Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Bombing policy

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Maybe it's 7.30 now, huh?

Yeah.

Are you worried about the clock?

Yes, I am.

Well, the thing I think you're quite aware of is that the clock is very strong at night.

The fact of the matter is, it may be that both sides are now in that position, reaching the wire.

It may be, too, that it's going to the extreme.

It may be that it's going to the extreme.

by our control.

That's what we've got to do.

You understand?

I understand.

My point is, if you're going to, when you're faced with what might be a debacle, your bargaining position changes a great deal.

You don't tell them a goddamn thing.

You go in and talk to them and find out where they are.

But I think we have to realize that we're in a quite different position.

Now, before we go that far, of course, I agree

that we've got to give them that whack on the anoint high point.

So they realize that that strengthens them.

And on that score, I think you would agree that that would enormously strengthen our bargaining position.

What we could do to the north would strengthen our bargaining position.

They have no confidence in what we can do to save the South.

Isn't that really what it gets?

Or do you agree?

Isn't that why we do the MI-HIFO?

Mr. President, I think it's premature to do what you suggest we do.

I think they can gain a terrible amount of money.

If I make such an order tomorrow, they'll take the land.

Yeah, yeah, I know.

I'm telling you what you could...

It may come to that.

What you should set up, though.

But on the other hand, set it up in such a way that we hit MI-HIFO.

before you have to come to the final conscience.

Because the major reason for hitting that is you well understand it's not only affecting Russia, I don't know if it's not, but it's also the major fear they have, hell, is what we can do to them.

And the fact that I just may say, well, the hell with it, you can lick South Vietnam, but you're not going to embarrass the United States.

Well, I've seen a message, a message that I've held since the day that you shouldn't.

I've been hit on the seat by a crew member who doesn't say my company might need it.

Correct.

And it's something that we need to be careful to open.

And I think tomorrow I've got to go in and have a new instructor come in here.

And then, instead of the second crew member, I have to go through, because he's certainly going to come in with something.

Yeah.

That is guaranteed.

Because of this truck, correct?

Correct.

I mean, it's built good to be on that attraction, but it's good to be on the coast.

He's not going to almost have it.

Now, I think the way I could handle that is to say, I will come back to Washington.

I'm not sure if that's going to be the best thing that I'll be able to do, but it's going to be an opportunity.

I don't know if it's going to be easier on the coast.

I think what you ought to know better is not about the benefits, but about the benefits.

Oh, that's true.

Oh, yes, yes, yes.

And the other thing is, we all know what the benefits are.

Of course, on the other side, you know, I think of other evaluations.

You take the confidence between Moore and Ward and Abramson, right?

He's not all that discouraged for what hasn't been in the past, although maybe he would be now.

What do you think?

Well, Abrams may be a reflection of the retreat.

I think it feels to me that it's just that amazing that he needs to be healthy every day.

And Abrams.

Yeah.

Why is it that he's so impatient?

He's basically a field commander, and that's what we should have kept him at.

Huh?

Well, anyway.

Another mission.

Number 13.

Keep it locked in.

All right.

But you should be assured, as far as I know, you're bargaining.

As far as these factors are concerned, as far as these factors, I want you to know, I am ready to fall on the sword.

In other words, we will demolish before we can allow ourselves to do that.

I believe that's what I believe.

No, that's your strong point.

So don't worry about South Vietnam, what's happening to the Prong people and all the rest of it.

Remember that they are in for a hell of a shot.

Well, I've been thinking about it.

Today, I do this.

You know, it makes you almost want to not have meetings, but sit there and hear the obvious, of course.

Who is more, I mean, in the public relations, who in the country is more aware?

Who has been counting on those meetings?

I counted up to 14.

I said, look, we don't need to sell this to the government.

And I was the one that last time said, well, gee, we've got to sell this to the hawks.

That's why I said to Moore, remember, I was really throwing that to Roger.

I said, now, Tom, you and Mel have got to sell this to the country.

Can you sell it?

You know, and they said they could.

And I just couldn't.

I just couldn't.

And with 1,500 vessels, they have no trouble with accepting a disparity of 1,500 ICBMs.

They have no trouble with filling the whole ABM program.

This is the only program we have.

And here is a field that gives the fact that McNamara and company put us in a bind.

It's the best we can now get in order to get some momentum going.

That's all you're talking about.

Also...

And that will help write the testimony.

We can't allow ourselves to be in a position to have frozen ourselves into a disadvantage.

Roger's right about that.

But we have more problems because we have all the delivery systems together with the bodies.

Hold this a minute.

Yeah, go ahead, Henry.

I was just talking to Manolo.

Go ahead.

Well, in any event, I just think you should know, though, that we are trying to see this thing through.

You know, as I was down in Texas the other day, I took a goddamn hard line, mainly because I know we've got to stand, as we say, tough and true, you know, because the PR types, the Colton, Frager, etc.,

Cali were all saying, and put emphasis on the hope for a ceasefire, which I'm sure they got right out of the state.

I didn't even mention ceasefire last night.

I know you didn't.

But I shouldn't have.

That's not my job.

Absolutely.

And don't you agree?

Absolutely.

I think you did it absolutely right.

And we just get across our point, which, I mean, I wasn't talking to the country, but to the enemy.

The enemy has got to know.

We all know that, but do you think they'll make any progress?

It could be very substantial.

If the Russians have put up two of them, it could be.

That's my point.

Well, which is no bluff.

No, I'm telling you that your backup position is one that I can well understand.

That's what I'm just telling you.

Yeah, yeah.

No, your backup position for negotiating.

is one that I want you to have in mind, and I didn't want to say it in front of anybody else, but you can have in mind that your backup position has to recognize reality.

And that's where we are.

Now the other thing, you see what I mean?

You just recognize reality, which gives you great flexibility to do whatever the hell you can do.

I mean, let's face it, you've got to make the best deal you can.

But on the other hand,

He used the poker analogy.

Remember I told you about it?

That in the South Pacific, the president, the young officer, won $10,000.

And he was one of the best poker players.

And the mark of the president, he seldom bluffed.

But that no one can remember an occasion when he was called that he didn't have the cards.

somebody called him in other words he if he if he uh played i mean he was he was the man that uh that poker requires humbug but the president if he was called he'd throw in the cards but he was called stayed in the pot he always had the cards and won the pot that's the thing they got around that's the way i play the game i just don't don't play it in terms of

You know, popping and popping and back and down.

Okay.

Okay, have a good flight.

Bye.

Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Bombing policy

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 1, 1972

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