goes.
And I'll see you later.
I just pretend the other side is tied to that exit to the air on it.
on the other hand well then maybe i better see him here then i don't know when i could i just think he needs to get the word as to what the hell we want done out there yeah yeah yeah well in any event uh
What I was going to say is that I really want him worked over, dressed down, and so forth, and told him that the whole future of his profession is involved here.
Not his own personal profession, but the profession of arms.
And basically, that lack of confidence in their leadership and the risk-taking, the... Well, it could happen.
I don't see any reason why he couldn't.
I mean, suppose I am tied in.
I'm supposed to know something about these things.
He just comes down to give me a report.
After all, have him come to keep his game.
I think that's better for me.
And then I can have him away from Maura and all the rest, and just have a goddamn tough talk with him.
Now, the other thing is that...
I noticed that they both refer to the White...
The Air Force, of course, isn't hitting where it matters, but...
Can't they, for Christ's sake, sit these areas and be free a little more?
How about turning around and doing one more, quit barking around with what they're doing up there in that area, and one B-3 strike again or something?
I just have a feeling that there's no concentration of force here, any place, you know.
I think it's a, I mean, despite the fact that they add up to the 500 sorties, you know where they drop them.
God damn it, we've dropped enough bombs to destroy Europe ten times.
I have the same uneasiness.
I'm on the phone with Moore over the time, three times a day.
Are you?
Yeah.
Well, I don't know.
I noticed that you, for example, called upon American fire departments very seriously and so forth and so on.
What do you think of that?
He's actually quite calm.
He's calm, but I mean, I don't mean, I'm not criticizing, but I mean, isn't he really saying to them, for God's sake, get off your ass and help us?
Well, I don't know.
I think we're in a position where we could hit the Haiphong area now.
I really do.
I think, you know, the public attitude may be such that we can now
I mean, they've asked for this, and if we do, I believe, we give it to them good.
Not in a rather cautious way that Bill was talking about.
I think we should, you know, the first thing we should do, Mr. President, is to clobber this area so that we win.
That's right.
So that we dry up the supplies into the battlefield.
That's right.
Then we should, towards the end of this operation, we should give one monumental shot to Iraq.
Yes.
Can I ask you to do one thing, though, immediately, that I don't think you probably got?
The restriction with regard to the 19th parallel does not apply to the naval gunfire.
As a naval gunfire, right now, if that road goes up, take the goddamn road clear up to Haiphong, if necessary.
There's no problem on that.
It's precise.
It hits the road.
Would you agree?
Get some things.
Well.
Yeah.
so that they don't, aren't able to reinforce.
That's right.
Then, and because all the other supply routes go through there too, the 18th parallel, where we made the line, gets all the passengers that go into Laos and Vietnam.
Listen, I'm just thinking about a shot across the belt.
The least you could do is to get naval gunfire above that.
Now,
put one destroyer just one you you call more and tell him i want one destroyer to get its ass up above at the 20th or 21st wherever it needs to be just put it in and shell the roads up there now let's do that that'll that they mean that's uh that isn't bombing the north but uh it'll it'll be a signal what do you think or do you agree with it or not i think i think we've got to do something different we're not doing they have really started traveling anywhere north of the dmc
All right.
Fine.
Don't even start immediately north.
Don't do it in the half-assed Johnson way.
That's the trouble, Henry, with all the plans you've submitted, even from the NSC staff.
You know, we'll do 18 degrees, 18th parallel.
I don't want to think in those ways.
If we're going to do it, we're going to do it good.
Now, get that goddamn ship above, above the DMC and above the 18th parallel.
Get it up to the 19th parallel where it'll, just so that they fire the lava shell in on the road high up.
You see what I'm getting at?
We've got, now the bombing up above is a problem.
naval shell i know that isn't going to be there right now there is a need i know something to sustain but right now there's a need for psychological boost to a hell of a lot of people in south vietnam and in the north
And we're sitting here, believe me, we're sitting here and saying, well, we want something we can sustain.
We'll wait till the weather clears in maybe three or four weeks, and we'll do that and this and that and the other thing.
In the meantime, the psychological effect goes down.
We need a psychological move, and we need it, I think, tomorrow.
Now, if you tell Moore to get off his ass and find something to do, psychologically.
What we should do is to shell strong noise.
That is the transhipment point.
But that's about 40 miles.
But what?
They haven't done it yet?
They haven't done it yet.
Well, why not?
Well, but now, listen, order it, and I want to report in the morning.
Now, God damn it, naval ships can fire at night.
I know that now.
Of course, it's daytime out there now, but get up and shell Dunghoy, and I want him to report personally to me in the morning, and I'll be ready by 10 o'clock before we go to Philadelphia.
How about ordering that?
Can you do that?
All right, shell it now.
Let's have one strike that means something.
We've really got, we need, Henry, I know the psychology of this situation.
Right now, we need the psychology of hitting something.
I couldn't agree.
Something that, I realize, I don't want to do something that gets us a lot of heat.
Don't worry, I'm strongly for it.
Yeah.
Because that's where they got EOL and supplies.
Right, right.
But not just one simple little destroyer.
Get in there and also send the planes in.
Can planes get to that or is it out of the cloud cover too?
I guess.
right well fine get get get a cruiser in there put the cruiser in whatever we've got but i want massive power and i want that place destroyed now let's do that let's do at least that much and do it now because we q needs it the american public needs it and the whole battle psychology needs it we need to do something that lets them know something else is coming okay right all right fine and i'll let you i want to report in the morning

