Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 033-089
Date: Saturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:02 PM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.
Recording device: White House Telephone
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/033-089
National Archives Catalog: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/417194393 (NAID 417194393)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:01] Mr. President, I have Dr. Kissinger calling you now.
[0:03] Fine.
[0:04] Thank you.
[0:05] President on the line, sir.
[0:07] Hi, Henry.
[0:08] Mr. President, you in New York or Washington?
[0:10] No, I'm here.
[0:11] Oh, fine, fine.
[0:13] I'm just back dictating about scores of letters to my friends.
[0:19] Boy, I've told you, nobody knows after an election how much you've got to do on that.
[0:23] I've got to work that in in my spare time.
[0:25] But I had to come down here to finish off a lot of them.
[0:28] I had a very nice letter from Ben Gurion, you know.
[0:31] Oh, isn't that nice?
[0:32] I wrote him a note, and he, with his great sense of history, hell, he didn't talk about Vietnam or the other thing.
[0:40] He said the greatest moment was China.
[0:44] And he said, because by that you may help to bring about the day when the peoples of the world can—well, he didn't put it this way.
[0:53] I did.
[0:53] People of the world can be friends and so forth, you know.
[0:55] But I mean, with that
[0:56] But the old man's like an Old Testament prophet.
[0:58] Do you know him?
[0:59] Yes, yes.
[1:00] He's a remarkable man.
[1:01] Yeah.
[1:02] Yes, I've met him.
[1:03] Go ahead.
[1:03] What do you have?
[1:04] We've also had a really very warm letter, which I'm sending to you from McCloy.
[1:10] Oh, yeah.
[1:12] Which compares what you went through with what Lincoln went through during the Civil War.
[1:18] And they are a version of the Dove.
[1:20] So I've sent it over to you.
[1:22] Uh-huh.
[1:24] And you might want to take a look on it.
[1:26] What I wanted to mention and check with you is, we had a phone call from Bunker, we haven't had the actual message yet, saying that now apparently the South Vietnamese are beginning to kick over the traces again.
[1:42] Oh, Christ.
[1:43] And I believe that we just have to continue now and get the best agreement we can, and then face them with it afterwards.
[1:53] How are they kicking it over?
[1:55] Well, they've apparently submitted a memorandum to him, which he just said the news is not good, and their ambassador here has also raised some questions with Sullivan.
[2:08] It's their old pattern.
[2:09] What they always do is they first read what you give them, then they raise a few technical objections, and then they just keep escalating it.
[2:20] Well, shall I send him another letter?
[2:22] No, I think we now have to wait, Mr. President, until we see at least what's going to happen in Paris.
[2:30] And once we have the text of an agreement in Paris, we'll have a new situation.
[2:39] So Bunker says that they're kicking over the traces and just being unreasonable as hell.
[2:44] Is that it, Curt?
[2:44] That seems to be the case.
[2:48] But we can't delay the negotiation, and we can't tell Hanoi that we're having trouble.
[2:54] No, sir.
[2:54] We're going to play it like an accordion.
[2:56] All right.
[3:00] When you really come down to it, though, I just can't see how Chew's got any other choice.
[3:05] God damn it.
[3:06] We've told him we're doing everything we can, and that's going to be it.
[3:11] But on the other hand, the idea of just making a bilateral thing, Henry, is...
[3:15] It's repugnant.
[3:17] It's repugnant because we lose everything we've done.
[3:20] You know what I mean?
[3:21] People said we could have done that years ago.
[3:24] Well, if we can get a ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia, and we can, of course, say we've put them in a position where they can defend themselves.
[3:37] But it's going to be a miserable exercise.
[3:42] Well, it may not be.
[3:43] You just can't tell.
[3:44] We do it bilaterally.
[3:46] This may be bargaining on their part, knowing that you're going to Paris.
[3:52] Basically, I really don't know where the hell they're going to go.
[3:54] And they're still making all the preparations as if there will be a ceasefire.
[4:01] Right.
[4:02] I know, sir.
[4:03] But I just wanted to check with you whether it is in accord with your...
[4:10] your views that we proceed negotiating.
[4:14] We can't wait any longer for coordinating.
[4:23] Well, what would be the choice otherwise?
[4:24] I mean, you wouldn't go?
[4:26] That's right, and ask for another delay, but I think that's almost impossible.
[4:34] Well, you couldn't do that.
[4:35] I mean, not after all, but I would simply go—you mean they—don't you really think they're trying to strengthen the bargaining position before you go to Paris, isn't it?
[4:47] Or— I think that's one possibility, that they're just trying to prove that if they're going to cave, they're going to do it afterwards, not before.
[5:02] And probably that they figure since they'll get less than what they agreed to, they better ask for more.
[5:11] Well, I think you tell Bunker to play it damn tough.
[5:15] He is, isn't he?
[5:16] Oh, yeah.
[5:27] In which Shianook says that, uh,
[5:30] his interests were completely sold out by the North Vietnamese.
[5:34] He said this to the Algerian ambassador.
[5:37] It was one of the most shocking examples.
[5:41] And it's an example of U.S.-Soviet pressure, and that it's the Soviets who pressed the North Vietnamese into yielding.
[5:50] Well, go right ahead on the same track.
[5:53] Do the very best that you can.
[5:55] Haig has no doubts about going ahead now, does he?
[5:58] Oh, no.
[5:58] No, no.
[5:59] He's completely with it.
[6:00] And feels that we have to do it.
[6:03] Haig is against an open break with them before the negotiation, as I am.
[6:07] Oh, absolutely.
[6:09] Yeah, no.
[6:10] Go negotiate now.
[6:12] When they kick over the treasurer, they're making public statements.
[6:15] No.
[6:16] No, no.
[6:16] This is a private communication.
[6:18] Yeah, yeah.
[6:19] All right.
[6:19] Just go ahead.
[6:20] Do the very best you can.
[6:22] Get the very best agreement you can.
[6:23] That's all right.
[6:24] Okay.
[6:25] Okay.
[6:26] Fine, Henry.
[6:26] Fine.