Conversation 031-112

TapeTape 31StartTuesday, October 17, 1972 at 8:37 PMEndTuesday, October 17, 1972 at 8:40 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone

On October 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 8:37 pm to 8:40 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 031-112 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 31-112

Date: October 17, 1972
Time: 8:37 pm - 8:40 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked with the President.

[See Conversation No. 368-16]

        Vietnam peace settlement
            -Henry A. Kissinger’s message
            -Proposed wording
                 -William H. Sullivan’s view
            -International commission
                 -William P. Rogers’s role
            -Kissinger’s prediction
            -Kissinger’s possible trip to Hanoi
            -Possible US bombing halt
                 -The President’s view
            -Forthcoming message from Kissinger
            -Status
                 -Nguyen Van Thieu
            -US military action
                 -North Vietnam
                 -Saigon area
            -South Vietnamese assembly
                 -Support for Thieu

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

President General Haig.
General Haig calling, sir.
Thank you.
Hello, Haig, sir.
I've got my first flash message from Henry.
He sent me the more detailed one.
It should be here in a moment.
In fact, he inferred that one of the two substantive changes we wanted in the paragraph that when Sullivan saw the
to a surrender document, as one can conceive, and recommends no changes in it.
We fell off the board with it fixed.
He's very concerned that we not let Rogers get too anxious about setting up the International Mission machinery.
Oh, God, of course.
And he said he'll explain in the follow-up to Cable why it's highly unlikely to have an agreed text on the present schedule.
More round is almost surely required, which I think is good.
That's encouraging to me.
Would the Hanoi trip then as well?
I think so.
He said, if I do not make last leg of trip, we have a problem due to our discussions with the other side on bombing hall, because I had hit it very hard on that.
Not going to be any bombing hall?
Well, I've gone back to him and said that that's just a titty as far as they're concerned, that
the pressure on them, and it would never be understood here unless it was dried up in a sea ice of an immediate settlement.
No bombing hull.
Right.
So I've gone back to that man and told him to do a no-condition suction very strongly.
So we'll have another more detailed message here shortly, sir.
I don't think anything is going to be taped.
I think this little delay is just fine.
It works in well in terms of Q.
And now on the other thing, are we doing an adequate job of using air power against this stuff in Saigon, are you?
Well, yes.
We've shifted down a little in the north.
Oh, in the north.
Hit this stuff around Saigon.
That's right.
And that's what they're doing.
They've put 52 all around Saigon.
And they aren't
out the South Vietnamese.
They are also, today, their Congress, their assembly, they're in a great state of concern, and they're all starting to kneel together to break up the factions and to join and support Chew.
They think he's going to be sitting down, you see.
Oh, and serving to unify behind Chew.
That's right.
That may be helpful.
That's right.
Okay, well, good.
All right, sir.
I won't bother you with this next one unless this is... No, I don't really need to see the next one.
He's going to go out there and we can discuss in the morning, okay?
Fine, sir.