NARA Description

On April 5, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 7:00 pm to 7:09 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 022-090 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 22-90

Date: April 5, 1972
Time: 7:00 pm - 7:09 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Vietnam
          -Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr.
                -Assignment to Vietnam
                      -Schedule
                -Proposed meeting with the President
                      -Instructions
                      -Washington Special Action Group [WSAG] meeting
                      -The president’s schedule
                            -Philadelphia
                      -Importance of his new command
                            -Future of the US Air Force
                      -Key Biscayne
                      -Adm. Thomas h. Moorer
                      -Timing
          -Air strikes
                -Reports
                      -Targets
                      -B-3 area

     -Concentration of force
     -Number
     -Capability
     -Kissinger’s talks with Moorer
-Nguyen van thieu
     -Statements
-Ronald W. Reagan
     -Call to Kissinger
-Nelson A. Rockefeller
     -Call to Kissinger
           -Weather
-Haiphong
     -Potential for an attack
           -Public attitude
           -Intensity
                 -The President’s view
                       -William P. Rogers
                 -Kissinger’s view
                       -Supply lines
-Naval gunfire
     -Restriction of air strikes
           -19th parallel
     -The President’s instructions
           -Attack on road
     -Number of ships
           -Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
     -Kissinger’s view
           -Rear areas
                 -Supply routes
                 -18th Parallel
                       -Laos
     -Destroyer deployment
           -Moorer
                 -Deployment above the 19th Parallel
           -DMZ
     -Plans compared with Lyndon B. Johnson’s plans
           -National Security Council [NSC]
           -Bombing
           -Naval shelling
     -Kissinger’s recommendation
           -Sustainability
     -The President’s view

                      -Purpose
                            -Psychology
                            -Weather
                -Orders to Moorer
                -Dong Hoi
                -Report to the President
                      -Philadelphia
                -Necessity
                      -Dong Hoi
                            -Petroleum, oil, lubricants [POL]
                            -Supply depots
                      -Destroyers, planes, cruisers
                      -Thieu
                      -US public
                -Follow up report

Also recorded on April 6, 1972

  • 022-091 7:09 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:09 pm and 7:12 pm.
  • 022-092 7:09 PM · 6 sec — unknown person(s) and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:09 pm and 7:12 pm.
  • 022-093 7:12 PM · 19 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone from 7:12 pm to 7:31 pm.
  • 704-001 8:45 AM · 56 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:45 am and 8:58 am.
  • 704-002 8:45 AM · 27 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:45 am and 8:58 am.
  • 704-003 8:58 AM · 25 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:58 am to 9:26 am.
  • 329-013 9:26 AM · 44 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, and John W. Vogt, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:26 am to 10:10 am.
  • 704-004 9:26 AM · 1 min — unknown person(s) and United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:26 am and 11:59 pm.

Cite this conversation

Conversation 022-090, April 6, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/022-090 (accessed October 1, 2026).