President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss military strategy regarding the North Vietnamese offensive, focusing on the need for decisive, aggressive action while public and Congressional support for the administration remains high. Nixon emphasizes his intent to move naval ships closer to Hanoi and insists that military leaders utilize tactical air strikes to punish North Vietnamese forces regardless of political polls. To ensure a focused message, Nixon instructs Kissinger to handle an upcoming congressional briefing alone, specifically excluding Secretary of State William P. Rogers to avoid potential interference regarding peace negotiations.
On April 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 7:41 pm to 7:54 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 022-111 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding AidConversation No. 22-111
Date: April 11, 1972
Time: 7:41 pm - 7:54 pm
Location: White House Telephone
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.
Kissinger’s location
Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon’s meeting with Irini Dobrynin
-Gift
-The President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
-Vietnam
-Message
Vietnam
-Melvin R. Laird
-B-52 strikes
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Forthcoming trip to Southeast Asia
-Length of trip
-Talk with Kissinger
-John B. Connally
-Previous talk with the President
-Talk with Armand Hammer
-Message to the President
-Advice concerning Russians
-Blockade
-US activity
-Russian ships
-Aircraft
-Submarines
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer’s instructions
-Blockade
-The President’s view
-Timing
-Necessity
-Prisoners of war [POWs] for withdrawal deadline
-Election
-Public response
-Moorer
-Previous talk with Kissinger
-Briefing of Congressmen
-Report on Congress’s mood
-Compared to 1967
-Laos
-Son Tay raid
-Cambodia
-Support for administration
-Max Frankel
-Previous talk with Kissinger
-Support for Administration
-Interest in Israel
-The President’s strategy
-Haig’s comment
-Kissinger’s views
-North Vietnamese tanks
-Washington Star report
-Destruction
-B-52s
-Haig’s report
-South Vietnamese responsibility
-B-52s
-Capabilities
-Military Region One [MR1]
-Results of the war
-The President’s view
-Honor of US and its military establishment
-Support of Congress
-Moorer’s report
-Forthcoming briefing
-Attendance
-Moorer
-Laird
-Kissinger
-William P. Rogers
-Kissinger’s handling of briefing
-Moorer
-Laird
-Length
-Rogers
-Negotiations
-Presence at briefing
-Moorer
-Laird
-Laird
-Presence
-Vietnamization
-Cambodia
-Saigon
-Tactical aircraft [TACAIR]
-The president’s instructions to Moorer
-Ship deployment
-Distance to Hanoi
-Current movement
-Haiphong
-Air strikes
-TACAIR
-Weather
-B-52s
-Moorer arrival
-Statement
-Weather
-Clearance
-North Vietnamese trucks
-Hanoi
-Destruction
-TACAIRr
-Capabilities
-Timing
-Connally’s advice
-Public opinion
-[David] Kenneth Rush
-State Department
-Communication with Kissinger
-Kissinger’s view
-William H. Sullivan
-Washington Special Action Group [WSAG]
-Frankel
-Synchronization
-Comments on the President’s policies
Foreign policy
-Dobrynin
-People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Michael J. Mansfield and Hugh Scott
Kissinger’s schedule
Vietnam
-Air strikes
-Public response
-The President’s talk with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Polls
-Influence
-Democrats’ response
-Edward M. Kennedy
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Connally observation
-Kennedy
-George S. McGovern
-The President’s instructions to Moorer
-Ships and planes
-B-3 area
-Naval attacksThis transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.