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Conversation 032-001

TapeTape 32StartSunday, October 22, 1972 at 3:06 PMEndSunday, October 22, 1972 at 3:10 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  White House operator;  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Alexander Haig coordinate the diplomatic response to the stalling Vietnam peace negotiations, specifically focusing on managing the fallout from recent North Vietnamese leaks and South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's resistance. Nixon instructs Haig to inform Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin that North Vietnam must cease public disclosures to avoid a total breakdown of talks before the upcoming election. Furthermore, the President orders a discreet, unannounced halt to the bombing north of the 20th parallel and adjusts Henry Kissinger’s travel schedule to ensure their meeting occurs after Nixon returns from campaigning in New York.

Vietnam WarHenry KissingerAlexander HaigAnatoliy DobryninNguyen Van ThieuBombing Halt1972 Election
AudioNARA Description

On October 22, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 3:06 pm to 3:10 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 032-001 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 32-1

Date: October 22, 1972
Time: 3:06 pm - 3:10 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with White House operator.

        Call from Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The President talked with Haig.

        Greetings

        Vietnam
            -Bombing halt
                -Haig’s talk with Henry A. Kissinger
                    -Kissinger’s position on halt
                         -Change
                         -Haig’s message
                -Conditions
                    -Area
                    -Time
                    -Duration
                    -Announcement
                         -The President’s view
                -Nguyen Van Thieu
                    -Kissinger’s plans
                         -Haig’s view
                         -The President’s view
                         -Kissinger’s request to be informed
                -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                    -Possible meeting with the President
                -President Thieu
                    -Reaction
                -Dobrynin
                    -Haig’s message
                         -The President’s instructions
                         -Thieu’s position
                                              2

                      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. Oct-06)

                              -Hanoi’s announcement
                              -Joint agreement
             -Negotiations
                 -Coalition government
                 -Dobrynin
                     -The President’s message
                 -North Vietnamese leaks
                     -Thieu
                     -The President’s view
                 -Breakdown
                     -1972 election
                 -1972 election
                           -Message to Dobrynin
             -Kissinger's return to US
                 -Meeting with Thieu
                 -Timing
                     -Meeting with the President
                     -Time
                     -Saigon time
                 -The President's schedule
                     -Campaigning in New York
                 -Timing
                     -The President’s view
                 -The President's location
                 -Delay
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

President General Hague is calling you.
Right.
You are.
Hello.
Hello, Mr. President.
Hiya.
I just talked to Henry on an open line, so we had to be circumspect.
Right.
But I think he's feeling, he's coming around a little more rationally from my perspective.
Right.
He said my message impressed him very much, and he's inclined to agree with it.
Well, that's on the bombing halt.
Yes, sir.
Now, what we will do, and I think this is essential,
We had agreed to stop bombing north of the 20th tomorrow morning, Saigon time.
Right.
So we'll just put that in effect like another one of those temporary things.
Don't say anything about it.
No.
Try nothing, just do it.
Not saying anything about it, then we're not committed to resuming it, see?
Exactly.
It's the announcement that bothers me, you see.
Right.
Then he was on this wicket of
forced you publicly, but I've given him a lot of time right there.
You told him now that I was, that you and I were talking, that you represented everything that I was thinking, too.
Yes, sir.
I don't want him to have any illusions here, you know.
He sometimes sort of thinks he can sort of go on his own on this stuff, but he doesn't have it now, no?
No, and he knows that.
As a matter of fact, he asked to be sure that we did nothing that we didn't inform him about, which is a good frame of mind for him to be in.
Right, right.
He said if you wanted to have Dobrynin in, that he agreed that that was all right.
And I said that you had changed your mind, that you felt that you would save that clout until we need it.
He agreed with that.
He agreed with that.
He made one good point, and that is that we should not hit two as the obstacle with Dobrynin.
Rather, what they did publicly and the fact that the troops in the south are just
too troublesome a problem for Chew, rather than Chew just rejected everything.
Well, I would do it, and are you going to see DeBrennan then yourself?
Yes, I'll call him.
Well, I would do it on this basis.
I'd start, now look, we had this thing on track.
Tell him that everything was moving along, and the president was putting his whole effort behind this effort, with a message to Chew that I personally had drafted yesterday.
And then this story...
broke, and Chu went right up the wall because it put him in the position of, in effect, it put him in Hanoi, him in the position where Hanoi was announcing something that he would have to accept.
That's right.
And that that couldn't be done.
This has to be jointly agreed.
Now, we all know what has to happen, but just put it just like that.
And they emphasized the coalition government.
And they put in the fact that it was going to be a coalition government, which it isn't.
And it was totally, therefore...
It was totally unacceptable.
Now, you can also say, it also emphasized to Brennan, it's my view, that we can still do this.
But now we've got to go one more round, and then I will try again with you.
But he's got to keep his people, his clients, from talking anymore.
Right.
Or say, if he doesn't take his clients, we'll play a little rough, from talking, we're going to have to break off and wait until after the election.
That's right.
Exactly right.
The other point I would make is, and I'd make the election point, and I think you should know, if you do play ball, though,
have an absolute commitment that we are going to see this thing through and the election is not going to be used as any excuse.
Okay?
Absolutely.
That sounds fine.
I think we've got it.
We've brought some time.
Henry will leave tomorrow right after he sees Chew.
About 11, get him in here tomorrow evening.
Our time.
He'll get in here tomorrow evening?
He'll be about 6 or 7 tomorrow night.
How could he possibly do that?
I'll be gone tomorrow, of course.
See, it's 3 o'clock in the morning for him now.
But the point is that it isn't a very good thing for him to get in.
He's campaigning.
I see.
I'd like for him to get in about three hours later.
All right, surely.
See, I will be coming back from New York around 10, 30, or 11 o'clock.
I think that it's quite important.
Well, it's almost imperative, actually, that
not arrive back and I'm up in New York campaigning.
See what I mean?
Right, sir.
How about... How about doesn't he make a stop or does he just stay two or three hours?
We can do whatever.
Well, having... What I would do is... 11 o'clock?
Having... Yeah, I'd like for him to arrive at 11 o'clock.
He could either stop on the way or he can, for a couple hours delay, or he can leave a little later.
Fine.
Okay.
Good luck.
Right.
Call me.
I'll be over here.
Yes, sir.
Right.
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