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Conversation 033-092

TapeTape 33StartSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:15 PMEndSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:20 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AudioNARA Description

On November 18, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 12:15 pm to 12:20 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 033-092 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 33-92

Date: November 18, 1972
Time: 12:15 pm - 12:20 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Settlement agreement
                   -Message to Ellsworth F. Bunker
                        -The President’s directions
                                -Dealings with South Vietnamese
                                      -Nguyen Van Thieu
                   -Thieu's attitudes
                        -The President’s previous letter
                   -South Vietnam
                        -Possible emissary to the President
                                -Paris negotiations
                                -Further messages
                                      -Bunker
                        -The President's response on South Vietnam bargaining
                         Position
                                -The President’s previous letter
                                -Pressure on US
                   -South Vietnam position
                        -Changes in negotiating points
                                -Problems
                                      -Le Duc Tho’s possible response
                                -Previous Changes
                                      -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s recent trip
                                -Comments
                                -Impact on agreement
                                -Withdrawal of forces
                                      -US and North Vietnamese
                   -Bunker
                        -Emissary to South Vietnam
                                            - 95 -

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. June-07)

                                                            Conversation No. 33-92 (cont’d)

                             -Haig
                             -John B. Connally
                  -North Vietnam reaction to US proposals
                  -Agreement quality
                  -South Vietnam
                       -US bargaining position
                             -Bunker

       Peter G. Peterson
             -New appointment
                   -Foreign policy
                         -Expertise
                         -Commerce Department
                              -George P. Shultz
                         -Access to White House
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yeah.
Dr. Kissinger, sir.
Yeah.
Mr. Pez, it seems to me you ought to inform Bunker that I have directed that we go ahead so that Bunker knows we're taking a hard line on the thing.
Absolutely.
And inform him so that Chew knows that there's no fooling around here and that this bargaining time is over.
I mean, that fellow has got to be out of his mind to think that after the letter that I wrote, if after that we don't get anything, why?
It just may be one of those breaking of relations.
They want to send an emissary to see you personally, too.
Is that what they said?
Yeah.
No.
They can't do that while we are negotiating in Paris.
No, no, no.
There's not going to be any emissary.
I've got everything.
Anything they have to say—Bunker's to say is to be transmitted through Bunker.
That's the way it's to be done.
Right.
Right.
that we've had enough emissaries and that sort of thing.
So I'll just say that we're ready to—if they have any.
I just think Munker has got to get to him a message from me to the effect that you're going ahead.
As I pointed out in my letter, we're going to negotiate as hard as we can, get the best position that we can, and that we're on this course.
He must realize that we will not be subjected to pressure or harassment on this thing.
Right.
I think that is essential.
This is a negotiation.
There's no ultimatums to be come from them under any circumstances.
Right.
But you don't have the substance of what they're beating about.
Yes, now I have the substance.
It just came in.
And again, the trouble with them is we have...
You see, every draft we give back to them already incorporates 70% of their changes.
This has now been going on for three weeks.
Now they've sent us another batch of changes.
I would say, again, we could accept 50% of them.
The trouble is that if we accept all of these on top of all of the others,
We have an entirely new document, and Lee Doctor is going to walk out.
No, no, no.
Just say that the document that we already have is the basic framework, and that that's that, and that we're going to do the best that we can.
And he needs to know that that's the situation.
After Haig went out there, when Haig went out there, we already incorporated all the changes they made to me when I was there.
Since then, we have made two more revisions.
based on comments they gave to him and comments they sent us afterwards.
Now they have given us yet another, oh, ten pages of comments.
And the end result of that is to kill the agreement.
How does it kill it?
Well, because they are changing everything.
For example, wherever they talk about the United States, say the United States will withdraw its forces, they want to say the North Vietnamese will withdraw its forces.
No, no, no, no.
The withdrawal has got to be handled on the basis that we've already suggested.
And so they keep putting in needles in practically where it says, replace—there's a phrase that says, U.S. forces and those allied with the United States.
You really feel now that Munker can handle this?
We don't need to send an emissary there.
I don't mean Haig, but the Connelly ploy.
I think we should wait until we see what we get.
kicks us in the teeth, then we don't have a problem.
But if Hanoi accepts the changes which we are bringing, then an already good agreement becomes excellent.
And then we might consider sending somebody.
Yeah.
All right.
That's the way it's to be.
But be sure Bunker tells them we're going to go forward and the document is already—that we already have will be the basis for it.
We'll do the best we can.
that a negotiation involves give and take on both sides.
Incidentally, I talked to Peterson this morning, and I think he will almost certainly accept it.
Oh, you do, huh?
Yeah.
Well, it's the best thing.
It's a better job for him.
It's a better job for him.
His talent is really in foreign policy.
That's right.
And it gives him a chance then to move in commerce.
He'll simply be a second man to Schultz and all the others.
That's right.
I told him he'd have
access to the White House and write, which is what you apparently had already discovered with that.
Okay.
Right.
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