Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Military Strategy

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Hello.

Mr. President.

Are you at dinner?

No.

But you are.

Yeah.

Mrs. Nixon had a good chat with Mrs. DeBrennan.

She said that when she talked to her, she said, Mrs. DeBrennan says, well, what kind of a, before she marries this subject, do you want to give you a gift?

Do you like birds?

And I think Mrs. Nixon said, well, of course, it's all straight.

But then, but of course, she's very gracious.

And then Mrs. Nixon raised this point.

I just hope it won't hurt the visit.

Mr. Green squeezed her hand and said with almost tears in her eyes, I hope not, I hope not.

So we got that message across.

Oh, hell yes, what you talked about.

My wife did, yes.

You know how she'd do it, right on the nose.

So that message goes back.

Did you get Laird off his ass?

No.

Now we are sending Haig, right?

The important thing is that

If a message needs to get out to them, time is wasting.

Connolly called me tonight.

He had an interesting call from Arnold Hammer, who you know, of course.

You know Arnold Hammer?

Well, he's the great art connoisseur of the Russians and so forth, you know, from Los Angeles.

And he's generally pro-Russian.

He said, yes, tell the president that I know the Russians.

He says he must not back down.

He must put it to him now.

He can get away with it now where he can't later.

Very interesting point.

And that's what Connolly said.

Connolly said,

President, I beg you, don't, he says, do something now.

And his way upon comments that we may have three or four days, he even would favor a blockade this week.

That's fine, I know.

But I think on the blockade, let me say,

This may not be the time, but there will come a time when we have to do it and say, now look, we've offered everything, like we offer prisoners for deadline and they turn it down.

Then about two weeks before the election, we blockade them.

See what I mean?

And that would have enormous public support.

Maybe earlier.

Well.

Earlier, of course, if we've come that far along the game, but I am thinking if the damn thing drags out that long.

Right, right.

Mora, I talked to Mora, you know, just about to do this position.

Right.

And he put three members of the House and Senate all day today.

Yeah.

And he said this is the best move he remembers since early 67.

He did?

Yeah, he said this is nothing like Laos or Somtay or... Or Cambodia.

Or Cambodia, they're all with us.

You know, it's interesting that your conversation with Max Frankel, that he would see it that way.

What do you think got to him?

That we did do it well?

Or maybe, you know, Frankel probably, you know, of course, Frankel's very interested in Israel.

He just may notice, may know that what I...

You know, the most significant thing that's happened is what I said yesterday, as I'm sure you realize, because that put it to the Russians.

As Haig says, nobody's ever done it that before.

Nobody has ever called it the way it is.

If this had been done seven years ago, the war would be over.

And this is why I favor so much the vocational tyrannical move.

Because if we are very safe in saying that if they go right, let them leave a little longer, we'll see what happens.

But if they are afraid that we're coming after them next...

You know, I noticed one thing tonight in the Star.

It said that all these tanks were knocked out by B-52s.

I thought that Hague said they were knocked out by...

I see.

Well, you can imagine the press, though, trying to make it appear that the South Vietnamese have done a damn thing.

Yeah, I know that.

Right.

Of course, of course, of course.

That's great.

Well, you know, all this is all, frankly, it's moot.

We don't care who knocked out Rich.

The question is who wins now.

And at this point, we are going to kick the shit out of them.

We're going to win this, whatever the cost.

Huh?

And I think our people want to be something for free.

And Maurer said that the congressmen were for us.

You don't want Maurer at that precinct tomorrow?

No, because then I'd have to have, I don't want Laird, let me say this.

They first had you there with Laird.

If I have Laird, I could have Rogers.

That cramps you.

The best thing is for you to handle the damn thing.

If we could have you and Maurer alone, I'd do it, but you can't do it without Laird, can you?

No.

And you'll do it better, you see.

We need a hard sell tomorrow.

I'll just tell them what is happening.

That's right.

And do it very briefly, you see.

30 minutes, and that's it.

Don't you agree with me?

You see, Henry, we can't have Rogers here at this time, because he will start protesting about the goddamn negotiations.

I don't want nothing, no crap on negotiations.

You can cover that very briefly, that negotiations were done, everything, period.

Huh?

If you think differently, I can, but if you understand, if I open it to Laird and more, I've got to have Rogers.

Now, do you want to have that?

No, no, absolutely not Rogers, and also not Laird, because Laird stands up better, but he always sort of says it's already won.

I mean, Laird is the guy who told you that...

that we wouldn't be in the mid-60s without Cambodia.

Hell, if they had the Cambodian bank to the president, the drive in the North would be a diversion, and the drive on Saigon would be the big challenge.

Oh, look, look, look, he knows better than that.

Of course, that's it.

That's the whole theory.

But at least, how about TAC Air, though?

TAC Air, the thing you were saying earlier today.

Well, let me come down to two things.

Does Moore, is Moore going to carry out my order or not?

to move those naval ships up within five miles, if necessary, of Hanoi.

In other words, that's, you know.

And that's good, don't you think?

And just so they don't hit Hanoi or Haiphong, shouldn't be hit because they're symbols, but hit anything else.

They are.

Don't you think it's a good idea?

Now, second point, with regard to the airstrikes, you're feeling that we ought to use TAC air in there.

They don't want to do that, huh?

Well, they will if it's the weather conditions.

I see.

Well, in the meantime, though...

Right.

and then they'll go and then by that time the weather will be by friday night at the latest we really think the weather will clear you know we've only had one day of clear weather in two weeks but when it does it'll stay clear so that is going to happen over the weekend all right and if we find that the instructor still in the truck park

Couldn't agree more.

With what?

With the TAC air, not with the TAC.

All right.

The TAC air can do that, can it?

Absolutely.

You see, Conley's point, which apparently he had discussed with you, is that right now, he said, you've got opinion with you.

Use it.

Get them now.

He says, later on, it may change.

And that's a very shrewd observation.

Absolutely.

And isn't that your feeling?

I'll say look that the staff isn't doing what I told them to do don't worry I it's gonna be hard as hell now rush is all what gives me all right good when you have no bleats from state at this moment

What do you think they're playing?

Boy, they're being awful careful.

Even Sullivan came around with a couple of good ideas today.

What was Frankel's real point about synchronization?

What impressed him?

Well, he said he was calm and interested in the show and television.

He got on top of the situation and handled it professionally.

And he said he was the best drum driver he could ever be.

And I hope you got across the point that it was basically a very calm deal on our part.

Well, anyway, we've got the, we're doing the soft glove thing with Sabrina, which is nice.

We'll get Mansfield and Scott over there slobbering over their Chinese, which is good.

Yeah, I'm feeling nice.

Yeah, and just let it go the way it wants to go.

But in the meantime, now that we've got these people where they are, let's punish them, punish them hard.

Because it may be correct, it may be the country will accept it now.

But let me say, as I told Harlem today, I don't care.

I mean, I've told them I don't want to see another poll for the next month.

I said, the thing to do is to do what is right.

You're not going to be influenced by it.

You've been there.

good let's uh have a good time tonight but on the on the other hand on these orders the ships will go up the planes will hit and uh and but they and they are going to follow my the suggestion i made that in the any area where the enemy like be like the

B3 front may be going back.

We will follow them and hit them.

They're going to do that.

Good.

Okay.

Bye.

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Military Strategy

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on April 11, 1972

Cite this conversation

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Military Strategy

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on April 11, 1972

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Cite this conversation